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Abstract 
Drawing on nine months’ field research in Kenya and using a predominantly qualitative methodology, 
this thesis investigates the role of decentralised governance in addressing Global South energy access 
issues. The study explores the concepts of decentralisation, governance, and energy access, engaging 
with overlooked debates concerning how these concepts interrelate and under what circumstances 
decentralised energy governance might help address Global South energy access issues. Concepts of 
scale and power are also explored, enabling new insights into the understudied area of how cross-
scalar power relations play out in decentralised energy governance, while extending debates over 
whether the state should be viewed relationally. Critically, a spatial lens is applied to the 
aforementioned concepts and debates, developing new knowledge on how and the extent to which 
decentralised energy governance is spatially contingent.  
Framed within debates on multilevel governance, the thesis shows cross-scalar power imbalances 
have led to a more hierarchical form of energy governance emerging in Kenya relative to that intended 
by legislation – this has led to excessive emphasis on grid electricity which has been detrimental to 
addressing energy access inequities. The emergent decentralised energy governance is also found to 
have marked geographical variations, underpinned by a range of spatially contingent historical, socio-
economic, and political factors. The overarching conclusion is that Kenyan decentralised energy 
governance needs to develop robust networks of local actors to provide effective checks and balances 
to ‘top-down’ governance: without which, energy access inequities are likely to persist.  
These findings have broader conceptual and theoretical implications for decentralised energy 
governance in the Global South. Decentralisation is shown to have distinct relevance to energy as grid 
electricity remains one of the few remaining de facto state monopolies in the Global South: the 
implication being central governments will see this control as too lucrative and politically important 
to cede to decentralisation reforms. The findings also highlight marked geographical variations, 
revealing that decentralised energy governance needs to be understood not only relationally, as 
typically seen in political economy analyses, but also spatially. This understanding has important 
methodological implications as it signals that geographical empirical approaches are required if on the 
ground practices of decentralised energy governance are to be better understood and more 
effectively developed.   
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Chapter 1 - Energy governance in the Global South: a critical research agenda 
“Underpowered, inefficient and unequal”, Kofi Annan’s damning verdict of Africa’s highly centralised 
energy systems, based on an assessment that such systems “benefit the rich and bypass the poor … 
undermining sustainable growth, jobs and investment … [and] reinforce poverty, especially for women 
and people in rural areas” (Africa Progress Panel, 2015, p.8). A major factor underlying the former 
United Nations (UN) Secretary-General’s criticism is governance, particularly the failings of central 
governments. In Annan’s words:  
Governance of power utilities is at the heart of Africa’s energy crisis. Governments 
often view utilities primarily as sites of political patronage and vehicles for 
corruption, providing affordable energy can be a distant secondary concern (Africa 
Progress Panel, 2015, p.23). 
Annan’s critique stresses the acute need to address the challenges centralised governance and 
centralised energy systems pose for greater and more equitable energy access, issues 
disproportionately affecting countries of the Global South. These challenges are particularly pressing 
as they have the potential to undermine ongoing, high-profile international efforts to address energy 
access issues, most notably the call of the UN ‘Sustainable Energy for All’ (SE4All) and ‘Sustainable 
Development Goals’ (SDGs) initiatives “for universal access to modern energy services” by 2030 
(SE4All, 2015, p.1). 
This PhD directly engages with these concerns by investigating the role of decentralised governance 
in addressing energy access issues in the Global South. Using Kenya as a case study, the research 
centres on the interactions and power dynamics between key stakeholders operating in and through 
decentralised energy governance and explores how these exchanges have shaped the quality of 
governance emerging. Stakeholders clearly operate at multiple scales. Accordingly, the thesis draws 
on key human geography perspectives of scalar governance involving multiple stakeholders (e.g. 
Bulkeley, 2005; Brown et al., 2015; Ockwell & Byrne, 2017) and contested theories of multilevel 
governance (e.g. Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Jessop, 2016) to better understand the assumed spatial 
variations in decentralised energy governance. 
This introductory chapter first highlights the urgent need for research in this area in section 1.1, 
emphasising how energy access and governance issues have disproportionately affected the Global 
South (and in particular sub-Saharan Africa). Section 1.2 then explores the rationale for decentralised 
energy governance as a response to energy access and governance issues, noting the lack of coverage 
in the wider literature which has predominantly treated the energy and decentralisation discourses as 
separate entities. The reasons why sub-Saharan Africa and Kenya were selected as the focal points for 
the study are then discussed in section 1.3. Lastly, the overall aim and research questions are provided 
in section 1.4, followed by an outline of the thesis structure in section 1.5.   
Global South and Global North: definitions and debates over usage 
Used throughout this PhD, the terms ‘Global South’ and ‘Global North’ have become prominent within 
academia to describe the economic inequalities between the poorer ‘South’ and richer ‘North’, largely 
because they are considered less hierarchical than their predecessors: the ‘First and Third World’ and 
‘Developed  and Developing countries’ (Hollington et al., 2015). Yet, these terms are contested and 
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have been critiqued, notably in the development studies and development geographies discourses, 
for reflecting a Global North blanket term imaginary which fails to capture the considerable diversity 
between localities in the South or acknowledge that many contemporary challenges of development 
are common to both South and North (Maxwell, 1998; McFarlane,2006; Pieterse, 2001). Despite these 
criticisms, this study sees value in arguments which understand the term Global South as a political 
statement for highlighting a part of the world “systematically subordinated both intellectually and in 
practical terms” (Allen et al., 2014). In addition, this study concurs with Arabindoo (cited in Allen et 
al., 2014) who finds ‘Global South’ a useful designation for framing research localities without a 
superlative lens; the geographer also posing the question, “what are the alternatives otherwise?”. 
This question and the surrounding debate are clearly not settled and whilst this PhD uses and finds 
value in the terms Global South and North, I recognise the need for continual engagement with 
debates concerning this terminology in subsequent research. In line with contemporary revisions of 
Brandt’s (1980) original demarcation, the Global South is understood in this thesis to encompass 
Africa, Latin America, Asia (except Japan, Russian Asia, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and 
Taiwan), and Oceania (except Australia and New Zealand). However, there is recognition that as the 
term is largely geopolitical, the geography of the two terms is contested and thus subject to change.  
1.1 The urgent need to address energy access issues 
The need to address barriers to energy access is clear and pressing. Globally, 992 million people lack 
access to electricity (International Energy Agency (IEA), 2018b), while more urgently, the cooking 
needs of 2.7 billion are met by the traditional use of solid biomass or coal (IEA, 2018a). The latter is 
significant because of the severe detrimental environmental and health impacts: the resultant air 
pollution attributable to 4 million premature deaths annually (World Health Organisation, 2018).  
Energy access is geographically uneven with data from the IEA (2018) showing how countries of the 
Global South are faring worst, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa. Only 54% of the population of 
the Global South have access to clean cooking facilities; the remainder are reliant on the traditional 
use of biomass (IEA, 2018a). Electricity access rates fare better, with 83% of the Global population 
having access although this drops to 73% in rural locations (IEA, 2018b). This falls dramatically in sub-
Saharan Africa where access to clean cooking facilities and electricity stands at 16% and 43% 
respectively (ibid). Further discrepancies are shown between different socio-economic groups within 
the Global South’s urban context, with the urban poor more likely to be disadvantaged by low-quality, 
unreliable electricity services and by having to use and pay more for polluting cooking fuels (UNDP, 
2016). 
Recognition of the urgency of addressing energy access has also been spurred by a growing 
acknowledgement of the key enabling role energy plays in a range of transformational benefits critical 
to human well-being. The globally agreed water, sanitation, education, health and poverty targets of 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were deemed unachievable by the IEA (2010) without 
energy provision. Similarly, the UN Development Programme (UNDP, 2016) stressed direct linkages 
between SDG7, ‘modern energy for all’, and all of the other 16 SDGs. The internationally renowned 
energy for development specialist, Subhes Bhattacharyya (2012, p.261), concluded that “consensus 
seems to exist that without affordable, reliable and clean energy services to the population, 
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sustainable development cannot be achieved”. Scientific consensus on the anthropogenic causes of 
climate change has also contributed significantly to the prioritisation of the pursuit of sustainable 
energy on international development agendas (IPCC, 2014). 
Definition of energy access 
The term ‘energy access’ is multidimensional (Table 1.1) and no universally agreed definition exists 
(Bhattacharyya, 2012). For this study, energy access will be defined as that which enables the provision 
of services to address broader developmental objectives such as those shown in Table 1.1. This 
definition incorporates the minimum basic needs of lighting, heating, cooking, cooling, 
communications and earning a living prescribed by Practical Action (2010) and agrees with 
Bhattacharyya (2012) that clean cooking is a higher priority than electrification due to the severe 
health impacts of solid fuels and because cooking forms the vast majority of energy demand in the 
Global South. Viewing energy in terms of services also reflects increasing consensus within the energy 
studies literature that energy is a means to an end rather than an end in itself and that the 
development it entails and the accompanying living standards benefits are the real markers of 
progress (Pachauri, 2011).  
Table 1.1 Dimensions of the term ‘energy access’ (Bhatia & Angelou, 2015)  
Dimensions  Examples  
Scales Households, community institutions, industry 
Services 
(household) 
Cooking, lighting, heating, cooling communication, income generation, refrigeration, 
entertainment, commercial/industrial, transport  
Services 
(shared) 
Street lighting, water pumping, health facilities, education facilities, government offices 
Carriers Electricity (grid and off-grid), renewable energy sources, solid fuels (e.g. biomass, coal), 
liquid fuels (e.g. petroleum, Liquid petroleum gas (LPG), kerosene, biogas), gaseous fuels 
(e.g. natural gas) 
Quantity and 
quality  
Connectivity, availability, quantity, convenience, safety and standards, health impact, 
reliability, affordability, environmental impact, legality 
Developmental 
objectives  
Gender equality, education, health, food security, rural development, poverty reduction, 
sustainable development 
1.2 Decentralised energy governance as a response  
Research addressing the pressing energy access issues facing the Global South has tended to be  
technocentric and econocentric, resulting in social science approaches and the critical human aspects 
of energy being overlooked (Watson et al., 2012; Sovacool, 2014). Ockwell & Byrne (2017, p.5) concur 
with this interpretation, citing the lack of socio-cultural and political approaches as a “scholarly 
deficit”. A recent review of ongoing UK energy research noted a predominant engineering focus on 
developing new technologies along with delivery models designed to scale these technological 
developments, the authors arguing “what has largely been missing in this effort has been an adequate 
appreciation of the broader social context of these interventions” (Bagley et al., 2018, p.32). Nine key 
themes were identified by Bagley et al. (2018, p.46) as lacking from the current energy studies 
literature; among which, governance, and in particular “how energy interventions are governed at a 
variety of different scales”, were emphasised as  
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absolutely crucial to grasping how new forms of energy access will affect the lives 
of the poor across the Global South … [and] when considering the kinds of skills 
and capacities that need to be developed if the current wave of energy sector 
interventions are to bring sustainable and equitable benefits. 
The quote reinforces the importance of the scalar approach to decentralised energy governance 
adopted by this PhD whilst also emphasising how governance is a major underlying factor to effective 
energy access interventions;  a view signalled by other leading energy scholars: Ockwell & Byrne (2017, 
p.205) stressing that “By far the most critical issue that remains to be addressed relates to the 
governance of socio-technical innovation system building. Table 1.2 further reinforces these 
arguments, underlining how governance is a significant factor in the other eight missing themes cited 
as missing by Bagley et al. (2018, p.46). 
Table 1.2 Governance links to missing research themes in current UK energy research (Bagley et al., 2018) 
Missing themes Links to governance 
Research & 
innovation  
Call for research into the different forms of support needed to facilitate the “huge” 
potential for innovation to challenge incumbent technologies in Africa. This implies the 
governance conditions required to facilitate these different forms of support for 
innovation and how these conditions link to theoretical understandings of innovation 
(e.g. ‘disruptive innovation theory’ and ‘theory of social change’. 
Longitudinal 
studies & 
differential impact 
Call for research on the medium to longer-term assessment of the wider impacts of 
energy access interventions, their unintended consequences, and differentiated 
impacts (e.g. gender, age, class, ethnicity). This will require “engagement with the 
complex political economy of energy issues at multiple scales of analysis”. 
User demand The political context (and by implication the governance context) is seen as an 
underlying factor in the call for “sociology-based research on the nature of social 
practices of women and men in consuming and paying for energy”.  
Energy planning 
and governance 
Call for more research on how governance affects “social and economic relationships 
that make changes to livelihoods and living standards possible”. Governance factors 
seen as “absolutely crucial” to understanding how new forms of energy access will 
affect the Global South poor. Understanding how energy interventions are governed 
at different scales also deemed absolutely crucial, particularly in terms of the 
capacities needed to be developed in light of current new energy sector interventions. 
Reaching the 
poorest 
Need for research into the governance conditions which can help “[ensure] adequate 
support for enterprises and practitioners seeking to reach the ‘last mile’”. 
Energy for 
productive uses 
Call for wider barriers to productive use uptake to be explored, which includes key 
aspects underlain by governance such as local/national policies, corruption and an 
enabling institutional environment.  
Scaling up of mini 
and micro-grids 
Call for “sustained work on the forms of governance through which mini-grids are 
developed and managed and also how they intersect with household levels systems 
and with the extending national grid” (community involvement particularly stressed).  
Transforming 
clean cooking 
Call for “more holistic thinking about the clean cooking challenge” This necessitates 
incorporating governance into the understudied areas of distributing and marketing 
cleaner fuels and enabling more sustainable forms of biomass production. 
Energy access in 
urban areas 
Call for “further expansion on research into sustainable urban governance” to 
“identify the specific needs of the urban poor, and to integrate them into energy and 
urban planning processes”. 
 
The term ‘governance’ has also assumed added importance in the light of increasing decentralisation, 
a process commonly understood as the transfer of authority from central to lower-level actors 
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(Wunsch, 2014), which Berkes (2010, p.491) sees as “a kind of governance reform, a mechanism to 
bring citizens, local groups and organizations into the policy and decision-making process”. 
Proponents of decentralisation also argue the process facilitates more informed, responsive, and 
accountable governance, enabling more effective delivery of services (Bennett, 1990; Donahue, 1997).  
Governance derived from decentralisation has also been viewed favourably in the context of energy 
by leading social science contributions to energy studies. Brown et al. (2015, p.9) emphasise 
governance in the context of decentralisation has particular relevance to energy due to “the 
challenges that the highly complex nature of energy infrastructures pose for effective governance”. 
This complexity is elaborated upon by Goldthau (2014, p.134), who stresses the particular challenges 
of infrastructure solutions spanning multiple scales, problems concerning common pool resources, 
and the interactions between the existing dominant “socioeconomic institutions, regulatory agencies, 
incumbent market actors and social norms”. Sovacool (2011, p.3832) notes that such polycentric 
governance approaches – i.e. which mix scales, mechanisms, and actors – “can foster equity, 
inclusivity, information, accountability, organizational multiplicity, and adaptability that result in the 
resolution of climate and energy related problems”. Goldthau (2014, p.134) is similarly supportive, 
arguing: 
the governance of energy infrastructure needs to be polycentric. This allows for 
contextualization, experimentation and innovation, which can lead to sustainable 
infrastructure solutions and learning across scales. 
Yet, within these espoused polycentric approaches, a critical research gap remains concerning the role 
of decentralised energy governance in Global South contexts and under what circumstances multi-
scale governance arrangements work. Whilst attention has been paid to the impact of decentralisation 
on the governance of other sectors in the Global South (e.g. water) and on energy in the Global North, 
it has been critically overlooked in the context of energy governance in the Global South (Brown et al., 
2015). Thus, given the increasing trend of decentralisation in the Global South, along with the 
prioritisation of energy access on international development agendas, the focus of this thesis on 
appraising the role of decentralised energy governance is both timely and urgently needed.  
Multilevel governance: concept and analytical framework 
Integral to this study’s main focus of enquiry are the concepts of ‘governance’ and ‘multilevel 
governance’. Widely used, the former generally describes the interactions between a broad range of 
actors (public and private sector, government and non-government) involved in the governing process 
(Kooiman & Bavinck, 2005; Bache & Flinders, 2004). Governance is thus distinct from ‘government’ as 
it is not simply the latter exercising its authority, but instead depicts a shared responsibility. In doing 
so, it incorporates the ideals of greater stakeholder collaboration, citizen participation, and 
community empowerment that the process of decentralisation is assumed to engender.  
‘Multilevel governance’ builds on the notion of governance by asserting that the interactions between 
actors operate on multiple scales. For over two decades multilevel governance (MLG) has provided an 
important analytical framework to understand the forms of governance stemming from 
decentralisation and has been applied to a wide range of sectors but as far as the author is aware 
never to decentralised energy governance. It is the contention of this study that multilevel governance 
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also provides a framework to develop new knowledge and understanding of the understudied forms 
of decentralised energy governance emerging from the Global South, and in doing so facilitate 
normative judgements as to their appropriateness for particular localities. To this end, this research 
uses Hooghe and Mark’s (2003) seminal intervention differentiating between ‘Multilevel Governance 
Types I and II’ (MLG1 & MLG21) (outlined in Table 1.3) as the primary theoretical tool within the study’s 
conceptual framework2. A fuller discussion of the different concepts of MLG is provided in Chapter 2.  
Table 1.3 Types of Multilevel governance (Hooghe & Marks, 2003) 
 Multilevel Governance Type 1 (MLG1) Multilevel Governance Type 2 (MLG2) 
Structure Hierarchical structure 
 
Multiple, often overlapping, structures 
Characteristics ▪ General-purpose jurisdictions  
▪ Nonintersecting memberships  
▪ Jurisdictions at a limited number of 
levels  
▪ Systemwide architecture  
▪ Task-specific jurisdictions  
▪ Intersecting memberships  
▪ No limit to the number of 
jurisdictional levels  
▪ Flexible design 
1.3 Sub-Saharan Africa and Kenya as a case study region and country 
The particular urgency of addressing energy access issues in sub-Saharan Africa is clear as the region 
has fared significantly worse compared to other parts of the Global South, particularly in comparison 
to Developing Asia, which has the second worst energy access rates (%) after sub-Saharan Africa. Table 
1.4 shows the proportion of the population with electricity access in ‘Developing Asia’ rose from 79% 
in 2010 to 91% in 2017, resulting in a 277 million fall in the number of people without electricity (IEA, 
2018b). In contrast, although electricity access in sub-Saharan Africa increased from 32% to 43% 
between 2010 and 2017, the number of people without electricity grew by 14 million due to a 
significantly higher population growth rate. In 2010, sub-Saharan Africa held approximately 47% of 
the world’s population without electricity. By 2017 this had increased to 61%. Further regional 
discrepancies are evident in the disparity between rural and urban locations: a gap far wider in sub-
Saharan Africa than the rest of the Global South. 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Marks and Hooghe term the concepts using Roman numerals (i.e. Type I and Type II). For ease of reading, this study prefers 
Arabic numbers. 
2 The thesis uses Imenda’s (2014, pp.189-193) definition of conceptual framework as “[a synthesis of] a number of concepts, 
research findings and theoretical perspectives … to explain or predict a given event, or give a broader understanding of the 
phenomenon of interest – or simply, of a research problem” which the author notes as differing from a theoretical framework 
which is “the application of a theory, or a set of concepts drawn from one and the same theory, to offer an explanation of 
an event”. This study concurs with Imenda (2014, p.193) that despite the terms conceptual and theoretical framework often 
being used interchangeably within academia, the two are not synonyms and that conceptual frameworks are usually more 
appropriate for social sciences where “research problems cannot ordinarily be explained by one theoretical perspective”. 
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Table 1.4 Electricity access in the Global South by region (IEA, 2012; IEA, 2018b) 
 
Region* 
Population with access (%) Population without 
access (million) Total Urban Rural 
2010 2017 2017 2017 2010 2017 
Developing countries 74% 83% 93% 73% 1265 992 
Sub-Saharan Africa 32% 43% 67% 28% 589 603 
Developing Asia 79% 91% 98% 85% 628 351 
Central & South America 94% 96% 98% 86% 29 20 
Middle East  91% 92% 98% 78% 18 18 
*The naming of regions follows IEA conventions. The term ‘Developing countries’ is broadly equivalent to the Global 
South, while ‘Developing Asia’ constitutes all of Asia except Central Asia and the Middle East. 
 
Access to clean cooking facilities highlights a far starker contrast between the progress made in sub-
Saharan Africa and the rest of the Global South.  Table 1.5 shows access rates are far higher in the 
other Global South regions, with considerable progress made in Developing Asia (IEA, 2018a). In 
Developing Asia, clean cooking access increased from 42% to 56% of the population between 2010 
and 2017, resulting in the total number of people without clean cooking facilities falling by 495 million. 
This contrasts markedly with sub-Saharan Africa, with the IEA (2018a, p.1) stressing that “The 
challenge in sub-Saharan Africa remains acute, with a deteriorating picture”. Only 16% of the 
population had access to clean cooking in 2017 (from 13% in 2010) while the high population growth 
means 193 million more people now lack access to clean cooking compared with 2010.  
Table 1.5 Clean cooking access in the Global South by region (IEA, 2012; IEA, 2018a) 
 
Region 
Population with access (%) Population without access 
(million) Total Urban Rural 
2010 2017 2017 2017 2010* 2017 
Developing countries 45% 54% % % 2588 (+ 400) = 2988 2677 
Sub-Saharan Africa 13% 16% % % 696 (+ 4) = 700 893 
Developing Asia 42% 56% % % 1814 (+ 396) = 2210 1715 
Central & South America 86% 89% % % 65 56 
Middle East  95% 95% % % 10 11 
*For population without access in 2010, IEA (2012, p532) only gives data for the traditional use of biomass but estimates 
a further 400m coal users “mainly in China but [with] significant numbers in South Africa and India”. Exact numbers of 
coal users per region are not given for 2010, so estimates extrapolated from 2015 IEA data are provided in brackets. 
Kenya as a case study 
Within this regional context, Kenya is a particularly relevant case study as the political and energy 
context suggests the country is well placed to establish effective decentralised energy governance. 
Kenyan decentralisation has been particularly extensive  (Cheeseman et al., 2016), described by the 
World Bank (2015, p.1) as “among the most rapid and ambitious devolution processes in the world”. 
Key energy powers have been devolved, such as county energy planning, suggesting a more significant 
role for decentralised energy governance than other nations engaged in a devolution process. The 
country’s infrastructure also seems facilitatory: Kenya has the world’s largest per capita photovoltaic 
solar market, aided by the ubiquity of mobile money (e.g. M-PESA3) which mitigates the issue of 
upfront equipment costs by facilitating payment on a ‘pay as you go’ basis (Ondraczek, 2013). 
 
3 M-Pesa is a mobile phone-based service for transferring money transfer and microfinancing. 
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Despite this seemingly conducive context for decentralised energy governance, at the inception of this 
study Kenya paradoxically had energy access rates below average for sub-Saharan Africa. 80% of the 
population relied on solid biomass for cooking, while 32% had access to electricity, dropping to 19% 
in rural areas (Sustainable Energy for All, 2016; African Development Bank Group, 2014). This paradox 
initially present in Kenya questioned the validity of the assumption that decentralisation improves 
service delivery, and thus indicated an ideal testing ground for investigating the circumstances in 
which decentralised energy governance arrangements work most effectively. 
Over the course of the study, significant investment in electricity (predominantly grid electricity 
initiatives) saw access increase to 73% of all households by April 2018 according to national 
government figures (KPLC, 2018), although the validity of the stated increase, and the quality and 
affordability4 of the electricity provided has been questioned by several sources (Lee et al., 2016). 
Although these criticisms are valid, electricity access has nevertheless improved by a fairly 
considerable margin. This adds further weight to the choice of Kenya as a case study as it prompts the 
question to what extent the increase can be attributed to effective decentralised energy governance, 
particularly as this period of increasing electricity access coincides with the era since the first county 
governments were installed in 2013. 
Kenya was also selected as the Geography Department at Loughborough University have established 
connections with a range of Kenyan energy stakeholders, including national and local government 
officials, NGOs, universities, research groups and private sector actors. Many of these contacts are a 
result of the earlier Renewable Energy and Decentralisation (READ5) and Solar Nano Grid (SONG6) 
projects, which were partly sited in Kenya and led by my supervisor, Professor Ed Brown. Both projects 
are concerned with the themes of decentralised energy governance and provided an invaluable entry 
point from which to ground this thesis and an opportunity to build on leading research in the field. 
The experience the department has of working in the Kenyan context and its extensive contacts was 
also anticipated to help avoid extractive research and foster collaborations with local stakeholders, 
aiding the development of Global South/Global North partnerships and diminishing the scope for the 
study to exacerbate existing geographical inequalities in the knowledge economy.                                              
1.4 Research aim and questions 
The aim and research questions were informed by findings in the wider literature, specifically the 
critical lack of attention paid to decentralised governance in addressing energy access issues in the 
Global South (Brown et al., 2015). This is of particular surprise given the Global South is the site of 
increasing and, in many cases, extensive decentralisation, a process implying changing national-local 
political relationships and a more prominent role for decentralised governance. 
 
4 Affordability has been particularly controversial of late as electricity prices were kept artificially low in the run up to the 
2017 election to favour the incumbent coalition, only to be significantly increased post-election (Wafula & Achuka, 2018).  
5 Funded by the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (ESPRC) and the UK Government Department for 
International Development (DFID), the READ project (2013-15) scoped the implications of decentralisation for energy 
governance, including an exploration of energy literacy capacity amongst local authorities in Kenya and Rwanda. 
6 The ESPRC, DfID, and UK Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) funded SONG project (2014-18) investigated 
the viability of ‘nano-grid systems’ (1-5kW) for small off-grid communities in Kenya and Bangladesh. 
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This study seeks to bridge the gap between the discourses on decentralisation and energy access, 
which have hitherto largely been discussed as separate entities. Through empirical research and 
critical engagement with the theoretical and conceptual debates of the aforementioned two 
literatures, the principal aim is to investigate the role of decentralised governance in addressing 
energy access issues since the devolution process was instituted in Kenya in 2013. Developed from 
this aim are three research questions which centre on the experiences, interactions, and agendas of 
the wide range of stakeholders operating at multiple scales in and through decentralised energy 
governance. The specific research questions (RQs) are: 
RQ1: How has the process of decentralisation and decentralised energy governance unfolded in 
Kenya? 
RQ2: How have the interactions and agendas of various energy stakeholders shaped the 
decentralised energy governance which has emerged in Kenya? 
RQ3:  How has the process of decentralisation and the interactions and agendas of various energy 
stakeholders shaped the development of decentralised energy governance at the local level in 
Kenya? 
These research questions respond to specific gaps identified in the literature. RQ1 addresses the lack 
of research concerning local level energy governance in the context of decentralisation, building on 
the more macro regional scale analysis offered by the few existing studies (e.g. Havet et al. (2009); 
Brown et al. (2015)) by providing a specific in-depth country analysis of Kenya. RQ2 focuses on the 
interactions and power dynamics between key energy stakeholders to better understand how they 
have helped shape developments in Kenyan energy governance, responding to Goldthau’s (2014, 
p.139) call for research which investigates “when multi-scale governance arrangements work, and 
under what circumstances they deliver – or not”. In contrast to the broader state level analysis of 
power relations in RQ1-2, RQ3 provides a county level response to Goldthau’s call which is deemed 
critical if the likely geographical disparities in local energy governance are to be better understood.  
Together, these research questions address the issue of whether the intended devolution process and 
its envisioned implications for decentralised energy governance (and consequently energy access) 
match the realities experienced by stakeholders operating on the ground. This issue is of importance 
as a disconnect between intended policy and reality has a number of significant implications. It could 
indicate decentralised energy governance has not been prioritised, that top-down centralised 
decision-making and energy systems still predominate, redolent of a more hierarchical MLG1 system 
of governance. Alternatively, it may suggest particular challenges, such as capacity issues, facing the 
newly installed county administrations, which may hinder the implementation of a more 
representative MLG2 form of governance.  
Overall, it is envisioned that the findings from the study will contribute to key conceptual and 
theoretical debates concerning the changing spatial and scalar realities of power implied by 
decentralisation and their consequences for the role of the state and energy governance. In addition, 
the thesis’s novel application of MLG to energy governance is expected to develop new knowledge 
concerning the effectiveness of MLG as a means to better understand decentralised energy 
governance in the Global South. Ultimately, it is intended that the findings from the PhD will inform 
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policy making which enhances decentralised energy governance and energy access more broadly 
across a range of sub-Saharan Africa and Global South contexts, acknowledging, as Sovacool (2014, 
p.17) does, that such approaches “do not come without risks” and there is a need to better understand 
“how … the advantages of decentralization [can] be synergized with those of centralization”. Thus, it 
is hoped the learnings from the Kenyan experience will contribute to an enhanced understanding of 
how decentralised energy governance might most effectively be applied across the Global South. 
1.5 Thesis structure 
The thesis is composed of seven further chapters, structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 reviews the decentralisation and energy studies literatures, and explores the contested 
debates concerning the central themes of the PhD: energy access, decentralisation, and governance. 
The chapter contends there has been a critical lack of engagement between the decentralisation and 
energy literatures in a global South context, undermining decentralised governance as a potential 
means to address energy access issues, whilst also justifying the focus of this study. The use of 
multilevel governance as the analytical framework of the study is then introduced and the reasons 
behind its appropriateness explored. 
Chapter 3 builds on the previous chapter, focussing the global debates on decentralisation and 
decentralised energy governance within the realities of the regional context of sub-Saharan Africa, 
and more specifically, Kenya, the site of the empirical research of this thesis. The region is seen to be 
significantly underrepresented in the literature despite being the most deprived in terms of energy 
access. An overview of the main drivers behind Kenyan devolution is then presented, with the post 
2007 election violence seen as the main spur. The chapter argues the resulting haste to implement 
the devolution process led to ambiguous legislation which undermined the decentralisation of sectors 
such as energy which previously had little to no local level representation. 
Chapter 4 critically appraises the methodology of the thesis and explores the debates surrounding  the 
use of predominantly qualitative approaches in studies investigating energy governance in the Global 
South. It is argued that a predominantly qualitative approach is required to measure the overlooked 
human dimensions present within the energy sector and the quality of governance they shape. 
Quantitative methods are deemed useful in a supportive role to help determine the 
representativeness and scalability of qualitative findings. Positionality issues are also emphasised, 
notably the impact of Global North researchers on existing geographical inequalities in the knowledge 
economy. Findings drawn from the chapter are intended to be practical, with the hope that lessons 
learned from the research process will be of use to other researchers working in the Global South. 
The first of three empirical chapters, Chapter 5 addresses RQ1 by exploring the developments in 
Kenyan decentralised energy governance since the implementation of the county governments in 
2013. It provides an analysis of how legislative developments in this period (or lack thereof) have 
shaped the energy governance which has evolved and assesses the impact of county governments on 
decentralised energy governance during their first term. It is argued that the inability or unwillingness 
of national government to cede effective power to devolved units has so far presented the most 
significant barrier to decentralised energy governance playing an effective role in delivering more 
locally appropriate energy services.  
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Chapter 6 focuses on RQ2 and adopts a scalar approach, exploring the interactions of stakeholders 
operating at transnational, national and community scales with decentralised energy governance. 
These power relations are argued to have resulted in decentralised energy governance bearing more 
of the hallmarks of MLG1; a significant departure from the rhetoric of Kenyan devolution which 
appears to embody much of MLG2. The chapter concludes by proposing that governance 
arrangements have worked most effectively when one key stakeholder group is not operating at an 
overwhelming position of strength compared to the other(s). Such imbalances in power dynamics are 
not readily identified by MLG, raising questions over the validity of using Hooghe and Mark’s 
framework to understand the changing realities of power and governance emerging from a 
decentralisation process. 
Building on the findings of the previous chapter, Chapter 7 addresses RQ3 by examining how the 
inequities in power relations found at the broader state level are being experienced in the energy 
governance present in four individual counties: Migori, Nakuru, Turkana, and Nairobi. Replicating the 
approach in Chapter 6, stakeholder interactions with decentralised energy governance at 
transnational, national, and local scales are explored in each county. The chapter finds many of the 
inequities in inter-scalar power relations seen at state level are also present in the four counties, but 
argues important spatial variations exist; a more representative MLG2-esque system of governance 
emerging in counties which have prioritised the energy sector and where non-governmental 
stakeholders are actively involved.  
Chapter 8 draws together the main empirical, methodological, conceptual and theoretical 
contributions of the thesis. Addressing the overall aim and research questions, the thesis contends 
that the Kenyan experience of decentralised energy governance has been spatially uneven, influenced 
primarily by inequities in inter-scalar relations which owe more to MLG1 forms of governance than 
the more MLG2 system devolution proports to attain. Within this milieu, it is argued that facilitating 
MLG2-esque networks of local actors to provides checks and balances to top-down governance is the 
key role of decentralised energy governance. The wider conceptual and theoretical of the research  
are then highlighted, with the Kenyan experience argued to have significant applicability for broader 
debates concerning the role of the state and the concept of decentralised energy governance in the 
Global South. Possible directions for future research are also examined. The thesis suggests that 
additional case-study analyses and nexus-based approaches are required to enhance the 
understanding and implementation of decentralised energy governance in the Global South. 
Overall, this thesis offers a better understanding of the role of decentralised energy governance in 
addressing energy access issues in the Global South and Kenya. It delineates in what circumstances 
decentralised multilevel governance arrangements function most effectively and carves a distinct 
facilitator role for local government that has applicability not only in Kenya, but broadly across the 
Global South. In doing so, the thesis questions the validity of Hooghe & Marks’ MLG framework to 
fully account for the effectiveness of multilevel decentralised energy governance as the twin concepts 
of MLG1 and MLG2 do not identify critical power differentials. As these power imbalances vary 
according to spatially contingent factors, it therefore follows that further geographical based empirical 
research is required to build on this study’s findings and develop deeper understandings of how the 
two forms interrelate in various Global South energy contexts.    
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Chapter 2 - Understanding Energy Access in an Era of Decentralisation  
There is an urgent need to address the ways in which energy access issues are being framed in the 
Global South, and in particular the overlooked but potentially crucial role of decentralised energy 
governance. The aim of this chapter is to unpack these thematic priorities by providing a critical 
analysis of the two key areas of literature most relevant to this study: energy studies and 
decentralisation. Exploring the intersection of these two literatures is considered critical as they have 
largely been discussed as separate entities in a Global South context (Brown et al., 2015). This scholarly 
deficit undermines the potential for decentralised governance to address energy access issues and 
reinforces the need for this study. 
To achieve this aim, the chapter begins by examining the discursive framing of the energy studies and 
decentralisation literatures. It does this by assessing the influence of prevailing economic paradigms 
on the energy sector and its governance. Section 2.2 then turns to the energy studies literature, 
highlighting how limited understandings of energy access and a lack of social science-based 
approaches have impeded the development of an evidence base to better inform energy policy on 
effective energy governance. Turning to the decentralisation literature, section 2.3 argues the issues 
found within the energy studies discourse have been compounded by a lack of attention paid to 
energy and its governance within the context of decentralisation in the Global South. Representations 
of governance are then critically examined in section 2.4, providing explanation for the use of Hooghe 
and Mark’s seminal ‘Multilevel Governance Types I and II’ as the analytical framework for this study. 
Lastly, section 2.5 concludes by summarising the key knowledge gaps this study seeks to address.   
2.1 Paradigm shifts and energy governance  
Energy, like almost no other sector, reflects changing economic paradigms on a 
global scale. 
This is the assessment of Andreas Goldthau (2012, p.200) on the impact of paradigmatic shifts on 
energy policy and governance7, the leading international relations and energy governance scholar 
explaining how: 
paradigms are lenses on reality and hence determine policy agendas. As a result, 
… they are also the basis of energy governance arrangements set in place to deliver 
on these agendas (Goldthau, 2012, p.206).  
Given their impact on governance, paradigm shifts are therefore highly relevant to the multilevel 
governance focus of this thesis (on multilevel governance), particularly as the various shifts have 
largely concerned changing attitudes towards the role of the state. Goldthau (2012) delineates a series 
of ‘energy paradigms’ emerging in response to their economic counterparts, which provides a useful 
means to explore the impacts that shifts in paradigm have had on energy policy and governance in the 
Global South. While other authors have also explored energy paradigms, notably to discuss shifts in 
national and geopolitical energy policy objectives (e.g. Flavin & Dunn, 1999; Helm, 2007), the use of 
Goldthau’s paradigmatic framework in this study is justified as its explicit focus on governance 
 
7 In line with conventional academic thinking, this thesis takes ‘paradigm’ to mean “an accepted model or pattern” (Kuhn, 
1962, p. 23) 
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patterns and the influence of the Global South provides a more convincing and apt framing for 
research on decentralised energy governance in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Goldthau’s identified paradigms are presented according to chronological era of prominence (Table 
2.1), yet it is important to recognise processes of change are often “messier and less linear” than this 
suggests (Kern et al., 2014, p.516) such that multiple energy paradigms can, and often do, coexist 
concurrently (Sovacool, 2008).  
Table 2.1 Summary of Goldthau’s (2012) energy paradigms and corresponding governance patterns. 
Energy 
paradigm & era 
of prominence 
Shaped 
by 
Policy 
challenge 
Policy 
agenda 
Governance patterns 
Statism 
(Post WW2 to 
1970s) 
Global 
North 
Energy security  Public 
provision  
▪ Vertical integration of energy value chain 
▪ State-run monopoly  
▪ State as owner 
Liberalism 
(1980s & 1990s) 
Global 
North 
Energy security  Private 
provision 
▪ De-integration of energy value chain 
▪ Free market exchange  
▪ State as rule setter & regulator 
Interventionism 
(2000+) 
Partly 
Global 
South 
Energy security 
Climate change 
Energy poverty 
Private with 
some public 
provision  
▪ Backward integration into upstream 
▪ Energy mercantilism re externalities 
▪ State as stakeholder of ‘public interest’ 
Fragmentation 
(currently 
emerging) 
Entirely 
Global 
South 
Energy security 
Climate change 
Energy poverty 
Mixed 
public/private 
provision 
▪ State-market hybrids  
▪ Energy governance à la carte 
(incorporating various state roles) 
Statism 
The first of Goldthau’s energy paradigms, statism, has its roots in post-Second World War 
reconstruction and was predominant until the 1970s. Reflecting notions of the state and economic 
development found within the ‘realism’ tradition of international relations (Snyder, 2004) and the 
main development theories of the 1960’s and 1970’s (i.e. Modernisation, Structuralism and 
Dependency theory), the statist paradigm sees the state as the key actor in the provision of public 
goods and services, Goldthau (2012) noting this was particularly the case for sectors reliant on 
infrastructure networks and thus considered natural monopolies such as telecommunications, 
railways, water, district gas heating as well as grid electricity. 
Energy, particularly centralised large hydro, was situated prominently within these development 
debates, advocated by development agencies as a key feature of technology driven industrialisation 
and economic progress (Van Der Straeten, 2011; Iwayemi, 1998)8. Electricity was often prioritised over 
other development goals (e.g. irrigation) as its particular characteristics lent themselves to the 
objective of measurable development – critical to the form of development envisaged by 
Modernisation theory, which was supported by both international donors and, initially, by new nation 
states (Van Der Straeten, 2011).  
To accommodate these ideological underpinnings, governance models veered towards state-run 
monopolies incorporating full control of the energy value chain (Goldthau, 2012). In addition, the 
 
8 This advocacy was not only found in the Global North. Showers (2011, p.200) adds that leaders of newly independent 
African states “were enthusiastic” about hydroelectricity’s potential to aid industrial development. 
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paradigm’s establishment in the Global North provided the region ‘rule-setting’9 power over global 
energy agendas, resulting in a tendency for the ‘rule-taking’ Global South to follow Global North 
energy pathways and adopt highly centralised energy systems which were often ill suited to the socio-
political contexts found within the Global South. 
Liberalism10 
An abrupt shift in economic paradigm emerged as neoliberalism took hold in the early 1980s, sparked 
by the economic crises of 1973-74 and spurred by the elections of conservative politicians Margaret 
Thatcher in the UK (1979) and Ronald Reagan in the US (1981). Later codified in the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ – the key Global North development framework of the 1990s (Williamson, 199011) –
neoliberalism contrasted with statism in seeing the state as the problem rather than the solution; the 
state’s lack of profit motive rendering it less efficient than private companies (Stigler, 1971). Neo-
liberalism thus called for the market to determine costs and the privatisation of state-run companies.  
Goldthau’s (2012) liberalism paradigm sees energy governance responding to neoliberalism via the 
increased privatisation and de-integration of state-run energy monopolies as energy became 
progressively regarded as a private good. Correspondingly, the role of the state was increasingly 
“limited to the role of a rule setter and enforcer, not owner. Its main task … to provide for a level 
playing field for competition and to enforce legal frameworks” (Goldthau, 2012, p.202).  
Interventionism  
However, disquiet over market based approaches grew in the late 1990s following recognition from 
“proponents and critics alike” that the neoliberal economic paradigm had largely failed to deliver 
(Rodrik, 2006, p.973). Most nations of the Global South stagnated economically (Easterly, 2001)12 
while crises befell a number of states following neoliberal doctrines, countering the core ideological 
notion that market reforms would stimulate growth (Word Bank, 2005)13. Contrastingly, the success 
stories of the era were “unexpected” from a neoliberal perspective as Rodrik (2006, p.975) explains:  
China and India increased their reliance on market forces, of course, but their 
policies remained highly unconventional. With high levels of trade protection, lack 
of privatization, extensive industrial policies, and lax fiscal and financial policies 
through the 1990s, these two economies hardly looked like exemplars of the 
Washington Consensus. Indeed, had they been dismal failures instead of the 
successes they turned out to be, they would have arguably presented stronger 
evidence in support of Washington Consensus policies. 
 
9 Goldthau (2012, p. 205) defines rule setting power as “the ability to create the institutions that are suitable and able to 
deliver on related policy agendas” which itself “is determined by the impact domestic decisions have on third actors, 
countries or systems”.  
10 Goldthau names his paradigm: ‘Liberalism’, although it seems it could quite conceivably have been called ‘Neoliberalism’ 
as it essentially captures the same underlying economic arguments found within the latter, more commonly used term. 
11 Williamson disputes the accuracy of what was done in the name of the Washington Consensus, stating it was applied far 
more “mechanistically” than intended (World Bank, 2005, p. xi). 
12 Global South median per capita income growth was 0.0 percent in 1980-98 but 2.5 percent in 1960–79 (Easterly, 2001). 
13 Examples include Mexico (1994), East Asia (1997), Brazil (1998), the Russian Federation (1998), Turkey (2000), and 
Argentina (2002) (World Bank, 2005a).  
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Recognition of the failings of neoliberal development ideals prompted Global North institutions to 
develop a ‘Post Washington Consensus’ (PWC) to remedy the shortcomings of its predecessor. The 
PWC which emerged added social and regulatory reforms, with a notable emphasis on inclusive 
growth, poverty reduction, and ‘good governance’ (Kaufmann et al., 1999, p.1). However, it remained 
firmly market orientated, representing as Güven (2018, p.392) notes “a turn-of-the-century upgrade 
of orthodox neoliberalism” rather than a genuine alterative.  
However, the influence of the PWC on energy seems more profound than in other sectors; its social 
regulatory reforms appear to have been increasingly mirrored by global energy agreements, with the 
landmark World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002 incorporating 
social and human development dimensions into international energy policy discussions (Najam & 
Cleveland, 2004). The increasingly social nature of international energy agendas was further pushed 
by the emerging UN concept of the Green Economy (GE), which, although adhering to or, in some 
cases, intensifying neoliberal practices, also clearly helped drive sustainability ideals to the fore, as 
later captured by the 2011 Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All) agenda. Thus, whilst economically, 
concepts such as the PWC and GE seem merely extensions of the neoliberal model, their influence vis-
à-vis energy seems sufficient to justify Goldthau’s proclamation of a new energy paradigm: 
interventionism. 
For Goldthau (2012), interventionism emerges as the prevailing energy paradigm in the early 
millennium once climate change and energy poverty joined energy security as the principal concerns 
of global energy agendas: a triumvirate of issues, commonly conceptualised as the ‘energy trilemma’ 
(ODI, 2012). Manging this trilemma became widely seen as the “central challenge” for energy 
governance (Gunningham, 2013, p.184); a priority reinforced by an “increasing unease” over the 
capability of the market to deal with the greater complexity of this new energy agenda, particularly 
the pricing of environmental externalities and provision of affordable modern energy services 
(Goldthau, 2012, p.202)14.   
The governance response to interventionism saw energy continue to be primarily provided by the 
private sector, but become both complimented and contested by re-emerging forms of state  
intervention (Goldthau, 2012), while Herington et al.’s, (2017) similar sustainable development energy 
paradigm also notes increasing collaboration with community led agencies. This polycentric system 
saw the perceived role for the state shifted to that of  “a stakeholder of public interest”, mandated to 
adopt a more mercantilist approach to protect key strategic assets and address the externalities of 
the energy trilemma (Goldthau, 2012, p.207). Interventionism also saw a shift in rule setting power; 
viewed by Goldthau as inextricably linked to changing shifts in paradigm.  Whereas the previous 
statism and liberalism paradigms were shaped by the economic hegemony of the Global North, the 
emergence of China and the focus on energy poverty resulted in interventionism being partly shaped 
by the Global South. 
Fragmentation  
Writing in 2012, Goldthau viewed a new energy paradigm of fragmentation emerging: one which 
advocated a less dogmatic, state-private hybrid approach to energy governance. The initial roots of 
 
14 Externalities most notably include greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions  
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this shift can be seen in conclusions drawn from the failings of the neoliberalism economic model, the 
former vice president of the world bank, Gobind Nakani (World Bank, 2005, p.xiii) acknowledging: 
The central message … is that there is no unique universal set of rules … [W]e need 
to get away from formulae and the search for elusive ‘best practices’  
For Rodrik (2006, p.986), Nakani’s assessment represents “a mea culpa as well as a way forward”; the 
economist agreeing with the World Bank’s (2005a, p.xii) turn towards “country-specific and 
institution-sensitive” economic policies. This call for more flexible, context specific approaches were 
buoyed by the mixed state/market economies of developing Asia (especially China and India) 
emerging largely unscathed from the 2008 financial crisis, boosting their role model status at the 
expense of Global North doctrines.  
This growing Global South influence is reflected in Goldthau’s (2012) fragmentation energy paradigm 
which he sees as “entirely driven” by the vast increases in the region’s energy consumption15, 
contrasting markedly with the predicted falls in the Global North. Goldthau (2012) argues this 
increased energy demand affords the Global South power and leverage as international responses to 
the energy trilemma (particularly climate change) would amount to little without Global South 
participation. Signs of this agenda setting power were perhaps evident at the Rio+20 conference 
(2012) where the market-based ‘Green Economy’ was reconfigured to address Global South concerns, 
specifically the Global North was to provide funding for implementing the GE. In addition, there was 
mutual recognition that states “needed to be able to define [the GE] to fit their own specific 
circumstances” (TWN, 2012, p.1).  
Similarly, the governance response to fragmentation does not prescribe a state or market-based 
approach but advocates cherry picking from both according to the specific energy requirements of a 
given locality; the assumption being that governance models “are no longer universally applicable, 
and policy prescriptions need to adapt to country or even local contexts” (Goldthau, 2012, p.207). This 
more flexible paradigm, shaped by Global South realities, appears to present an opportunity for 
alternatives to the energy governance norms of the Global North which imply centralised carbon-
intensive energy systems, often ill-suited to meeting the climate change and energy poverty 
challenges of the Global South. In the words of Goldthau (2012, p.206):   
Finding an alternative pathway, possibly leapfrogging the western experience and 
fostering a decentralised system instead, might enable the new decision makers in 
Beijing and Delhi to avoid and circumvent some of the mistakes that have been 
made in earlier industrialisation processes. 
The quotation highlights the need for research which investigates how policy and governance might 
facilitate effective ‘alternative pathways’ and ‘decentralised systems’, ostensibly more viable in the 
emerging fragmentation paradigm devoid of overriding prescriptiveness.  
Yet, more recent treatments suggest evidence of a shift towards fragmentation is mixed. Kern et al. 
(2014, p.523) found signs in the UK, noting a shift in policy paradigm to one which has “‘picked and 
mixed’ between perspectives on energy and how energy should be governed”. However, they add 
 
15 Predicted to account for all new growth in energy demand from 2020 (Goldthau, 2012) 
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that while the policy changes amount to a policy paradigm shift, little has altered in terms of the on 
the ground characteristics of the energy system, with the principal actors still the big six private energy 
companies whose behaviour and influence is little changed. Likewise, Herington et al. (2017, p.1412) 
noted in a rural development context, energy planning had hardly changed over the past 35 years (up 
to 2016) and was largely “out of step with contemporary paradigms of energy access and 
development”, remaining largely techno-economic focussed and consequently shorn of meaningful 
local stakeholder engagement. These contrasts between paradigm and on the ground practices of 
energy governance highlight how key to the development of less centralised alternative pathways 
under fragmentation will be conceptualisations of how the state operates on different scales and the 
need to understand how spatially contingent power relations and interests running in and through the 
state and energy sector are operationalised on different scales. These dynamics also support human 
geography arguments concerning the need to view the state and energy sector in relational terms 
(Angel, 2017; Van Veelen, 2018) and emphasise the importance of this study’s focus on cross-scalar 
stakeholder interactions.  
The fragmentation paradigm’s advocacy of decentralised systems also raises questions concerning the 
future of the grid. Corneli & Kihm (2016) suggest a regulatory paradigm shift is likely needed, with 
state funding used to support the social benefits of grid connectivity as increasingly competitive off-
grid technologies reduce the profitability of former centralised grid monopolies. The authors note this 
shift requires acceptance of “the grid as basic ‘public good’ infrastructure much as roads and airports 
are treated today”, with the grid potentially evolving to become a platform for various off-grid energy 
systems – a blending of centralised and decentralised approaches seemingly indicative of the 
polycentric governance within fragmentation. However, evidence from both Global North (Stein, 
2019) and South (Hankins, 2019; Newell & Phillips, 2016) suggests that irrespective of wider societal 
benefits, this evolution of the grid is likely to be keenly resisted by powerful interests vested in the 
continuation of the centralised grid electricity regime.  
Overall, it appears there is still a struggle for control over the direction of thinking concerning energy, 
which in turn has implications for policy, governance and the role of the state. It seems clear that the 
prominence of the energy trilemma and the growing rule setting power of the Global South means 
the Global North and neoliberal market-based approaches have less dominance than before. More 
flexible, less dogmatic interventionism and fragmentation energy paradigms have emerged, ostensibly 
giving Global South nations more scope to tailor policy and governance options to their specific 
contexts, suggesting a policy environment more amenable to alternative pathways incorporating 
decentralised governance. Yet, the increased rule setting power afforded the Global South is not held 
equally among its constituent nations, and thus it seems the extent to which states can operationalise 
independently fragmentation’s ‘energy governance à la carte’ will vary significantly. 
2.1.1 From paradigm to policy: international interventions and their impact on energy governance 
Echoing Goldthau’s (2012, p.200) assertion that “policy agendas mirror paradigms, and vice versa”, 
this sub-section explores how the emerging interventionism and fragmentation paradigms have been 
reflected in conceptualisations of energy governance in key international policy interventions. 
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Energy’s return to prominence16 on global policy agendas can be traced to the sustainable 
development agenda initiated by the 1987 Bruntland Report and the 1992 UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro. The latter formalised a series of 
agreements, including the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) establishing non-
binding GHG limits and a framework for future interventions (e.g. the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, 2015 Paris 
Agreement), and ‘Agenda 21’: a non-binding action plan for sustainable development. In terms of 
governance implications, the UNCED was largely seen as “an exercise in the rhetoric of national 
governments” (Voisey et al., 1996, p.34), although Local Agenda 21 (LA21) (a sub-section of Agenda 
21) emphasised the local level as the best starting point for the achievement of sustainable 
development and called for local authorities in each country to have established by 1996 an LA21 
through consultations with their communities (UN, 1992). However, the focus of these sustainable 
development objectives was more broadly on the environment, with the energy sector 
underprioritised by global development agencies. This trait persisted over the next decade; most 
clearly seen by the lack of explicit reference to energy in the 2000 Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), later termed the ‘missing MDG’ (Modi, 2004, p.6).  
However, the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg marked a 
turning point as energy emerged in this and subsequent policies (Table 2.2) as a central issue in its 
own right rather than merely a subsidiary of the environment (Clancy et al., 2007). Seemingly 
reflecting the greater social emphasis in the PWC and Goldthau’s (2012) interventionism paradigm, 
the WSSD recognised energy as critical for fulfilling basic human needs, with energy poverty seen as 
“a key constraint to economic development and to the eradication of poverty in developing countries” 
(Piebalgs, 2012, p.78). Unlike the earlier UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol (UN, 1998), there was also a clear 
stress on “good governance”, including the “full and effective participation of developing countries in 
global decision-making” (UN, 2002, p.9) .  
Elements of Goldthau’s fragmentation paradigm can also be seen in the WSSD (UN, 2002, p.100) call 
for policy which enables countries to “take their own decisions on energy use and policies” including 
a balance between “centralised … conventional energy”, redolent of Global North pathways, and 
“more decentralized, small-scale technologies for the rural poor” as urgently required in the Global 
South. Yet, multilevel governance (MLG) approaches were only acknowledged in the context of water, 
where it was argued: 
Better institutional Frameworks are needed for governance, decentralization and 
multi-stakeholder arrangements — an overarching framework that helps to link 
national, regional and local levels (linking strategies and policies with actions at the 
local level) (UN, 2002, p.99). 
The lack of reference to MLG in the context of energy seems indicative of a broader trait in the 
literature where MLG approaches are far less common in energy than other key sectors, such as water 
(Moss & Newig, 2010), agriculture (Cash et al., 2006), and climate change (Amundsen et al., 2010).  
 
 
16 i.e. after its initial prominence in the era of Goldthau’s statism paradigm. 
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Table 2.2 Key international policies interventions impacting energy and their implications for governance 
Policy intervention Year Overview & outcomes Governance 
implications 
WSSD Johannesburg 2002 Energy recognised as a central issue in its own 
right and critical for fulfilling basic human 
needs. 
Global South 
participation in ‘good’ 
global governance 
Conference of the 
Parties (COP) 16: 
Cancun 
2010 Green Climate Fund (GCF) established Multi-stakeholder and 
multilevel 
Sustainable Energy for 
All (SE4All) 
2011 Set three 2030 targets: 1) universal energy 
access; 2) double global rate of improvement in 
energy efficiency; 3) double the share of 
renewable energy in the global energy mix 
Multi-stakeholder and 
multilevel 
UN Commission on 
Sustainable 
Development (Rio+20) 
2012 Global North proposal, ‘the Green Economy’ 
reconfigured to meet Global South demands. 
Multi-stakeholder and 
multilevel 
Sustainable 
Development Goals 
(SDGs) 
2015 17 SDGs (or ‘2030 Agenda’) replace the eight 
MDGs, with a specific energy goal (SDG7), 
incorporating SE4All targets. 
Multi-stakeholder and 
multilevel 
COP 21: ‘Paris 
Agreement’  
2015 All nations agree to aim to keep global 
temperatures "well below" 2.0C (3.6F) above 
pre-industrial times. But only elements of 
COP21 legally binding. US later announce 
intention to withdraw in 2017. 
Multi-stakeholder and 
multilevel with 
capacity building 
considerations 
Roadmap for localising 
the SDGs 
2016 Global Taskforce of Local and Regional 
Governments (GTF) document advocates 
decentralisation but lacks specific energy focus 
Multi-stakeholder and 
multilevel. 
Decentralised 
New Urban Agenda 2016 Stronger city governance (i.e. decentralised) 
seen as key to sustainable urbanisation agenda. 
Specific decentralised energy governance roles 
incorporated. 
Multi-stakeholder and 
multilevel. 
Decentralised  
 
MLG approaches in energy and an increased Global South presence were more apparent in 
interventions following Johannesburg. Established at the 2010 UN Climate Change Conference, the 
Green Climate Fund (GCF) mandated Global North nations to provide funding for climate change 
adaptation and mitigation initiatives in the Global South. There was also recognition of the need for 
governance approaches involving multiple stakeholders operating on multiple scales to address “all 
aspects of climate change”, thus incorporating, if not specifically mentioning, energy (UN, 2011, p.3).   
MLG approaches were explicitly mainstreamed into energy in 2011 following the launch of the UN’s 
“ambitious” (ISO, n.d.) Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) initiative. Calling for universal access to 
modern energy services and a 100% increase in global rates of energy efficiency and renewable energy 
by 2030 (Ki-moon, 2011), the SE4All (2012) ‘Framework for Action’ envisaged coordinated multi-
stakeholder approaches operating at various scales. Included was a detailed breakdown of potential 
roles for stakeholders in the public sector (host and donor governments, public institutions, 
multilaterals), private sector (businesses, banks, investors), and civil society (NGOs, academia). 
However, an analysis of possible roles for the sub-national level was lacking, with decentralisation not 
mentioned anywhere in the framework (SE4All, 2012).  
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The energy targets of SE4All were also incorporated into the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), which unlike their predecessor, the MDGs, had a specific energy goal (SDG7). The governance 
implications of the SDGs were captured in the overarching SDG17 (‘Partnerships for the goals’), whose 
focus on “partnerships between governments, the private sector and civil society …  at the global, 
regional, national and local level” essentially replicated the MLG vision of SE4All (UN, n.d.). Similar 
multi-stakeholder and multilevel governance prescriptions were evident at the “landmark” 2015 Paris 
Agreement, where all nations agreed to “aim” to keep “a global temperature rise this century well 
below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels” and "pursue efforts" to limit the increase to 1.5C 
(UNCC, 2019, p.1). Although country specific policies were emphasised in the form of legally binding 
‘Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to reduce GHGs, there was little focus on the role of local 
governance or decentralisation aside from recognition that capacity building was required at all 
governance levels. 
However, running parallel to the SDGs and Paris, the role of local government and decentralisation 
was championed by the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) facilitated Global Taskforce of 
Local and Regional Governments (GTF) set up in 2013 to coordinate major international networks of 
local governments in driving international policy processes. The 2016 GTF roadmap viewed the SDGs 
as “a fresh opportunity to strengthen the decentralization agenda and promote new forms of 
cooperative governance (multilevel and multi-stakeholder)”, advocating local and regional 
governments to call on their central governments to implement the decentralisation agenda 
embodied within the 2009 UN Habitat document ‘International guidelines on decentralization and 
access to basic services for all’ (GTD, 2016, p.18). The guidelines provide extensive coverage of the 
roles subnational structures should adopt under decentralisation but are orientated towards the UN 
Habitat agenda on SDG11, ‘sustainable cities and communities’, which acknowledges energy but lacks 
an explicit focus on decentralised energy governance roles. This was partially amended by the later 
2016 UN Habitat agreement, the New Urban Agenda. Although not predominantly energy focussed, 
specific decentralised energy governance roles were outlined (UN Habitat, 2017, p.30): 
to promote sustainable energy initiatives to achieve universal energy access, and 
take direct control, where applicable, … of local infrastructure and codes, to foster 
uptake in end-use sectors such as residential, commercial and industrial buildings, 
industry, transport, waste and sanitation. 
This brief outline appears a welcome and long overdue step towards more explicit and comprehensive 
advocacy of decentralised energy governance within international policy interventions. 
Yet, energy governance models embracing multiple stakeholders and levels without specifically 
addressing the implications of decentralisation continue to be the norm of international policy 
interventions, although the increasing pessimism over meeting the Paris Agreement appears to have 
strengthened calls for decentralised governance approaches. Writing in Nature, Victor et al. (2017, 
pp.25-26) argue “No major advanced industrialized country is on track to meet its pledges to control 
the greenhouse-gas emissions that cause climate change”, stressing the “logic” of countries setting 
their own NDCs “threatens to unravel because national governments are making promises that they 
are unable to honour”. Optimism over Paris was also reduced by the United States (US) decision to 
withdraw in 2017; President Trump arguing the agreement “would undermine our [the US] economy" 
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(The White House, 2017, p.1). However, in response, several prominent US networks of subnational 
stakeholders, including states, cities, businesses, higher learning institutions, faith groups, and cultural 
institutions, have formed to drive policies to meet the Paris Agreement (potentially accounting for 
40% of US emissions). This reinforces the potential of the sub-national level noted in the broader 
environmental governance literature (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003), and highlights the need for similar 
decentralised governance research specifically focussing on energy. 
Overall, the evolution of international policy has seen energy become increasingly prominent but 
these interventions appear to only partly reflect contemporary energy paradigms. Governance 
involving multiple stakeholders operating on multiple levels has increasingly become the norm of 
global policy prescriptions concerning energy reflecting the more polycentric nature of 
interventionism and fragmentism. However, despite this apparent embrace of the local, the specific 
energy roles for local level governance within such MLG arrangements remain opaque while the 
implications of decentralisation for energy governance remain largely untouched by international 
policy agendas. This oversight is significant and a likely explanatory factor behind assertions in the 
literature stating that shifts in energy paradigm have resulted in little meaningful improvement to 
local energy governance on the ground, particularly in terms of power dynamics vis-à-vis the state and 
powerful private sector institutions (cf. Kern et al., 2014; Herington et al., 2017; Farrell, 2019). This 
only partial realisation in international policy interventions of the energy governance conceptualised 
in fragmentation seems likely to undermine efforts to implement decentralised energy governance 
initiatives. 
2.2 Energy Studies: limitations impede the development of decentralised energy governance 
The previous section highlighted the lack of a specific focus on decentralised energy governance within 
the international energy policy arena. This section explores how this policy deficiency is partly 
explained and compounded by a similar lack of focus on decentralised governance within the energy 
studies discourse. The underlying factors behind this deficiency are assessed, exploring first the impact 
of flawed conceptualisations of energy access and subsequently the lack of social science-based 
approaches.  
2.2.1 Concepts of energy access: flawed rationales, flawed governance 
Conceptualisations of ‘energy access’ are highly influential on energy policy and governance for as 
Pachauri notes, “The way … [energy] access is defined will have a direct impact on the design and 
implementation of specific energy development initiatives”. This issue is particularly critical as the lack 
of a universally accepted definition of ‘energy access’ (see Chapter 1) offers more scope for various 
understandings to emerge catering for specific agendas. This section appraises these different 
conceptualisations, exploring how and why they have been mobilised by various stakeholders and 
their subsequent impact on governance. 
As indicated in Chapter 1, the futility of a single parameter approach is clear given energy access 
incorporates a multitude of dimensions, including scale, services, quality, and most importantly 
broader development objectives (Bhatia & Angelou, 2015). Affordability is one of the most commonly 
overlooked dimensions (Practical Action, 2010); critical given the poorest households spend a far 
greater proportion of their income on energy (often due to using the most inefficient fuels and 
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devices) (Foster et al., 2000). This policy oversight may stem partly from the challenge of assessing 
affordability as biomass (the most common fuel source in a rural development context) is typically not 
bought, while the opportunity cost of time spent collecting biomass and the health and welfare 
impacts of biomass collection (e.g. the danger of assault) also need to be factored in (Mirza & Szirmai, 
2010). The cost of energy devices is also often overlooked; Reddy (2003) noting the prices of liquid 
petroleum gas (LPG) stoves results in cooking with LPG being more expensive than biomass despite its 
greater efficiency. A holistic governance approach to affordability is thus required which encompasses 
both fuel and equipment costs along with the typically non-monetised opportunity and welfare costs.   
Another critical but common misconception in definitions of energy access are those which 
concentrate just on electricity. Bhattacharya (2012, p.260) notes a “disproportionate emphasis on 
electrification” in energy access programmes which is “neither sustainable nor adequately 
contributing to development” as cooking and heating is the “greatest challenge” due to it comprising 
≈90% of poor people’s energy demand in the Global South. Bhattacharya’s stance is supported by Birol 
(2014), who argues the majority of the predicted 4 million premature deaths attributed to indoor air 
pollution from cooking (see Chapter 1) would be avoided if the uptake of clean cooking facilities was 
pursued more urgently. A team of pre-eminent economists led by Nobel laureate, Prof. Finn Kydland 
cite economic reasons for prioritising clean cooking. They identified cutting indoor air pollution by 
providing clean cookstoves as one of the 19 SDG targets (out of a total 169) that “represent the best 
value-for-money in development over the period 2016 to 2030, offering more than $15 back on every 
dollar invested”: thrice the benefit assigned to the universal provision of electricity (Kydland et al., 
2015, p.1). Thus, governance approaches which belie the general trend and prioritise cooking over 
electricity seem prudent given the severity of the health impacts and the favourable economic 
indications suggested above – although recent research suggests the two should not necessarily be 
seen as mutually exclusive given the growth of electric cooking as a concept (Batchelor et al., 2018a). 
A further issue concerns whether conceptualisations of energy access refer to centralised energy 
systems or those with varying degrees of decentralisation in their management, production and 
distribution. The former typically refers to electricity generated in large power stations and then 
transmitted and distributed via a national (and sometimes trans-national) grid network but can also 
refer to the provision of gas and petroleum where similarly centralised distribution networks exist. A 
centralised energy system also indicates its constituent parts (e.g. resource extraction, production and 
distribution) are centrally managed, typically by the state in a Global South context (Goldthau, 2012). 
Centralised energy (particularly electricity) systems have tended to be over emphasised in energy 
access conceptualisations; a significant flaw as they are often not feasible in a Global South rural 
development context due to the cost and impracticality of extending the grid to sparsely populated 
and geographically isolated areas. In such localities, ‘decentralised energy’ has become increasingly 
important (Sen & Bhattacharyya, 2014). These systems typically refer to electricity generated from 
small scale facilities situated at or near the point of use which do not utilise the grid network (i.e. are 
‘off-grid’). However, they can also refer to more localised provision of cooking and heating facilities, 
and, in a political context, the transfer of energy governing powers from a higher to lower level 
authority. Given the potential significance of decentralised energy systems, it is thus vital they are 
incorporated into conceptualisations of energy access informing policy and governance. 
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The analysis above suggests that policy and governance derived from single dimension understandings 
of energy access are likely to fall short in meeting the needs of citizens as they are highly unlikely to 
cater for the various socio-political and cultural facets of energy access. Yet, it appears that these are 
precisely the type of definition most commonly mobilised by key energy stakeholders as noted by 
(Bhatia & Angelou, 2015, p.22): 
In the absence of a comprehensive and widely accepted approach to defining and 
measuring the different facets of energy access, most projects and programs treat 
energy access as a unidimensional and binary parameter that simply entails having 
or not having energy access 
Pachauri (2011) concurs that the physical availability of energy carriers is internationally the most 
common understanding definition of energy access, arguing the appeal of this understanding lies in 
the convenience of its simple metric nature to policymakers. This is evident in approaches adopted by 
leading multinational agencies who commonly use a range of physical access indicators that are 
compromised by their entirely binary nature, which fails to account for the quality of energy accessed 
and the way it is utilised (Bhatia & Angelou, 2015). Unidimensional conceptualisations centred on 
physical access are also politically convenient as they enable improvements in energy access to be 
claimed regardless of whether the physical availability of energy has been translated into the more 
complex and harder to achieve goal of actual usage (Lee et al., 2016). Understandings of this nature 
seem to particularly cater for centralised governance approaches which often seek to retain control 
of the energy sector through promotion of one-size-fits-all grid electricity-based initiatives. Pachauri 
(2011) warns against such approaches, stressing energy access is inherently geographical and will vary 
by location according to a range of factors including climate, culture, demographics, type of locally 
available energy sources, and the efficiencies of end-use devices typically used in the locality.   
Overall, it seems shortcomings in energy access conceptualisations have negatively impacted on 
energy policy and governance. Stakeholder conceptualisations have tended to be insufficiently 
holistic, leading to policy and governance which largely fails to accommodate the multidimensionality 
of energy access. Limited, unidimensional understandings have also been mobilised to justify one-size-
fits-all energy policy approaches, particularly centralised grid electricity-based interventions which 
tend to align with the interests of national governments in the Global South. These approaches are 
often at the expense of the rural poor who are more likely to benefit from more multidimensional 
interpretations that better cater for critical spatial differences. This, in turn, would likely result in the 
advocacy of a range of policy interventions, particularly decentralised approaches (both in terms of 
the energy system and its governance) which can be more readily tailored to specific localities. 
2.2.2 Imbalances in the energy studies literature and their implications for energy governance 
The previous section highlighted how different, and often deficient, understandings of energy have 
impacted on policy, contributing to the lack of emphasis on decentralised energy governance 
arrangements. This section explores how this shortcoming has been compounded by imbalances in 
the energy studies literature which have focussed primarily on technology and economy-based 
approaches and overlooked the social sciences. This has resulted in a limited academic evidence base 
for informing policy on the potential of decentralised energy governance.   
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This propensity for econocentric and technocentric approaches can be traced to the neoliberal turn in 
the 1980s (see section 2.1), which Stern (1986) and Lutzenhiser (1992) see reflected in a movement 
towards efficiency and enhancing models of energy conversion and use, and away from the 1970’s 
focus on conservation. Lutzenhiser (1992, p.58) posited that a movement to a more humanistic 
approach on end-users was needed, vividly highlighting the limitations of the focus on efficiency: 
The engineers and natural scientists in the energy community may only be 
required to ask ‘How can we be more efficient?’ Social scientists are also bound to 
ask ‘Why are we not more energy-efficient, when clearly that has been possible?’. 
Lutzenhiser rightly saw the focus on efficiency as turning attention away from the issue of equity (i.e. 
the technological and energetic life conditions of the poor) and the influences of corporations and 
governments upon public and private sector consumption and conservation. He later suggested with 
Shove (1999, p.225) that there was a neoliberal underpinning behind this shift, highlighting how 
concerns over budgets and providing value for money led to Global North research agendas becoming 
less flexible, preferring more streamlined technical or market-based research to the broader and less 
clearly demarcated social sciences. 
This imbalance within the energy studies literature has been the subject of criticism from various social 
science disciplines. The psychologist Paul Stern (1986) noted promising policy options were being 
disregarded due to an over reliance on economic theory at the expense of non-economic behavioural 
sciences. The sociologists Lutzenhiser & Shove (1999, p.217) concurred, arguing this focus largely 
ignores the notion of “human choice as critical and controlling in energy use and technology choice”. 
This notion of choice was seen by the political scientist, Lynton Caldwell (1976, p.32) to have ethical 
and political considerations not captured by the prevailing technocentric approach:  
If there is a comprehensive energy problem, it is a problem of choice and value in 
a world of finite capabilities. It is therefore also a moral and political problem, and 
for this reason will not yield to a purely technical solution.  
Discussing the broader context of global warming, the environmental sociologist, Thomas Heberlein 
(2012, p.3) saw the avoidance of such ethical behavioural issues in preference to technological fixes 
as a result of the latter being more convenient: “they bypass human behaviour. They require that 
people do basically nothing. We simply change the environment and go on living much as we have in 
the past. Problem solved”. This paradigm of narrow technical and economic focus in energy is seen as 
disadvantaging social science-based research in the field, thus limiting its scope to address current 
energy issues. 
The deficit of social science approaches also contributes to the inadequate capture of gender-based 
issues by the energy studies literature. Although the “strikingly gendered” (Sovacool, 2014, p.14) 
nature of energy use (particularly in the Global South) has become increasingly prominent in access 
debates17, notable gaps exist concerning gendered impacts on energy governance. Pachauri & Rao  
(2013, p.205) highlight that “Existing power relations and institutions today discriminate against 
women in many developing countries”, critiquing the existing literature for a lack of “Compelling 
 
17 Partly through international programs such as ENERGIA (Cecelski, 2000).   
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empirical evidence on the gender differentiated impacts and determinants of energy transitions”, 
which “undermine the potential for transforming women's status and well-being”. The authors argue 
research needs to understand the factors affecting women’s agency vis-a-vis the adoption of modern 
energy services, including the policies and research intended to address these gendered issues. 
(Sovacool, 2014, p.15) concurs, urging academia to explore “the gendered aspects of energy 
production and use, and what constitutes ‘gender-aware’ energy planning”. 
More broadly, there is a clear need for greater interdisciplinary energy research reflecting broader 
humanistic goals. D’Agostino et al. (2011, p.519) stressed that “the development agenda should drive 
the energy agenda, not vice versa” as there is a need to “cover issues not easily confined to technology 
and science (such as energy demand, human behavior, and mundane technologies such as cook stoves 
and light bulbs)”. More recently, Bagley et al. (2018, p.7), remarked “The gaps/weaknesses in the [UK 
energy] research portfolio are reflected as much in the lack of collaborative initiatives as in the 
absence of actual research/funding”, highlighting how a lack of interdisciplinary research remains an 
ongoing concern. As the authors note, governance research is particularly “crucial” in addressing this 
issue, given it intersects and underlies many of the other aspects missing in the current energy studies 
literature (Bagley et al., 2018, p.46). 
More recent systematic literature reviews support the assertion of continuing imbalances within the 
energy studies literature, particularly the clear emphasis on engineering and economy-based 
approaches to the detriment of the social sciences. The scale of the issue was outlined by Sovacool 
(2014) in a content analysis of 4444 articles from three leading energy journals over 15 years, only 
19.6% of the articles were grounded in social sciences with just 3.3% concerned with governance. 
Brown et al. (2015) concur, noting a particular lack of attention paid to the role of local governance in 
facilitating energy access. As seen in Chapter 1, the recent review of the UK energy studies literature 
by Bagley et al. (2018, p.46) arrived at much the same conclusions, suggesting calls for a broadening 
of energy research have gone largely unheeded. 
Overall, despite the increased prominence of energy on global development agendas and the 
availability of significant finance for energy-based research, an uneven portfolio has emerged from 
the energy studies literature, predominantly centred on technocentric and econocentric approaches 
at the expense of the social sciences. This epistemological issue critically undermines the ability of the 
energy studies discourse to incorporate the multiple socio-political dimensions of energy, including a 
notable lack of studies on governance. This deficit of governance-based research is unsurprisingly 
reflected by an even greater paucity of studies looking at the more nuanced multilevel forms of energy 
governance emerging from decentralisation; a deficiency impeding the development of an evidence 
base to better inform policy on the potential of decentralised forms of energy governance. 
2.3 Decentralisation: a key research agenda for energy governance 
In the last twenty years decentralisation has established itself as a political and 
institutional phenomenon in most countries around the world (UCLG, 2007, p.18)  
This statement highlights the global prominence of decentralisation, a process which has direct 
implications for governance roles and structures and is thus highly relevant to this study’s MLG 
approach. Advocacy of decentralisation generally stems from the view that the process results in more 
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informed, responsive, and accountable governance, and consequently more effective delivery of 
services (Bennett, 1990; Donahue, 1997). Yet, analysis has been critically lacking concerning the 
impact of decentralisation on the delivery of urgently needed energy services in the Global South 
(Brown et al., 2015). This deficit of the decentralisation discourse replicates and compounds the 
failures of the energy studies literature to engage with decentralisation (see section 2.2). Responding 
directly to this deficiency, this section draws together the two discourses in order to better understand 
the potentially crucial implications decentralisation could have for energy governance in the Global 
South. 
2.3.1 Concepts of decentralisation and their implications for governance  
Various definitions of decentralisation exist, which need to be examined as they are crucial to 
understanding how the concept might be mobilised by different stakeholders and applied to energy 
policy and energy governance. The term ‘decentralisation’ has been utilised loosely in a range of policy 
contexts and research literatures and is broadly understood as “the reorganisation of a single 
concentrated unit (e.g. a government, an industry) into smaller more autonomous units” (Brown et 
al., 2015, p.6). However, decentralisation has long been understood to incorporate three forms 
depending on the extent to which powers are distributed and the nature of accountability (Rondinelli 
et al., 1983) (Table 2.3).  
Table 2.3 Definitions of decentralisation forms (adapted from Gregersen et al. 2004; Cabral, 2011)  
Term Type of reorganisation Where decision making lies 
Deconcentration  Involves the transfer of administrative 
responsibilities/functions to subordinate 
units of government, often on a 
geographical basis.  
Decision-making power remains at the 
centre. 
 
Delegation Consists of the transfer of responsibilities 
for public functions/services to parastatal 
or semi-autonomous public entities. 
 
Decision-making power remains mostly at 
the centre, with the semi-autonomous 
entities implementing programmes for and 
accountable to central government but not 
wholly controlled by it. 
Devolution Entails the transfer of governance powers 
and responsibilities to sub-national levels, 
often via an electoral process which 
leaves sub-national authorities directly 
accountable to local people. 
Decision-making power is transferred to 
the sub-national level and largely outside 
the direct control of the central 
government. 
 
There are key differences between the three forms in Table 2.318. Deconcentration, or administrative 
decentralisation, is generally seen as the weakest form of decentralisation and involves the transfer 
of administrative responsibilities but not decision-making power from the centre to one or more lower 
level authorities, generally on some spatial basis. Delegation involves the transfer of responsibility for 
a public function or delivery of a service (which can be on a local or national level basis) to semi-
autonomous public bodies who are accountable to the centre but not wholly controlled by it. 
 
18 ‘Privatisation’ (or deregulation), where public functions are transferred to the private sector has also been considered a 
form of decentralisation.   This study will adopt the position of Steiner (2005) and not consider it so as in most cases power 
is completely removed from government structures. 
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Compared with delegation and deconcentration, ‘devolution’ involves a far greater transfer of power 
from the centre including decision making powers which are largely outside the direct control of the 
central government.  Power is transferred to sub-national entities who are often elected and thus 
directly accountable to local people. 
Overlapping these three forms, are the dimensions of administrative, fiscal and political 
decentralisation. As noted above, administrative decentralisation is linked with the weaker 
deconcentration and delegation forms and concerns “the mere relocation of execution to the local 
level with decision-making power remaining at the centre” (Cabral, 2011b, p.2). Fiscal decentralisation 
concerns the authority to spend financial resources and, in some cases, raise taxes to meet assigned 
responsibilities. It can be found to varying extents in all three forms. Political decentralisation is mostly 
associated with devolution as it concerns the transfer of decision-making powers and involves a 
degree of accountability to local people, often through an electoral process (Gregersen et al., 2004).  
The three dimensions are closely linked and somewhat dependent on one another for each to take 
effect (Cabral, 2011). Falleti’s (2005) sequential theory has proved highly influential in understanding 
their interrelatedness, stating that greater autonomy accumulates in decentralisation processes 
where political decentralisation occurs before administrative and fiscal decentralisation, whereas in 
cases where the reverse is true, authority remains centralised. In the former sequence, subnational 
actors are able to ensure their autonomy before accruing responsibilities which strengthens their 
negotiating position with central government. However, the latter sequence sees the centre assume 
initial control over decentralisation, enabling responsibilities to be divested to the subnational level 
before autonomy is conferred – providing the central government continued leverage throughout the 
decentralisation process. Leading decentralisatin scholar, Dickovick (2014, p.3) praises Falleti for 
providing “real leverage in understanding decentralization's causes” but stresses that as the theory 
was devloped using Latin America as the empirical referent, revisions are required to account for the 
significant historical and institutional differences in the sub-Saharan African context (see Chapter 3). 
For the purposes of this PhD, all three forms are considered important for better understanding the 
nature of decentralised energy governance, particularly as the actual extent of power, autonomy and 
accountability transferred via each of the three forms will vary from case to case. This study thus 
agrees with the analysis of Wunsch (2014, p.3) that limiting the discussion to only devolution, as many 
studies have, is an error as all three forms “fit the standard definition of decentralization, which 
involves the transfer of authority, powers, resources, and responsibilities from central to lower-level 
actors”. In addition, Wunsch (2014, p.3) seems prudent in asserting that theoretically “it is possible 
for delegation and deconcentration to provide many of the beneficial outcomes that devolution is 
intended to provide” and that empirically, the three forms often do not reflect the on the ground 
nuances of a decentralisation process; a point reinforced by Erk (2014, p.539) who noted that in both 
the Global North and South “factors exogenous to institutional design often influence and determine 
the workings of federalism and decentralization”. For instance, the three forms run the risk of being 
conflated (unintentionally or otherwise) and erroneously mobilised by stakeholders to retain or 
assume powers outside the stated legislative provisions (Rodríguez-Pose & Gill, 2003). 
The broader decentralisation is thus the lens through which the analysis of this PhD is conducted and 
is understood using Wunsch’s aforementioned ‘standard definition’. It is also seen as an umbrella term 
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for deconcentration, delegation and devolution, which are defined as shown in Table 2.3. The varied 
ways decentralisation can be conceptualised also reinforce the benefits of this study’s MLG approach, 
which simplifies the inherent complexity of decentralisation and the ensuing multi-scalar and multi-
stakeholder governance, facilitating analysis over whether realities match intended outcomes. 
2.3.2 The rise of decentralisation and its impact on governance 
The rise of decentralisation over the last two decades appears largely a response to broader economic 
paradigm shifts in a manner redolent of the reflective nature of energy paradigms (see section 2.1). 
As noted previously, these economic paradigm shifts largely concern changing views towards the role 
of the state, which in turn have direct implications for perceptions of decentralisation and are thus 
highly relevant to the MLG approach of this thesis. 
The intersection of decentralisation with perceptions of the state is evident in the origins of its current 
prominence, which is usually traced to disillusionment with centralised governments in the 1980s 
following the economic crises of 1973-74, subsequent fiscal crises of the 1980s, and the post 1989 
collapse of the socialist economic sphere (Berkes, 2010). Having previously been widely seen as the 
best means to achieve development in the 1950s and 1960s (Manor, 1999; Béné & Neiland, 2004), 
this erosion of faith in centralised governments to effect development led most African, Asian and 
Latin American countries to implement decentralisation reforms under the auspices of international 
agencies such as the World Bank (Manor, 1999; Berkes, 2010). 
Rodríguez-Pose & Gill (2003, p.3) suggest the onset of ‘contemporary globalisation’ (itself largely a 
product of liberal economic policies and increasing world trade following the 1973-74 economic crises) 
has also contributed to the rise of decentralisation. They note globalisation has coincided with “a 
greater relevance of place, space, and regions”, which Keating (1998) supports by highlighting the 
more prominent role of local government in this period. Rodríguez-Pose & Gill (2003) also note the 
era is marked by political unrest emanating from and contributing to the disillusionment with the 
centre, particularly at the subnational level. This has led in extreme cases to the emergence of new 
states, both peacefully (e.g. The Czech Republic and Slovakia) and via conflict (e.g. Eritrea, East Timor 
and the states of the former Yugoslavia).  
Despite apparent neoliberal underpinnings, the rise of decentralisation seems likely to appeal to a 
broad political spectrum: neoliberal interests piqued by the assumed efficiency gains of the process 
while advocacy from the democratic left stems from the process offering a means to promote greater 
participation and democratisation of the political process (Slater, 1989). This broad acceptability helps 
explains the current popularity of decentralisation, particularly as its flexibility ostensibly facilitates 
policy-based evidence making tailored to specific localities; a facet likely facilitated by the current PWC 
era, in which policy and governance is less dominated by the Global North and a single form of 
economic doctrine. Critically, this scope for spatially contingent applications of decentralisation aligns 
with the human geography and MLG approach of this thesis, which seeks to better understand the 
localised complexity of emergent forms of decentralised governance. 
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2.3.3 Potential impacts of decentralisation for energy governance  
The need to study the implications of decentralisation for energy is clear given the well-documented 
and significant benefits and pitfalls of decentralisation in other sectors. The vast literature on 
decentralisation essentially occupies itself with the question of whether the process is beneficial, with 
answers dependent on a wide range of socio-political, economic and geographical factors. Proponents 
of the process claim local governance is better placed to deal with socio-economic challenges owing 
to assumed advantages over central authorities such as greater access to local information which 
enables greater responsiveness to local needs and improved accountability (Bennett, 1990; Donahue, 
1997). Yet questions remain concerning quality as decentralisation has tended not to lead to 
“significant decentralisation of authority, budgets and strategic roles in many parts of the world” 
(Vincent & Wa Gathui, 2014, pp.11–12). This section thus explores these issues by assessing three 
widely held assumptions about the impacts of decentralisation, namely: enhanced localised decision 
making and information access; increased resource availability; and improved administrative 
performance.  
Assumption 1: enhanced localised decision making and information access  
Based on the economic argument of ‘allocative efficiency’ of resource use, decentralised local 
governance structures are often viewed as better placed to align public goods to local preferences due 
to possessing superior knowledge of these local preferences, and thus deemed more probable to 
respond to local demands (Azfar et al., 1999). Enhanced powers for local authorities are also assumed 
to improved efficiency of local planning and increase the likelihood of local people playing a more 
active role (Vincent & Wa Gathui, 2014). 
However, the quality of locally sourced information is dependent on both the source and its 
interpretation by institutions in receipt of decentralised power, with the representativeness and 
responsiveness of such institutions to local needs dependent on: the type, structure and composition 
of the institution; the capacity and motivation of the individuals concerned; local and national power 
structures and the type of decentralisation (e.g. deconcentration or devolution). Conyers (2007) 
deems the latter issue critical, arguing the benefits of devolution over decentralisation are not always 
clear given the former has suffered from patronage-based politics. She argues this clientelism has 
resulted in little difference in terms of representativeness between local and central government, with 
the latter continuing its hold over local development control. Perhaps most critically, Ribot (2002) 
warns that minimum standards stipulating where national and sub-national roles begin and end are 
required in decentralisation reforms to avoid the common occurrence of excessive central 
government oversight. 
Assumption 2: increased resource availability 
Decentralisation is assumed to increase resource availability for decentralised governance as it 
enables new sources of tax revenue not open to central government, improves existing tax collection, 
assists the collection of service user fees and voluntary public contributions (e.g. of money, materials, 
labour), and lowers the cost of service provision thereby creating surplus funds to be used elsewhere 
(Conyers, 2007). However, this notion is disputed by Cabral (2011) who notes taxes tend to be difficult 
to collect (particularly in rural areas), while central administrations often seek to retain control on the 
management and allocation of tax revenues by limiting scope for locally raised taxes.  
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Yet, decentralisation reforms have tended to be characterised by central governments bestowing 
insufficient resources to match decentralised responsibilities (Conyers, 2007). Cabral concurs, adding 
that central government often have pre-ordained funds for specific projects, altering the role of local 
authorities in Batchelor et al. (2014) words to “deconcentrated agents of central government rather 
than autonomous bodies”. Local authorities are also often unconsciously complicit in reducing their 
revenues due to adopting a zero-sum game approach in a bid to outcompete other local authorities 
for perceived limited resources (Olowu, 2001). Diprose & Ukiwo (2008) partially counter this 
argument, noting decentralisation has been found to both exacerbate and alleviate internal conflict, 
either intensifying religious and ethnic tensions over resources or easing conflict through the provision 
of a framework to resolve disputes. 
Assumption 3: improved administrative performance 
Decentralisation is said to benefit administrative performance by reducing the administrative distance 
between politicians and their electorate and by using local politicians with specialist localised 
knowledge and capacity to implement locally attune policy innovations (Bennett, 1990; Donahue, 
1997). For instance, Conyers (2007) notes decentralised powers could be used to support donor-
backed programmes, which she argues have had short term success in areas such as capacity building, 
improved planning, coordination and project implementation. Local authorities could also use 
decentralised powers to enhance coordination between various local governance structures in order 
to exploit synergies, such as the so called “triple win” nexus of energy, agriculture and the combatting 
of poverty and climate change (Africa Progress Panel, 2015).  
Yet, several of these assumed benefits to administrative performance appear to have been relatively 
short lived. Conyers (2007) notes difficulties have arisen in long term local level administrative 
performance, particularly in terms of scaling up projects to national level, replacing short term donor 
funds, and maintaining performance once donor capacity building programmes have ceased. Arguably 
the most significant impediment to improved administrative performance is local authority capacity, 
consistently cited as a critical barrier impeding the potential positive impact of decentralisation. 
Particular capacity shortcomings include: poor quality planning, budgeting, implementing and 
monitoring (Cabral, 2011b); issues concerning compliance, responsiveness to public needs and 
documentation preparation (Dickovick & Riedl, 2010); along with difficulties understanding 
stakeholders and responding flexibly to rapidly changing circumstances (Brockhaus et al., 2012). 
Despite these numerous concerns, it appears that administrative performance has generally not 
deteriorated under decentralisation with local capacity generally seen as reflective of capabilities at 
national level (Dickovick & Riedl, 2010; Conyers, 2007).  
Overall, there is growing consensus within the literature that traditionally held assumptions on 
decentralisation’s benefits for service delivery may lack veracity. Conyers (2007, p.18) rebukes the 
wider literature, stating “there is very little evidence” to ascertain whether service provision is 
improved by decentralisation, arguing that it impacts on four intermediary processes instead (access 
to local information, localising decision-making power, resource availability and administrative 
performance). She adds that assessing these intermediate processes is complicated by its effects not 
being solely dependent on decentralisation but also several key factors, such as the type of 
decentralisation and its implementation, the type of service indirectly impacted on, stakeholder 
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capacity and, in particular, the broader economic and socio-political environment. Ludeki (2004, p.10) 
concurs, adding that development could worsen under decentralisation or occur regardless of 
decentralisation, highlighting that: 
a country can adopt decentralised … structures but fail to realise development. 
Conversely, a country can achieve breakthroughs in development at the local level 
under highly centralised, even authoritarian, administrative structures.  
Thus, it seems clear that the assumed benefits of decentralisation on governance are highly 
dependent on a range of spatially contingent factors, including most prominently: local authority 
capacity and inter-scalar power dynamics. These issues reinforce the critical need for geographical 
approaches to assess these spatial variations in order to better understand the circumstances in which 
decentralisation might benefit energy governance most effectively.  
2.3.4 Lack of engagement between the decentralisation and energy literatures 
Despite the potential significant impacts of decentralisation to governance and service delivery noted 
in the previous section, the decentralisation literature has inadequately engaged the energy sector. 
Vincent & Gathui (2014, pp.11–12) stress the extent of this issue, highlighting “a general lack of 
attention … to local governance in most international approaches towards addressing sustainable 
energy access”. This has led to “frustration” on the part of Brown et al. (2015, p.4) who note the 
extensive literatures on decentralisation and energy as separate entities, but a lack of research 
analysing the two together. They along with the UNDP (2009) suggest this deficiency may be hindering 
significant opportunities to exploit synergies between decentralisation policies and energy initiatives.  
The little research which does exist on decentralisation and energy in unison predominantly focuses 
on the Global North, where disparities in legal responsibilities, budgets, resources, capacities relative 
to the Global South often impede parallels being drawn from the one context and applied to the 
other19 (Brown et al., 2015). The dearth of Global South data is stressed by the report by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2009), ‘Energy in National Decentralization Policies - A 
Review on the Least Developed Countries and sub-Saharan Africa’, one of the few to focus on energy 
in the context of decentralisation in the Global South. Assessing the decentralisation policies of 64 
nations, the UNDP found only four (Madagascar, South Africa, Nepal and Sudan) with specific 
decentralisation legislation affecting energy, and another two (Bangladesh, Mali and in some instances 
Nepal) where energy governance had become more decentralised but without a connection to a 
decentralisation process. As the UNDP report is almost ten years old, the need for further studies 
addressing the deficit of research on energy and decentralisation in the Global South are critical in 
order to capture the region’s rapidly changing political and energy landscapes. 
The lack of research engaging both the decentralisation and energy studies literatures is partly 
explained by the difficulties inherent in such analysis. The UNDP report implies challenges may arise 
due to difficulties in distinguishing whether an enhanced local authority energy governance role is a 
result of decentralisation or simply due to that authority being given a different role (i.e. irrespective 
 
19 However, the UK seems to provide a warning to heed concerning both convoluted legislation which fails to encourage local 
authorities to prioritise climate change measures and instances of local governments being handed more responsibility 
without the power (i.e. the budget) to effect change. 
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of decentralisation). A further potential difficulty concerns distinguishing between decentralisation 
legislation affecting energy generation, and that relating to energy distribution (see South Africa and 
India) or the allocation of responsibility to existing infrastructure (see Mozambique, Burkina Faso, 
Ghana, Sudan and Madagascar) (UNDP, 2009). Whilst examples of the former are scarce in the 
literature, the latter two are more prevalent and may provide insights into the implications of giving 
local authorities similar controls over energy generation. 
Likewise, it may be possible to draw learnings from instances where other state services affecting 
energy have been decentralised. The UNDP (2009, p.7) argue decentralisation legislation is more likely 
to discuss energy via such indirect contexts, which include forestry (e.g. Guinea), transport (e.g. Kenya, 
South Africa), and motorised agriculture equipment (e.g. Mali). However, heating and cooking remain 
notable gaps in this aspect of the UNDP coverage (Brown et al., 2015). Further insights might be 
feasible from instances where individual local authorities have carried out energy related initiatives 
but not as part of a broader decentralisation process (UNDP, 2009). Examples include waste-to-energy 
initiatives in Malaysia and Indonesia, although whether such projects are facilitated by 
decentralisation remains unclear. 
The lack of research combing both discourses is particularly concerning given Brown et al. (2015, pp.4-
16) emphasise “a special relevance” between decentralisation and off-grid energy as “both are 
concerned fundamentally with the changing relationships between different scales of activity and 
both revolve around enhancing the importance of smaller scale levels of activity over larger”. The 
authors argue the two need to be considered together if opportunities for off-grid energy are to be 
maximised but warn of significant political economy barriers given the “continued dominance of the 
entrenched centralised energy paradigm” whereby: 
Rather than ceding power in and through processes of decentralisation, power 
companies, governments and other key actors have remained active progenitors 
in shaping the form that decentralised energy systems take. Naturally they have 
sought (and will continue to seek) to exert their influence over such changes in 
order that, if there is to be a transition towards more decentralised energy 
systems, they are decentralised energy systems which enable them to maintain 
control over managing and regulating the energy sector (Brown et al., 2015, p.23). 
Examples of such centralised resistance and political economy barriers to off-grid energy are becoming 
increasingly common. In Spain, a tax on electricity generated from household solar PV (even if for self-
consumption) was introduced (2015-2018) following lobbying by grid electricity utilities. The tax 
sought to protect utility profits by disincentivising off-grid systems and was seen as illustrative of the 
political power of energy utilities and their close ties with government which have been viewed as a 
“revolving door with former ministers taking up senior posts in the sector and vice versa” (Burgen, 
2018, p.1). Similarly, US state-level grid electricity utilities have developed considerable political 
power from their sector monopolies, which they have used to oppose off-grid energy initiatives that 
threaten the predominance of their centralised grid utility business model (Farrell, 2019; Stein, 2019). 
33 
 
 
These cases suggest that previous understandings of grid utilities as natural monopolies20 are 
increasingly outdated as consumers were deprived of competitive off-grid alternatives. Countering 
this monopolistic control may lie with decentralisation and decentralised governance: community 
governance advocates Pomerantz & Farrell (2019) calling for the public to influence energy regulation 
policy by applying pressure to sub-national authorities, who are more likely to be responsive to a 
potential local election issue than national government stakeholders. 
Overall, there has been a clear lack of engagement between the decentralisation and energy 
literatures in a global South context, which appears likely to undermine the development of effective 
decentralised energy governance. This is critical as the theorised impacts of decentralisation to 
governance and service delivery (seen empirically in other sectors) indicate decentralised energy 
governance has considerable potential to address energy access issues in the Global South, while 
findings in the energy studies literature suggest decentralisation may have special relevance to energy 
as a potential check to the predominance of centralised grid-centric monopolies. 
2.4 Concepts of governance in the era of decentralisation  
The previous section highlighted how understandings of decentralised energy governance in the 
Global South have been undermined by the lack of engagement between the discourses on 
decentralisation and energy studies. This section responds to this deficiency by exploring how 
governance has been conceptualised under decentralisation; critical if the forms of decentralised 
energy governance emerging from the Global South and the circumstances in which they work 
effectively are to be understood.  Particular attention is paid to ‘Multilevel governance’, the most 
prominent of the various conceptualisations and the analytical framework for this thesis.  
Conceptualisations of ‘governance’ have taken on added significance in the current era of increasing 
decentralisation as the two concepts directly interact. The applied ecologist, Berkes (2010) sees 
devolution as a process to reform governance and incorporate local stakeholders into policy and 
decision-making process. This sharing of the governing role among various actors raises issues of 
democratic accountability and implies a possible decline in the power of central government (Peters 
& Pierre, 2004), with Bache & Flinders (2004) suggesting the role of the state may often be reduced 
from directing to coordinating policy.    
This emphasis on the changing scalar and spatial realities of power implied by decentralisation has led 
to a reappraisal of the role of the state by human geographers. Notions of the state as static, bounded, 
vertical, simple hierarchies have been critiqued by human geographers, who instead have viewed the 
state relationally, arguing that state institutions are composed of complex and contradictory socio-
ecological processes which they in turn help to reproduce (Jessop, 1990). Brown & Purcell (2005, 
pp.614–620) agree, arguing that: 
 
20 Economists define a natural monopoly as where a single company could provide a service or good more efficiently than 
multiple competing firms (Stein, 2019). A legal monopoly refers to a company operating as a monopoly under a 
government mandate; the legal monopoly providing a specific good or service at a regulated price (Kenton, 2019). 
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scales and scalar relationships are the object and outcome of political struggle 
[and] … scales and scalar relationships become fixed, un-fixed, and re-fixed as a 
result of that struggle. 
These sentiments have led a number of leading scholars (Smith, 1995; Leitner, 1997; Brenner, 1997) 
to suggest the existence of an extensive restructuring of the state “as its powers are relocated upwards 
to supra-regional or international bodies, downwards to regional or local states, or outwards to ... 
cross-national alliances” in what has been termed a ‘hollowing out’ of the nation-state (Jessop, 1999, 
p.354). However, crucially, as Goodwin et al. (2005, p.424) point out Jessop’s ‘hollowing out’: 
makes no explicit claims about the organizational or institutional forms that may 
result … and one needs other conceptual devices to help in the understanding 
about how and why that process subsequently unfolds.  
It is thus to an analysis of the most prominent of these “conceptual devices”, ‘Multilevel governance 
(MLG)’, that the thesis now turns. 
Multilevel governance (MLG) 
Widely viewed as the key response to conceptualising the governance emerging from the 
restructuring of the state, MLG was seen by Behnke et al. (2019, pp.v-2) to have gained “immense 
popularity over the past 20 years” as “it captures several fundamental insights about the institutional 
structures and policy-making processes of modern democratic states”. Stephenson (2013, p.818) 
concurs, noting as its chief virtue the ability “to overcome complexity and ambiguity in international 
policy-making”. 
MLG was first introduced by the political scientist, Gary Marks (1993, p.402) to describe the greater 
prominence of the subnational and supranational levels following structural changes21 to the then 
European Community (EC), but was then further developed by Marks alongside fellow political 
scientist, Lisebeth Hooghe to analyse the policy making of the EC’s successor, the European Union 
(EU). Together, they (1997) initially conceptualised MLG as the reduced role of the nation state within 
the EU, whose requirement for collective decision-making afforded stakeholder networks influence 
over the previously monopolistic control of national governments over policy making. They felt this 
did not necessarily mean the state was not important or the most important actor, but instead 
emphasised it was ‘one among a variety of actors contesting decisions that are made at a variety of 
levels’ (Hooghe & Marks, 1997, p.23). Within their framework, ‘multilevel’ referred to the vertical 
hierarchal relationship between national and sub-national, while ‘governance’ referred to the growing 
horizontal interdependence between governments and non-government actors (Hooghe & Marks, 
1997). 
 
 
 
21 Conzelmann (2008) notes the main changes as the opening of subnational ‘embassies’ in Brussels, the creation of the 
Committee of the Regions, the 1988 reform of structural funds, and increasing direct contact between the subnational level 
and the EC. 
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MLG1 and MLG2: the continued development of the MLG concept 
However, the term MLG has since been developed by Hooghe and Marks from its original incarnation 
to incorporate a broader range of governance arrangements, which respond to the emergence of less 
hierarchical, more polycentric forms of governance involving various public and private actors, 
operating within and beyond the borders of the traditional state (Conzelmann, 2009; Peters & Pierre, 
2001). Aiming in particular “to broaden understanding of different levels of public policy making and 
the role of the state” (Mortal et al., 2018, p.68), Hooghe and Marks demarcated two, not necessarily 
exclusive, ‘types’ of multilevel governance. 
The first, MLG1 (Table 2.4), is based on federalism and essentially replicates Mark’s 1993 framework. 
Authority is seen as dispersed to a limited number of general-purpose jurisdictions at a limited number 
of levels. Commonly analogised as a ‘Russian doll set’, MLG1 is conceived of as a hierarchical structure, 
where the smaller (usually territorial based) jurisdictions do not overlap their larger counterparts. As 
Conzelmann (2009, p.2) notes, the focus is on “the interaction between these levels and the sharing 
of competences between them … [and] thus is attached to a state-centric concept of politics”. Mortal 
et al. (2018, p.68) agree, noting Type 1 “shows clear vertical linkages between the different 
governance levels with a central role for the state”. 
Table 2.4 Multilevel Governance Type 1 (Hooghe & Marks, 2003) 
 Characteristics  
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General-purpose 
jurisdictions 
 
Functions are bundled 
Jurisdictions bundle together multiple functions, including a range of policy 
responsibilities  
Nonintersecting 
memberships  
Hierarchical structure with static, usually territorial membership (as in 
national states, regional, and local governments). Smaller jurisdictions are 
neatly contained within the borders of the larger ones and do not overlap. 
Sy
st
e
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ic
 
p
ro
p
er
ti
e
s 
Jurisdictions at a 
limited number of 
levels  
levels of government are multiple but limited in number 
 (e.g. international, national, regional, meso, local). only one relevant 
jurisdiction at each level 
Systemwide  
Architecture 
 
Territorial jurisdictions are intended to be stable for periods of several 
decades or more with institutions fairly rigid, though the allocation of 
policy competencies across jurisdictional levels is flexible 
 
In contrast to the first form, MLG2 (Table 2.5) centres on flexible task specific jurisdictions (such as 
providing services or solving problems) which “operate at numerous territorial scales” and “tailor 
membership, rules of operation, and functions to a particular policy problem” (Hooghe & Marks, 2004, 
pp.12–29). Governance is seen as non-hierarchical with overlapping jurisdictions, focussed on 
complex patterns of interactions and power relations between myriad state and non-state actors as 
Bulkeley & Betsill (2003, p.28) illustrate: 
In this picture, the ‘neat scales, or levels, or tiers, disappear – they meld into one 
another. There is no up or under, no lower or higher, no dominant class of actor; 
rather, a wide range of public and private actors compete or collaborate in shifting 
coalitions.  
Thus, MLG2 largely ignores traditional notions of territorial spaces and levels of government and 
instead sets no limit to the number of levels jurisdictions may operate in (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). 
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Rosenau (1997) agrees with Hooghe & Marks (2001) in seeing MLG2 forms emerging at the boundaries 
of formal politics, characterised by the engagement between formal and informal “spheres of 
authority” in both territorial and non-territorial networks.  
Table 2.5 Multilevel Governance Type 2 (Hooghe & Marks, 2003) 
 Characteristics  
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Task-specific 
jurisdictions 
 
Jurisdictions are designed around fulfilling distinct functions, each 
providing services (e.g. water, energy, transport) or solving problems 
(adjudicating international trade disputes, monitoring water quality)  
Intersecting 
memberships  
 
Non-hierarchical structure, with many overlapping, often competing and 
formally independent centres of decision-making  
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ro
p
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e
s 
No limit to the 
number of 
jurisdictional levels  
Jurisdictions may operate at numerous territorial (or otherwise defined) 
scales 
 
Flexible design 
 
Jurisdictions are responsive to temporary need and may discontinue 
when no longer required. The mode of decision making, adjudication, 
and implementation can be adapted to particular policy problems 
 
Applications of MLG 
The term, MLG, has since moved beyond its original EU incarnation and been “developed and 
extended to other political arenas” (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003, p.27). Kersbergen & Waarden (2004) 
note the spread of MLG configurations in numerous national, subnational, transnational and 
international contexts. Behnke et al. (2019, p.3) concur, arguing the prevalence of MLG configurations 
in various world regions renders limiting MLG analysis to the EU as “outdated”. In a 2016 publication, 
Hooghe and Marks (2016) themselves assessed multilevel configurations in 81 countries22, providing 
further acknowledgement of the global spread of MLG23.  
However, MLG “has not been interpreted and applied in the same way by all scholars” as Stephenson 
(2013, p.817) highlights in an analytical review of the various scholarly applications of MLG. Behnke et 
al. (2019, pp.v-2) agree, noting the concept has been embraced by a wide range of scholars and 
extended to incorporate a diverse range of research themes including federalism, regionalism, and, 
critically for this study, decentralisation. The authors propose that the term Multilevel governance 
(MLG) has come to be seen as an umbrella term encompassing a wide range of “research perspectives 
on governing and governance in multilevel systems” (Behnke et al., 2019, pp.v-2). 
MLG has also been applied to a wide range of sectors including water, agriculture, biodiversity, 
pollution, health, education, and business (Cash et al., 2006), although rarely to energy where there 
are only isolated examples of its use (e.g. Li & Yi, 2014) and, as far as the author is aware, never as a 
lens on decentralised energy governance. Moss & Newig (2010, p.1) note the particular relevance of 
MLG to aspects of environmental management, such as water, air pollution and biodiversity, as “Levels 
of government and administration typically do not fit the environmentally relevant scales, resulting in 
 
22 The study contains countries from every continent bar Africa despite the existence of many African decentralisation 
initiatives. This appears to again highlight the general disservice towards the continent from academia (REF). 
23 The authors referring to these arrangements as “regional’ rather than ‘MLG’, but they still clearly consist of multilevel 
configurations and are thus perceived as MLG; aligning with thinking from Behnke et al. (2019).  
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inefficiencies, spatial externalities, and spillovers”24. These applications are both conceptual and 
practical, Lockwood et al. (2010), for example, have developed a suite of governing principles for 
multilevel governance of natural resource management to be used in establishing effective and 
equitable governance institutions and for developing governance monitoring and evaluation 
instruments. 
These applications suggest MLG could be successfully applied to energy, a sector where benefits and 
costs clearly overlap jurisdictions, and in which there is an urgent need to establish and develop 
effective decentralised energy governance institutions (see Chapter 1). Doing so seems particularly 
pressing in the context of increasingly prominent nexus debates25, which have centred on the potential 
synergies and trade-offs energy has with water and agriculture (Stevens & Gallagher, 2015). As the 
latter two sectors are already well-documented within the MLG literature, applying MLG to energy 
remains the missing link to enhancing understanding of the circumstances in which multilevel 
arrangements work effectively in nexus approaches.  
Criticisms of MLG as a framework 
MLG has been subject to various criticisms during the course of its proliferation, potentially 
questioning its use as the analytical framework of this study. Arguably, the most prominent have been 
critiques decrying MLG as merely descriptive and lacking predictive powers to explain causality and 
the evolution of governance systems (Jordan, 2001). Stephenson (2013, p.818) suggests this criticism 
may be unfair given other well-known frameworks and theories lack a predictive scope (e.g. policy 
networks, grand theory), arguing MLG should instead be lauded for its ability to “overcome 
complexity” and inform “how governance is arranged today in a way that is easy to grasp”. Whilst 
Stephenson’s analysis seems prudent, it does seem to confirm Kohler-Koch & Eising's (1999) assertion 
that MLG should be seen as a concept rather than a theory with predicative and explanatory scope. 
Other concerns have centred around the perceived inability of MLG to interpret the influence of actors 
within governance, Bache (2008), for example, argues that MLG offered little insight into the links and 
power relations between actors. Both he and Warleigh-Lack (2008) suggest combining policy network 
approaches with MLG to account for these varying power differentials between actors. Similarly, the 
political scientist, Blom-hansen (2005, p.644) felt MLG “fails to specify which actors, at which levels, 
will be causally important”, suggesting the use of principal agent theory to address this shortcoming. 
However, the political scientist acknowledged the concept provides “a descriptively accurate picture” 
of the complexity present in contemporary governance structures. 
The renowned geographer, Jessop (2006, p.151) argues the concept of MLG could be “misleading”, 
primarily because it “neglects problems of meta-governance” (i.e. “the governance of governance” 
(Jessop, 2010, p.106)) which might typically include efforts to improve aspects of governance and 
avoid the increasingly recognised concept of ‘governance failure’. For Jessop, this involves actors 
engaging in reflexive, self-balancing processes to create checks and balances within governance in 
 
24 Examples of spillovers include: ‘pollution spillovers’ (the movement of pollutants across jurisdiction boundaries); 
“preservation spillovers (resource use by citizens from other jurisdictions); and ‘competitive spillovers’ (states competing on 
environmental matters)  (Moss & Newig, 2010). 
25 For instance, the 2016 annual conference at the Royal Geographical Society with Institute of British Geographers was 
dedicated to the theme of nexus thinking. 
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order to achieve policy aims; a commonplace praxis coined ‘collibration’ by Dunsire (1996). The 
intrinsic presence of collibration leads Jessop to argue that MLG would be more accurately termed 
‘multi-scalar meta-governance’, although he acknowledges these issues have been circumvented in 
many studies by the use of additional theoretical and empirical analyses alongside MLG. 
Rationale for applying an MLG  framework to decentralised energy governance 
Despite the aforementioned criticisms, MLG remains a particularly suitable framework for 
understanding energy governance in post devolution Kenya. Taken as a concept rather than a theory, 
Hooghe and Mark’s various contributions to MLG have stood the test of time over twenty years, not 
only as a seminal foundational piece of the literature, but also critically as a tried and tested means of 
overcoming the complexity inherent in governance comprised of networks featuring a wide array of 
actors operating on multiple socially constructed scales. As such, its simplifying, descriptive nature 
provides a platform for understanding governance, facilitating the empirical analyses of this study to 
address the limitations of MLG in terms of identifying power differentials, incorporating meta-
governance, and identifying which actor(s) will be causally important. It is thus anticipated that this 
thesis’s application of MLG to energy (itself an emergent model of enquiry) can replicate the successes 
found with its more established usage in other sectors, and in doing so facilitate better understanding 
of the circumstances in which decentralised energy governance arrangements might work most 
effectively in the Global South. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Overall, the critical analysis of the energy studies and decentralisation literature in this chapter has 
clearly illustrated that insufficient attention has been paid to the impact of decentralisation on energy 
governance in the Global South, with key knowledge gaps revealed. The energy studies literature was 
found to have neglected the study of governance (and more broadly the application of social science-
based approaches) undermining in the process more holistic governance approaches incorporating 
the multiple socio-political dimensions of energy and limiting the evidence base for policy exploring 
the potential of decentralised energy governance forms to address Global South energy access issues.   
This scholarly deficit has been compounded by the failure of the decentralisation literature to address 
the theme of energy in the Global South. This clear lack of engagement between the decentralisation 
and energy studies discourses appears highly likely to have undermined the development of effective 
decentralised energy governance which it can be argued shows considerable potential given the 
success of such initiatives in other sectors. In addition, the few texts which do engage with both 
discourses suggest decentralisation may have particular relevance to energy in terms of facilitating 
off-grid initiatives and as a check to centralised energy governance monopolies.  
Thus, given the increasing trend of decentralisation in the Global South, along with the prioritisation 
of energy access on international development agendas, the focus of this thesis on appraising the role 
of decentralised energy governance – within the more broadly recognised need for polycentric energy 
governance approaches – is both timely and urgently needed. Due to their expediency in better 
understanding the complexity of such forms of governance, the thesis employs Hooghe and Mark’s 
(2003) twin concepts of MLG1 and MLG2 as the main analytical framework to help situate and 
interpret the empirical findings of the study. 
39 
 
 
Chapter 3 - Global Goals, sub-Saharan African Realities: The Energy 
Governance Challenge in Kenya   
This chapter justifies Kenya (and more broadly sub-Saharan Africa) as the site of the empirical research 
of this thesis and provides a critical discussion of how the conceptual and theoretical debates 
discussed in Chapter 2 have unfolded in the country and wider region. In doing so it begins to uncover 
significant contradictions between the rhetoric of decentralisation and the realities on the ground; a 
recurring theme in Kenya as the later empirical chapters reveal. As with the previous chapter, the 
energy studies and decentralisation literatures are drawn together, facilitating a novel approach 
whereby developments in Kenyan energy governance are explored through the lens of 
decentralisation. Adopting this approach enables a fuller understanding of how the spatially 
contingent dynamics of decentralisation might affect the potential of decentralised energy 
governance to address energy access issues in Kenya. 
To achieve this Section 3.1 first highlights the relevance of the broader sub-Saharan Africa region to 
this research which is argued to be on the front line of energy access and governance debates. These 
regional influences are critical to understanding the Kenyan context and why the country emerges as 
a particularly pertinent case study to ground the thesis empirically. Section 3.2 then explores the 
historical developments in Kenyan decentralisation and energy policy, revealing their significant 
influence on the current stakeholder interactions shaping decentralised energy governance. The 
implications of the current political framework for decentralised energy governance are then 
interrogated in section 3.3, unearthing critical issues concerning the legislative provisions for devolved 
energy likely to undermine decentralised governance. Lastly, section 3.4 concludes by establishing the 
chapter’s main findings, particularly how the emergent contradictions between concept and reality 
might be better understood through this study’s MLG approach.  
3.1 Sub-Saharan Africa: the energy access front line 
Although decentralised energy governance is highly relevant to much of the Global South, the greater 
urgency of energy access issues in sub-Saharan Africa is the principal reason it was selected as this 
PhD’s region of study. As Chapter 1 stressed, sub-Saharan Africa has fared worse than other Global 
South regions in addressing energy access issues (IEA, 2018b; IEA, 2018a), a problem compounded by 
predictions indicating electricity and in particular clean cooking access rates will not keep pace with 
the projected population growth (Table 3.1). Unlike other Global South regions, this is expected to 
lead to the number of people without electricity and clean cooking access continuing to increase until 
2030 before signs of a decline emerge towards 2040. The relevance of sub-Saharan Africa to this 
research is also demonstrated by the clear ongoing trend towards decentralisation in the region 
(Mohmand & Loureiro, 2017), as seen by the African Union adoption of an African Charter on values 
and principles of decentralisation in 2014 (UN Habitat, 2015). In addition, there has been an ongoing 
regional commitment to the ideals of the New Urban Agenda (NUA) which has decentralisation at its 
core (Bwire, 2019).  
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Table 3.1 Predicted population without access to modern energy services (IEA, 2016; IEA, 2018a/b) 
Region Without access to electricity  Without access to clean cooking facilities 
2017 2030 2040 2017 2030 2040 
Sub-Saharan Africa 603 619 489 893 823 708 
Developing Asia 351 166 47 1715 1458 1081 
Latin America  20 0 0 56 56 52 
Middle East 18 0 0 11 8 7 
World/Global South  784 536  2345 1849 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa is defined using what the UN Statistics Division (UNSD) (2003) term “the most 
common” definition: namely all of Africa except the five North African countries of Morocco (including 
the disputed Western Sahara territory), Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt (Figure 3.1). However, the 
notion of ‘sub-Saharan Africa’ has been criticised for being a euphemism for negative ‘black Africa’ 
news stories (Udeze, 2009). This is supported by the term’s clear geographical inaccuracy as 
predominantly ‘black African’ countries such as Mali, Mauritania, Chad, Sudan and Niger lie mostly 
within, rather than below the Sahara, while it has been alleged that South Africa was not considered 
part of sub-Saharan Africa until after apartheid and the implementation of a majority black 
government (Ekwe-Ekwe, 2012). 
Despite these criticisms, the notion of sub-Saharan Africa is a useful designation for energy access 
studies in Africa due to the sharp contrast between the near universal energy access found in North 
Africa and the much lower levels in the continent’s other regions (Table 3.2). The access levels in North 
Africa clearly indicate the region is not a priority for this PhD, and thus, a naming convention is 
required to distinguish between Africa and the focus of this study. As potential substitutes to sub-
Saharan Africa may also derive similar negative connotations, the term will be used in keeping with its 
usage by most major multilateral and regional organisations (e.g. UN, African Development Bank 
(AfDB)). 
Table 3.2 2017 Energy access in Africa by region (adapted from IEA, 2018a/b).  
Region Electricity 
access 
Clean cooking 
access   
Countries with access rates equal or 
above South Africa 
North Africa 100% > 99%  
Su
b
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ar
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A
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a 
Central Africa 26% 10% Gabon (e & c), Equatorial Guinea (e)  
East Africa 41% 11%  
West Africa 51% 11% Cape Verde (e & c), Ghana (e)  
Southern Africa* 32% 17% Mauritius (e & c), Seychelles (e & c) 
South Africa 84% 85%  
Sub-Saharan Africa 43% 16%  
* Excludes South Africa26. e = electricity, c = clean cooking 
 
 
 
26 The IEA’s separation of South Africa from its region Southern Africa may be read as further evidence of sub-Saharan Africa 
being a pejorative term as Gabon, Mauritius, Seychelles and Cape Verde have better access rates than South Africa but are 
not separated from their regions. However, the four countries have small populations and thus it seems are not separated 
as they do not skew the regional data to the same extent as South Africa (the most populous country in Southern Africa).  
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Figure 3.1 Map of sub-Saharan Africa (Source: Khandke, 2016)   
 
3.1.1 Decentralisation in sub-Saharan Africa 
The ongoing movement towards decentralisation in sub-Saharan Africa has been shaped by varied 
historical agenda which are important to explore if the underlying influences shaping current 
decentralised energy governance initiatives are to be better understood. First emerging in the 1980s, 
the decentralisation agenda was initially advocated by Global North development agencies (often as 
part of structural adjustment programmes) as a way to improve governance and service delivery by 
circumnavigating the perceived corruption, rent seeking and ethnic patronage of the centralised state 
(Cheeseman et al., 2016). By the 2000s, such reforms had become a “cure-all prescription” 
(Cheeseman et al., 2016, p.3); a means to variously “protect minorities, diffuse conflict, boost local 
development, and bring politics ‘within the people’s reach’” (D’Arcy & Cornell, 2016, p.246).   
Decentralisation in sub-Saharan Africa has been well documented as “widespread but not deep” 
(Cabral, 2011, p.2). Ndegwa's (2002, p.22) well-known analysis of 30 countries in the region found all 
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contained sub-national governance structures but central government retained its “continued 
dominance”. Similarly, the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), in what Batchelor et al. (2014, 
p.10) consider the “most comprehensive review of decentralisation worldwide” found 
decentralisation policies in “practically all stable countries” in sub-Saharan Africa but noted most were 
“limited” in extent (UCLG, 2007, p.21-24). D’Arcy & Cornell, (2016, p.253) argue “there are few real 
success stories”, noting general agreement within the decentralisation literature that meaningful 
reform has not been implemented by most central governments “because it threatens their hold on 
power and means of rule”.  More recent treatments suggest these traits of ongoing but not extensive 
decentralisation polices continue to persist: (Mohmand & Loureiro, 2017), with notable discrepancies 
emerging between decentralisation legislation and realities shaped by what Erk ( 2014, p.536) terms 
“long-term structural uncodified factors”; the decentralisation scholar emphasising that:  
it seems everywhere to the south of the Sahara there is a gap between the 
institutional/constitutional blueprints introducing the reforms and the facts on the 
ground (Erk, 2014, p.535) 
As such, sub-Saharan decentralisation has “consisted mostly of deconcentration of administrative 
functions, rather than true devolution of powers” (Cabral, 2011b, p.2), characterised by insufficient 
power and resources to match responsibilities (Conyers, 2007) and at times efforts by central 
government to ‘recentralise’ due to changing priorities (Rondinelli et al., 1989). These weak forms of 
decentralisation have often been used by elites to consolidate central power by creating positions 
which either divide opposition power bases or are filled by officers loyal to central government (Crook, 
2003). However, these limited deconcentration realities are not confined to sub-Saharan African but 
are a global occurrence (Rodríguez-Pose & Gill, 2003); the devolution of power to ‘city regions’ in the 
UK serving as a Global North exemplar. This policy resulted in the multiplication of overlapping sub-
national scales of governance, weakening the newly formed city regions and highlighting “how the 
state shapes policies in ways that protect its legitimacy for maintaining regulatory control and 
managing the economy” (Harrison, 2012, p.1255).  
Factors at the sub-national scale have also hindered the impacts of governance reform in sub-Saharan 
Africa, such as underpaid staff lacking motivation and capacity, lack of clarity over systems and 
procedures, interference from other political scales, lack of accountability, and corruption (Ribot, 
2002). In addition, the prevalence of political patronage at both national and sub-national levels has 
undermined decentralisation efforts in the region, “exacerbated by lack of pressure from civil society 
organisations, which are often weak and part of the same political patronage system” (Conyers, 2007, 
p.23). The presence of clientelism further emphasises the critical impact of stakeholder agendas and 
interactions, resonating with Faguet's (2014, p.10) assertion that decentralisation “is not exogenous 
to the issue of who has the power and what they want”. 
Despite the general lack of genuine reform in sub-Saharan Africa, significant regional variations can 
be observed. Ndegwa's (2002, p.22) noted a marked tendency for francophone and lusophone 
countries to have lower levels of decentralisation, due to their roman law tradition which emphasises 
greater state centralisation. Revising Falleti’s (2005) sequential theory (see Chapter 2), Dickovick 
(2014) argued sub-Saharan Africa’s historical and institutional context (which differed significantly 
from Latin America, the empirical basis of Falleti’s work) was key to explaining the varying depths of 
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decentralisation within the region. Whereas decentralisation emerged in Latin America in a context of 
‘post-developmentalism’ in the 1980s, sub-Saharan Africa prior to decentralisation “was 
neopatrimonial and personalistic”, Dickovick emphasising that: 
In particular, Africa has a much less robust history [than Latin America] of local 
governance and countervailing local elites that can meaningfully oppose central 
rule. That is, the history of governance is more centralized.  
Dickovick therefore proposes revising sequential theory, adding variations (in bold in Figure 3.2) to 
account for sub-Saharan African outcomes. Those factors placed higher in the four variables of history, 
imperative, sequence and institutions presumed to lead to more robust decentralisation.  
Figure 3.2 Model of sub-Saharan African decentralisation  (Source: Dickovick, 2014) 
 
In a later compendium assessing decentralisation outcomes of ten sub-Saharan African states, edited 
by Dickovick & Riedl (2014), several of the model’s features were apparent. Ethiopia, Nigeria, and 
South Africa were seen as most decentralised27, being federal states with the highest proportion of 
government spending at the subnational level and whose decentralisation initiatives had largely arisen 
from security concerns over ethnopolitical divisions. In contrast, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Mali, and 
Mozambique were regarded the most centralised: the subnational level receiving a very small share 
of total government expenditure, with elected officers in the francophone and lusophone countries 
overseen by central government institutions. Dickovick’s revision of sequential theory appears to 
support the use of Kenya as the case study for this PhD as the country exhibits several of the factors 
expected of robust decentralisation28. Despite its neopatrimonial past, Kenyan devolution emerged 
from security concerns after the post-2007 election violence, with a near simultaneous  
implementation of political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation, while the institutions that 
condition decentralisation have been described as “quasi-federal” (Kangu, 2015).  
Decentralisation has also varied significantly by sector in sub-Saharan Africa. Energy has rarely been 
incorporated into decentralisation reforms (see following sub-section) while other sectors, such as 
health, water and agriculture have a more established tradition. Mehrotra's (2006) analysis of the 
1987 Bamako initiative to decentralise decision-making for public health services found mixed results 
but noted “very successful” reforms in Benin, Guinea and Mali, incorporating components of “deep 
 
27 The three countries along with Comoros are the only federal states in sub-Saharan Africa. 
28 Kenya was not one of the countries analysed in the compendium edited by Dickovick & Riedl (2014). 
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democratic decentralisation”. The ideals of urbanisation have also been a driving force, with for 
instance a number of African cities adopting decentralisation policies and strategies for solid waste 
collection and disposal (UN-Habitat 2010a; Bwire, 2019).  
Overall, it seems clear that decentralisation in sub-Saharan Africa has lacked depth, with the success 
of reforms highly dependent on spatially contingent factors, particularly policy agendas and the power 
relations between central elites and actors at the sub-national level (Cabral, 2011b): facets which 
reinforces the relevance of the geographical approach adopted by this study. Sub-Saharan African 
decentralisation has, paradoxically, often consolidated central authority (Fessha & Kirkby, 2008), 
hindering research in the area by limiting the number of cases where genuine reform has occurred. 
This concern contributed to Kenya’s selection as the case study for this PhD, for as Cheeseman et al. 
(2016, p.3) note: “there has been genuine reform: decentralisation was neither killed at birth … nor 
was it limited to a set of superficial measures with little significance”. 
3.1.2 Energy policy and governance in sub-Saharan Africa 
Historical context 
The tendency for sub-Saharan African decentralisation to consolidate central authority has had clear 
implications for energy policy and governance, with few countries implementing policies that 
integrate energy into decentralisation processes (Brown et al., 2015). This is partly attributable to the 
general reluctance of central governments to decentralise noted in the previous section, yet sector 
specific factors are also pertinent, particularly the influence of prevailing energy paradigms. 
Discussed in Chapter 2, Goldthau's (2012) assertion that energy paradigms mirror economic 
paradigms is largely backed up by the evidence from sub-Saharan Africa. Following independence, 
most countries formed energy systems with highly centralised management dominated by large-
hydro powered grid electricity systems, aligning with the prevailing statism and modernisation 
development models (Showers, 2011). Neoliberal reforms to the region’s energy sector, which came 
to prominence in the 1990s as part of conditions attached to development loans, advocated greater 
commercialisation of the energy sector (Wamukonya, 2003). Yet, while these policies offered greater 
access to private investors, they did not significantly diminish central government control vis-à-vis the 
sub-national level (Brown et al., 2015).   
The increased geopolitical influence of the Global South and growing concerns over climate change 
triggered the emergence of the interventionism and fragmentation paradigms, whose more flexible 
governance patterns ostensibly suggested greater scope for decentralised energy governance in sub-
Saharan Africa. This potential was also indicated by cost reductions in off-grid technologies which 
suggested the economics driving the traditional (and often monopolistic) centralised approach might 
no longer apply, thus enabling greater use of distributed energy, whose more localised level of 
operations appears to align with the remit of decentralised governance (Levin & Thomas, 2016). This 
is of particular relevance to sub-Saharan Africa where low population densities indicate off-grid 
provision is key to addressing energy access issues (Pachauri et al., 2012). 
Despite this context, the key international policy interventions driving the low carbon energy agenda 
contained very little in provision for decentralised energy governance (see Table 2.2) while investment 
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from Global North financial institutions in off-grid energy and clean cooking has trailed significantly 
behind that for grid-based initiatives (Bhattacharyya, 2013). Decentralised technology initiatives have 
remained largely the domain of bilateral donor programmes: notably the solar and clean cooking 
programme of the German development agency, GIZ29 (GIZ, 2018; 2019). Having risen to become sub-
Saharan Africa’s largest energy development partner (Gualberti, 2014), China has also shown an 
investment preference for large scale generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure for grid 
electricity (Figure 3.3).  
Figure 3.3 Chinese-added generation capacity mix in sub-Saharan Africa, 2010-20 (source IEA, 2016)  
 
Domestically, sparsely populated areas which might benefit from off-grid solutions have not been 
prioritised by central governments due to “fewer perceived political ‘returns’” (Scott & Seth, 2013, 
p.7), a feature Kofi Annan (2015, p.18) emphasised, noting political patronage and corruption have 
meant “For too long, Africa’s leaders have been content to oversee highly centralized energy systems”. 
The content noted by Annan resonates with thinking in the political science discourse, which 
emphasises the high stakes associated with loss of centralised control in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Cheeseman (2015, p.10) highlighting: 
Where the government enjoys a monopoly over resources and jobs (such that 
opportunities for those outside of the regime are few and far between), as in many 
African countries, political control means economic control. Under these 
circumstances, loss of office implies a loss of financial opportunities not just for 
the leader, but also for their allies, family, and supporters 
Given the current monopolistic control of many sub-Saharan African governments over energy and 
the sector’s lucrativeness, the quote suggests that central governments are likely to particularly keenly 
resist decentralisation reforms to the energy sector which might threaten their dominion. 
Overall, it seems the reluctance of domestic governments to decentralise along with international 
investor priorities and prevailing energy paradigms have been the main causes behind the prevalence 
of highly centralised energy governance and energy access inequities in sub-Saharan Africa. However, 
there are currently a limited number of more decentralised governance systems in the region to which 
this thesis now turns. 
 
29 GIZ is an acronym for the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale (German Corporation for International Cooperation) 
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Decentralised energy governance in sub-Saharan Africa 
The two most prominent studies on energy in the context of decentralisation in the Global South: 
UNDP (2009) and Brown et al. (2015) (see Chapter 2) highlight several sub-Saharan African cases, 
providing insight into the spatially contingent factors affecting decentralised energy governance in the 
region. The two studies find six countries (Madagascar, Sudan, South Sudan, South Africa, Rwanda and 
Kenya) have legislation integrating energy into an overall decentralisation policy while a seventh, 
Malawi, is in the process of implementing such reforms (Buckland et al., 2017).  
The reforms in the former three nations appear less extensive: sub‐national government ownership 
and operation of distribution systems and power plants has been enabled but has mainly resulted in 
local governments struggling to maintain former centrally controlled infrastructure rather than 
actively adopt new energy roles and responsibilities30 (Brown et al., 2015). In contrast, the approaches 
of the latter three nations have been far more extensive. In Rwanda, significant energy roles have 
been transferred to the district level including integrating energy into annual plans, approving local 
energy initiatives by non-government actors, and awareness raising initiatives; although budgetary 
and human resource constraints have proved challenging (Vincent & Wa Gathui, 2014). The roles 
emanating from Kenya’s part-devolution of energy are arguably further reaching, particularly the 
mandate for county energy planning (explored more fully in Sections 3.8-3.9). South Africa’s 
constitution provides more extensive powers still, devolving “executive authority and rights to 
‘administer’ electricity” (UNDP, 2009, p.9).This has led to the sub-national level playing key roles in 
electrification (particularly distribution) and energy efficiency initiatives (Brown et al., 2015).  
Despite the provision for local authority energy roles, initiatives have often been hindered by sub-
national level capacity issues, particularly a lack of sectoral knowledge and “inclination to devote time 
and resources to addressing energy issues” (Brown et al., 2015, p.42). These challenges have largely 
gone unaddressed, with only a few capacity building schemes specifically targeting issues concerning 
decentralised governance, such as the 2008 ‘Renewable and Efficient Energy for Poverty Alleviation in 
Southern Africa’ (REEPASA) project in Southern Africa (Brown et al., 2015), and more recently the 
2015-19 ‘Community Energy Malawi’ initiative. Unlike other decentralised energy governance 
initiatives (e.g. Kenya), Community Energy Malawi took the uncommon but prudent step of engaging 
with a wide range of stakeholder to define the decentralised energy role prior to the devolved position 
being implemented (Buckland et al., 2017).  
In addition, the aforementioned legislative roles almost all relate to electrification and there are few 
cases of significant sub-national authority involvement in other aspects of energy (UNDP, 2009). 
Isolated examples include Rwanda, where local authorities were prominent in the national biogas 
programme (Tumwebaze, 2014), and the Central African Republic, which saw local authorities conduct 
needs analyses of community energy needs that subsequently helped shape national policy (UNDP, 
2009). The UNDP found no decentralised legislation governing the region’s most pressing energy 
access issues, domestic cooking, although Brown et al. (2015) note developments since the UNDP 
 
30 Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Mozambique also feature legislation with these provisions to the sub-national level although not 
as part of an overall policy of integrating energy into decentralisation processes. 
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study, highlighting examples from Kenya and Rwanda where local authorities have undertaken key 
roles in promoting clean cookstoves.  
Overall, the few decentralised energy governance initiatives which exist in the region indicate local 
authorities could potentially play a wide range of roles in the energy sector, incorporating most 
critically clean cooking and not confined to electrification as has mainly been the case thus far. The 
case studies illustrated suggest decentralised energy governance initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa are 
more effective when sufficient budgetary control is transferred, sub-national level capacity building 
has been implemented, and where devolved roles have been clearly demarcated as part of a multi-
stakeholder collaborative process. These factors provide key insights into issues likely to impact the 
Kenyan decentralised energy governance experience which this study explores. 
The themes discussed in this section also help explain why Kenya emerged as an ideal case study for 
this research. A key difficulty cited by both the UNDP (2009) and Brown et al. (2015) concerns whether 
a sub-national energy governance role is a result of decentralisation or simply due to being allocated 
a new role regardless of decentralisation. For the purposes of this study, it was thus prudent to choose 
a case study country, such as Kenya, with explicit devolved energy reforms so that the implications of 
decentralisation might be more easily determined. Although regionally, South Africa appears to offer 
the most significant devolved energy provisions, Kenya was selected as it has more pressing energy 
issues, a more recent devolution process, and was deemed more representative of the Global South 
than South Africa which despite its striking inequalities is classed as an upper-middle-income economy 
(World Bank, 2019b). 
3.2 Exploring Kenya’s extensive decentralisation process  
Kenya provides a particularly relevant context in sub-Saharan Africa for this study since it has 
undergone a far more extensive decentralisation process than most countries in the region (D’Arcy & 
Cornell, 2016), including, distinctively, the devolution of key energy powers. This suggests a more 
significant role for decentralised energy governance than other nations engaged in decentralisation 
processes. Kenya’s relevance to this research is reinforced by the country’s shifting energy access 
picture since the devolution process was implemented in 2013, with significant increases in electricity 
access (although not clean cooking access) inviting the question to what extent these trends can be 
attributed to decentralised energy governance (Figure 3.4). 
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Figure 3.4 Access to clean cooking and electricity in Kenya (adapted from (World Bank, 2018a/2018b) 
 
3.2.1 Decentralisation in Kenya 1963-2010: a conflicting legacy 
Understandings of decentralised energy governance, which consequently affect how the term is 
mobilised by stakeholders and ultimately its effectiveness, are highly influenced by historical 
conceptualisations of decentralisation. It therefore follows that the pre-devolution context is critical 
to explore. In this sense, Kenya between independence in 1963 and the new constitution’s 
promulgation in 2010 presented a paradox: a highly centralised MLG1-esque political system prevailed 
(Kangu, 2015), yet debates concerning decentralisation retained an “enduring place in Kenya's 
politics” (Anderson, 2005, p.564).  
Decentralisation was the dividing issue in the run-up to independence between the two main parties: 
the Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU) and the Kenyan African National Union (KANU). KADU, 
mainly representing the smaller rural-based ethnic communities, advocated majimboism (regional 
autonomy) due to fear of political and economic dominance by the larger, better educated Kikuyu and 
Luo ethnic groups who supported the nationalist, unitary state ideology of KANU (Anderson, 2005). 
Supported by self-interested colonial policies which sought to cultivate local politics and undermine 
notions of national unity, KADU’s vision prevailed and Kenya became independent under a semi-
federal majimbo constitution31. However, this was quickly undone after KANU won the inaugural 
election; their initial agreement to majimboism merely a ploy to accelerate independence 
(Cheeseman et al., 2016). The election dispute had detrimental implications for the development of 
decentralisation as “the rhetoric of KANU turned the federalist goal of majimboism into a slur: 
majimboists were derided as tribalists who opposed the broader goals of nationalism” (Anderson, 
2005, p.447). 
 
31 The 1963 independence constitution created eight regions with “considerable powers” (Chitere et al., 2006, p.12). Each 
had a legislative assembly, president, executive, and a police force in a more extensive form of decentralisation than the 
present system. Although majimbo literally translates as ‘regions’, a (highly politicised) debate exists over whether what was 
achieved by the 1963 constitution was federalism (which KADU sought). However, most align with Maxon’s (2011) 
interpretation that the independence constitution “was regional in character but fell short of a federal system”. 
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Following the defeat of majimboism, Kenya became increasingly centralised; a one-party state 
emerging under KANU’s, and the country’s, first two presidents: Jomo Kenyatta32 (1964-1978) and 
Daniel Arop Moi (1978-2002) (Table 3.3). Although weak forms of decentralisation were introduced 
during Moi’s presidency, these were self-serving policies to consolidate central control. In the 1980s, 
Moi allocated power to district administrators, yet these policies amounted to deconcentration: an 
expansion of field offices filled by personnel centrally and ethnically aligned to Moi which consolidated 
his control over rural development (Barkan & Chege, 1989). Similarly, in the 1990s, Moi invoked 
majimboism as a means to divide the opposition, mobilising ethnic sentiment over contested land 
rights in the Rift Valley and the Coast which sparked election violence in 1992 and 1997. This 
mobilisation of majimboism involved no actual transfer of power but “showed how devolution could 
be used to reinforce rather than counter ethnic politics” (Cornell & D’Arcy, 2014, p.14). 
Table 3.3 Historical context of Kenyan decentralisation: timeline of key events 
Year Event 
1963 Kenya gains independence with a semi-federal constitution 
1964 Amendment abolishes parliamentary system making Kenya a republic and highly centralised 
1965 Amendment abolishes majimboism (Regionalism) abolished 
1969 Kenya becomes de facto one party state 
1982 Kenya becomes de jure one party state 
1983 Moi introduces weak deconcentration reforms to consolidate central power 
1991 Moi mobilises majimboism as a divide and rule measure, exacerbating ethnic tension 
2005  Proposed new constitution is defeated in a referendum. Opposition centred around Kibaki’s 
weakening of the devolution and parliamentary system provisions in the earlier Bomas draft. 
2007-8 Post-election violence leads to urgency for devolution 
2010  New constitution adopted with devolution at its core 
2018+ Following the disputed 2017 election, opposition leaders have called for the Constitution to be 
amended to bring in the parliamentary system proposed by the Bomas draft. 
 
Further central government constraint of decentralisation initiatives was evident when Mwai Kibaki 
took office in 2002; the new president reneged on a pledge to support genuine constitutional change 
(commitment to which had brought him to power) by weakening the significant devolution provisions 
in the constitutional reform document, the ‘Bomas draft’ (Chitere et al., 2006). Opposition to the 
dilution of these reforms saw the emergence of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) opposition 
group which campaigned successfully to defeat the proposed constitution in the 2005 referendum 
(with a clear 58% ‘no’ vote). Following the referendum, ODM advocated decentralisation in the run 
up to the 2007 election as a means to unify communities outside Kibaki’s central province heartland, 
while Kibaki sought to side-line the process to consolidate centralised power.  
However, persisting with the centralised status quo became no longer tenable in the wake of the 
violence following the disputed 2007 election, which claimed over 1000 lives and displaced almost 
700,000 people (Lynch 2009). Deep rooted ethnic tensions came to the fore particularly over the 
historically emotive issue of land rights; an issue exacerbated by successive elite regimes using land as 
a patronage resource to mobilise electoral support (Boone, 2011), creating the conditions where 
extended civil conflict seemed a distinct possibility (Cheeseman, 2008). While the election was seen 
 
32 Kenyatta was Prime Minister from 1963-64 before constitutional amendments conferred on him the role of president. 
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as having ignited the crisis, the root cause was broadly understood to lie in Kenya’s highly centralised, 
corrupt winner-takes-all ethnic-based polity (Mueller, 2008; Branch & Cheeseman, 2009): D’Arcy and 
Cornell (2016, p.247) summarising the “underlying pathologies of Kenyan politics” as:  
the over-centralization of the state that allowed certain ethnic groups to dominate 
leading to inequitable resource distribution, politicized ethnicity in ways that 
fuelled violence, and stimulated a political culture of “our turn to eat”. 
Stakeholder recognition of these deep-rooted causes in the negotiations to end the violence resulted 
in the political elite committing to seek constitutional reform incorporating devolution “as a means to 
address Kenya’s chronic ethnic conflicts” (Cheeseman et al., 2016, p.3). This gave rise to the 2010 
referendum where a new constitution was overwhelmingly passed with 68.6% in favour; surveys 
conducted by Kramon and Posner (2011, p.96) finding devolution along with “a simple desire for 
change” the two most commonly cited reasons for support.  
Overall, the pre-devolution context highlights the contentiousness of decentralisation in Kenya due to 
the various ways it was mobilised by Kenya’s political elite, used variously as a defensive measure 
against economic and political domination, a symbol of ethno-nationalism, or as a vehicle for greater 
representativeness. These tensions have implications for the current devolution process as they 
indicate the potential ways the Constitution and its provisions for decentralised energy governance 
might be mobilised by stakeholders to serve significantly different political agendas – a critical issue 
which reiterates the importance of research question 2 in interrogating how the interactions and 
agendas of energy stakeholders have shaped the emergent decentralised energy governance in Kenya. 
3.2.2 Energy policy and governance 1963-2010: centralisation and inequality in Kenya 
The tension over decentralisation noted in the previous section was influential in the development of 
Kenyan energy policy and governance prior to devolution. This backdrop is thus important to explore 
if the influences on the current stakeholder interactions and agendas shaping decentralised energy 
governance (the subject of RQ2) and their spatial variations (the focus of RQ3) are to be fully 
understood. To this end, this section adopts the novel approach of exploring the historical 
development of Kenyan energy policy and governance through the lens of decentralisation, 
addressing a gap in the literature which has paid insufficient attention to correlations between the 
two themes. 
The influence the degree of centralisation has had on Kenyan energy policy and governance has been 
evident from independence and echoes the notions of energy paradigms mirroring economic 
paradigms noted in Chapter 2 (cf. Goldthau, 2012). Following independence, the Kenyan economy was 
heavily influenced by the ideals of modernisation theory which were articulated via the key planning 
document, ‘Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965’33. Although entitled “African Socialism”, the document 
espoused a mixed economy, combining aspects of the free market with strong centralised control and 
the nationalisation of key sectors (Speich, 2009). The paper conceived entirely economic means to 
 
33 Competing visions for Kenya’s post-colonial economy existed but ultimately Planning Minister Tom Mboya’s modernist 
vision prevailed over vice-president Oginga Odinga’s socialism, leading to the latter’s departure from KANU in 1966. 
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achieve its objectives of social justice and humane living conditions (Odhiambo, 2013), an end which 
led to the conscious marginalisation of ‘less developed’ areas as indicated in Article 133: 
One of our problems is to decide how much priority we should give in investing in 
less developed provinces. To make the economy as a whole grow as fast as 
possible, development money should be invested where it will yield the largest 
increase in net output. This approach will clearly favour the development of areas 
having abundant natural resource, good land and rainfall, transport and power 
facilities, and people receptive to and active in development (Government of 
Kenya). 
This belief in trickle-down economics deliberately created the now recognised historical 
marginalisation of arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs - Figure 3.5), a policy reinforced by attitudes within 
the highest levels of government (Odhiambo, 2013). Former senator for Mandera (an ASAL county), 
Billow Kerrow, arguing with reason that it was “a deceptive attempt to create political equality, equal 
opportunities and social justice” (Kerrow, 2015, p.1).  
The implications of the highly centralised and geographically unequal control proffered by ‘Sessional 
Paper No. 10 of 1965’ were evident for energy policy and governance. Indicative of the then prevailing 
statism paradigm, energy investment centred on large state subsidised capital infrastructure projects, 
built by foreign investors which created a highly centralised governance structure and a reliance on 
large hydropower (Newell & Phillips, 2016). The geographical inequities insinuated by Sessional Paper 
No. 10 of 1965 also appeared striking, given the distinct lack of electricity coverage in ASAL regions 
areas which still resonates today (Figure 3.5). Former senator for Mandera (an ASAL county), Billow 
Kerrow (2015, p.1), arguing “The consequences of such skewed socio-economic policies and 
development blueprints formed the basis for the pursuit of devolution to address inequitable resource 
allocation”. 
Figure 3.5 Lack of grid electricity coverage in ASAL areas of Kenya in 2013 (Source: Pueyo, 2015)        
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With the economy faltering in the 1980s, Kenya ostensibly aligned with the prevailing ‘neoliberal turn’, 
becoming the first sub-Saharan Africa nation to agree to World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) structural adjustment programme in 1980 (Gertz, 2008). However, the government initially 
ignored specifications to adopt more open, market-based approaches, with Moi reluctant to 
implement reforms which “threatened [the] rent-seeking opportunities and political patronage” 
proffered by centralised state control of the economy (Were et al., 2006, p.51). The centralised control 
of the energy sector was thus largely unaffected by this initial foray into neoliberalism. 
Moi’s lack of compliance eventually led to an aid embargo by the World Bank and IMF in 1991, which 
particularly hit the energy sector: the scale of corruption surrounding the Turkwell Gorge Dam project 
(built 1986-91) causing "donor allergy" towards the sector (Wrong, 1995 cited in Elliot, 1997, p.529), 
which resulted in the suspension of international donor aid for energy projects until 1996 (Hawley, 
2003).  The pressure imposed by this embargo contributed to the subsequent liberalisation of the 
economy and introduction of multi-party elections in 1992 (Crawford, 2007) while the deterioration 
of energy services in Kenya during the longer energy sector aid embargo led to a greater willingness 
to adhere to the prescriptions of the Bretton Woods institutions vis-a-vis the energy sector.  
However, as Newell & Phillips (2016, p.42) remark “clear distinctions cannot be made between an era 
of state-led and privatised energy in Kenya”. This appears evident in the conditional loans of the World 
Bank and IMF that followed the embargo’s lifting in 1996 which prescribed the partial privatisation of 
Kenya’s energy sector34, reflecting the shift in developmental thinking to more flexible hybrid state-
market approaches (Goldthau, 2012). Central to these recommendations was restructuring state 
owned and public/private energy utilities to operate on a commercial basis (Newell & Phillips, 2016), 
a reform fulfilled by a series of legislative acts between 1996-2006 which unbundled the vertically 
integrated Kenya Power and Lighting Company (KPLC): the discrete functions of the electricity sector 
now run by separate semi-autonomous parastatals with access enabled to the private sector (Table 
3.4)35.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 See ‘Economic Reforms for 1996-1998: Policy Framework Paper’ (Government of Kenya, World Bank and IMF, 1995)  
35 Kenyan law defines ‘parastatal’ as: “a State Corporation established by an order of the President to perform specific 
functions” (Kamau, 2013). There were 119 parastatals in 2015; nine ‘energy parastatals’ under the Ministry of Energy and 
Petroleum (MoEP) (Muriuku, 2015). 
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Table 3.4 Key Kenyan agencies established after 1995 neoliberal reforms (adapted from Dong & Mori, 2017) 
Legislation Year Agencies established Functions 
Economic Reforms 
for 1996-1998 
Policy Framework 
1995 First Independent Power 
Producers (IPPs) 
Private sector generation selling bulk 
power to Kenya Power & Lighting Company 
Ltd. (KPLC) 
1997 
Electric Power Act 
1997 Kenya Electricity Generation 
Company (KenGen) breaks from 
KPLC  
KenGen: Electricity generation. 
KPLC: Off-grid generation, power purchase, 
transmission, distribution and retail. 
Energy Act 2006 2006 Rural Electrification Authority 
(REA) 
Implementation of the Rural Electrification 
Program (scheme construction). 
2006 Energy Regulatory Commission 
(ERC) 
Enforcing regulations, licensing, customer 
protection, approving power purchase 
agreements and tariff reviews. 
2006 KenGen part privatised (30%) As above 
2007 Energy Tribunal Hear and determine appeals brought 
against the decisions of the ERC.  
2008 Geothermal Development 
Company (GDC) 
Development of geothermal resources. 
2008 Kenya Electricity Transmission 
Company (KETRACO) 
Development and ownership of new 
transmission lines. 
 
Yet, this restructuring did not envisage a role for the sub-national level and while reforms provided 
private sector investment opportunities, most notably for independent power producers (IPPs) to 
generate electricity, actual control of the electricity sector remained highly centralised. The terms and 
conditions of power purchase agreements (PPAs) for IPPs were determined by the Energy Regulatory 
Commission (ERC) while, moreover, KPLC remained the sole off-taker, retailer and predominant 
distributor of grid electricity, thus ensuring a de facto national government monopoly (Figure 3.6). 
Thus, these structural reforms clearly constitute a form of ‘delegation’ (see Chapter 2), with the 
parastatals and IPPs still responding and accountable to the centre. 
Figure 3.6 Institutional structure of grid electricity in Kenya in 2017 (adapted from KETRACO, 2017) 
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Following the structural reforms, the part liberalised status of the Kenyan energy sector facilitated a 
range of state, donor and private sector actors to play significant roles in the governance of energy 
(Newell & Phillips, 2016). Off-grid solar energy was a particular beneficiary of this new regime. Having 
emerged in the mid-1980s, donor support mainly in the 1990s helped create demand, build networks 
and absorb risks that the private sector alone could not bear (Ockwell and Byrne, 2016). This support 
was particularly critical given the state offered little support and at times was deliberately obstructive 
(e.g. by setting uncompetitive feed-in tariffs for solar) due to off-grid solar conflicting with central 
government grid electricity interests (Newell & Phillips, 2016). 
The growing influence of South-South investment has also provided Kenyan energy governance with 
alternative policy options to those advocated by the Global North, a situation which continues to 
resonate today. In particular, Chinese financing has been viewed as less conditional, lending itself to 
energy investments (e.g. in fossils fuels – see Figure 3.3) where Global North agencies have often been 
more circumspect due to the prevailing sustainable development agenda (Newell & Phillips, 2016). 
This broader range of financing options seemed to resonate with Kenyan energy governance in the 
late 2000s. The key energy policy developments: Kenya Vision 2030 (Kenya’s long-term development 
plan) and the Least Cost Power Development Plan 2011-2031 (LCPDP) made provisions for both fossil 
fuel and renewable investment while also incorporating nuclear power into long-term planning (Table 
3.5). 
Table 3.5 Key Kenyan energy policies launched before the Constitution (adapted from Dong & Mori, 2017) 
Legislation Year Outcomes 
Kenya Vision 2030 2008 long-term development blueprint 
Feed-in-Tariff policy 2008 Allows IPPs to sell renewable electricity to off-takers at a pre-
determined tariff for a given period of time. 
Least Cost Power 
Development Plan 2011-2031 
2009 Forecasts future power demand and how best it can be met at least 
cost. Targets multiple renewable sources and fossil fuels  
 
Overall, it seems Kenya’s prevailing highly centralised energy governance has played a significant part 
in the nation’s energy access inequities. Policy development was skewed to marginalise less developed 
areas while measures which could have mitigated the impact of these policies, such as off-grid solar 
and decentralising control of the sector, received little to no state support. The implications of this 
historical context bear significant weight for the current devolution process as they raise questions 
concerning how stakeholder agendas and power relations entrenched in the highly centralised top-
down MLG1-esque energy governance of the pre-devolution era can be integrated into the devolved, 
ostensibly MLG2, form proposed by the new constitution. The lack of provision for decentralised 
energy governance pre-2010 also raises concerns over how capably counties will assume devolved 
energy powers. Much would appear to depend on the clarity and guidelines of the constitution and 
surrounding legislation which is where this study turns its attention next. 
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3.3 The 2010 constitution: a new system of governance? 
Promulgated in 2010, the new Kenyan Constitution has devolution at its core (Kangu, 2015), providing 
for 47 county governments36 in an attempt to add checks and balances to centralised power 
(particularly the president’s) and mitigate ethnic-based politics (Figure 3.7). Each county has an 
elected assembly and governor (heading the county executive) while representation at the national 
level is achieved via an elected women’s representative in the national assembly and a senator in the 
newly formed upper house, established to represent county government interests (Figure 3.8). The 
Constitution depicts Kenyan devolution as a system of multilevel government, comprised of two levels 
(national and county) which are “distinct and interdependent” and required to “conduct their mutual 
relations on the basis of consultation and cooperation" (Article 6(2)). Power is thus separated both 
vertically through distinct national and county functions and horizontally with both levels required to 
collaborate and provide checks on the other (Lumumba & Franceschi, 2014, p.18), thus implying a 
MLG2-esque vision of governance. 
Figure 3.7 Political map of Kenya pre- and post-implementation of the 2010 Constitution (Maps of World, 
n.d.; Herstory, n.d.) 
 
 
 
 
 
36 Previously, Kenya was divided into 8 provinces which were subdivided into a number of districts (40 + the Nairobi area at 
independence in 1963 and later 46 + the Nairobi area in 1992. However, these former sub-national levels were unelected 
and had little autonomous power, with Anderson, (2005, p.546) noting: “the daily administration of the provinces and 
districts remains under the direct control of the Office of the President without reference to Parliament”. The 47 counties in 
the 2010 constitution are based on the 46 districts + Nairobi which existed in 1992.  
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Figure 3.8 Structure of governance under the new Kenyan Constitution (adapted from Express 
Communications Ltd, 2015) 
 
Kenyan devolution is thus more extensive than most decentralisation processes in sub-Saharan Africa 
(D’Arcy & Cornell, 2016), its checks to centralise power further reinforced by the constitution’s 
protections to governors and senators, reallocation of key functions to counties, and guarantee of at 
least 15% of national revenue to the counties37 (Cheeseman et al., 2016). This extensiveness, 
encompassing devolved political, administrative, and fiscal powers means the Kenyan system is closer 
to federalism (Crawford & Hartmann, 2008) as constitutional law expert, Kangu (2015, p.15) explains: 
devolution in the Kenyan context … is not mere decentralisation. The system has 
quite a number of federal features which are entrenched in the Constitution and 
cannot be changed on a whim of the national government. … . The system closely 
resembles the South African one and may correctly be described as quasi-federal.   
This extensive “quasi-federal”, consultative and cooperative form of devolution presented in the 
Constitution reinforces the notion of a governance system more in line with MLG2 than MLG1. 
Yet, the viability of devolution was questioned. There were concerns from county governments that 
national government would not fully relinquish power and instead steer counties to acquiescence with 
its own objectives (Cheeseman, 2014). Others saw scope for corruption, political patronage and a new 
‘winner-takes-all’ ethnic politics to be devolved to the county level, potentially reigniting existing or 
creating new ethnic conflict (Boone, 2012). The cost of devolution was also a frequently raised 
concern, understandable given the creation of 47 new administrations, which also increased the scope 
for duplication of services (World Bank, 2011).  
 
37 Counties are allocated a share of this revenue based on five parameters: population (45%), poverty Index (20%), land area 
(8%), basic equal share (25%), and fiscal responsibility (2%); a method employed to facilitate more equitable redistribution 
of wealth than under the previous system (CRA, 2017). The Constitution also sets aside a further 0.5% of annual national 
revenues for the national government equalisation fund to be shared among the 14 historically marginalised counties. 
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In addition, there appeared to be potential for contested understandings of the functions (i.e. roles) 
assigned to each level of government as certain functions overlapped both national and county 
government mandates. In such cases, the functions need to be understood with reference to the 
articles listed in Table 3.6, particularly 186(2) which highlights that in instances of overlap, jurisdiction 
is “concurrent” (i.e. shared). However, as Dr John Mutakhu Kangu (2015, p.192), a leading 
constitutional law scholar and author of the sole text centred on interpreting the devolution provisions 
in the Kenyan constitution, explains: concurrent functions “must be determined through 
interpretation” as they are not explicitly identified by the constitution. Kangu (2015) states overlaps 
should be addressed via the ‘bottom up’ approach of the South African Constitution38 which argues 
the exclusive powers of the subnational powers should be determined first before the remainder are 
allocated to the national level. This rationale was first established by the South African Supreme Court 
of Appeal (2010, p.157) as: 
It is to be expected that the powers that are vested in government at the national 
level will be described in the broadest of terms, … the provincial government … in 
narrower terms, and … the municipalities will be expressed in the narrowest terms 
of all. To reason inferentially with the broader expression as the starting point is 
bound to denude the narrower expression of any meaning and by so doing to 
invert the clear constitutional intention of devolving powers on local government. 
It is thus to this task of interpretation that this thesis now turns as it seeks to understand the intended 
provisions for decentralised energy governance in the new constitution.  
Table 3.6 Key articles governing concurrent functions in the Constitution of Kenya 
Article 
no 
Article description 
6 (2) The governments at the national and county levels are distinct and inter-dependent and shall 
conduct their mutual relations on the basis of consultation and cooperation 
186 
(2)  
 
A function or power that is conferred on more than one level of government is a function or power 
within the concurrent jurisdiction of each of those levels of government. 
186 
(3)  
 
A function or power not assigned by this Constitution or national legislation to a county is a 
function or power of the national government. 
191 
(1-2) 
 
 
Re conflicts between national and county legislation over matters within the concurrent 
jurisdiction of both government levels. National legislation prevails over county legislation if: a) 
the national legislation applies uniformly throughout Kenya and any of the conditions specified in 
clause 3 is satisfied; or b) the national legislation is aimed at preventing unreasonable action by a 
county that: (i) is prejudicial to the economic, health or security interests of Kenya or another 
county; or (ii) impedes the implementation of national economic policy. 
3.3.1 Interpreting devolved energy in the Constitution of Kenya 
Although the broad motivations behind the devolution of energy are not explicitly stated by the 
constitution, they can be assumed to align with the underlying “objects [i.e. objectives] … of devolved 
government” in Article 174 (Table 3.7). Arguably most relevant given the sector’s recognition as a key 
 
38 The Kenyan Constitution borrows heavily from South Africa’s constitution vis-a-vis devolved government (Kangu, 2015) 
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enabler of development and poverty alleviation, is the objective “to promote social and economic 
development and the provision of proximate, easily accessible services throughout Kenya” (Article 
174f. In addition, the geographical inequities in energy access in Kenya pre-devolution suggest 174e 
and 174g might also particularly resonate with energy although 174h and 174i appear challenging due 
to the pre-existing elite capture of the highly centralised Kenyan energy sector (see Section 3.6). 
Table 3.7 Objects of devolved government in the Constitution of Kenya, Article 174 
The objects of the devolution of government are: 
a) to promote democratic and accountable exercise of power; 
b) to foster national unity by recognising diversity; 
c) to give powers of self-governance to the people and enhance the participation of the people in the 
exercise of the powers of the State and in making decisions affecting them; 
d) to recognise the right of communities to manage their own affairs and to further their development; 
e) to protect and promote the interests and rights of minorities and marginalised communities; 
f) to promote social and economic development and the provision of proximate, easily accessible services 
throughout Kenya; 
g) to ensure equitable sharing of national and local resources throughout Kenya; 
h) to facilitate the decentralisation of State organs, their functions and services, from the capital of Kenya;  
i) to enhance checks and balances and the separation of powers. 
 
However, whilst the motivations for the devolution of energy can be assumed to align with these 
objects, the specificity of the powers devolved is far less easily deduced as the Constitution provides 
only a broad overview of county energy roles39.  As Table 3.8 highlights, the main county energy role 
is not uniquely demarcated and is instead found as a subsidiary of function 8, which stipulates the 
county energy role as “county planning and development [of] … electricity and gas reticulation and 
energy regulation” but provides no specifics of what that planning should encompass.  
Further county energy roles can be found in the sub-sections of other sectoral functions (Table 3.8), 
with the county responsibility for street lighting embedded within function 5, ‘County transport’40. 
Opaquer still, the responsibility for air pollution is contained within the broad remit of function 3 
“Control of air pollution, noise pollution, other public nuisances and outdoor advertising”. As air 
pollution is the most pressing energy issue facing Kenya due to the severe health and environmental 
impacts from cooking with biomass (see Chapter 1), it seems critical to explicitly state the direct 
causality between energy and air pollution. Failing to do so appears to run the risk of the responsibility 
not being interpreted as an energy function, particularly as it is not clear whether this clause refers to 
indoor pollution or only pollution experienced outside (i.e. from cars, factories)41. 
 
 
 
39 The allocation of national and county government functions is found in the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution. 35 
functions are allocated to national government and 14 for county governments 
40 Although transport is directly connected to energy, it is not incorporated into this PhD as the county functions centre on 
the communications aspects (e.g. roads, parking) of the sector rather its energy requirements. 
41 The other responsibilities in county function 3 are redolent of issues experienced outside the house, possibly suggesting 
air pollution is also conceived as outdoor rather than the critical indoor concern. 
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Table 3.8 Allocation of energy functions in the Constitution of Kenya 
National Government function County Government function 
Protection of the environment and natural resources 
with a view to establishing a durable and sustainable 
system of development, including energy policy (22d)* 
County planning and development (8) 
including: (e) electricity and gas reticulation and 
energy regulation. 
Energy policy including electricity and gas reticulation 
and energy regulation (31) 
County transport (5) 
including… (b) street lighting 
 Control of air pollution, noise pollution, other 
public nuisances and outdoor advertising (3) 
*function number as listed in the Constitution provided in brackets 
 
The lack of detail concerning county energy roles contrasts markedly with sectors such as agriculture 
and health, where the Constitution provides a detailed breakdown of specific county responsibilities 
(Table 3.9). This difference stems partly from health and agriculture being more devolved but also 
suggests the devolution of energy was not as clearly envisaged compared to other sectors. Support 
for the latter interpretation appeared to derive from the comments of a senior national government 
devolution officer, who stated that he was unaware of the criteria for deciding why energy would be 
largely concurrent unlike water and agriculture which are more fully devolved [4] 42. 
Table 3.9 Allocation of agriculture and health functions in the Constitution of Kenya 
National Government 
function 
County Government function 
Agricultural policy (29)* Agriculture (1) including: (a) crop and animal husbandry; (b) livestock sale yards; 
(c) county abattoirs; (d) plant and animal disease control; and (e) fisheries. 
National referral health 
facilities (23) and  
Health policy (28) 
 
 
County health services (2) including: (a) county health facilities and pharmacies; 
(b) ambulance services; (c) promotion of primary health care; (d) licensing and 
control of undertakings that sell food to the public; (e) veterinary services 
(excluding regulation of the profession); (f) cemeteries, funeral parlours and 
crematoria; and (g) refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal. 
*function number as listed in the Constitution provided in brackets 
 
The overlapping nature of the Constitution’s energy roles offers potential for roles to be misconstrued, 
particularly the main county energy function: “county planning and development [of] … electricity and 
gas reticulation and energy regulation” which appears to closely mirror the national government 
function: “Energy Policy including electricity and gas reticulation and energy regulation”. Legal expert, 
Omuko-Jung (2016, p.1) highlights that “pursuant to Article 186(2) … energy regulation (including 
planning) is a concurrent function of the two levels of government”. Kangu (2015, p.179) agrees, but 
warns that the Constitution “may be misinterpreted as conferring powers upon national government 
to reticulate electricity and gas”, stressing that “the operational phrase is ‘energy policy’, which 
demarcates and limits the responsibility and powers of national government to policy or legislative 
matters only”. Thus, Kangu (2015, p.179) concludes “national government may make policy or 
legislate to govern the reticulation of electricity and gas, but may not itself reticulate electricity and 
 
42 The number within square brackets refers to a code assigned to each stakeholder interviewed. The full list of 
interviewees and their codes can be found in Appendix 1. 
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gas”. Under this bottom-up analysis, Kangu demarcates the energy functions of the Constitution as 
shown in Table 3.10. 
Table 3.10 Kangu’s Interpretation of concurrent energy functions (adapted from Kangu, 2015, p.200) 
National 
exclusive powers 
Concurrent powers listed as 
national function  
Concurrent powers listed as 
county function 
County exclusive 
powers  
 Protection of the environment 
and natural resources with a 
view to establishing a durable 
and sustainable system of 
development, including energy 
policy (22d)* 
County energy regulation (8) Implementation of 
national government 
energy policy in respect 
of intra-county matters 
(implied by 22(d)) 
 Energy policy including 
electricity and gas reticulation 
and energy regulation (31) 
 County electricity and 
gas reticulation (8) 
 
Overall, the constitutional articles governing energy suggest an MLG2-esque model of energy 
governance was intended for Kenya. This leaning towards MLG2 in the energy sector seems arguably 
more pronounced than for Kenyan governance generally given the prominence of overlapping energy 
functions and the non-hierarchical structure interpreted by Kangu and Omuku. However, there 
appears clear potential to revert to a MLG1 position as articles 186(3) and 191(1) provide national 
government with jurisdiction in matters of unclarity or conflict; articles which, although 
understandable given Kenya remains a unitary or “quasi-federal” state (Kangu, 2015, p.15), could 
significantly impact on energy governance given the prevalence of concurrent roles. In addition, while 
both levels of government can legislate in terms of reticulation and regulation, this study disagrees 
with Kangu’s interpretation of energy policy as concurrent as the extent to which policy under article 
31 is (or will be interpreted as) the preserve of national government and will dictate the sector is 
unclear (Table 3.10). Whether correct or not on a theoretical basis, the empirical findings of this thesis 
will reveal that in the four years following Kangu’s work, policy has largely resembled a national 
exclusive power (see Chapters 5,6 & 7).   
3.3.2 Devolved energy: interpreting the broader legislative framework 
The lack of detail concerning the devolution of energy roles in the Constitution is partly addressed by 
the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution (section 7) which states:  
All law in force immediately before the effective date continues in force and shall 
be construed with the alterations, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions 
necessary to bring it into conformity with this Constitution.  
It therefore follows that any jurisdiction assigned to the sub-national level before the enactment of 
the Constitution is conferred to the county government, the successors of that sub-national authority. 
Thus, an examination of the key pre-Constitution legislation governing sub-national jurisdiction is 
required to help determine the scope of devolved energy powers. An overview of the county roles 
deduced from these legislative acts is provided in Tables 3.11-3.12, although the constraints of the 
word limit dictate only those acts considered to have most bearing will be analysed in detail. 
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Table 3.11 Deduced county energy roles from legislation enacted before the Kenyan constitution 
Legislation County energy role 
Environmental 
Management and 
Coordination Act 1999 
Prepare a district environment action plan every 5 years. Identify hilly 
/mountainous areas in risk of degradation and plan for their reforestation, 
afforestation and sustainable use. Comment on emission license applications  
Energy Act 2006 Designate petroleum tankers parking site (99). Counties to be informed of 
applications for energy generation, transmission & distribution licences (28.3) 
2005-10 Forest/Charcoal 
Acts 
Hold in trust unregistered community land. 
Energy (Electricity 
Licensing) Regulations 
2010 
May undertake generation, transmission or distribution of electricity once 
issued with a license. 
Physical Planning Act 2010 Grant development permissions within the area of county authority  
Energy Act 2006  
Guided by Sessional Paper No. 4 of 2004 which cemented Kenya’s neoliberal reforms (see section 3.6) 
into energy policy, the Energy Act 2006 was the operative law governing the energy sector at the time 
of the Constitution’s enactment and remained so until March 2019 when the Energy Bill 2017 was 
enacted. The Act posed challenges for devolution as significant powers were not delegated to the 
districts (the sub-national level prior to devolution); the districts only mandated with the designation 
of petroleum tanker parking sites and the need to be informed of applications for energy generation, 
transmission and distribution licences. 
Subsequent amendments to the Energy Act 2006, shown in Table 3.12, specified additional roles for 
local authorities which should be conferred to the county. The potential to undertake generation, 
transmission or distribution of electricity stipulated in the Energy (Electricity Licensing) Regulations 
2010 is potentially transformative but subject to approval by national government, thus constraining 
autonomy. The latter two are far less significant. The Energy (Solar Water Heating) Regulations 2012 
create a county role enforcing national solar heating systems policy role while the Energy (Energy 
Management) Regulations 2012 stipulate counties ensure their own facilities comply with national 
energy saving regulations. Therefore, it seems the Energy Act 2006 and its later amendments do not 
significantly aid the interpretation of the intended devolved energy role under the Constitution. 
Table 3.12 Effect of Energy Act 2006 amendments on devolved roles in Kenya (adapted from Omuko, 2016) 
Regulation Local authority role now applicable to county governments  
Energy (Electricity 
Licensing) Regulations 
2010 
May undertake generation, transmission or distribution of electricity once issued 
with a license (pursuant to the Energy Act, section 27). 
Energy (Solar Water 
Heating) Regulations 
2012  
Before approving building plans, enforce requirement that all premises within the 
county jurisdiction with hot water requirements exceeding 100 litres per day 
install and use solar heating systems. Premises heating water via cogeneration or 
excess renewable energy are exempt (3-4). 
Energy (Energy 
Management) 
Regulations 2012  
Develop energy management policies, have energy audits undertaken, prepare 
investment plans and proposals for energy conservation, and take measures to 
realize 50%+ of the energy savings identified for facilities either owned or 
occupied by the counties (5-8). 
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In addition, although the post-Energy Act 2006 milieu saw the launch of key policies, such as the 
development blueprint, Kenya Vision 2030, and the energy planning document, the Least Cost Power 
Development Plan (LCPDP) (Table 3.12); neither provided much assistance in interpreting how energy 
roles were to be devolved. Kenya Vision 2030 (2007, p.159) envisaged “a democratic decentralisation 
of decision making and resource distribution … that takes account of local needs and priorities” as a 
guiding principle, specifying devolved funds and roles for health and urban planning yet not for energy. 
The LCPDP (2011, p.95) provided no explicit reference to devolution, suggesting only that local 
authorities have “substantial potential” to use municipal waste for power generation. However, there 
was tacit understanding at the time of the Constitution’s unveiling of the need to clarify and 
‘unbundle’ the energy roles; “the Constitution can’t have everything” as a senior NGO officer 
remarked [73]. An energy bill to replace the Energy Act 2006 was being considered during the second 
administration of President Kibaki (2008-2013), yet the first draft was not released until 2015 and not 
promulgated until March 2019 (see Chapter 5). 
Post-Constitution legislation 
Following the promulgation of the Constitution on August 27th, 2010 but prior to its implementation 
after the 2013 General Election, several key legislative acts were passed which had bearing on the 
interpretation of devolved energy roles (Table 3.13).  Chief among these was the County Governments 
Act 2012, considered by Omuko (2016, p.2) 
the main legislation that gives effect to, among others, Article 186 and the Fourth 
Schedule to the Constitution by providing for the powers, functions and 
responsibilities of county governments.  
The Act charges the counties with developing five-year County Integrated Development Plans (CIDPs) 
and ten-year County Sectorial Plans (Articles 108-109), with Article 106(2) stating these plans are to 
be “based on the functions of the county governments as specified in the Fourth Schedule to the 
Constitution and on relevant national policies”. As the Constitution stipulates energy regulation as a 
concurrent function, it follows that counties are mandated to develop county energy plans.  
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Table 3.13 2010 - 2013 post-Constitution legislation and its effect on devolved energy roles in Kenya 
Legislation County energy role 
Urban Areas and Cities 
Act 2011 
Provides for the management and governance of urban areas and cities including 
the preparation of an integrated urban area or city development plan, 
County Governments 
Act 2012 
Develop five-year County Integrated Development Plan (CIDP) and 10-year 
County Sectorial Plans 
Energy (Solar Water 
Heating) Regulations 
2012  
Enforce requirement that all premises within the county jurisdiction with hot 
water requirements over 100 litres per day install and use solar heating systems.  
Energy (Energy 
Management) 
Regulations 2012 
Counties to develop energy management policies, have energy audits 
undertaken, prepare investment plan and proposals for energy conservation, and 
take measures to realize at least 50% of the energy savings identified in the plan 
for facilities either owned or occupied by the counties. 
Transition to Devolved 
Government Act 2012  
No specific reference to energy but provides a framework for the transition to 
devolved government pursuant to the Sixth Schedule (15) of the Constitution, 
which states parliament shall ensure the phased transfer not of the functions 
assigned to the county does not exceed three years. 
Intergovernmental 
Relations Act 2012 
No specific reference to energy but establishes a framework for consultation and 
co-operation between the national and county governments and amongst county 
governments, including mechanisms for resolving intergovernmental disputes.  
Public Private 
Partnership (PPP) Act 
2013 
Provides for the county to engage in a PPP enabling private sector involvement 
(e.g. financing, construction, operation) in government infrastructure or 
development projects (including energy). For each PPP, the county is mandated 
to establish various institutions while projects exploiting natural resources under 
Article 71 of the Constitution must be ratified by (national) Parliament. 
National Government 
Co-ordination Act 2013 
No specific reference to energy but establishes in each county (in hierarchical 
order): a county commissioner, deputy and assistant county commissioners, and 
chiefs to co-ordinate national government functions. This effectively constitutes a 
repackaging of the pre-devolution deconcentrated administration system, 
running parallel to the newly devolved system. (Cheeseman et al., 2016) 
 
These energy plans clearly seem the most significant energy role charged to the counties, yet the 
requirement for these plans to be guided by national policy suggests the national level may still be the 
driver of sub-national energy sector interventions. In addition, power dynamics are further clouded 
by the reimplementation of the national government deconcentrated administration system, which 
was “smuggled” into the new governance arrangements via the National Government Co-ordination 
Act 2013, passed in the final weeks of Kibaki’s government (Cheeseman et al., 2016, p.24)43.  Thus, 
how policy power is wielded and the power relations between the two levels of government seems 
highly likely to influence whether the MLG2 form of governance depicted by the Constitution reverts 
to a more hierarchical MLG1 form. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a discussion of how the conceptual and theoretical debates discussed in 
Chapter 2 have unfolded in Kenya and, more broadly, sub-Saharan Africa. Through this critical 
engagement, I begin to show how the novel application of MLG to energy governance provides an 
 
43 A senior law academic at a Kenyan university contended that the retention of the pre-devolution national government 
administration system “made no sense [and] was a political compromise” to ensure support from commissioners and chiefs 
for the 2010 referendum on the Constitution.    
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easily comprehensible means to understand how the inherently complex processes of 
decentralisation and decentralised energy governance have developed in Kenya – the aim of research 
question 1 and a focus resumed in Chapter 5.  
The use of MLG helps identify that the legislative framework surrounding Kenyan devolution strongly 
implied an MLG2-esque form of governance was intended for Kenya and even more so for the Kenyan 
energy sector, evident from the overlapping national and county government jurisdictions which 
operate at several scales and the explicit requirement for both levels of government to collaborate 
and provide checks on the other (cf. Table 2.5 - Hooghe & Marks, 2003). The MLG framework then 
helps reveal three clear tensions between the legislative rhetoric of Kenyan devolution and on the 
ground realities – disconnects which have significant scope to undermine decentralised governance. 
Firstly, Kenya’s historical context of entrenched highly centralised governance, which contributed 
considerably to the nation’s energy access inequities, has direct implications for the current 
devolution process. Most pertinently, it questions the feasibility of integrating the power relations 
ingrained in the previous MLG1-esque system into the new constitution’s ostensibly MLG2 form – a 
tension exacerbated by the energy sector remaining a de facto state monopoly despite structural 
reforms. The lack of provision for decentralised energy governance prior to devolution is also of 
concern as it suggests counties are unlikely to inherit sectoral experience, casting doubts over how 
capably they will assume devolved energy roles. 
Secondly, the study finds that the overlapping legislative framework for devolved energy in Kenya had 
several key weaknesses: namely a distinct lack of detail concerning the nature of devolved energy 
roles and the potential for certain overlapping functions to be misinterpreted. Aside from the county 
energy plans provided for in the County Government Act 2012, devolved energy roles tended to be 
subsidiary and did not forge a comprehensive picture of how energy under devolution was to be 
understood. This suggests the devolution of energy was not clearly envisaged, particularly in 
comparison with other sectors.   
Critically, the ambiguities present in the energy legislation offers potential for the ostensibly non-
hierarchical and overlapping MLG2 model indicated by the Constitution to be reimagined as a more 
hierarchical MLG1 structure dependent on the ensuing power relations between the two levels of 
government. This appears to be a distinct possibility given the historic legacy of highly centralised 
governance within Kenya and the likely national government interest in energy remaining a de facto 
state monopoly.  
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Chapter 4 - Methodology 
This chapter justifies the predominantly qualitative methodology of the thesis and explores the 
debates surrounding the use of the approach in studies investigating energy governance in the Global 
South. During nine months’ fieldwork in Kenya, the qualitative data collected comprised 70 semi-
structured interviews with Kenyan based energy sector stakeholders, 14 questionnaires with County 
government officials, and seven focus group discussions with rural communities. Attending various 
energy conferences, workshops and forums in Kenya also constituted a critical component of the 
research process. Various challenges were encountered during fieldwork and the chapter aims to draw 
lessons on conducting research within this context in order to inform future research within the field.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides a critical discussion of research paradigms 
which justifies the qualitative approach taken, while section 4.3 evaluates the various qualitative 
research methods used. An appraisal of the data analysis approach then follows in section 4.4, with 
section 4.5 reflecting on the challenges of cross-cultural fieldwork and the critical issues of 
positionality and ethics concerning Global North research in the Global South. Lastly, section 4.6 
provides a conclusion, highlighting the PhD’s contribution to research best practice. 
4.1 Research Approach  
Justification of a predominantly qualitative approach 
A predominantly qualitative research approach is most appropriate for this study given the focus of 
the research questions and underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions. The research 
questions centre on human interactions and power relations, themes which align with a 
constructionist ontological position, where ‘truths’ are considered as human generated or 
‘constructed’ as opposed to discoverable phenomena. This leads to an interpretivist epistemological 
stance, where the focus is on critically appraising the various, subjective, and often competing, 
stakeholder actions, interests, and perceptions which constitute these human constructed ‘truths’.  
The research questions and corresponding ontological and epistemological stance align with the use 
of qualitative methods, noted by Miles & Huberman (1994) as aiding the interpretation of different 
stakeholder perceptions and motivations, the drivers and barriers behind the pursuit of their interests, 
and how their behaviours are influenced by contextual factors; dynamics particularly pertinent to this 
study. Limb & Dwyer (2001, p.1) concur, adding that such methods enable the researcher to “explore 
the feelings, understandings and knowledges of others … to gain a deeper insight into the processes 
shaping our social worlds”. 
In keeping with most qualitative research of this ilk, this PhD primarily adopts an inductive approach 
(rather than testing a pre-conceived hypothesis), allowing findings to emerge from the data and for 
multiple interpretations. This is appropriate as the PhD aims to understand decentralised energy 
governance within different geographical contexts, rather than test a generalisable phenomenon 
across populations. Yet, assumptions concerning a study’s empirical object(s) are inevitable; for 
instance, the study presumes energy governance to have geographical variations. However, the study 
does not specifically seek to test this assumption, rather it uses the notion as a starting point to 
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understand and develop new theory from findings bound to particular (i.e. non-generalisable) political 
and socio-economic contexts within particular localities. 
Quantitative approaches were not deemed central to this study’s focus on human interactions despite 
being widely used elsewhere in the energy studies literature (Sovacool, 2014). This position aligns with 
the rationale of Lutzenhiser and Shove (1999, p.217) who argue quantitative methods mask the aspect 
of “human choice as critical and controlling in energy use and technology choice”. Similar issues exist 
in the decentralisation literature, with Batchelor et al. (2014) noting that quantitative studies, 
although commonplace, fail to assess the quality of decentralisation, often concealing how many 
central authorities maintain control of power despite the existence of decentralised sub-national 
governance structures; a common feature of decentralisation as seen in Chapter 3 (cf. Cabral, 2011).  
Batchelor et al. (2014) suggest studies investigating the quality of decentralisation assess various 
factors not easily ascertained by quantitative means including: the interrelationships between 
different scales of government; participation in governance by local citizens; decision making power 
and autonomy; upward and downward accountability; and access to resources. Similarly, Conyers 
(2007) notes that as decentralisation is a process, assessment should accordingly be process and not 
outcome centred, taking into account the wide array of highly influential social, economic, historical 
and political factors; a rich complexity more readily assessed by qualitative analysis. However, despite, 
not being central to addressing the research questions, quantitative methods are deemed useful as a 
means to assess the representativeness of qualitative data. While still requiring triangulating with 
qualitative approaches, quantitative analysis presents an opportunity to scale the findings from 
qualitative data.  
Overall, this PhD’s assessment of the power relations operating in and through Kenyan 
decentralisation and decentralised energy governance necessitates a predominantly qualitative 
approach to measure the quality of decentralisation and address the overlooked human dimensions 
present within the energy sector, with quantitative methods used in a supportive role to help 
determine the scalability of qualitative findings. 
A geographical research approach 
This PhD explores notions of governance, power relations, energy for development, and 
decentralisation, themes which have seen contributions from academics spanning a wide range of 
disciplines, reflecting the interdisciplinary nature of decentralised energy governance (Table 4.1). 
Although this research draws on theories and concepts heavily imbued within other disciplines 
(notably Multilevel governance’s prominence within political science), the study is situated within 
human geography owing to the explicit emphasis on exploring the spatial variations of the human 
interactions within decentralised energy governance. This relevance of geography, particularly in 
relation to more theorised understandings of governance and power relations was underscored by 
Griffin (2012, p.208), who viewed the discipline as critical in “remain[ing] open and attuned to the 
complex geographies of power that might actually operate in practices of governance on the ground”. 
Critiquing “theoretical models that have prior, inherent assumptions about dominant modalities of 
power”, she emphasises the need for more empirical, spatially contingent, geographical approaches 
as “power relations are not present in models, territories or networks: they are made and remade in 
relationships, exchanges and interactions” (Griffin, 2012, p.209).  
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Table 4.1 Varying disciplines of leading academics in decentralisation and energy governance  
Discipline Examples of leading academics 
Geography Prof. Ed Brown, Dr. John Harrison, Dr. Jon Cloke, Prof. Dave Ockwell, Prof. Harriet 
Buckley,  
International relations 
/ Political science 
Prof. Andres Goldthau, Prof. Peter Newell, Dr. Stephen Ndegwa, Dr. Jan Erk, Prof 
Dickovick, Prof. Rachel Reidl 
Anthropology Dr. Ben Campbell, Dr. Jamie Cross 
Law Dr. John Mutakha Kangu, Dr. Luis Francheschi, Prof. PLO Lumumba 
(Socio-) Economics Prof. Ben Sovacool, Prof. Subhes Bhattacharyya, Dr. Shonali Pachauri 
Social science / 
Development studies 
Dr. Diane Conyers, Dr. Njeri Wamukonya, Dr. Lidia Cabral, Dr. Helene Ahlborg 
(environmental science) 
Other Prof. Andrew Stirling, Dr Rob Byrne (both Science & Technology Policy (SPRU)), 
Prof Izael Da Silva (engineering) 
 
Griffin’s arguments clearly chime with the spatially contingent, multi-scalar relationships between 
transnational, national, county and community level stakeholders that are the focus of this study. 
Traditional geographical and political approaches have tended to view such multi-scalar arrangements 
as spaces where “decisions are cascaded from international, to national, and then local scales” with 
the state seen “as the primary arena of political power” (Bulkeley, 2005, pp.876–878). This study 
differs, placing the county level as the central focus owing to it being the site of the recently 
decentralised, energy governance powers. This is in keeping with contemporary human geography 
axioms which regard scales as constructed and contested (e.g. Brenner, 2001), challenging the 
conventional notion that the ‘national’ is always ‘higher up’ the hierarchy than ‘the local’ (Bulkeley, 
2005, p.897). Adopting this approach also aligns with the methods used by the precursor to this PhD, 
the Loughborough University geography department Renewable Energy and Development (READ) 
project (see Chapter 2); although this study has a narrower local focus contrasting with the more 
macro regional analysis its forerunner provided. 
4.2 Data Collection and Methods 
Overview 
The research process consisted of three broad phases: pre-fieldwork research design and planning 
including an initial literature review; just under 9 months’ fieldwork in Kenya; and post-fieldwork data 
analysis and write up of the thesis. The fieldwork comprised four separate site visits to Kenya between 
2016 and 2018, during which data was collected using various predominantly qualitative research 
methods (Table 4.2). These methods were used concurrently, with data acquired informing 
subsequent application and adaption of these methods. 
Table 4.2 Site visits to Kenya 
 Dates Duration Interviews Focus 
groups 
Questionnaire 
responses 
Key 
conferences  
Site visit 1 28/05/16 - 11/06/16 2 weeks 4 0 0 0 
Site visit 2 28/10/16 - 03/06/17 7 months 64 7 14 6 
Site visit 3 24/11/17 - 19/12/17 4 weeks 2 0 0 3 
Site visit 4 08/04/18 - 16/04/18 1 week 0 0 0 1 
Total - ~ 9 months 70 7 14 10 
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During fieldwork, I was based in Nairobi, which assisted with accessing stakeholders as most key 
institutions were based in the capital.  Connections made in Nairobi were also often able to assist with 
accessing stakeholders in other counties by contacting them on my behalf. In Nairobi, I was hosted by 
Strathmore University Energy Research Centre (SERC), which proved incredibly valuable, enabling an 
immersion into a context where conversations concerning Kenyan energy governance, the 
accompanying political debates, and different world views were a day-to-day norm. This was critical 
in facilitating a deeper understanding of the various dynamics operating in and through Kenyan 
decentralised energy governance. Engaging directly with local academia also helped avoid extractive 
research and foster collaborations with local stakeholders, aiding the development of Global 
South/Global North partnerships. In addition to SERC, collaborations with the following local 
organisations were particularly fruitful: the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) (Nairobi office); the 
SE4All Kenya website development committee; the Council of Governors (CoG); the African Centre for 
Technology Studies (ACTS); and the National Environment Trust Fund (NETFund).  
Site visits 
The aims of the first site visit were to contact existing project partners, develop new contacts, gain 
experience of conducting fieldwork, and familiarise myself with life in Kenya. This visit proved highly 
valuable as it enabled me to receive feedback on the scope and objectives of my proposed research 
from Kenyan project partners. It also eased my transition into the practicalities of living in Kenya as 
the visit was undertaken with two colleagues with experience of working in Kenya; their insights into 
the Kenyan context helping me to hit the ground running when I returned alone for site visit 2.  
Lasting seven months, the second site visit saw the vast majority of primary data collected, including 
all focus group discussions and questionnaires. The third visit (undertaken six months after site visit 
2) sought to interview stakeholders about ideas emerging from the PhD, whilst gauging any changes 
in the energy governance milieu after the general election (held in August and October 2017). This 
ensured the research had a longitudinal component rather than merely being a snapshot of an issue 
at a certain point in time; critical to this PhD given interviewee responses in site visit 2 may not have 
been entirely representative in the run up to a general election. The visit also provided an opportunity 
to assess how decentralised energy governance might be affected by newly elected county 
administrations, particularly in comparison to those counties where the government was re-elected 
for a second term. The final visit was taken in conjunction with other Geography department members 
and timed to coincide with a highly relevant conference Loughborough University was co-chairing. 
Case study selection - depth 
Fieldwork primarily took place in Migori, Nakuru, Turkana and Nairobi counties, the four operating as 
case studies and providing the empirical core of the research. Ideally, data would have been collected 
from all 47 counties to better reflect the assumed spatial variations in energy governance. However, 
this was clearly beyond the time, cost, and security44 constraints of the study.  Selecting case study 
counties was thus required, with Sovacool (2014, p.11) summarising the main selection issues as: 
 
44 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) advised against “all but essential travel” to several counties, mainly along 
the Somali border due to perceived terrorism risks. 
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How does one balance depth—going ‘deep’ on a small sample of respondents—
with breadth—producing conclusions sufficiently generalizable beyond those 
respondents? 
To be sufficiently ‘deep’ a case study county was felt to need at least one interview from each of the 
six major stakeholder groups identified as operating in and through decentralised energy governance  
(Table 4.3). Given any individual or organisation could potentially be termed a decentralised energy 
governance stakeholder (i.e. virtually all individuals/organisations use some form of energy service), 
identifying stakeholder categories was felt necessary as a pragmatic means (or check list) to ensure 
reasonable coverage of the varied interactions, interests and agendas assumed in decentralised 
energy governance (cf. the rationale behind RQ2 & RQ3 in Chapter 1). These categories also reflect 
the MLG theoretical underpinnings of the PhD outlined in Chapter 2, with governance assumed to be 
operating on multiple scales among multiple governmental and non-governmental actors (Hooghe & 
Marks, 2001).  
Table 4.3 Six key stakeholder groups engaged in decentralised energy governance  
Stakeholder group Details 
1. National government Includes politicians and civil servants working for national government and its 
institutions, including those working for any of the nine energy parastatals. 
2. County Government Includes politicians and civil servants working for the county government 
3. Domestic non-
government actors 
Includes representatives of organisations such as NGOs, community based 
organisations (CBOs), civil society organisations (CSOs), and research 
institutes whose operations are wholly or predominantly based in Kenya 
4. Domestic Private Sector Includes representatives of commercially orientated groups whose 
operations are wholly or predominantly based in Kenya 
5. Community scale actors Includes state and non-state actors predominantly operating within the sub-
county level, including  ward administrators, village elders, church leaders, 
SACCO leaders45, chiefs, local businessmen/women, and citizens. 
6. Transnational actors Includes all TAC1, TAC2, and TAC3 actors (Table 4.4) 
 
The six key stakeholder groups identified were derived from findings in the MLG literature (principally 
Hooghe and Marks (2011)) and the implications of the Kenyan devolution legislation (Chapter 3). 
Groups 1 (national government) and 2 (county government) reflect the emphasis in MLG on authority 
being diffused to subnational institutions (Hooghe & Marks, 2001) and the relationship between the 
national and county governments at the core of the new Constitution (Article 6(2)). Similarly, groups 
3 (domestic non-government actors) and 4 (domestic private sector actors) respond to the 
acknowledgement of non-state actors as a core part of MLG (Hooghe & Marks, 2001) and the 
recognition of the role of public-private partnerships in Kenyan devolution (Kenyan County 
Governments Act, Article 6(3)). Although groups 3 and 4 could potentially have been merged, the 
distinct primary mandates of each – typically advocacy and service provision with group 3 and 
commercial interests with Group 4 (Goode, 2007) – were deemed likely to result in significantly 
 
45 SACCO = Savings and Credit Cooperative Organisation. A SACCO is a type of cooperative where the savings of members 
are pooled and then used to provide members with credit facilities – the objective being to promote the economic 
interests and welfare of members. 
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different interactions, agendas and interests within decentralised energy governance. Thus, two 
groups were considered warranted. 
Both MLG and Kenyan devolution infer a role for actors (state or non-state) operating at smaller scales 
than the county. MLG1 recognises multiple hierarchical subnational jurisdictions while MLG2 depicts 
a vast number of jurisdictions operating at diverse territorial scales. Multiple scales are also a feature 
of Kenyan devolution: counties are divided into 290 constituencies (each with an elected member in 
the national assembly) which in turn are divided into 1450 wards (the smallest electoral unit, each 
conferring an elected member to the county assembly). Further decentralisation occurs within wards, 
with county assemblies charged with establishing village units run by appointed village councils 
composed of 3-5 village elders and chaired by a village administrator (County Governments Act 2012). 
Group 5 was thus created to reflect the actors operating in these multiple sub-county scales and the 
emphasis and starting point of the Constitution (Article 1(1)) that “all sovereign power belongs to the 
people of Kenya”.  
MLG also envisages authority being diffused from the state upwards to supra-national or international 
bodies  (Hooghe & Marks, 2001), long a feature of Kenyan governance as notably seen with the World 
Bank and IMF’s structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s (Gertz, 2008), and their conditional 
loans between 1996-2006 which prescribed the liberalisation of Kenya’s energy sector (Newell & 
Phillips, 2016). This considerable, and ongoing, influence of international organisations informed the 
identification of group 6: ‘transnational actors’.  
However, the term ‘transnational actor’ was considered opaque given the myriad types of institutions 
whose operations could be deemed at least partly international. For this thesis, the term was 
therefore clarified as meaning an actor whose operations are predominantly centred on one or more 
overseas territories, often with the ability to influence, control and coordinate. This definition was 
derived from the work of Vertovec, (1999) who viewed transnationalism as denoting economic, social 
and political processes which occur across international boundaries. Transnational actors were then 
further defined, organised into three categories according to their operational scale and membership 
and funding composition (Table 4.4). Although significant differences exist between institutions within 
each category (e.g. in terms of funding, reach and influence), this broad categorisation facilitated a 
macro-level exploration of the impact of transnational actors on energy governance which was more 
precise than using ‘transnational actor’ as one all-inclusive term, yet not so convoluted as would have 
been the case had each type of transnational institution been referred to individually. 
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Table 4.4 Transnational actor categories 1-3 (TAC1-3) 
Transnational actor 
category  
Operational scale, membership and funding Examples 
TAC1: Multilateral 
governmental 
organisations 
Organisations whose membership and funds derive from 
multiple different governments. Operational scale is generally 
larger than bilateral organisations, with funds typically spent on 
development issues across a wide range of countries. 
UN agencies, 
World Bank, AfDB  
TAC2: Bilateral 
governmental 
organisations 
Organisations that operate directly between two parties 
(typically, two countries) and whose membership and funds 
derive from its home government. Operational scale is generally 
more targeted than multilateral organisations, with funds 
typically spent on development issues in countries that the 
donor deems most needy or which reflect donor interests. 
DfID, GIZ, USAID 
TAC3: International 
‘a-governmental’ 
organisations 
Organisation without direct government representation in its 
governance, operating in one or more countries outside their 
domicile. Operational scale varies considerably from singular 
localised interventions to organisations with global reach (e.g. 
WWF).  
NGOs, charities, 
research institutes, 
corporations with 
an international 
outreach 
 
Case study selection – breadth 
Energy governance was also expected to vary significantly among counties, shaped by widely varying 
social, political, and economic factors. Thus, to have adequate ‘breadth’, three county case studies 
was initially considered a suitable compromise between being sufficient to illustrate the assumed 
spatial variations in governance, and the aforementioned logistical constraints.  Developments during 
the course of the fieldwork later led to the number of case studies being increased to four. 
Nakuru county was selected first, largely because it was the site of previous Loughborough Geography 
department research into energy governance (see READ and SONG projects in Chapter 2) which 
enabled the PhD to follow up on previous findings and access the department’s existing network. 
Migori county was then chosen following discussions with the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI). 
The county was seen as a suitable counterpoint to Nakuru, being an opposition stronghold, 
predominantly rural, with very low access to modern energy services, compared to Nakuru’s support 
for the ruling coalition, and increasing levels of urbanisation and energy access. SEI had also assisted 
Migori with developing community participation in county energy planning, thus providing 
opportunities to gain access to the county stakeholders involved and their valuable insights into this 
key decentralised energy planning role. 
The choice of the third and fourth case studies was influenced by a discussion with a Kenyan energy 
consultant, who mused whether counties with different energy profiles (such as Nakuru and Migori) 
should be selected to assess the extent the energy profile impacts on governance, or if removing this 
variable and having counties with similar energy profiles might more readily highlight governance 
issues. These reflections relate to Sovacool's (2014) deliberations over whether case studies should 
be selected on the basis of being outliers or commonplace, with both considered critical in enabling 
conclusions to be drawn with greater confidence. Reflecting on these deliberations led to Turkana, 
and later, Nairobi being selected as they were felt to address both concerns: operating as outliers on 
an individual basis, yet forming certain commonalities when combined with Nakuru and Migori.  
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Turkana’s outlier status derives mainly from its vast recently discovered oil resources, arguably the 
most contentious issue affecting energy governance in Kenya, with interactions between national and 
county government particularly tense. Nairobi was added as a fourth case study during the latter 
stages of site visit 2, partly due to the large quantity of primary data collected on the county, but 
mainly because the capital’s decentralised governance emerged as particularly unique, providing an 
interesting counterpoint to the other three counties. The county effectively superseded the pre-
devolution Nairobi province, meaning many decentralised governance structures were in place, but 
were subject to influence from the highly tangible presence of national and regional power structures.  
Although both clearly outliers, in combination with Nakuru and Migori certain commonalities emerge. 
Turkana and Migori are both predominantly rural, poorer counties with low energy access rates, while 
Nairobi and Nakuru have far higher rates of urbanisation, wealth and energy access. This presence of 
shared and distinct political, socio-economic, and energy features enables conclusions to be drawn 
with greater confidence over which variables more readily impact decentralised energy governance.  
Data gathered from stakeholders representing other county administrations further supported these 
conclusions (Table 4.5). Officers from many of the other 43 counties were engaged at major national 
conferences, while questionnaires were sent to every county government. Interviews were also held 
during shorter visits to Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, and Machakos counties, but not in sufficient number 
to achieve the depth needed for a case study county. 
Table 4.5 County administrations engaged during fieldwork  
Research method County administrations engaged 
Semi-structured interviews  Machakos, Migori, Nairobi, Nakuru, Trans Nzoia, Turkana, Uasin Gishu,  
Focus group discussions Migori, Nakuru, Turkana 
Questionnaires Responses from: Baringo, Busia, Garissa, Homa bay, Kiambu, Kisumu, 
Kitui, Machakos, Marsabit, Nakuru, Nyamira, Siaya, Taita Taveta 
Conference: 4th Annual 
Devolution Conference 
47 counties present. Direct engagement with Baringo, Kajiado, Kiambu, 
Kitui Machakos, Marsabit, Migori, Nairobi, Siaya, Taita Taveta 
Conference: NETFund Renewable 
Energy in County Planning  
37 counties present. Direct engagement with Kilifi, Kisumu, Kitui, 
Mandera, Migori, Turkana, Wajir 
4.2.1 Semi-structured interviews   
Rationale for use of method 
Semi-structured interviews were the primary research method used during fieldwork due to their 
expediency in investigating the “complex behaviours, opinions and emotions and for collecting a 
diversity of experiences” which are key to this PhD’s focus on stakeholder interactions within 
decentralised energy governance (Clifford & Valentine, 2003, p.128). The use of semi-structured 
interviews was also advantageous as their fluidity provided space for participants to speak more freely 
and deviate from my questions, potentially raising issues of interest not anticipated by the research 
design (Bryman, 2008). This was particularly pertinent to the study given the dynamic, constantly 
evolving nature of decentralised energy governance in Kenya, where interviewees were often at the 
forefront of the process and privy to the most recent developments. The method’s flexibility also 
permits the interviewer more scope to unearth the reasonings, meanings, and significance behind 
respondents’ answers, which under a more rigid line of enquiry may remain concealed (Hoggart et al., 
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2002). This was critical for a study grounded in power relations, where it often took time to build trust 
with participants to become more candid about these often sensitive and complex stakeholder 
dynamics. 
Participant selection  
The participant selection process was designed to achieve a relatively even spread of interviewees 
from the six key stakeholder groups identified (Table 4.3). This reflected the theoretical underpinnings 
of the PhD, which assumes governance to be operating on multiple levels among multiple actors (see 
Hooghe & Marks, 2001). Discussions with project partners and attendance at key Kenyan energy 
conferences and meetings in the early stages of site visit 2 initiated an ongoing critical stakeholder 
analysis process, which proved useful in identifying “relevant stakeholders for a specified project or 
policy, … their relative power, influence, and interests, … [and] the broader context in which they 
interact” (Sovacool, 2014, p.13)  
Across the three site visits, 70 interviews were conducted in total (Table 4.6). Most interviews (20) 
were conducted with national government representatives mainly due to the number of different 
energy parastatals in operation, whose interests varied by organisation and location. County 
government officers were the second most interviewed group (15), reflecting the primary focal point 
of the study. There was a relatively even distribution of interviews with representatives from the 
Transnational actors (10), and Domestic non-government actors (12), and the Private sector (13).  
Table 4.6 Number and location of semi-structured interviews with each stakeholder group  
 National government and parastatals Other Stakeholder groups 
Location of 
interview 
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Nairobi 3 2 2 1 1 2 2  14 4 8 9 9 46 
Migori  1  1    1 3 3   2 8 
Nakuru          2 1  1 4 
Turkana  1       1 2 3 1 1 8 
Uasin Gishu  1      1 2 1    3 
Trans Nzoia  1       1 2    3 
Machakos          1    1 
TOTAL 3 6 2 2 1 2 2 2 20 15 12 10 13 70 
 
Interviews took place across seven counties, with the majority held in Nairobi where most key national 
and transnational energy institutions were based. In the week-long visits to the other case study 
counties, time constraints meant it was not possible to interview representatives from all the 
stakeholder groups. This was partly compensated for by interviewing Nairobi based transnational 
actors actively involved in the three counties, while the interview with a Geothermal Development 
Company (GDC) representative in Nairobi centred on the governance of geothermal resources in 
Nakuru, helping to partly address the lack of interview with a Nakuru based national government 
representative. On spec interviews were also held in both Trans Nzoia and neighbouring Uasin Gishu 
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county following an unexpected invitation to stay with friends in Trans Nzoia county as they were 
anticipated to add weight to macro level arguments. The interview with a Machakos county 
government was motivated by the county uniquely combining energy and devolution departments in 
the same ministry, the two main themes of this PhD. 
Location 
Interview locations were selected by the participant, and usually held in a private office or demarcated 
meeting space within the interviewee’s workplace. These locations usually proved suitable, being 
sufficiently free from background noise, while providing an appropriate level of comfort and privacy 
for participants. The office location also at times enabled participants to draw on other colleagues for 
information where uncertainties existed concerning particular questions. 
In some cases, it was possible that an interview outside the workplace may have led to more frank 
discussions, with participants possibly fearful of being seen with the interviewer and unintentionally 
straying from official lines. This occurred very occasionally with energy parastatal officers, who 
sometimes appeared suspicious of my intentions, perhaps due to their organisations being subject to 
particular public scrutiny and criticism. Interviews held in cafes or bars were less successful as the 
background noise made hearing and recording participants more difficult. There was also the very 
occasional instance of alcohol affecting interviewee coherence. 
Formation of questions 
The semi-structured interviews were conducted using an interview guide comprised of 45 questions 
(see appendix 2). These questions were shaped to address the research questions (RQs) identified in 
Chapter 1 (and the overall aim of the PhD which they serve) and were informed by the debates and 
literature introduced in Chapters 2 and 3. In particular, the questions were designed to draw together 
the concepts of decentralisation, governance and energy access, addressing the lack of engagement 
between the decentralisation and energy studies discourses (Brown et al., 2015), and the neglect of 
governance within energy studies (Bagley et al., 2018) – deficiencies which have impeded the 
development of an evidence base to better inform policy on the potential of decentralised energy 
governance to address Global South energy access issues.  
The questions also centred heavily on the themes of changing scalar roles and power relations, 
informed by human geography arguments which view the state relationally (Jessop, 1990), including 
in the context of energy (Angel, 2017). This scalar focus was also a response to the more flexible 
governance patterns assumed by the concept of multilevel governance (Hooghe & Mark, 2011) and 
the contemporary ‘interventionism’ and ‘‘fragmentation’ energy paradigms (Goldthau, 2012). The 
questions also had an underlying geographical dimension, reflecting arguments in human geography 
that the cross-scalar power relations underpinning practices of governance on the ground are spatially 
contingent (Griffin, 2012).  
The guide’s 45 questions were organised into five broad topic areas: each primarily addressing two or 
more of the three RQs (Table 4.7). All topic areas pertained to RQ3 which incorporates both RQ1 and 
RQ2 but applies the questions to the local scale. During the course of the fieldwork, an inductive 
approach was taken with topics and questions adapted or added to the guide in order to reflect new 
findings or the interviewee’s area of expertise.  
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Table 4.7 Interview guide topic areas and the research questions they primarily address  
Theme RQ1 RQ2 RQ3 Mainly discussed 
in chapter(s): 
1. Experiences of devolution x  x 5 
2. Policy development  x  x 3+5 
3. Stakeholder Interactions  x x 6+7 
4. Overall evaluations  x x x 6+7+8 
5. Future visions  x x 6+7+8 
 
The questions in topic areas 1 and 2 mainly focussed on RQ1 and how the processes of decentralisation 
and decentralised energy governance have unfolded in Kenya. Topic area 1 centred on stakeholder 
experiences of devolution: the intention being to capture the contested understandings of the 
devolution process and decentralised energy governance which the literature has overlooked in the 
Global South (Brown et al., 2015). The focus of theme 2 on decentralised policy development was 
intended to better understand the extent to which Kenya had swayed from the intended blueprint of 
the devolution legislation, a trait the literature notes as common with decentralisation process more 
broadly (Erk, 2014; Rodríguez-Pose & Gill, 2003), and a feature which has often led to a lack of genuine 
reform in sub-Saharan Africa (Cabral, 2011; Cheeseman et al., 2016).  
Topic areas 1 and 2 provided the context for topic area 3 which primarily focussed on RQ2 and how 
stakeholder interactions and agendas have shaped Kenyan decentralised energy governance. 
Questions centred on uncovering the underlying stakeholder power relations (incorporating factors 
such as decision making power, autonomy, and resource access) viewed by the social sciences as 
critical to determining the quality of decentralisation processes but overlooked in a Global South 
context (Batchelor et al., 2014). Topic area 3 also had a particular emphasis on counties and the 
interactions shaping decentralised energy governance at the local level – the subject of RQ3. This focus 
enabled spatially contingent empirical data concerning scalar power relations to be gleaned, which 
the human geography literature notes as key to understanding practices of governance on the ground 
(Griffin, 2012). Lastly, themes 4 and 5 provide an opportunity for overall reflection, enabling the 
interviewee to contemplate the discussions stemming from the proceeding questions, facilitating a 
more macro level (and potentially more balanced) appraisal of the power relations shaping Kenyan 
decentralised energy governance.    
The questions in all five topic areas were grounded in the ontological and epistemological assumptions 
of the research which consider that studies focussed on human interactions and power relations must 
contend with there not being one observable truth but rather multiple subjective and often conflicting 
narratives which must be appraised (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Therefore, to gain insight into these 
stakeholder perceptions and agendas, interview questions were predominantly qualitative. Further 
engagement with the notion of multiple narratives and subjectivity is facilitated by several questions 
asking not only for the interviewee’s opinion but also the interviewee’s opinion of how other 
stakeholders have viewed events, interactions and agendas. Where differences emerge between 
stakeholders, the questions invite the interviewee to discuss causes and outcomes. In a sense, this 
encourages the interviewee to recognise conflicting narratives and offer their own appraisal of 
differing human constructed ‘truths’, providing valuable insights for the researcher. 
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Language 
Interviews were conducted in English, an official language in Kenya (along with Swahili) and the 
primary language of government, law, media and education. For most Kenyans, English is a third 
language behind one of the 67 ethnic languages in Kenya usually spoken as a first language (Lewis et 
al., 2009), and Swahili, the national language and lingua franca of Kenya. However, Swahili and English 
are both taught from primary school to university, leaving the neurolinguists Abuom & Bastiaanse 
(2012, p.5) to comment that “an adult with over 12 years of uninterrupted education in Kenya is 
generally expected to be equally highly proficient in both languages”. As all participants occupied 
positions where such an educational background could be assumed necessary, it was possible to use 
English in all semi-structured interviews. 
Despite interviews being held in English, there were occasional communication issues. ‘Kenyan 
English’ is recognised by scholars as a distinct English variety. Buregeya (2006 & 2007) notes specific 
Kenyan English grammatical and lexical features while pronunciation is generally seen as the most 
frequent “deviation” (Schmied, 1991, pp.64–65). During fieldwork, I was able to quickly learn the 
occasional grammar and vocabulary variations that appeared, such as the use of the word ‘docket’ to 
mean “the portfolio or jurisdiction of an official, especially of government” (Buregeya, 2007, p.15), 
and the interjection of the Swahili ‘nini’ (literally translated as ‘that’ or ‘what’) to denote something 
the speaker cannot remember (i.e. the British English ‘thingy’).  
Pronunciation was a more frequent challenge, although still for the most part not an issue. Kenyan 
English is influenced by pronunciation norms of Swahili, most notably its use of five vowels as opposed 
to twenty in English, which could cause occasional comprehension issues. In such instances, the 
context of the discussion would often enable meaning to be deduced. However, if this was not the 
case, I would seek clarification from the interviewee, often by reformulating what I had understood 
from the interviewee’s response to mitigate the embarrassment or annoyance potentially caused by 
repeatedly asking the participant to reiterate what they had said. Reviewing recorded interviews could 
also assist with comprehension issues, although shorn of visual communication clues, meaning could 
at times be more opaque. 
As a speaker of another English variety, ‘British English’, I was conscious that participants could 
potentially have had difficulties understanding me. I was also aware there were positionality issues 
connected with being a speaker of the so called ‘original English’, which could cause interviewees to 
be uncomfortable asking me for clarification. I therefore tried during interviews to avoid dialectic 
features of British English, such as idiomatic phrases, or certain pronunciation idiosyncrasies of a South 
East England accent such as the dropped /t/ consonant in the middle or end of words. Having 
previously worked as a teacher of English as a foreign language, I was familiar with grading my own 
language and pronunciation and believe this was not a particular issue during interviews. Kenyan 
English is also more influenced by British English than US English due to the legacy of colonialism, 
suggesting there was likely to be a degree of familiarity with the variety of English I spoke.  
Challenges 
I had a number of difficulties in securing interviews. Requests by email or cold-calling were initially not 
fruitful due to not fully appreciating the importance of introductions in securing interviews. It was thus 
necessary to build up contacts to acquire introductions; a process assisted by attending high-stakes 
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events, such as the planning meetings for the County Energy Framework and SE4All website. However, 
this took more time than expected and led to the decision to extend site visit 2 from five to seven 
months.  
Interviews with national and county government stakeholders were also impeded by administrative 
issues. Several government officers stated I needed a letter of support from the Ministry of Energy 
and Petroleum (MoEP)46 to conduct interviews despite being in possession of a similar letter for the 
questionnaire component of my research. This demand was not stipulated by all officers, suggesting 
it may not have been strictly necessary and seems most likely a result of certain officers wanting 
understandably to cover their backs. This second letter of support was secured in February 2018.  
The critical breakthrough in terms of securing interviews occurred at the Fourth Annual Kenyan 
Devolution conference in Naivasha (07-09/03/17), a major national conference attended by key 
stakeholders from the national government (including the president), private sector, transnational 
organisations, and, critically, all 47 county governments. Each county had a stand, which facilitated 
meeting county officers in person, securing their contact details, and at times conducting impromptu 
interviews if there was an energy specialist present. Subsequent follow up calls to the officers I had 
met were significantly more successful than previous efforts as the officers knew who I was and were 
therefore far more willing to assist. This triggered a ‘snowball effect’ whereby these officers would 
arrange interviews with relevant stakeholders, who in turn would then often provide additional 
contacts or arrange further interviews on my behalf. 
This process very much aligns with the advice for general research practice and conduct in sub-Saharan 
Africa given in a Loughborough University first-year review meeting.  On reflection, I am not sure why 
I had not acted upon this advice earlier. It was perhaps due to a lack of confidence in adopting an 
approach which for the most part would be academically and culturally inappropriate in the UK, which 
the ideal scenario presented by the conference allowed me to overcome. Seeing this process in action 
at the conference is essentially where I felt I understood the keys to undertaking research in Kenya. 
Having grasped what was required to secure interviews, there then followed an intensive three-month 
period of interviews across seven counties. While the triggered ‘snowball’ effect proved hugely 
beneficial in terms of obtaining data, the sheer concentration of interviews in this period (over 50) 
proved challenging. I felt I lacked time to process interview content and to use the data obtained to 
inform subsequent interviews. On reflection, I would have perhaps benefitted from a longer fieldwork 
period. However, advice received from Kenyan colleagues over potential security concerns in the lead 
up to the August general election indicated a further field work extension was not recommended. 
4.2.2 Focus group discussions 
Rationale for use of research method 
Focus group discussions (FGDs) were used to capture community level views as an aggregated 
community response was sought which “generate[d] interchange and debate between respondents” 
 
46 The Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MoEP) was divided into two in June 2018 forming the Ministry of Energy and the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Mining. This thesis refers to the MoEP as it was the ministry in existence when fieldwork was 
conducted. 
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(Gomez & Jones, 2010, p.199). This would have been too time-consuming to achieve via semi-
structured interviews, with the need to determine representative community interviewees adding to 
the challenge.  FGDs also lessened the potential for tension over compensation paid to participants as 
payments were spread across a greater number of people than would have been the case with 
individual interviews47. 
Participant selection 
FGDs were held in two communities in Migori, Nakuru, and Turkana (Table 4.7), which enabled 
comparisons to be made within and across counties, facilitating the identification of geographical 
trends. There was insufficient time to arrange FGDs in Nairobi due to the late decision to use the 
county as a case study. This shortcoming of the research is partly compensated for by the extensive 
grey literature on community level energy initiatives in Nairobi (e.g. Lambe & Senyagwa's (2015) focus 
on informal settlements), and the interviews conducted with three early career energy consultants 
using the FGD guide which provided representation of urban middle class perspectives in the capital. 
In each of the three counties where FGDs were conducted, I worked with a research assistant (RA) 
who was local to the area, knew the communities, and spoke the local ‘ethnic’ language of the 
communities along with Swahili and English. Selected via recommendations from research institutions 
I had collaborated with in Nairobi, each of the three RAs greatly facilitated the research by carrying 
out several vital roles, namely: fixing FGDs and interviews; conducting and translating FGDs; providing 
valuable insight to the local area and stakeholders; and being someone with whom I could reflect on 
ideas and findings emerging from each day’s research activities.  
Table 4.8 Community focus group locations and attendees 
 
Participants for each FGD were selected through discussions between the community and the RA for 
that particular county. Prior to the FGDs, the RAs would be briefed on the aims and objectives of the 
FGDs and asked to arrange FGDs in rural communities, locations widely reported in the literature as 
underserved in terms of energy services and political representation.  Mixed gender groups of senior 
community members (e.g. village elders, SACCO members, religious leaders, and local level political 
figures such as ward administrators and chiefs) were targeted for the FGDs as they were considered 
most likely to have engaged with the devolution process and higher-level stakeholders.  
Given the patriarchal nature of rural Kenya society, the focus on senior community members likely 
contributed to women being less well represented in the FGDs although 35.5% of total attendees were 
 
47 Compensation for community participation in research is common practice in Kenya. 
Location Attendees 
Community County Men Women Total 
Suna Migori 6 2 8 
Masaba Migori 5 3 8 
Echariria Nakuru 9 7 16 
Lemolo B Nakuru 11 3 14 
Napetet Turkana 5 3 8 
Nakwemekwi Turkana 4 4 8 
TOTAL  40 22 62 
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women enabling a degree of scope for gendered issues of energy to arise. Despite this numerical 
representation, the active involvement of the women participants in the FGDs varied considerably, 
with significant contributions noted in the Turkana communities and Masaba, whilst participation was 
less active in the other communities, particularly Echariria and Suna. The fewer contributions may well 
be linked to how comfortable female participants felt expressing their views in the presence of 
community leaders who were all men (Krueger & Casey, 2009).  
The emphasis on senior community members also resulted in youth and disabled representation being 
absent from most FGDs. Two of the six communities had a ward administrator present (both Migori), 
who tended to be considerably more knowledgeable on energy matters than other community 
members and may have affected the responses of other community members. National government 
appointed Chiefs were also present at both FGDs in Migori who tended to be less knowledgeable than 
the ward administrators but vocal and may also have influenced other community members. 
Location 
Each FGD was held in a central community location selected by the participants in discussion with the 
local research assistant (RA) I was working with in each county. In six of the seven FGDs, the discussion 
was held inside a public amenity (e.g. a community hall, church). This had the advantage of being a 
shared space, which may have enabled participants to speak more openly than as a guest at a private 
residence, where they may have been less willing to disagree with the host. In Napetet (Turkana), the 
FGD took place outside a participant’s house, and thus some participants may have felt 
uncomfortable. However, the distribution of participant contributions was more evenly spread than 
in most of the other FGDs, suggesting the location was not a particular issue. 
Formation of questions 
A chronologically structured guide was used with questions divided into three sections: 1) 
expectations and experiences of devolution; 2) interactions with other key stakeholder groups; 3) 
future expectations. The guide was structurally similar to that used for the semi-structured interviews 
but had fewer questions as more time was allocated per question due to the greater number of 
participants (see appendix). A distinct feature of the FGD guide was the focus in section 2 on the 
frequency and nature of community engagement with the other key stakeholder groups. This was 
designed to ascertain the extent of community participation in decentralised energy governance; 
seemingly a key outcome of devolution and viewed within the literature as a critical factor determining 
the quality of a decentralisation process (Batchelor et al., 2014). 
Language 
English is less commonly spoken in rural Kenya and thus five of the seven FGDs required the local RA 
to conduct the discussion in the community’s first language and later transcribe the proceedings into 
English. The approach had certain benefits, with Clifford & Valentine (2003) highlighting that 
communicating in the participants’ language can help mitigate power imbalances along with status 
and privileges associated with the ability to communicate in one specific language (particularly 
relevant given the domination of English in Kenyan public institutions). The authors note that efforts 
to communicate in the language of the informants are often appreciated by respondents as a sign of 
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genuine interest in their culture, which I attempted to show by learning sufficient Swahili to greet 
participants and introduce myself. 
However, several issues emerged from conducting FGDs in another language. I was unable to 
accurately monitor the progress of the discussion, meaning the richness of the data captured 
depended largely on how the RA conducted the FGD, and in turn the briefing I had given the RA prior 
to conducting the FGD. Differences often emerged between what was intended and what transpired, 
particularly in terms of trying to ensure a relatively even distribution of contributions from 
participants. This is partly a positionality issue as the RA may have felt uncomfortable limiting 
contributions from more dominant members in a community they knew, while as a former teacher 
experienced in conducting groupwork, I perhaps expected too much from RAs potentially leading a 
FGD for the first time and may not have allotted sufficient time to pre-FGD briefings.  
The transcribing of the FGDs into English also complicated analysis as culturally specific nuances could 
be missed, as Smith (1996, p.162) notes, ‘any translation always seems to be a reduced and distorted 
representation of other social texts and practices’. This issue was partly mitigated by following the 
suggestion of Twyman et al. (1999), who advise discussing the transcription with the translator after 
completion to clarify potential areas of confusion. There also appeared to be different understandings 
of what transcribing entailed, with two of the three RAs initially providing summaries rather than 
verbatim transcriptions. Although, I had briefed the RAs by email on what was expected, it would have 
been better to show and discuss specific examples to help clarify the intention.  
The two FGDs in Migori were conducted in English, which had not been previously arranged and it 
remains unclear whether this was primarily initiated by the RA or the communities. The use of English 
was mostly advantageous as I could manage and monitor the discussion, directing impromptu 
questions, where necessary, to better address the RQs. It also allowed for two first-hand 
interpretations of the FGD, mine and the RA’s, unlike the other FGDs which solely relied on the RA. 
The clear disadvantage of using English was participants would most likely have felt more comfortable 
speaking in their first language, and may have provided richer, more nuanced accounts. 
Challenges 
FGDs constitute a form of interviewing and were thus subject to the same challenges noted for semi-
structured interviews. However, specific FGD challenges also emerged. The size of the first FGDs in 
Echariria and Lemolo B (both Nakuru) was not limited, resulting in large groups which hindered 
discussion between members and left some voices overshadowed by more dominant members. As 
each participant needed to be compensated, large groups were also financially challenging. After 
Nakuru only one FGD was held per community and FGDs were limited to eight attendees, reflecting 
opinion within the literature which states 8-10 participants as optimal (e.g. Gomez & Jones, 2010). 
This resulted in more manageable, effective discussions in Migori and Turkana. 
4.2.3 Questionnaires 
Rationale for use of research method 
Questionnaires were used primarily to gain insight into counties which were not visited, adding 
breadth to the research scope, and enabling a more representative analysis of the assumed spatial 
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variations in Kenyan decentralised energy governance. It was also anticipated that questionnaire 
responses may add weight to the findings from the case study counties by reducing the probability of 
the four counties being outliers. 
The questionnaires were initially intended to be used quantitatively as a means to determine how 
representative the qualitative data emerging from the interviews and focus group was of Kenya as a 
whole. However, difficulties obtaining responses (detailed in the ‘challenges’ section) resulted in a 
small sample size which reduced the meaningfulness of numerical analysis. As a result, questionnaire 
findings were used both quantitatively and qualitatively, serving mainly as a means to glean a picture 
of energy governance in each county – i.e. broadly equivalent to a simplified version of the data I might 
have obtained had I been able to conduct semi-structured interviews in person.  
Participant selection 
Senior officers of the county administration working in energy were targeted, with the director of the 
energy department the ideal recipient. However, finding suitable respondents was complicated by 19 
counties not having energy departments, with energy either listed as a sub area of another 
department or not at all. In these instances, third parties advised it was best to contact the County 
Secretary, who answers to the county executive committee and operates as head of the county public 
service. They were deemed best placed to assign the questionnaire to a relevant officer and carry 
sufficient authority to ensure the questionnaire was completed. 
Location 
Questionnaires were mostly sent via email, with recipients asked to reply within a week. On a few 
occasions during meetings, it was possible to deliver questionnaires in person. This resulted in some 
officers electing to complete the questionnaire at the meeting. 
Formation of questions 
The questionnaire was composed of 41 questions divided into six sections: 1) county energy plan; 2) 
county energy roles, 3) county ministries, 4) county energy data, 5) devolution, 6) contact with other 
stakeholders. These sections and their questions broadly aligned with those utilised in the semi-
structured interview and FGD guides, although many were altered in form as closed questions were 
also required to ensure the questionnaire could be completed in a reasonable amount of time. 
Following the interest shown by county officers at the Fourth Annual Devolution conference in 
answering questions concerned with county energy investment needs, a specific question addressing 
this issue was added to the questionnaire. Whilst a highly relevant question to the field of study, it 
was also hoped the possibility to shed light on specific funding needs would motivate officers to 
complete the questionnaire. 
Language 
The questionnaire was written in English. As the intended respondents held county government posts 
requiring an educational background, the use of English was not anticipated to be an issue.  
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Challenges 
The process of obtaining responses to the questionnaire from suitable county officials was fraught 
with difficulty and strategies learned from the process could assist similar future research endeavours. 
Initially, I contacted prominent non-governmental organisations to request the contact details of any 
county energy officers they might have from previous collaborations. The rationale being an email 
sent to a targeted energy officer with a reference to a previous collaborating organisation would be 
less easily ignored. This process was time consuming but moderately successful in achieving contact 
details. However, I received no responses from the subsequent emails sent to county officers. 
A Kenyan project partner recommended securing letters of support for the questionnaires to add 
more gravitas to my requests to county administrations. Letters were obtained from Strathmore 
University and a senior MoEP officer, the project partner instrumental in helping secure the latter. 
This highlighted again the importance of contacts in Kenyan based field work, yet, despite the letters, 
I still received no responses.   
Following advice from a World Bank representative that senior government officials would be in a 
more powerful position to coerce the counties as private organisations were often not able to divulge 
information on the counties who were their clients, I approached the Council of Governors (CoG) 
where an official offered to email the questionnaire to each county under the auspices of the Council 
of Governors. The assumption was this significant backing would yield responses, yet none 
materialised, primarily I believe as the questionnaire was not sent to individual county officers but to 
a shared CoG institution email address which I felt was more likely to be ignored. A month later, the 
same CoG official unexpectedly called to invite me to pitch the questionnaire at an energy meeting 
that day with representatives of most counties. Seven responses were obtained, although an error 
when printing the 47 questionnaires immediately prior to the meeting, resulted in the questionnaires, 
and consequently the seven responses, being incomplete. 
Over the course of the fieldwork, 14 questionnaires were completed or partially completed (Table 
4.8); a debateable cost-benefit ratio given the significant time and effort expended obtaining 
responses. However, were the process to be repeated, I believe the questionnaire could be 
administered more effectively by applying learnings drawn from this research process, such as the 
need to secure letters of support, channel the questionnaire via stakeholders with leverage (e.g. senior 
government officials), and emphasise explicitly the benefits of the research to counties (such as 
increased investment opportunities). 
The questionnaire also had important secondary benefits as the efforts to secure county government 
contact details put me in contact with a range of stakeholders which helped embed me within energy 
governance circles and facilitate other meetings, interviews and conferences invitations.   
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Table 4.9 Questionnaire responses 
County Former Province Completed 
Questionnaire 
Partially completed 
questionnaire 
Baringo Rift Valley 1  
Busia Western  1 
Garissa  North East 1  
Homa bay Coast  1 
Kiambu Rift Valley  1 
Kisumu  Nyanza  1 
Kitui Eastern 1  
Machakos* Eastern 1 1 
Marsabit Eastern 1  
Nakuru Rift Valley 1  
Nyamira Nyanza  1 
Siaya Nyanza  1 
Taita Taveta Coast 1  
Total  7 7 
*Machakos completed two questionnaires which contained several contradictory statements, raising questions about 
capacity, access to data, and coordination within the county. 
4.2.4 Conferences and workshop attendance 
Rationale for use of research method 
Conferences and workshops were regularly attended as a means to engage with key stakeholders and 
keep informed of the latest developments in the rapidly changing energy sector. These events were a 
vital research activity, not so much for the programmed content, but because the concentration of 
high-profile stakeholders in one space provided a time efficient means to engage multiple 
stakeholders. Certain high-profile attendees (e.g. senior representatives from government or 
transnational organisations) were also more accessible at these events than they ordinarily would be 
as they could be approached spontaneously during breaks in proceedings. 
Participant selection 
Although a list of attendees was usually distributed pre-event, it was difficult to ascertain who would 
attend and whether it would be possible to speak to them. Therefore, rather than individuals, I tended 
to target the specific stakeholder groups who were likely to be most prominent at an event; for 
instance, the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA) meeting offered particular scope to 
engage with transnational actors (Table 4.9). The county government and community level tended to 
be less well represented at these events, raising questions over the inclusivity of these various 
governance centred forums. 
The Fourth Annual Devolution Conference and the NETFund ‘Renewable Energy (RE) in County 
Planning’ workshop proved the most useful events as both were county centred (with representation 
from 47 and 38 counties respectively) and contained coverage of the decentralisation and energy 
themes of this PhD. Most other key stakeholder groups were also present at the two events, helping 
replicate the multilevel governance focus of the PhD. One event outside Kenya was also attended: a 
workshop in Malawi to present the findings of a study into the role of the proposed District (i.e. 
decentralised) Energy Officers in Malawi. This provided a valuable insight into alternative Global South 
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processes of energy decentralisation, with Malawi designing the decentralised role before 
implementing; the inverse of Kenya.  
Table 4.10 Key events attended during fieldwork 
Event Date Stakeholder group present? 
(bold indicates main group targeted) 
NG CG TA PS DNG Com 
GIZ County Energy Planning Framework meeting, 
Nairobi (Kenya) 
24/11/16  
 
Yes(y) No(n) y y y n 
Official Launch of the SE4All Action Agenda and 
Investment Prospectus, Nairobi 
08/12/16  
 
y n y y y n 
SE4All website development meetings, Nairobi 01/11/16 - 
28/02/17 
y n y n y n 
A Stakeholder Workshop: Blueprinting District-
Level Energy Officers. Lilongwe (Malawi)  
02/03/17 y y y y y y 
Fourth Annual Kenyan Devolution conference, 
Naivasha (Kenya) 
07/03/17-
09/03/17 
y Y y y y n 
Kenyan Association of Manufacturers (KAM) 
conference, Nairobi 
29/03/17-
30/03/17 
y n y Y y n 
Meeting for the United Nations Environment 
Assembly (UNEA) Nairobi (Kenya) 
04/12/17-
05/12/17 
y n Y y y n 
NETFund renewable energy in county planning 
workshop, Lake Elementaita (Kenya) 
06/12/17-
08/12/17 
y Y y y y y 
Understanding Sustainable Energy Solutions 
programme (USES) workshop, Nakuru (Kenya)* 
09/12/17-
10/12/17 
y y y y y y 
Transforming Energy Access (TEA) conference, 
Kisumu (Kenya) 
10/04/18-
11/04/18 
y y y y y n 
Key: NG = national government; CG = county government; TA = transnational actors; PS = private sector; DNG = 
domestic non-government actors; Com = community level 
*Organised and run by the Low Carbon Energy Development Network (LCEDN) 
Location 
When attempting to engage one on one with attendees, location was far less of a consideration than 
the availability of the stakeholder. Attendees were often occupied with their own networking 
concerns at these events and thus an opportunistic approach was required, looking for moments 
(usually during breaks) when stakeholders were available. 
Formation of questions 
Stakeholder engagement at conferences and workshops tended to consist of impromptu discussions 
during breaks in event proceedings, and thus interactions were far more informal and spontaneous 
than during semi-structured interviews. The questions I asked were generally based on those from the 
semi-structured interview guide but tailored to reflect the stakeholder’s expertise and the nature of 
the discussion. As it was difficult to anticipate when a conversation would finish, it was critical to 
prioritise, where possible, the most relevant and important questions for each stakeholder.  
Language 
English was used in all the conferences and workshops I attended, reflecting its status as the language 
of official proceedings in Kenya and the often significant presence of international attendees. All 
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attendees I spoke to on a one-to-one basis were proficient English speakers and thus language was 
not a constraint (outside the issues outlined in the semi-structured interviews section). 
Occasionally, conference presenters would briefly switch to Swahili, a phenomenon Nyabola (2017) 
considers politicians use “to shift personalities” with the “more raucous and combative” Swahili 
deployed to give speaker and listener the sense “they are getting a truer version of the other” away 
from English, the language: 
in which formal policy is mostly delivered – and usually as a meaningless stream of 
buzzwords, shielding real questions of power from scrutiny and leaving analysts 
with little more than hot air to analyse.  
The author adds these switches particularly impact the many rural citizens who do not speak English 
(or in some cases Swahili) as they “are left out of formal policy conversations and left with an especially 
reductive version of politics”. The reverse was true for me as I do not speak Swahili and was thus 
deprived of its often revealing use by politicians to manipulate power dynamics in their favour. 
Challenges 
It was not always possible to speak directly to the most relevant stakeholders, as often they were 
senior representatives who were invariably the most occupied at these events. This appeared to be 
partly influenced by positionality issues for although being a white British citizen appeared to open 
more doors than seemed possible for a Kenyan at a similar career stage, my status as an early career 
researcher meant I was often not seen as a priority for senior figures. Therefore, it was often necessary 
to speak to less senior members of organisations, who potentially were less well informed, although 
these discussions could at times lead to introductions to more senior colleagues. 
4.2.5 Use of secondary sources  
Rationale for use of research method 
Secondary source data was utilised throughout the course of the study, helping to contextualise and 
triangulate findings from the primary data. Almost all secondary source data was obtained online or 
in the UK, the exceptions being certain unpublished Kenyan Government policy documents and 
Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) which were requested from, or offered by, Kenya based 
stakeholders. Academic articles formed the bulk of secondary source material used in the thesis, 
informing the literature review, and helping place empirical findings within the wider body of 
academic debates. The grey literature was also valuable, particularly in revealing how stakeholders 
framed their own interventions in decentralised energy governance and those of other actors.  
National newspapers and social media (particularly Twitter) proved useful in keeping up to date with 
the fast-moving energy sector, providing updates and criticisms of various national and county energy 
initiatives. These sources were used throughout the research process due to the sparse coverage of 
Kenyan and East African affairs in the mainstream English language media outlets of the Global North. 
However, it was important to be aware of political leanings. National newspapers had clear editorial 
lines while worrying trends appeared to be curbing the freedom of the Kenyan media, widely regarded 
as one of the most open in the region (Cheeseman, 2018c). Most notably in 2018, eight prominent 
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columnists resigned from ‘The Nation’, Kenya’s largest media group, alleging national government 
interference in editorial decisions (France 24, 2018). Online publications helped mitigate the curbed 
editorial freedom of the mainstream media, with several of the resignees from the Nation migrating 
to the online publication, ‘The Elephant’. Twitter also proved highly useful for accessing information 
outside mainstream press narratives, notably during the disputed 2017 general election. 
Challenges 
Several important policy documents were challenging to source, notably county energy plans. It was 
widely recognised among senior energy governance circles that these plans had not been completed 
by most counties, yet no stakeholder spoken to was able to clarify with any certainty those which had. 
Further difficulties arose as completed plans were usually not publicly available. A senior Turkana 
county energy officer stated the county was waiting for the national Energy Bill 2015 (see Chapter 5) 
to be promulgated before publishing in case the Bill necessitated the county plan be amended. In 
Nakuru, the plan was provided following a direct request, but was still in draft form and appeared 
incomplete.  
The plans would have been valuable for understanding county interpretations of their decentralised 
energy roles, without which County Integrated Development Plans (CIDPs) remain the main indicator. 
However, these are far broader documents encompassing plans for all sectors under the county remit 
during the first term of the county administrations (2013-2017), and most lack detail concerning 
specific energy planning. Most CIDPs were published in the early stages of the first term before the 
county energy functions proposed in the Energy Bill 2015 would have been known, raising questions 
over the status and viability of the energy plans in the CIDPs. 
A further challenge concerned accessing a plan of the rollout of KPLC grid extension work, which would 
have helped gauge whether national and county energy plans were coordinated, particularly given 
uncertainties over grid extension locations have a detrimental impact on off-grid electricity 
investment. Certain national government stakeholders indicated the plan might be available if 
requested through the right channels, but none could assist with accessing the document. This 
contrasted with approaches in other Global South locations; a Malawian energy consultant stating the 
grid extension plan for Malawi was publicly available, precisely to facilitate off-grid investment [108]. 
4.2.6 Fieldwork notes 
The use of field notes to record the researcher’s own experiences and observations are widely seen 
as a key part of qualitative investigations (Patton, 2002). Initially, I intended to keep a diary for 
recording field notes but found establishing a daily writing routine challenging as days were rarely 
regular. Instead, I adopted a more ad hoc approach, jotting down ideas and thoughts as and when 
they occurred to me, often following a discussion, whether part of a formal interview or informal 
conversation. These notes formed a valuable source of primary data and I found this more ad hoc 
approach more effective and motivating than keeping a field diary as I would be recording the events 
I felt were most relevant. However, an element of regularised self-reflection was maintained through 
the weekly progress email I sent my supervisors. This provided an update on progress made the 
previous week and the plans for the forthcoming week, proving a highly valuable means to reflect on 
both progress and research approach.  
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4.3 Data analysis  
This section appraises the data analysis methods used. Primary data was analysed using a three-stage 
process. Data was first transcribed (or notes taken where the interview was not recorded), then coded 
and finally incorporated into the write up of the thesis.     
Transcription/note taking 
Where possible, interviews and FGDs were recorded and then transcribed. Five of the 7 FGDs were 
recorded and 19 of the 70 semi-structured interviews; the low number of recordings for the latter 
method partly a consequence of several participants not wishing to be recorded in the early stages of 
fieldwork. One senior National government officer stated, “you can [record the interview], but you 
may not get the answers you want”, implying greater candidness if the interview was not recorded. A 
project partner seemed offended when asked to be recorded, possibly because it elevated the 
discussion to a more formal level than expected from the previously more informal relationship.  
This reluctance to be recorded made me reticent to ask the same of later interviewees. I often felt it 
was inappropriate to ask to record discussions emanating from on spec interview requests as I was 
concerned the participant would be offended having ‘done me a favour’ by agreeing to be interviewed 
without notice. Towards the end of site visit 2, having begun asking again to record impromptu 
interviews, I realised most did not mind being recorded and it seems I may have drawn erroneous 
conclusions from the disinclination shown earlier. 
Unrecorded interviews necessitated notes were taken during the discussion. This affected my ability 
to fully engage in the conversation as I was writing at the same time, but heightened my concentration 
as I was aware I only had one opportunity to note down the interviewee’s words. Writing notes rather 
than transcribing also required me to summarise as there was not sufficient time to note down 
responses verbatim. This was beneficial in forcing me to think critically during interviews about what 
was being said and its relative importance, but inevitably resulted in certain details being lost. This last 
shortcoming the main reason why I would always endeavour to record future interviews. 
After interviews I aimed to transcribe or type the handwritten notes as soon as I could, as it was easy 
to forget particular facets of the interview not deducible from the recordings, such as participant’s 
manner (which I noted immediately after interviews). During unrecorded interviews, the speed of 
note-taking led to untidy handwriting and use of shorthand which might also have been difficult to 
deduce had I not typed the notes soon after the interview.  
However, the sheer concentration of interviews and FGDs in the latter half of site visit 2 meant 
transcriptions (which required five hours per hour recorded) could not always be transcribed within a 
relatively short time of the interview. This is likely to have affected the quality of transcription as 
certain contextual information (such as participant emotions at different stage of the interviews) may 
have been lost, while interpreting unclear pronunciation would also have been easier the closer to the 
interview the transcription was completed.  
I endeavoured to transcribe as closely to the participants words as possible and did not ‘tidy up’ 
language containing grammatical or syntactical features considered erroneous in written form. 
Instances of repetition were sometimes omitted if interpreted as not indicative of particular added 
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meaning although most ‘hesitation phenomena’ such as pauses, repeats and false starts were 
transcribed given the insights they potentially reveal into respondent psychology (Maclay & Osgood, 
1959). Where meaning was unclear from the audio recording, a ‘?’ in parenthesis would be inserted 
in place of the inaudible word or next to the closest approximation, thus denoting caution was 
required when considering the relative weight of that particular utterance. 
Coding 
All interviews and FGDs, along with the notes taken from key conference proceedings were coded as 
a means to organise data, develop an analytical structure, and identify emerging trends linking findings 
to the wider literature. As indicated by Cope (2010, p.445), the process of coding was non-linear and 
proved to be “inevitably circular, sporadic and, frankly, messy …. [and] involve reading and rereading, 
thinking and rethinking, and developing codes that are tentative and temporary along the way”. 
Bryman (2001) agrees, suggesting no correct method of coding exists, rather it is a continual creative 
process reliant on ongoing and evolving interpretation of the data. 
Following advice provided in the literature (e.g. Cope, 2010), I created an initial set of codes by reading 
through my data set and assigning sections I deemed important with a code. The skeletal framework 
for the PhD was also used to identify codes. These codes were then applied to the data set using 
Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) as managing and analysing in-depth 
the large quantity of primary data generated by the research would have been far more time-
consuming using pen and paper methods (Hoven, 2010). I elected to use MAXQDA software as I found 
it more intuitive with a clearer interface than the N-Vivo software more widely used in the 
Loughborough University Geography Department.  
However, applying these codes to the data set using MAXQDA still took considerable time (four 
weeks). In retrospect, I believe I spent too much time on the coding process before writing, as I found 
it easier to appreciate the codes I required once the writing process had begun and I could more 
tangibly visualise the composition of paragraphs. Although a degree of initial coding is necessary to 
ascertain themes to kickstart the writing process, I feel it would have been more efficient to note a 
few (c. two to four) key themes as I completed each transcription (or typed notes) which I could later 
use as codes. This would obviate the need to read through the data set to create an initial set of codes.  
In addition, I believe it would have been better to spend far less time (approximately one week) 
applying the initial set of codes; simply enough to secure sufficient gist of the data to begin writing. 
Once writing had begun, I would then be better placed to judge which codes required creating or 
adjusting, thus entering at an earlier juncture the aforementioned circular process acknowledged by 
Cope and Bryman.  Ultimately, much of this is personal preference and I feel the lessons learnt via this 
self-reflection have been highly valuable and will enhance my future research practice  
Writing  
The critical challenge facing qualitative writing is how to decide whose voices are heard, how much 
credence each voice is given, and how to incorporate these often differing views with the researcher’s 
own interpretations. This quandary highlights the significant power bestowed on the researcher 
regarding how participants are represented in research, leading Sovacool (2014, p.11) to question, 
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“How can researchers minimize bias - their own, and that of their subjects - when doing research?”, 
McDowell (1992, p.409) adding the challenge is then how “to write this into our research practice”. 
To address this predicament, data was triangulated wherever possible using both primary and 
secondary sources. Similarly, direct quotations were mainly used to emphasise quotes considered 
emblematic of a particular stakeholder group position, or at times to clearly demarcate how certain 
stances were distinct outliers. Given the focus on multilevel governance, conclusions were only 
deemed viable once representation of the various stakeholder groups operating in each locality had 
been considered and critically appraised. Lastly, inferences from the data were contextualised by using 
the wider literature to indicate how and where findings were supported by existing narratives.   
4.4 Positionality and ethics 
It is critical to acknowledge the issue of positionality when conducting research, for as Skelton (2001, 
p.89) stresses researchers “are not neutral, scientific observers, untouched by the emotional and 
political contexts of places where we do our research”. For Clifford et al. (2010, p.534) this involves 
“Recognizing and trying to understand the implications of the social position of the researcher with 
respect to the subjects, particularly with regard to power relations or cultural differences that may 
influence the process of the research and its interpretation’’. Many factors affect positionality and 
how researchers conduct research and understand the world including gender, race, class, age, job 
status, education, being a parent or not, sexuality, and ableness (Skelton, 2001). Similarly, information 
provided by respondents is dependent on the way the researcher is regarded within that specific 
context (Clifford et al., 2010). Thus, there is a need for researchers to be respectful to local attitudes 
in a way that according to Nash (2000, p.146) “respects the cultural as well as the physical 
environments”.  
The positionality issues above are particularly pertinent to research, such as my own, involving a 
Global North researcher working in the Global South. Highlighting inequities between developed and 
developing countries, Clifford & Valentine (2003, p.183) emphasise researchers “need to pay attention 
to how cultures are embedded in, and part of, ongoing global inequalities”. The legacy of the 
predominant post world war II development model ‘Modernisation theory’ is particularly concerning 
in this respect, given its implication that development requires a “process of change towards those 
types of social, economic, and political systems that have developed in Western Europe and North 
America” (Eisenstadt, n.d., p.1). Instead, advocates of ‘Dependency theory’ argued a country’s 
development paths is unique and that underdevelopment stemmed not only from internal factors, 
but also from external Global North exploitation of Global South resources (e.g. Rodney, 1972). Similar 
concerns were highlighted by Said (1978) who saw Colonialism as leaving a legacy of what he termed, 
‘orientalism’, where other cultures are viewed as ‘primitive’ requiring the modernizing influence of 
the West. This ‘orientalism’ is also visible in studies where the researcher’s own culture or ideology is 
seen as the benchmark, producing what Cloke et al. (1999, p.43) referred to as ‘self-centered’ or 
‘ethnocentric’ geographies.  
Following the lead of Clifford et al. (2010, p.159), I aimed to avoid ethnocentrism by seeking “to 
understand other cultures in and of themselves while also understanding how local places and 
cultures are connected to national and global processes in uneven and unequal ways”. It was therefore 
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important to reflect on how my positionality as a white British male conducting research in a former 
British colony in the Global South impacted the research process. As Clifford & Valentine (2003) note 
it is often the privileged social position of the researcher within a particular context that enables the 
research to be feasible, an issue made apparent to me by a Kenyan Strathmore University colleague 
who upon hearing I was visiting the Ministry of Devolution on spec to request an interview, remarked 
“Your ethnicity gets you into places. If I went, they would just tell me to go away” [23]48.  
While the greater stakeholder access my positionality provided was clearly advantageous for my 
research, a balance needed to be struck so as not to perpetuate the current stereotypes of who does 
research in the Global North dominated knowledge economy. I therefore adopted, as England (1994) 
suggests, a deferential stance which emphasised the participant as expert in an effort to support the 
standing of local knowledges. This approach was aided by drawing on my own 12 years’ experience 
teaching English as a foreign language, which involved engaging with a wide range of cultures 
(including many from the Global South), and where, critically, best practice also situates the teacher 
as listener and facilitator (Scrivener, 2011). In addition, a three-month volunteer placement for a 
sustainability project in rural Nicaragua provided me with experience of living without modern energy 
services and of the power dynamics in marginalized rural communities. This, I believe enabled me to 
better relate to the often similar realities facing participants in Kenya and adopt a more unassuming 
position during the research process.  
The study’s focus on Kenya also brought into question the appropriateness of ‘outsiders’ conducting 
the research, particularly where a less powerful group is represented by a researcher in a more 
powerful position. As the leading British Professor of Democracy, Nic Cheeseman (2018b, p.1) notes 
“Of all the inequalities between the Global North and South, the geographical divide in the knowledge 
economy is one of the worst”. I often questioned whether my own research was contributing to this 
inequity as the PhD could have been conducted by a Kenyan, who would know far more about the 
country. Cheeseman (2018a, p.1) posed a similar question to the Kenyan readership of the Daily 
Nation (Kenya’s largest newspaper by circulation) over his place writing a fortnightly column in the 
newspaper. Most responses urged him to stay, many citing that in an era of politically partisan Kenyan 
politics, ‘neutral’ external perspectives were valuable and “may, occasionally, be better placed to 
separate the wood from trees”. Whilst clearly I am not as valuable an ‘external perspective’ as a 
preeminent professor of African democracy, I drew a degree of comfort that Kenyan voices shared my 
own rationale for the need for outsider views. 
However, the support Cheeseman received was not without caveats, with many rightly suggesting 
(and Cheeseman agreeing) he use his position to foster collaborations with Kenyan writers, creating 
space for “authors who might traditionally find it hard to bring their experiences and ideas to a larger 
audience” (Cheeseman, 2018a, p.1). This collaborative aspect is also a critical component of 
addressing the inequalities in academia between Global North and South, such as the 
underrepresentation of African authors in energy studies journals, which Sovacool (2014) noted 
amounted to only 0.8% of global output between 1999 and 2013. Thus, I aimed to collaborate with 
Global South partners throughout the course of my PhD, through first year discussions with Kenyan 
project partners over the direction of my research, to being based at Strathmore University during 
 
48 Interviewee code. See appendix 1 for table of interviewees and assigned codes. 
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field work, and being part of ongoing work by the Low Carbon Energy Development Network49 (LCEDN) 
to foster Global North-South partnerships. These collaborations have contributed to a number of 
mutual benefits including ongoing partnerships on LCEDN projects (e.g. the Modern Energy Cooking 
Services (MECS) programme) and a recently published journal paper (see Zalengera et al., 2020). 
Another potential positionality issue regarding the knowledge economy concerns the study’s MLG 
framework as it has been dominated by Global North thinking. The research aims to address this issue 
by operating as a critical appraisal of the concept, drawing on rarely acknowledged Global South 
perspectives in its analysis. Incorporating these voices, along with the adjustments for positionality 
noted in this chapter, facilitates a more balanced application of MLG to decentralised energy 
governance, which in turn leaves the study better placed to deliver a more inclusive response to 
Goldthau's (2014, p.139) call for research investigating “when multi-scale governance arrangements 
work, and under what circumstances they deliver - or not”.  
Working with gatekeepers 
Gatekeepers were hugely important in terms of accessing stakeholders, with most successful 
applications of the research methods a direct result of gatekeepers providing introductions on my 
behalf. However, there has been concern within the research methods literature that gatekeepers can 
lead to researchers being directed to certain individuals deemed representative while other 
stakeholders or groups are excluded (Willis, 2006).  
This issue was not a particular problem in Nairobi as I had a broad base of contacts and sufficient time 
to allow for more independent decision making, but the visits to Nakuru, Migori and Turkana were 
more challenging. For the week I was in each county, a research assistant (RA) was employed who I 
was far more dependent on to organise FGDs and interviews as I lacked the time and contacts I had in 
the capital. Thus, in situations where it was not possible to speak to the specific stakeholder I had 
requested or if I was seeking to speak to a generic stakeholder group, I was almost entirely reliant on 
the RA to source stakeholders 
I attempted to mitigate the impact gatekeeper impartiality might have on the research by briefing 
each RA on the aims of the research prior to my arrival. While the briefing was mostly successful in 
terms of facilitating representative participant selection, other misunderstandings occurred regarding 
research objectives and conduct.  The role and form of transcription was misunderstood by two of the 
three RAs, while one RA joined me in several interviews and often asked interviewees largely irrelevant 
questions. This emphasises the importance for researchers in establishing clear communications with 
gatekeepers and factoring in time for questions, doubts and suggestions to be raised. 
However, the benefits the three RAs brought to the research process far outweighed the drawbacks. 
Each provided highly valuable insight into the local context and culture, while providing company and 
someone with whom to reflect on the research findings – a rarity during the often very solitary 
fieldwork process. This also assisted my own personal security as I was generally always accompanied 
and going somewhere with purpose. Without their assistance, it is highly unlikely the FGDs could have 
 
49 The LCEDN is a leading UK-based platform for energy stakeholders to engage on research for low-carbon development 
(see https://www.lcedn.com/) (LCEDN, 2019). 
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taken place as the RAs provided shortcuts to addressing the language and cultural barriers which 
would have made organising the FGDs by myself highly challenging.  
Ethics 
Prior to fieldwork, ethics and risk assessment forms were completed, along with a full and frank 
supervisory meeting covering health and safety arrangements. Research partners in Kenya were also 
contacted in advance to ease transition and improve safety. The ethics form was approved without 
issue as participants were not classed as vulnerable groups. 
However, the tendency of ethics forms to focus on discrete issues largely fails to capture the more 
fundamental ‘everyday’ morality required for ethical research. This was far better encapsulated by 
the human geographer Hay (2010, p.35), whose well-established work on ethics notes: 
To behave ethically in geographical research requires that you and I act in 
accordance with notions of right and wrong - that we conduct ourselves morally. 
Ethical research is carried out by thoughtful, informed and reflexive geographers 
who act honourably because it is the ‘right’ thing to do, not just because someone 
is making them do it. 
Integration of Hay’s ideals into my own research was assisted by attending a Masters module in Global 
South research methods prior to fieldwork. Particularly relevant was the course content on how not 
to unwittingly contribute to the propagation of Global North-South power imbalances. Regular 
analysis of my own practice also helped maintain and improve the ethical standards of my work, aiding 
a reflexivity process described by Clifford et al. (2010, p.534) as “Critical and conscious introspection 
and analytical scrutiny of one-self as researcher … in order to gain new insights into research”. 
On completion of my PhD, I intend to have a briefing paper of my thesis translated into Swahili as a 
small step towards mitigating the inequalities of the knowledge economy, whilst enabling non-English 
speaking participants access to the work they contributed towards. The latter reason partly inspired 
by a discussion with a Global North sociology researcher working at Kakuma refugee camp, who 
remarked how camp residents had grown skeptical of the numerous studies conducted at the camp 
as they were never provided the opportunity to read the outputs. The Swahili briefing paper also aims 
to mitigate the “cultural bomb” of English, the term the renowned Kenyan author and post-colonial 
theorist Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o (1986, p.28) coined to describe how colonising languages have impacted 
development and education, namely via a: 
deliberate disassociation of the language of conceptualisation, of thinking, of 
formal education, of mental development, from the language of daily interaction 
in the home and in the community. 
4.5 Conclusion  
The main argument of this chapter lies with its espousal of a predominantly qualitative methodology, 
with quantitative methods deemed largely irrelevant to the central focus on the spatial variations of 
human interactions in decentralised energy governance. This represents a departure from most 
studies within the decentralisation and energy studies literatures. The thesis also innovates by 
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adopting an organisational structure based on scale reflecting to an extent the MLG framework it 
critically appraises. This helps ensure representation is provided to the various stakeholders operating 
at multiple scales within decentralised energy governance; a key concern of the methodology. 
The process of conducting research for this PhD has also unearthed a range of methodological 
strategies and approaches which are likely to be of use to future researchers in the field. As a whole 
these strategies amount to a researcher’s toolkit for energy governance research in the Global South. 
Of particular note was the importance of contacts, with introductions to other stakeholders heavily 
reliant on prior (mostly face-to-face) engagement with these gatekeepers. Positionality issues were 
also stressed, particularly how Global North researchers working in the Global South may exacerbate 
the existing geographical inequalities in the knowledge economy. This was argued to be partly 
mitigated by a process of ongoing collaboration with in-country partners.   
Overall, this chapter endeavours to be of use as a resource for future research and it is hoped that the 
experiences and lessons contained within will be of benefit to other researchers working in the field 
of governance and more broadly, the Global South
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Chapter 5 – Developments in Kenyan Decentralised Energy Governance: The 
Reticence of National Government to Devolve 
The aim of this first empirical chapter is to uncover the developments in Kenyan decentralisation and 
decentralised energy governance since the implementation of the first county governments in March 
2013. This focus addresses research question 1, extending the analysis begun in Chapter 3 which 
focussed on the period pre-2013. The chapter appraises the various interpretations of these 
developments, which the ontological and epistemological grounding of this study assume to be 
subjective and contested. In doing so, the chapter explores how varied understandings of the concepts 
of decentralisation, governance and energy access intersect, themes the energy studies and 
decentralisation discourses have rarely drawn together in a Global South context (Brown et al., 2015).  
Bridging these disciplines, enables the study to engage with and extend broader debates in the 
decentralisation and political science discourses which have increasingly questioned assumptions 
concerning decentralisation’s benefits for service delivery (Conyers, 2007). The tendency for 
stakeholders to mobilise conceptualisations of decentralisation to retain or assume powers outside 
those stated by legislation has received particular focus (Erk, 2014; Rodríguez-Pose & Gill, 2003), 
suggesting energy decentralisation reforms may also be subject to similar concerns. These issues could 
potentially impede energy access issues being addressed; yet, detailed qualitative analysis of how 
these debates intersect with decentralised energy governance in a Global South context has not been 
undertaken (Brown et al., 2015). This is a critical epistemological issue hindering the development of 
an evidence base to better inform policy on the potential of decentralised energy governance to 
address Global South energy access issues – a knowledge gap also detrimental to ongoing debates 
over how the polycentric governance approaches advocated by leading energy studies scholars might 
work in practice (Goldthau, 2012; Sovacool, 2014). 
To address this scholarly shortcoming, section 5.1 begins by critically evaluating the energy legislation 
which has emerged since 2013 and the extent to which the ambiguities of the pre-2013 legislation 
have been clarified. The chapter then turns to on the ground developments in decentralised energy 
governance practices to help determine any disconnects between policy and reality. Institutional 
developments are first assessed, followed by developments in the governance of grid electricity, off-
grid electricity, and clean cooking (Sections 5.2-5.5). The progress made by county governments in 
terms of developing energy sector institutions, capacity and initiatives is then interrogated in section 
5.6. As with Chapter 3, Hooghe and Mark’s (2011) twin concepts of MLG1 and MLG2 are used to help 
deduce and then compare the form of energy governance intended by legislation with that 
materialising on the ground, enabling further insights into debates over the usefulness of MLG as a 
concept for understanding decentralised governance processes. Lastly, section 5.7 concludes by 
revealing the impact developments in decentralised energy governance have had on addressing 
Kenyan energy access issues.   
5.1 The impact of post-2013 energy legislation on decentralised energy governance 
Since 2013, further legislation governing devolved energy has been enacted or drafted (Table 5.1), 
adding to the pre-existing framework discussed in Chapter 3. This section explores this more recent 
legislation in order to assess the extent to which clarification of the ambiguities of the pre-existing 
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legislation has occurred and ascertain the broader implications for the development of decentralised 
energy governance. This form of analysis is critical as the clarity of devolved legislation and sub-
national roles are factors viewed by the decentralisation literature as likely to have a significant 
influence on the stakeholder interactions shaping decentralised energy governance (Ribot, 2002).  
Table 5.1 Post 2013 election legislation affecting devolved energy roles  
Legislation County Energy Role 
Energy (Improved Biomass 
Cookstoves) Regulations 2013 
No role stated 
 
2014: Forest Policy Counties named as one of the organisations responsible for sustainable 
management of forests but no specific role stated 
National Energy and Petroleum 
Policy 2015 / Petroleum Bill 2017 
Various, see Tables 5.2-5.4 
Energy Bill 2015 / 2017 Various, see Tables 5.2-5.4 
Climate Change Act 2016 Mainstream climate change into relevant sectors by incorporating the 
National Climate Change policy into county plans (e.g. CIDPs).  
Autonomy to enact legislation to implement the Climate Change Act 
5.1.1 Energy Bill 2015 & 2017 
Of the post-2013 legislation, the 2015 and 2017 drafts of the Energy Bill have had most impact on 
determining devolved energy roles. This thesis centres on the 2015 draft as it was the version pending 
when fieldwork was conducted. However, the 2017 draft (the version ratified in March 2019) assigns 
identical roles to the national and county governments and thus does not invalidate the analysis. 
The Energy Bill 2015 most notably differs from its predecessor, the Energy Act 2006, through its 
incorporation of the county level, providing a detailed breakdown of the national and county 
government energy roles in an attempt to ‘unbundle’ the broad functions articulated by the 
Constitution. These more detailed roles are categorised under three headings: ‘Planning’, ‘Regulation’, 
and ‘Operations & Development’ which the following sub-sections explore in turn50 . 
Planning functions 
Echoing the Constitution, the planning functions of the Energy Bill 2015 (Table 5.2) allocate to national 
government the formulation of national energy policy (see national function 1a (NF1a)), and to the 
counties the preparation of county energy plans incorporating petroleum, renewable energy, and 
electricity (county function 1a (CF1a)). The remaining county planning functions (CF1b-1e) provide 
further indication of the content required in the energy plans, expanding on the planning role only 
articulated (i.e. not content specified) in the County Governments Act 2012. Once completed, all 47 
county plans are to be consolidated by the national government into an integrated national plan 
(NF1b). This process potentially lowers concerns that national interests will dominate policy (see 
section 3.9) as it appears to provide a feedback mechanism for counties, although power relations 
between the two levels still seem a more likely indicator of whether recentralisation and a movement 
towards MLG1 occurs, a trait noted in the literature (Rondinelli et al., 1989).  
 
50 The Draft Energy and Petroleum Policy 2015 contained the same list of functions, but this list was omitted from the 2017 
update, the Petroleum Bill. By this time, the Petroleum and Energy departments were no longer in the same Ministry and 
presumably including energy functions in a specifically petroleum focussed document was considered unnecessary. 
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Arguably of most concern is the clear overlap between NF1c and CF1c over land rights, which is likely 
to be contentious given the highly emotive nature of land in Kenya, which has historically been subject 
to various, and often competing, interests (see Chapter 3). Here, the extent to which national or 
county jurisdiction holds sway is likely to be a critical determiner in whether a more MLG1 or MLG2 
form of governance emerges as the mobilisation of this function has the potential to block energy 
infrastructure initiatives from either level of government.  
Table 5.2 Planning functions in the Energy Bill 2015  
1. National policy formulation and integrated 
national energy planning functions 
1. County energy planning functions 
(a) Formulation of the National Energy Policy.
  
 
(a) Preparation of County energy plans, incorporating 
petroleum, renewable energy and electricity master 
plans. 
(b) Preparation of Integrated National Energy Plan, 
incorporating fossil fuel, renewable energy and 
electricity master plans. 
(b) Physical planning relating to energy resource areas 
such as dams, solar and wind farms, municipal waste 
dumpsites, agricultural and animal waste, ocean 
energy, woodlots and plantations for production bio 
energy feedstock. 
(c) Provision of land and rights of way for energy 
infrastructure. 
(c) Provision of land and rights of way for energy 
infrastructure.  
 (d) Facilitation of energy demand by planning for 
industrial parks and other energy consuming activities. 
 (e) Preparation and implementation of disaster 
management plans. 
Regulation functions 
The regulation functions in the Energy Bill 2015 significantly unbundle the concurrent provision for 
energy regulation conferred by the Constitution to the extent there no longer appear to be any shared 
roles (Table 5.3). Electricity regulation remains solely with national government, which seems prudent 
in the case of grid electricity and its inherent natural monopolies (e.g. one state-owned grid network), 
but not for off-grid electricity which is devoid of many of these monopolies and operates on a more 
localised scale which appears to align well with the county mandate. Exclusive national control is likely 
to impede county government opportunities in off-grid electricity by creating added bureaucracy and 
limiting scope for autonomous initiatives. This is particularly the case with smaller scale off-grid 
systems whose more localised scale suggests counties are ideally placed to facilitate and which are 
unlikely to affect national level grid electricity operations (or could be later integrated into the grid)51. 
County regulation functions are instead centred on fossil fuels and biofuels primarily for domestic 
purposes, with provision also made for end point petroleum services and energy efficiency.  The latter 
role (CF2h) sees the only use of the word ‘customise’ (or equivalent synonym) in the entire bill, which 
seems an oversight given it is regarded an implied component of devolution processes (Hunold, 
2010)52. Moreover, its more frequent inclusion would have likely helped clarify the overlaps in both 
the planning and operations & development functions.  
 
51 This thesis uses the common convention of defining small-scale electricity generation as 10 kW to 10 MW  (EU, 2014). 
52 For instance, the synonyms ‘modify’, ‘tailor’, and ‘adapt’ are never used to describe county government responsibilities. 
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Table 5.3 Regulation functions in the Energy Bill 2015  
2. National energy regulation functions 2. County energy regulation functions 
(a) Regulation and licensing of importation, refining, 
exportation, transportation, storage and bulk sales of 
petroleum and their derivatives. 
(a) Regulation and licensing of retail petroleum service 
stations. 
(b) Regulation and licensing of production, conversion, 
distribution, supply, marketing and use of renewable 
energy. 
(b) Regulation and licensing of county gas reticulation 
systems. 
(c) Regulation and licensing of generation, 
importation, exportation, transmission, distribution, 
retail and use of electrical energy. 
(c) Regulation and licensing and supply of retail coal 
products for domestic use. 
(d) Approval of energy purchase agreements, network 
service contracts as well contracts for common user 
facilities. 
(d) Regulation and licensing of designated parking for 
petroleum tankers. 
(e) Protection of consumer, investor and other 
stakeholder interests. 
(e) Regulation and licensing of biomass production, 
transport and distribution. 
(f) Preparation and enforcement of regulations and 
standards. 
(f) Regulation and licensing of biogas systems. 
(g) Formulation of national codes for energy efficiency 
and conservation in buildings. 
(g) Regulation and licensing of charcoal production, 
transportation and distribution. 
(h) Issuance of energy saving certificates to enhance 
energy efficiency and conservation. 
(h) Customize national codes for energy efficiency and 
conservation in buildings to local conditions. 
(i) Setting, review and adjustment of energy tariffs and 
tariff structures 
 
(j) Resolution of complaints and disputes between 
parties over any matter in the energy and petroleum 
sector. 
 
(k) Prosecution of offences created under the Energy 
Act 
 
(l) Certification of petroleum tanker drivers, electrical 
workers and contractors, solar system installation 
technicians and contractors. 
 
Operations & development functions 
In contrast to the regulation functions, five of the eight county operations and development functions 
can be interpreted as either partly overlapping or concurrent with national roles (Tables 5.4-5.5). This 
is potentially concerning given the warnings in the wider literature that poorly defined stakeholder 
roles can reduce the effectiveness of decentralised energy governance (Brown et al., 2015). The 
concurrent electricity and gas reticulation53 functions (NF3d and CF3a) appear particularly susceptible 
to misinterpretation because they seem to contradict interpretations of the Constitution which placed 
responsibility exclusively with the county (cf. Kangu’s, 2015). 
Exacerbating this legislative ambiguity is the reality that opportunities for counties to play a role in 
electricity reticulation seem, aside from smaller off-grid systems, largely unfeasible due to the de facto 
 
53 The Energy Bill 2015 (Art. 2) defines ‘Electricity reticulation’ as “the planning and construction of the network consisting 
of low and medium voltage electric supply lines together with service lines to enable a consumer to get supply of electricity”, 
and gas reticulation’ as “the planning and construction of the system through which a consumer gets a continuous supply of 
gas at the turn of a tap through a piping network or from a centralised storage system”. The latter seems an improbable 
county function as no piped gas network exists in Kenya while developing a county network seems highly infeasible given 
the costs and capacity and constraints. 
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monopoly over grid distribution and retail held by the national government parastatal, the Kenya 
Power and Lighting Company (KPLC). This may lead to tension between county aspirations (raised by 
the legislative provisions of the Energy Bill 2015) and what is feasible, as remarked upon by a 
transnational actor category 2 (TAC2) representative:  
There are things they [the counties] would still want to do that the national 
government has as part of its mandate. Of course, on the one hand, you will say 
'yes, reticulation lies with both', but to what extent can a county be able to do 
reticulation? … [the counties] may want to, but does it make sense? … For mini-
grids it makes sense, but for the grid it doesn't [Interviewee 67 - cf. Appendix 1].  
The quotation reinforces that national government dominance over grid electricity both legislatively 
(e.g. NF3d) and institutionally means the county mandate aligns more realistically with off-grid 
electricity and clean cooking. In addition, it highlights the growing and prudent sense among 
development agencies (but less so counties as later discussed in section 5.6) that the practical 
implications of implementing certain concurrent energy functions need to be first assessed rather than 
automatically assumed to require being fulfilled by county administrations.  
Table 5.4 Operations and development functions in the Energy Bill 2015 
3. National operations and development functions 3. County operations and development functions 
(a) Exploration and production of geothermal and 
other energy based natural resources. 
(a) Electricity and gas reticulation.  
(b) Importation, exportation, and refining or 
processing of petroleum and its derivatives. 
(b) Provide and maintain adequate street lighting. 
(c) Transportation, storage and bulk sales of 
petroleum, coal and their derivatives. 
(c) Provision of designated parking for petroleum 
tankers. 
(d) Generation, transmission, distribution (including 
reticulation) and retail supply of electricity. 
(d) Collect and maintain energy data. 
(e) Collect and maintain energy data. (e) Implementation of county electrification 
projects. 
(f) Implementation of the Rural Electrification 
Programme and management of the Rural 
Electrification Programme Fund. 
(f) Undertake feasibility studies and maintain data 
with a view to availing the same to developers of 
energy resources and infrastructure. 
(g) Undertake feasibility studies and maintain data 
with a view to availing the same to developers of 
energy resources and infrastructure. 
(g) Establishment of energy centres for promotion of 
renewable energy technologies, energy efficiency 
and conservation.  
(h) Provide technical and other capacity building 
support to county governments.  
(h) Protection of energy infrastructure inc. oil and 
gas fields/pipelines, refineries, power plants, control 
centres, electric supply lines, substations and depot. 
(i) Administration and management of the 
Consolidated Energy Fund and the National Energy 
Conservation Fund. 
(i) Undertake energy efficiency and conservation 
within the county. 
(j) Protection of energy infrastructure including 
pipelines and storage depots, refineries, power plants, 
control centres, electric supply lines and substations. 
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Table 5.5 Concurrent or overlapping operations and development functions in the Energy Bill 2015 
National function  Concurrent or overlapping county function 
3d 3a, 3e 
3e 3d 
3f 3e 
3g 3f 
3h Potentially all county functions 
3j 3h 
5.1.2 Clean cooking in post-2013 legislation 
The critical issue of clean cooking is not explicitly addressed by the Energy Bill 2015 with the word 
‘cook’ entirely absent from the bill, although devolved responsibility for upstream aspects of clean 
cooking is alluded to via the county regulatory functions over biomass, biogas and charcoal (CF2e/f/g). 
While the ‘establishment of energy centres’ (CF3g) also suggests a county role in disseminating clean 
cooking initiatives, this function seems likely to cause contention as it overlaps with the interests of 
the national government who already run 16 such centres which predate the devolution era.   
A county role in clean cooking is also not specified in other post-2013 legislation concerning the energy 
sub-sector. The Energy (Improved Biomass Cookstoves) Regulations 201354 confer to the Energy 
Regulatory Commission (ERC) regulatory and licensing responsibilities over improved biomass 
cookstoves55 and institutional use of biomass fuels for cooking and heating. These regulations appear 
to overlap the upstream biomass functions of the county in the Energy Bill 2015 (CF2f), again providing 
scope for misinterpretation of roles. The potential for confusion over upstream biomass roles is 
increased by the Forest Policy 2014, which names counties as one of the institutions responsible for 
sustainable management of forests but does not establish the specific role they are to play. 
The National Energy and Petroleum Policy 2015 (Article 6.8.2) partly attends to the lack of clean 
cooking legislation, calling for the provision of:  
incentives for use of clean modern household energy to eliminate the use of wood-
fuel, charcoal and kerosene as an energy source [and] support and promote 
conversion of cook stoves to uptake modern and clean fuels in households and 
institutions.  
As the policy does not explicitly assign this role to either level of government, the function is allocated 
to national government under article 186(3) of the Constitution and therefore does not cater for a 
county role. The policy also calls for stakeholder collaboration on afforestation and biogas initiatives, 
providing for multi-stakeholder, but not necessarily decentralised, energy governance56. Thus, overall, 
the post 2013 legislation does not sufficiently address the failings of the Constitution to address clean 
cooking and contains little provision for a county role. This is clearly a missed opportunity as the more 
 
54 The Energy (Improved Biomass Cookstoves) Regulations, 2013 fall under the Energy Act, 2006 
55 This covers manufacturers, importers, distributors, technicians, and contractors of improved cookstoves. 
56 See articles 2.4.2 (5), 3.4, 3.6.3, and 6.8.2(16 & 20) of the National Energy and Petroleum Policy (2015) 
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localised nature of clean cooking which is largely free from the natural monopolies inherent in grid 
electricity seems to readily align with decentralised energy governance.  
5.1.3 The Climate Change Act 2016 
Aside from the Energy Bill 2015, the Climate Change Act 2016 has been the most significant post-2013 
legislative act affecting devolved energy roles. Unlike the Energy Bill and most key energy legislation 
affecting devolved energy roles, county governments were directly engaged in the drafting of the 
Climate Change Act 2016 as an NGO representative involved in the drafting of the document revealed:  
We engaged head to head with these guys [the counties] and said to them, ‘ok, ok 
what is it you want, give us your opinion’, and we asked all 47 CECs responsible for 
climate change act, so we worked it out57 [73]. 
This collaborative drafting seems far more likely to lead to the well-defined roles deemed essential for 
successful decentralised governance interventions (Brown et al., 2015); which the high degree of 
county autonomy derived from the Act seems to support. Under the Act, counties are charged with 
incorporating the National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) devised by the national government 
into their sectoral plans and CIDPs. Autonomy is provided for the county to enact legislation to 
implement the Act while technical assistance for county initiatives is available via the NCCAPs newly 
established Climate Change Fund, which provides finance for climate change interventions. These 
provisions are of direct benefit to county energy initiatives as the energy sector is integral to the 
emphasis of the Climate Change Act on low carbon transitions. In addition, the county integration 
from the offset of the Act’s development perhaps helps explains why workshops focussed on 
implementing the Act have had significant county uptake58.  
5.1.4 Promulgation issues with energy legislation 
Despite the Energy Bill 2015 offering a far more detailed breakdown of the county energy role than 
the Constitution, this benefit was largely diminished by the lengthy impasse over the Bill’s 
promulgation which left devolved energy in a legislative void. Passed by parliament, the Energy Bill 
2015 along with the Energy and Petroleum Policy 2015 were both vetoed by President Uhuru Kenyatta 
in 2016. The latter policy was the more contentious as the president sought to reduce and cap the 
proportion of petroleum revenue allocated to county governments and local communities (Kenyatta, 
2016), an issue brought to prominence following the discovery in 2012 of significant oil reserves in 
Turkana county (see Chapter 7 for a fuller discussion). Yet, as the Energy Bill 2015 delineated national 
and county functions over petroleum, its enactment was also blocked whilst the revenue sharing issue 
remained unresolved. A clause in the Energy Bill 2015 stating KPLC pay compensation for electricity 
outages over three hours was the other key reason for the president’s refusal to assent (Ngirachu, 
2016). These reasons given for not promulgating the two Bills appear a clear attempt to consolidate 
centralised governance interests and a movement towards MLG1, redolent of the recentralisation 
tendencies widely noted to affect broader decentralisation reforms (Cheeseman et al., 2016). 
 
57 CECs refers to County Executive Committee members who head each of a county’s ten ministries. 
58 For instance, the 2017 NETFund workshop discussed in sub-section 5.6.2 provides a clear example of this uptake. 
101 
 
 
Speculation that the President would acquiesce to the new but largely unchanged Energy Bill 2017 
emerged towards the end of 2017. One Turkana county energy officer remarking on the apparent 
volte-face of the national executive, stated “they’ve done their sums over oil”, referring to the belief 
that the national government was now willing to remove caps limiting the revenue counties and local 
communities could receive59 [31]. This appears to have been the case as the Energy Bill 2017 and 
Petroleum Bill 2017 were eventually promulgated into law on March 12th, 2019 with only minor 
changes taking into account the president’s objections60. The provision for compensation for outages 
lasting over three hours is maintained, whilst the share of petroleum revenues is kept at 20% for the 
county government, with the national government share raised from 70% to 75% at the expense of 
the local community whose allocation is lowered from 10% to 5%. However, the highly contentious 
caps limiting county and community allocations have been removed (KCSPOG, 2018) in what has been 
seen as a “big win” for the county governments and local communities (ESAL, 2019, p.5).   
Nevertheless, the prolonged failure to replace the Energy Act 2006 and promulgate energy legislation 
incorporating the counties has had a detrimental effect on decentralised energy governance, with a 
wide range of energy stakeholders, commenting on how this void created significant uncertainty over 
policy, governance and development within the energy sector. A senior energy consultant stressed 
this issue was “the biggest blip on the horizon for … the energy sector” arguing that without a bill 
“there's no clear regulation for them [the counties] to operate in” [60]. A representative from a Nairobi 
based research institute concurred emphatically: “Without national legislation to enact energy policy, 
county governments are impotent” [80]. Within government, a representative from the Council of 
Governors cited the Energy Bill 2017 as “the key piece of legislation” but warned that it is still “not 
clear where national functions end and where the counties’ start” [81]. 
These promulgation issues contrast markedly with the Climate Change Act which had county 
involvement from the offset of its formulation. While undoubtedly less contentious as it does not 
concern revenue sharing from petroleum, the Climate Change Act still serves as an example of how 
more collaborative engagement is likely to lead to more productive intergovernmental relations and 
swifter promulgation. This is reinforced by the strong ongoing support for the Act from both levels of 
government as evidenced by very well attended national government run workshops on incorporating 
the Act’s provisions for renewable energy into CIDPs. A senior energy officer from Wajir described one 
such workshop61 as “a game changer” for the support it provided and the fact that funds were 
provided for all the counties to attend; not just those closest to the workshop venue as often seen 
which precluded the more remote ASAL counties [82]. 
Overall, it seems that while the various legislation passed (or drafted) since 2013 has helped to 
delineate devolved energy roles, there are still significant issues which are likely to impede 
 
59 The move in June 2018 to separate petroleum from the MoEP and form two ministries: the Ministry of Energy and Ministry 
of Petroleum and Mining was also seen as a means to stop the petroleum dispute delaying the Energy Bill 2017 enactment. 
60The headline feature of the enactment of the bills was the establishment of three new energy entities to manage and 
regulate Kenya’s energy resources: the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority, the Rural Electrification and Renewable 
Energy Corporation and the Nuclear Power and Energy Agency, which replace ERC, REA and the Kenya Nuclear Energy Board 
(KNEB) respectively (Kandie, 2019). The enactment of the bills coincided with the completion of this research and thus it has 
not been possible to fully explore the implications of these new entities. 
61 The National Environment Trust Fund (NETFund) workshop. Held in December 2017, the three-day workshop was attended 
by energy officers from 37 counties as well as actors from all the key stakeholder groups. 
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decentralised energy governance. Several of the key legislative acts passed contain little to no 
provision for autonomous, streamlined county level decision making. While this is understandable for 
grid electricity, the lack of scope for a devolved role in off-grid electricity and in particular clean 
cooking seem critical oversights. In addition, a number of the energy functions proposed by the Energy 
Bill 2015/2017 are concurrent or overlapping. Although this aligns with the cooperative and 
consultative MLG2 governance indicated by the Constitution, there is often no clear demarcation of 
where national government responsibility ends and the county starts. This has the potential to lead to 
ambiguity over responsibilities, and possibly erroneous shifting or assuming of roles, particularly over 
the emotive issue of land rights which seem to have clear scope to create inter-governmental tension. 
Moreover, the deadlock over the promulgation of the Energy Bill for the first six years of devolved 
government created ongoing legislative uncertainty over county roles, suggesting counties may 
understandably have been unwilling to devote time and limited resources to roles which might not 
have come into being. This impasse, driven by national executive efforts to consolidate centralised 
control, seems particularly likely to have impeded the emergence of MLG2-esque decentralised 
energy governance. These legislative issues suggest the realities of decentralised energy governance 
materialising since 2013 may well differ considerably from the legislative blueprint, a common 
occurrence within sub-Saharan Africa (cf. Erk, 2014). It is to these on-the-ground governance 
developments in the Kenyan energy sector that this thesis now turns.  
5.2 Institutional developments since 2013 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the predominance afforded national government by the pre-2013 
legislation was mirrored in the heavily centralised institutional structure of the energy sector. The 
neoliberal reforms to the energy sector in the 1990s and 2000s constituted a form of ‘delegation’ 
establishing semi-autonomous parastatals and independent power producers (IPPs) responding and 
accountable to the national government. This structure maintained the de facto national government 
monopoly over grid electricity distribution and retail, providing little scope for interventions from the 
sub-national level and raising questions over how capably decentralised governance stakeholders 
would be able to assume newly devolved energy roles. Building on this analysis, this section uncovers 
the extent to which the institutional set up has developed since 2013 to accommodate the counties 
and the legislative provisions for devolved energy in the Energy Bill 2015. 
In doing so, this section provides the first of five sub-sections (5.2-5.6) assessing on the ground 
developments in decentralised energy governance since 2013 which are used to help determine 
whether and to what extent there has been a disconnect between policy and on the ground realities. 
This appraisal is critical to developing knowledge on how decentralised energy governance is 
understood to have developed in a Global South context (the focus of RQ1), an area little studied in 
the literature and a deficiency impeding the development of an evidence base to better inform policy 
on effective forms of decentralised energy governance. 
Structural developments  
The six energy parastatals (ERC, GDC, KenGen, KETRACO, KPLC, and REA) running the various 
constituent parts of the Kenyan grid electricity have varied considerably in the extent to which they 
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have restructured to accommodate devolution62. The changes at KPLC have been most noticeable, 
establishing offices, supportive sub-offices and sub-stations in all 47 counties, adding to the 10 
regional offices in existence pre-devolution in what appears to constitute a form of administrative 
decentralisation or ‘deconcentration’. The Rural Electrification Authority (REA) was seen to be looking 
to “copy the KPLC structure” by establishing representatives in each county and larger regional offices 
[47], although a senior REA officer pointed out this process was not complete and certain counties 
remain without REA officers on the ground [14]. The other four parastatals, whose activities operate 
at a more national scale and are less customer facing, have remained heavily centralised, operating 
from central headquarters in Nairobi, although the Geothermal Development Company (GDC) and 
KenGen have representation in the specific counties where their activities are sited.  
The KPLC structural changes have been viewed positively by most stakeholders. KPLC officers based 
in-county tended to praise the restructuring, arguing it enabled county needs to be better represented 
and resources to be more effectively used. Several county energy officers agreed, stating that it 
facilitated access to the parastatal, thus enhancing coordination and accountability [49, 52]. Yet, at 
the central KPLC headquarters in Nairobi, a senior planning manager saw the restructuring more 
negatively, complaining that “statistics and data and new configurations of our operating structures, 
and our tracking of historical data is now complicated because the way we define our regions is now 
different” [6]. This suggests central KPLC administration priorities may differ from their county-based 
colleagues, with the manager seemingly more concerned about the challenges imposed on top-down 
governance by the need to accommodate the counties. 
County governments were more ambivalent concerning the structural changes adopted by REA, with 
many feeling the parastatal should be more, or even fully, devolved. At the 2017 National Devolution 
Conference, the governor of Wajir publicly called for REA to be fully devolved to the counties, a 
sentiment shared by a senior Uasin Gishu county water officer who highlighted in an interview that a 
draft document from the National Transition Authority (NTA) showed most of REA’s functions were 
intended to be devolved to the county [49]. The document was explained by a senior REA officer as a 
misunderstanding between the MoEP, who had “indicated rural electrification was a function that 
took place at a lower level but that didn’t mean it should be devolved”, and the NTA who “were asking 
what should be devolved and took it to mean that rural electrification [and consequently REA] should 
be” [14]. This ambiguity over whether REA was intended to be devolved supports Kangu’s (2015) 
concern over the potential for roles to be misinterpreted. 
Calls for REA to be more fully devolved were unanimously dismissed by parastatal officers. A KPLC 
officer argued it would be impractical and less effective for counties to implement key national 
government policies assigned to REA, such as the Digital Literacy Programme (DLP): “If the 
electrification of primary schools had been devolved, it wouldn’t have been done to the extent it has” 
[30]. The senior officer from REA saw political motivations behind the call for REA to be fully devolved, 
stemming from some counties wanting “to dictate which projects are done and by who”, while also 
warning that the large funding requirements made full devolution impossible: “REA has to be public 
and has to be at national level because the kind of funding requires government and development 
 
62 At the time of research, there were nine energy parastatals. Representatives from the other three (Kenya Nuclear 
Electricity Board (KNEB), Kenya Pipeline Company (KPC), Kenya Petroleum Refineries Limited (KPRL)) were not interviewed 
as part of this PHD as their mandates had less significance in determining access to electricity and clean cooking. 
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partners” [14]. The quote highlights how REA is in effect the corporate social responsibility arm of 
KPLC, working in non-profitable areas that would not satisfy the need of either KPLC (with its public-
private ownership model) or the private sector to make a profit and satisfy shareholders. This suggests 
REA should not be fully devolved as the funding limitations of counties would preclude them from 
financing national initiatives such as the DLP63.  
Operational developments 
Although structural changes have been mainly restricted to KPLC and REA, officers from all the six 
aforementioned energy parastatals highlighted significant operational changes to accommodate the 
county governments. Most emphasised was the need to engage with counties on day-to-day 
operations. A GDC officer remarked “anything that we do, we have to inform the county government”, 
highlighting licensing as a particular “major change” with the parastatal’s projects now requiring 
county authorisation [15]. Supporting the GDC officer’s sentiments, an ERC officer was particularly 
emphatic concerning the need for county consultation: 
Nowadays we don’t do anything with the county without consulting them [the 
counties] … stakeholder consultations is [sic] mandatory. It means that we can’t 
even approve an energy project, whether geothermal, hydro, if you didn’t do 
stakeholder consultation. So, you have really to bring everyone on board [12]. 
The quotes from the GDC and ERC officers suggest the devolution process has created a consultative 
process between national and county government, resulting in checks and balances to centralised 
control. The ERC officer also stressed such checks and balances were applied to counties, emphasising 
that ERC’s role regulating, monitoring and approving licences for county energy projects had become 
critical as “you can't tell the county government to regulate itself” [12].  
These mutual checks and balances embrace the “consultation and cooperation” proclaimed by the 
Constitution. However, actors from all key stakeholder groups noted this engagement has led to cases 
of intergovernmental deadlock, particularly over projects where counties have mobilised community 
sentiment over land rights (see sub-section 6.3.3). Thus, a trade-off has emerged where the 
consultative process seems to function, at least over land, but often leads to the delayed 
implementation of energy initiatives where there are competing national and county agendas. This 
brings to light the tension anticipated in section 5.1 regarding the overlapping functions over land 
rights provision in the Energy Bill 2015. An ERC officer added the failure to enact the Energy Bill 2015 
which contained provisions for a collaborative framework had also hindered intergovernmental 
coordination [11],  reinforcing the argument that the Bill’s delayed promulgation has significantly 
impeded effective decentralised energy governance.  
In addition, the extent to which this inter-governmental consultation is indicative of the intended 
devolution process is questionable as comments by parastatal officers revealed top-down is still 
prevalent at national level. Several officers argued operational changes needed to be limited until 
after national government initiatives had been completed. A Migori KPLC officer suggested “after 
energy structures are 80%-90% done, then we can maybe have more devolving of energy powers – 
 
63 The more pertinent question of whether the DLP should have been implemented at all is discussed in Chapter 6 
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but only once we are there, after the Last Mile [Connectivity] Project” while a Turkana counterpart 
argued devolution is “still a toddler, we’re still putting structures in place, so we may not add more to 
their [the counties’] roles” [38, 30]. The above quotes seem indicative of support by national 
government representatives for top-down MLG1-esque governance, which while largely pragmatic in 
terms of implementing grid electricity infrastructure is far less so when broader, more accurate 
conceptualisations of energy access are used which account for spatial inequities (Pachauri, 2011). 
Other parastatal arguments concerning devolution were far less cogent, particularly the regularly 
expressed idea that KPLC and REA were “already devolved” [30, 51].  This is plainly untrue if devolution 
is taken to incorporate political decentralisation (Cabral, 2011), and suggests, as widely acknowledged 
in the literature, that different understandings of devolution are being mobilised to serve different 
agendas (Rodríguez-Pose & Gill, 2003). The misinterpretation of the ‘deconcentration’ reforms of KPLC 
and REA since 2013 as genuine devolution may possibly be disingenuous, potentially serving national 
government interests in avoiding a deeper decentralisation process. A representative from KPLC 
Turkana appeared to confirm deconcentration was the modus operandi, stating that devolution has 
“basically not affected our work since the function is under national government, so no effect. 
Everything is done up-down [sic i.e. top-down]” [30]. 
Overall, compared with the highly centralised energy governance in operation prior to devolution 
which was largely responsible for the severity of the historical energy inequities in Kenya, the 
structural and operational changes adopted by the parastatal agencies represent an improvement in 
terms of equitable governance. The distribution of officers to the counties, especially by KPLC, appears 
to have aided accountability by virtue of bringing those responsible for service provision closer to the 
people they serve. However, these changes constitute a form of deconcentration rather than 
devolution, with sub-national offices having little or no political or financial autonomy from the MoEP 
and national government. Thus, despite increased consultation between national and county 
governments, MLG1-esque governance remains.  
This has led to a growing sense that administrative decentralisation is what the national government 
would prefer to see, rather than any form of autonomous, political and fiscal decentralisation that 
might lead to resources and revenues being drawn from the centre, particularly as the national 
government still holds a de facto monopoly over grid electricity distribution and retail. This suggests 
resources will continue to be consolidated in national government interests, potentially at the expense 
of smaller scale off-grid electricity and clean cooking initiatives where national government enjoys less 
control. Given energy is one of the top three most lucrative ministries (Wafula, 2017), and widely 
alleged to be subject to elite capture (Musau, 2018), the central government preference for 
deconcentration seems to reflect how energy, far more than other resource areas, is seen as too 
politically and financially important to more fully decentralise. 
5.3 Developments in grid electricity since 2013 
Given the legislative and institutional control of national government over grid electricity, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the allocation of resources in the energy sector since 2013 has primarily centred on 
grid electricity (Table 5.6). Guided by the Least Cost Power Development Plan (LCPDP), these grid-
based investments do not appear to have been specifically enabled by devolution as the LCPDP 
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predates and makes no reference to the process, while county engagement on grid centred projects 
such as the Last Mile Connectivity Project (LMCP) and DLP has been limited as Chapter 6 will reveal. 
Instead, these initiatives appear a continuation of pre-devolution energy policies fixated on 
centralised governance of a centralised grid electricity system.  
Table 5.6 Largest national government led initiatives in each energy sub-sector by US$ of investment (Kenya 
Power, 2017a; Anyanzwa, 2018; Kipsang, 2018; EU, 2019; World Bank, 2019) 
Energy sub-sector Projects Financed by Investment  
Grid Electricity LMCP (phases I & II)64 World Bank (US$450), AfDB (US$270), 
Government of Kenya (US$30M), EU (33M)  
US$783M 
Off-Grid electricity Kenya Off-Grid Solar 
Access Project (KOSAP) 
World Bank US$150M 
Clean cooking LPG Government of Kenya US$31M 
 
The largest of the national government grid electricity initiatives, the ongoing LMCP was launched in 
2015. Funded by international donors and the national government, the program aimed to connect 
70% of the population by 2017 by extending the grid to those living within 600m of the existing 
network and subsidising their connection charges from 34,000Ksh (US$340) to 15,000ksh (US$150)65. 
National government figures indicate the programme has been successful, with connectivity rising 
sharply from 32% in 2013 to 73% of all households by April 2018 (KPLC, 2018). An energy consultancy 
representative backed the LMCP, citing the reduced connection fee as crucial: “it even went to 150 
dollars, and that’s really what has increased the connectivity of Kenya Power … the numbers have 
really jumped in the last few years” [60]. This increased connectivity appears to leave Kenya on track 
to meet the national government’s targets of 70% connectivity by 2017 and possibly its ambitious goal 
of universal access by 2020 (KPLC, 2018).  
However, the government connectivity figures do not elaborate on the likely disparities between rich 
and poor, urban and rural, and quality of supply – with blackouts frequent, particularly in rural areas 
(IEA, 2014). The figures also represent availability or physical connection rather than actual 
consumption, echoing concerns in the wider literature over misleading energy access definitions 
(Bhatia & Angelou, 2015). Most notably, Lee et al (2016) remark on the common phenomenon of 
being ‘under-grid’, that is where grid electricity is available yet inaccessible (or unwanted) due mainly 
to cost. Lee et al. (2016) conclude that despite the LMCP’s reduced connection fees, the affordability 
of grid electricity is still the critical barrier to access. As a Nairobi county officer remarked in 2017: 
“70% have access to electricity, the 30% who don’t, it’s because they can’t afford it” [22]. Evidence of 
the inaccessibility of energy is further highlighted by excess electricity capacity standing at 500MW in 
201766. This surplus resulted in KPLC abolishing its target to have 5000MW of total capacity in place 
by the end of 2017 in what seems tacit acknowledgement of the failings of over-prioritising grid 
electricity. 
 
64 The funding for the third and final phase of the LMCP has yet to be confirmed. 
65 US dollars (US$) have been used. The dollar is the international business currency in Kenya and the exchange rate of around 
100ksh to 1US$ makes currency conversions more easily comprehended than the pound which stands at around 130ksh. 
66 Stated by a senior KPLC officer at the ESCoBox workshop at the University of Nairobi on  11th January 2017. Similarly, in 
2018, national peak electricity demand stood at 1,832MW against a total installed capacity of 2,351MW (Olonyi, 2019). 
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The national government driven ‘World Bank Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid’ (GPOBA) 
sought to address this issue of affordability by further subsidising the grid connection fee from 
15,000ksh (US$150) to 1160ksh (US$11.60) for those living in informal settlements. According to 
national government figures, GPOBA connections accounted for 60% of the 1.28 million new grid 
electricity customers during the financial year 2015/16 (Kamau, 2016). Despite these connections, it 
appears new beneficiaries may not become consistent electricity consumers as many are still to 
purchase tokens to top up those provided free on installation (Kenya Power, 2017b). This is partly for 
reasons of affordability but mainly due to the very low electricity consumption of poorer customers 
(Ndii, 2019). In addition, an EU representative disputed the extent to which GPOBA was primarily a 
connectivity programme: “this is not really about connecting people as they are already [illegally] 
connected, it is about getting payment from the illegally connected” [69]. Thus, while GPOBA has 
enabled significant numbers of people to access grid electricity, the extent of its success as indicated 
by national government figures is likely overstated. 
Another major national government initiative, the ‘Digital Literacy Programme’ (DLP) was a flagship 
policy of the Jubilee Party government in their victorious 2013 election campaign. Initiated in 2013, 
the US$170M DLP aimed to provide every primary school child with a laptop, which thus required 
100% electrification of primary schools. Electrification was to be mainly achieved via grid extensions, 
with off-grid solar used for more remote areas (ICT Authority, 2016). Implemented by the Rural 
Electrification Authority (REA), the DLP had according to national government figures connected 95% 
of primary schools 2016, up from 43% in 2013 (Wanzala, 2016). However, more recent reports have 
highlighted laptop provision has been scaled back, with the programme facing significant financing, 
electricity reliability and teacher training issues (Nyaundi, 2019). This casts doubts over the long-term 
sustainability of the DLP, which increasingly resembles a populist political project rather than one in 
tune with Kenya’s long-term energy and education development needs67. 
The continued dominance of national government over the allocation of resources in the energy 
sector has fuelled a growing sense among counties that grid electricity has not been devolved in any 
meaningful way. This sense of powerlessness is compounded by the difficulty of a county intervening 
in an energy subsector which is a de facto state monopoly and prohibitively capital-intensive, leaving 
an ERC officer to conclude: “the risk in investing in energy [i.e. grid electricity] is substantial and the 
only area for [non-national government] investors is mini-grids” [11]. This corroborates findings in the 
literature discussed in Chapter 3, which suggest decentralisation in Kenya has not significantly altered 
the energy governance landscape, with investment and policy continuing to align with national 
government grid electricity interests (Ockwell & Byrne, 2017; Newell & Phillips, 2016). Although some 
opportunities exist for county grid electricity interventions, such as lobbying and coordinating the 
rollout of grid electricity at local level (see Chapter 6), the notion that grid electricity governance 
remains top-down and has yet to be meaningfully devolved appears accurate.  
5.4 Developments in off-grid electricity since 2013  
Despite resources being primarily focussed on extending and modernising the grid, there is a critical 
need for off-grid energy systems in Kenya as grid extensions alone will not reach the entire population 
 
67 The DLP’s educational merits have also been questions, critiqued as more “political than pedagogic” by Omanga (2018) 
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of Kenya in the foreseeable future. This is primarily due to the dispersed nature of Kenya’s large rural 
population and its low energy demand characteristic, which leaves grid extension initiatives to those 
areas both logistically and economically unfeasible. An extensive World Bank funded report indicated 
that 4.3 million people (9.5% of the total population) live beyond the grid’s viable reach and therefore 
require off grid solutions (NRECA International, 2017). As the minimum value of the solar resource in 
Kenya stands at a monthly average of 4.7kWh/m2/day and is even higher in the ASAL regions most 
lacking grid electricity access, solar powered off grid systems offer particularly significant 
opportunities to increase electricity access68 (WorldClim, 2017). 
Despite the significant potential for off-grid systems in Kenya, interventions have been limited since 
2013, and where they exist, mainly national government run. Data from the Word Bank administered 
Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP, 2016) found only 21 national government 
run mini grids in operation in 2016 constituting approximately 1% of Kenya’s total installed capacity69. 
ESMAP (2016) also estimated “at least a dozen” much smaller off-grid systems exist; installed by the 
private sector or civil society, and often community owned and operated. 
The struggles to establish off-grid electricity appears largely regulatory. A key barrier for investors has 
been the question of what happens if the grid is extended to the area where their off-grid installation 
is sited, as a senior MoEP officer admitted: 
We haven’t developed policy on off-grid … the biggest problem for supporting the 
private sector are guaranteeing the national grid won’t arrive shortly & 
guaranteeing what the [feed-in] tariffs will be70 [2].  
Evidence of this issue can be seen in two TAC3 financed community scale off-grid initiatives, the Energy 
for Development (E4D) and Solar Nano Grid (SONG) projects, where the grid arrived shortly after or 
during the projects’ implementation despite government assurances to the contrary71. The first, and 
to date only, grid tied solar photovoltaic (PV) system in Kenya – the 660kW PV array atop Strathmore 
University – has also been beset by regulatory issues due to national government delays over the 
establishment of net-metering regulation [107]. By 2017 it was still to receive any payment for the 
electricity supplied to the grid since 2014, leading the university to consume the vast majority of 
generation itself and essentially become an off-grid ‘captive system’; a precedent which has seen 
other private sector off-grid operators eschew becoming grid-tied (see Chapter 7). These regulatory 
issues seem highly likely to disincentivise private investment in off-grid initiatives. 
Cost is also a key barrier to off-grid energy initiatives particularly as communities living outside the 
current and predicted reach of the grid tend to be poorer and more dispersed (African Progress Panel, 
2015). The low energy consumption of such communities (initially only likely to use electricity for 
lighting and mobile phone charging) has ramifications for potential off-grid energy investors as it 
 
68 100 solar mini-grid sites were identified in Northern Kenya alone (GIZ, 2017) 
69 The 21 mini-grids have an installed capacity of 24.8MW (23.7MW thermal, 0.569MW solar, 0.55MW wind). 19 are owned 
by REA and run by KPLC; the other two (in Lamu and Garissa) are owned and run by KenGen and have been incorporated 
into the grid (ESMAP, 2016). State figures give Kenya’s total 2016 installed capacity as 2341MW (Senelwa, 2016). 
70 A representative from ERC reported that mini-grid regulations would be released “hopefully by the end of [2017]” [11]. 
71 The University of Southampton developed the Energy for Development (E4D) initiative (Gollwitzer, 2017) while 
Loughborough University led the Solar Nano Grid (SONG) project (Blanchard et al., 2017). 
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creates a lengthy payback period for the large upfront capital expenditure (CAPEX) required as a 
(senior) energy consultant explained: 
The CAPEX of just setting up a grid let’s say in a far-flung area of Kenya like Turkana 
is so expensive and the people pay such low amounts. … Kenya Power say that 
private developers don't see it as profitable to set up let’s say a 10million dollar 
plant and people will be spending two dollars per month and you may get just 500 
customers. So, mini-grids have been trying to go to densely populated areas in 
Kenya where people may eventually use more energy: so instead of just two 
dollars, [they spend] ten dollars and above - that's where it makes sense for them 
[private investors]. But in those far-flung areas like Turkana, Wajir, you know the 
North, it may not make sense and that's why Kenya Power is going there [60]. 
This highlights that the cost implications of off-grid electricity development in the poorer ASAL areas 
(where it is most needed) mean investment from the private sector investment and county 
government is unlikely with only the national government and transnational actors having the means 
to shoulder and subsidise the cost involved72.  
Indeed, the primary initiative to expand mini-grids is a joint national government and TAC1 venture: 
the ESMAP supported and financed ‘Kenya Off-Grid Solar Access Project’ (KOSAP), which aims to 
provide off-grid electricity to the 14 “traditionally underserved” ASAL counties (Kenya Power, 2017a). 
However, this initiative also seems to have adverse effects for private and county sector involvement 
in the off-grid sector, a possibility acknowledged by ESMAP (2017, p.41): 
A major objection to KOSAP is its possible effect on existing regulation and the new 
mini grid regulation. Many of the already proven and implemented models would 
no longer be feasible. Programs as KOSAP are seen as hindering innovation and 
additional revenue streams, putting control back with KPLC that already enjoys a 
quasi-monopoly. Some suggest that MoEP and ERC consider leaving existing 
agreements unchanged; and keep the market open for models that work outside 
the KOSAP program, which comes with limited funding.  
The quotation indicates that major national government led off-grid electricity initiatives, such as 
KOSAP, can potentially limit the role of other stakeholders in the off-grid sector. This may well be 
detrimental to the sector, given findings in the literature emphasise the need to build broad networks 
of diverse stakeholders to support learning and develop off-grid markets (Byrne et al., 2014). 
Similar off-grid initiatives financed by the aid departments of Global North nations (i.e. TAC2 actors) 
were also primarily conducted through national government. The Nordic Development Fund (NDF) 
financed via national government the hybridisation of a KPLC owned mini-grid in Turkana from diesel 
only to one also incorporating solar energy (NDF, 2015). The current DfID financed Green Mini Grid 
Facility Kenya initiative (GMG), partly addresses the issue of innovation being limited by through 
seeking to develop the off-grid market via grants and technical assistance to private mini-grid 
 
72 The suitability of the ASAL counties for off-grid investment is indicated by the Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA, 
2017), who define the 14 counties as ‘marginalised’ in terms of infrastructure, investment and services, with a population 
density four times lower than the national average, and un-electrified households estimated to number 1.2 million.  
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investors. However, this is still conducted through the auspices of the national government who form 
the ‘program committee’ with little county engagement, save for when negotiating approvals (GMG, 
2018). The approach of the GIZ Pro Solar project was similar to the GMG, although ongoing GIZ 
capacity building on county energy planning provides some scope for the county to lead such 
initiatives (GIZ, 2018).  
The predominance of national government over off-grid systems may also be detracting from the 
more feasible role counties could play in smaller community level off-grid systems and solar home 
systems (SHS)73, which have lower costs and payback periods. County led initiatives in this field have 
been limited, with collaborations on initiatives such as the donor driven SONG project in Nakuru an 
isolated example of what such interventions could achieve (Blanchard et al., 2017). There appears 
particular scope for the county to facilitate SHS initiatives given the strength of the industry in Kenya. 
The country is the world’s second largest SHS market after China and the world’s largest per capita 
(Czek, 2013), with “well in excess of 300,000 SHSs … sold through a vibrant private market” (Ockwell 
& Byrne, 2017, p.71). In addition, the widespread use of mobile money in Kenya facilitates payment 
of SHSs in instalments, vital for poorer customers for whom upfront costs are prohibitive. This has 
given rise to the dominant perception of SHS as a market-driven private sector led phenomenon (e.g. 
Van der Plas & Hankins, 1998; Jacobson, 2007), which seems likely to have contributed to the limited 
number of county SHS initiatives: counties deterred by the sense that the SHS market is already 
dominated by well-established private sector players, such as M-Kopa and D-light. 
Yet, more contributions from the innovations systems literature have highlighted how the 
development of the SHS market was driven by a range of capacity building initiatives undertaken by a 
diverse MLG2-esque network of actors, which enabled the market to grow by reducing the risks that 
would have deterred private investment (Byrne et al., 2014). These capacity initiatives helped build 
networks of diverse local stakeholders, conduct market research, raise awareness and fund 
experimental initiatives to foster community scale off-grid electricity and SHSs (Ockwell & Byrne, 
2016). The lack of county SHS and other small scale off-grid electricity interventions therefore seems 
to be a clear missed opportunity as the more localised scale of county governments seems ideally 
placed to facilitate and coordinate these capacity building activities, without which more recent and 
convincing treatments suggest the Kenyan solar market phenomenon may never have occurred 
(Ockwell & Byrne, 2017). 
5.5 Developments in clean-cooking since 2013 
As highlighted in Chapters 1 & 3, clean cooking remains the most urgent energy issue in Kenya and 
the Global South due to the severe health and environmental impacts associated with the traditional 
use of biomass. Yet, in Kenya, the resources allocated to clean cooking since 2013 have been far less 
than those assigned to either grid electricity or off-grid electricity. A representative of the Global 
Alliance for Clean Cook Stoves (GACC) highlighted the governance filing behind this state of affairs:  
I would call it [clean cooking] the least prioritised as well as the least understood, 
and particularly by the government structures that we have [66]. 
 
73 Solar home systems are off-grid photovoltaic systems used predominantly to supply electricity to individual households 
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The GACC officer’s concerns help explain there has been far less progress in improving clean cooking 
access compared to electricity (see Figure 3.4), an issue compounded by the relative lack of resources 
to the sub-sector. Despite the completion of several detailed energy mapping exercises for electricity 
access (e.g. NRECA International, 2017), the linear trajectory of the results for clean cooking access 
suggests the use of less comprehensive aggregated data (see Figure 3.4) (World Bank, 2018a). In 
addition, there has only been one major national government initiative: the ‘Mwananchi [ordinary 
citizen] Gas Project’, which sought to ease the transition from biomass to cleaner, liquid petroleum 
gas (LPG) by subsidising the upfront costs. Yet, the project has stalled due to fraud issues with the pilot 
schemes, raising questions over whether the parastatal running the project, the National Oil 
Corporation of Kenya (NOCK), complied with due diligence (Ngugi, 2018). Decentralised energy 
governance was largely bypassed; the project run through NOCK with local sensitisation efforts 
assigned to Chiefs (Muchiri, 2017), who are accountable to national government and often seen as 
vestiges of the pre-devolution system (Cheeseman et al., 2016). 
Indeed, the county appears to have played a limited role in clean cooking as seen by the limited focus 
in county CIDPs, with only five counties identifying the energy sub-sector as a priority action (UK AID, 
2017). A senior Nairobi based research institute representative stressed that both “national and 
county governments are not focusing on biomass burning energy for cooking” [80]. As with small scale 
off-grid electricity, this seems a clear missed opportunity as the more localised nature of clean cooking 
suggests the counties are ideally placed to facilitate networks of local stakeholders to develop 
innovative and locally appropriate initiatives. The lack of county prioritisation seems partly due to the 
insufficient attention paid to cooking energy in the pre- and post-2013 legislation, an issue 
compounded by the absence of a regulatory framework as an officer from ERC revealed in 2016:  
we were developing an improved biomass cook stove regulations, they're still in 
the process, we’re still doing the justification for that regulation … but that 
regulation will mostly focus on cook stoves for institutions [12].  
This regulatory deficit is likely to disincentivise county clean cooking initiatives as it creates investor 
uncertainty. In addition, ERC’s focus on the institutional level is of concern as it suggests the more 
urgent need to address clean cooking at the household level may be neglected.  
Efforts to address clean-cooking at both institutional and household level have mainly been led by 
non-governmental actors, with varying degrees of county engagement. Transnational actor initiatives 
have had a long-standing presence in clean cooking, such as GIZ’s Energising Development (EnDev) 
Kenya project 2006-2019 which focussed on improved cook stoves and incorporated capacity building 
for county governments “to enable them to drive forward the energy access agenda at grass roots 
levels” (GIZ, 2019, p.1). In addition, a recent £37.6M (US$48.5M) clean cooking initiative funded by 
DfID, the Modern Energy Cooking Services (MECS) programme, incorporates a multi-stakeholder 
approach, suggesting a greater emphasis on decentralised energy governance to address clean 
cooking issues (MECS, 2019)74.  
 
74 MECS centres on addressing clean cooking barriers, with a notable focus on electric cooking. The five-year project will take 
place across a number of Global South states, including Kenya (MECS, 2019). 
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Most prominent in driving clean cooking have been representative NGO bodies, particularly the Clean 
Cooking Association of Kenya (CCAK) and GACC. The two facilitated the development of an inter-
ministerial committee on clean cooking in 2014 comprising members from national government and 
over 15 government agencies. The committee included members of government from sectors outside 
energy, such as health, education, and agriculture, in an effort to address the cross-cutting nature of 
cooking. However, the committee has not had county representation, a critical oversight as one 
energy consultant explained: 
I think the county should play a role in clean cooking and … for clean cooking, it's 
really more about awareness … they can instil an awareness of the people in the 
counties on why [they should] consider either purchasing a clean cook stove or 
looking to clean cooking rather than the other forms [61]. 
The failure to incorporate the county level into the committee has likely exacerbated the limited role 
counties have so far played in clean-cooking, although committee members recognised the urgent 
need to address this. A representative from a leading Kenyan clean cooking NGO stressed, “we really 
need to engage with county government officials, it doesn't make sense to only engage 
with national government officers”, while she also reported that the chair of the committee, a senior 
MoEP officer, had more bluntly stated, “cooking should be a devolved function” [72]. 
The quotes above highlight the issues concerning the limited approach to clean cooking adopted by 
decentralised energy governance since devolution. Despite the counties being able to play a critical 
role in facilitating clean-cooking initiatives, there has been a lack of engagement in the sector partly 
because their potential role has not been adequately recognised legislatively or institutionally. The 
fact the chair of the inter-ministerial committee on clean cooking goes as far to say clean cooking 
should be devolved emphasises the deeply flawed nature of the current clean cooking governance set 
up. 
5.6 The development of county governments since 2013 
As sub-sections 5.2-5.4 have indicated, there is a sense of unfulfilled potential regarding county energy 
interventions since 2013. This is particularly striking when compared to other sectors, where there 
have been notable county achievements. Most evident is the implementation in previously 
marginalised counties of infrastructure, such as tarmacked roads and health facilities, which prior to 
devolution was rarely or never seen. Among county government interviewees, consensus was that 
these successes had been primarily enabled by the guaranteed share of national revenue and 
independent control over this budget enshrined in the constitution [19, 46, 49]75. Yet positive 
developments of this ilk have been far less common in the energy sector and while national 
government policies and institutional control have limited county energy initiatives, this section 
reveals that underlying capacity and institutional issues at the county level are also a critical 
impediment on the development of effective decentralised energy governance. 
 
75 Since 2013, this share has far exceeded the minimum 15% share mandated by the constitution although opposition 
politicians and prominent county governors have called for this to be increased further to 45% (Munya, 2016).  
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Broader Kenyan devolution trends are also likely to have implications for decentralised energy 
governance. Devolution is a perceived to have improved local governance accountability, with 
communities gradually re-focusing on leadership at the local level, realising their problems do not 
necessarily emanate from central government. This was particularly evident in the 2017 general 
election where over half of Kenya’s incumbent governors – 62% of its MPs and 79% of its women 
representatives –lost their seats (Waddilove, 2017). This possibly suggests county leaders may have 
to be more accountable to a more issues-based polity rather than relying on ethnic based support.   
Yet, devolution has not been without its critics, with many pointing to the costs. Recurrent expenses 
such as public worker salaries now form over 50% of the national budget, reducing the budget for 
development efforts (Kimanthi, 2018). Others have pointed to cases of ethnic tension being devolved 
to the county level, a tendency of decentralisation reforms acknowledged in the wider literature 
(Selway & Templeman, 2011). More recent analysis suggests the effect of devolution may change with 
each electoral cycle due to shifting national electoral coalitions that shape both the national and 
county landscape (Waddilove, 2019), indicating the quality of decentralised energy governance may 
also be strongly influenced by temporal dynamics.  
5.6.1 Developments in county institution building  
Part of the reason county energy interventions have thus far been limited seems to stem from a lack 
of institutional energy structures at the sub-national level. 19 counties do not have a standalone 
energy department within their ten permitted ministries, indicating that the prioritisation of energy 
varies significantly among county administrations (Figures 5.1-5.2). Legislative and institutional 
uncertainty seem to have been a significant factor in come counties not establishing energy 
departments as a senior Uasin Gishu county water officer explained:  
We don’t know if REA will be devolved – the national government would like to 
hold on to it. If they are devolved, we [the county department] would absorb it, so 
we are delaying the creation of the energy department [49].  
This again reiterates the detrimental impact of the prolonged failure to promulgate the Energy Bill 
2015. In other cases, the lack of energy department appears to be a response to what is electorally 
beneficial, with energy often seen as a far lower priority for citizens than water, food, health and 
roads. As one Migori county officer remarked, “if you’ve never had energy, you don’t realise you need 
it” [83]. This neglect of energy seems to imply a lack of awareness among county electorates regarding 
how energy is critically interconnected with other, currently more politically expedient, sectors such 
as food, water, health, and the economy generally.  
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Figure 5.1 Departments found in county ministries containing energy  
 
 
Figure 5.2 Example county government structure76 
 
 
These structural issues at county level are intensified by challenges surrounding the levels of 
coordination between the different departments held in each of a county’s ten ministries. The 
questionnaire of 13 counties conducted as part of this PhD (see Chapter 4) found inter-departmental 
 
76 The departments which makeup each of the ten ministries (see bottom of figure) vary from county to county, with an 
energy department absent from many counties. 
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coordination varied considerably among counties (Table 5.7), with awareness of potential cross-sector 
nexus synergies often lacking depending on personnel. Rather than an atmosphere of collaboration, 
county energy departments emphasised there is often competition with the other departments for 
the limited resources allocated to a ministry, resulting in a zero-sum logic taking hold.  
Table 5.7 Perceived level of inter-departmental coordination in county ministry containing energy 
Responses to the statement: ‘In the ministry containing energy, policy for energy is well integrated with 
the other sectors found in that ministry’. 
Strongly agree 0 
Agree 5 
Neither agree or disagree 3 
Disagree 3 
strongly disagree 2 
Sample size: 13 questionnaires from 13 different counties 
 
Compounding the lack of inter-departmental coordination is the varied and often incoherent manner 
departments are combined within a county ministry (Figure 5.2). County officers reported that some 
departments were grouped rationally to exploit cross-sector synergies, while other combinations 
reflected vested interests and political patronage concerns, particularly those of the governor, 
responsible for the departmental composition of ministries and the appointment of the senior 
executive who head each ministry: the County Executive Committee members (CECs) and Chief 
Officers (COs). Being political positions, the CECs and COs provide a further coordination issue as they 
are unlikely to have experience in more than one of the sectors within their ministries; a notion 
reinforced by a range of stakeholders reporting critical capacity issues concerning how county 
executives govern energy [74, 76]. 
Further institutional deficiency is evident from the issues surrounding the allocation of funds to county 
administrations. Several county officers interviewed argued the resources allocated were insufficient 
to carry out their energy mandates, and that the national treasury is slow to release state funds, 
hindering county efforts to budget for and implement energy projects [52, 84]. This reflects the 
discussion in Chapter 3 which highlighted the broad acknowledgement in the sub-Saharan Africa 
decentralisation literature of the reluctance of central governments to cede effective control and 
resources (e.g. D’Arcy & Cornell, 2016). However, there have also been several instances of counties 
returning funds to the national treasury unspent (Shiundu, 2013), while a Nairobi county energy 
officer highlighted that “Where counties don’t have an energy department, it can cause issues with 
budgeting” [19]. This again suggests structures have been inadequately established at county level to 
ensure funds are effectively allocated. There does appear to be consensus though regarding the 
energy project implementation process, with both county and national government representatives 
commenting the process is overly bureaucratic and needs streamlining. 
5.6.2 Developments in county capacity building 
Further impeding county engagement in the energy sector are critical internal capacity issues, which 
vary considerably among county administrations (UK AID, 2017). This is particularly apparent in the 19 
counties without standalone energy departments, while the departments in the other 28 counties are 
often critically understaffed and lack expertise. This is partly because energy (unlike other sectors) 
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was not a function of the former districts and thus experienced staff and capacity were not inherited. 
Brown et al. (2015) note capacity challenges particularly affect the political class, with a lack of energy 
specialists in the county executive and assembly impeding energy planning.  
The need for county capacity building was widely acknowledged by various actors. At the National 
Energy Trust Fund (NETFund) county renewable energy workshop in December 2017, all six key 
stakeholder groups77 concurred on this point, including all the county energy officers present (with 38 
counties represented). Among the specific capacity issues emphasised at the workshop by county 
energy officers was the challenge of navigating the lengthy energy project implementation process, 
along with proposal writing for energy project funding. The latter was seen as time-consuming for a 
typically understaffed energy department, but critical, in order to avoid relying on the often-delayed 
disbursement of funds from the national treasury.   
Limited technical expertise was also highlighted by many county officers at the workshop, who stated 
their departments lacked the qualified personnel to conduct energy audits, manage energy portfolios, 
and assess the merits of various energy technologies to make informed procurement decisions. The 
latter point chimes with a Kenyan energy consultant’s assertion that understanding investor intentions 
and the various benefits and pitfalls of such projects has been “a significant bottleneck” for county 
administrations [65]. These findings provide specificities of broader technical capacity issues 
acknowledged within the literature; Johnson et al. (2016, p.34) emphasising the general need of 
county governments to “develop their capacity to deal with energy issues … [through] hiring new staff 
and training new and existing staff”, while Brown et al. (2015) noted capacity challenges for the sub-
national level in developing renewable energy resources, implementing decentralised energy projects, 
and coordinating the installation and maintenance of infrastructure. 
Officers also highlighted that technical capacity issues (e.g. engineering) often impact more on the 
former marginalised ASAL counties compared to other counties as it tends to be more difficult for 
these counties to attract and retain such personnel to work in their energy departments. A Mandera 
county officer stressed “we don’t have technical people in this county and nobody wants to come” 
[85].  This supports the well-established principal that a key pitfall of decentralisation is its facilitation 
of agglomeration economies, where skilled civil servants are attracted to the centre (Cabral, 2011b). 
Thus, as a response, it seems critical for initiatives to prioritise capacity building of the county civil 
service on a geographically even basis. Civil servants are also seen as “the key dimension of capacity” 
(Azfar et al., 1999, p.24) as they are more likely to keep their jobs from one administration to another. 
Thus, to aid continuity, it seems prudent to focus capacity building on the civil service rather than 
politicians (e.g. CECs and COs) who may not be reappointed when a new administration takes office. 
To address capacity shortcomings, county officers at the NETFund workshop called for greater 
research development, energy data documentation, and resource mapping78 to support county 
research development and planning in the energy sector. In addition, they argued for benchmarking 
activities (e.g. against other leading counties), and technical institutes within counties to help address 
these technical capacity shortcomings. These sentiments recognising the importance of inter-county 
 
77 The six key stakeholder groups as outlined in Table 4.3. 
78 The resource mapping called for included county energy needs, renewable energy sources, and spatial planning. 
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best practice sharing have recently come to prominence within the academic community via a major 
2018 joint UK/Kenyan multi-stakeholder initiative to develop a county energy information sharing 
platform (Chengo, 2018)79.  
However, efforts to address county capacity needs have been undermined by legislative and 
institutional uncertainties concerning energy as a Baringo county officer noted:  
If the energy sector and regulatory framework is not well defined, it is more 
difficult to define the role and capacity required of staff within a county energy 
department [86]. 
The quotation indicates that national government has been largely responsible for county capacity 
shortcomings due to their prolonged failure to promulgate the Energy Bill 2015 which would have 
helped address the legislative uncertainty surrounding energy roles and which also mandates the 
national government to “Provide technical and other capacity building support to county 
governments” (NF3h - Table 5.4)80. As the next sub-section will reveal, national government support 
of this ilk has been critically lacking in many regards, hindering county energy initiatives. 
5.6.3 Developments in county energy initiatives 
This sub-section explores the various developments in county energy initiatives since 2013. These 
developments have been notably impacted by the ambiguities of devolved energy legislation and 
issues of county capacity highlighted in this Chapter. 
County energy plans 
As noted in Chapter 3, the formulation of county energy plans was the most significant devolved 
energy role affecting decentralised energy governance, expected to form the basis for county 
facilitated energy initiatives and seen as key for attracting private investment (Newell et al., 2014). 
Yet, by the end of the counties’ first four-year term, most had not completed energy plans. 
Stakeholders interviewed were unable to provide a definitive list of which counties had plans although 
the questionnaire of 13 counties conducted for this PhD indicate the task had been completed by only 
three - Kiambu, Marsabit, and Nakuru (Table 5.8). 
Table 5.8 highlights various factors potentially contributing to counties completing energy plans. The 
data between counties varies significantly, highlighting how decentralised energy governance is 
spatially contingent. The table suggests the number of officers working on the plan and external 
capacity building support are the most significant factors in determining the likelihood of plan 
completion81. The three counties with completed plans reported an above average number of officers 
working on the plan, contrasting with the below average score of counties with uncompleted plans. 
External assistance with planning (either from national government or another organisation) appears 
 
79 The 2018 proposal emerged from a conference which formed part of the DfID funded Transforming Energy Access (TEA) 
Initiative and is jointly led by the LCEDN and the Kenyan research institute, the African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS)  
80 The Constitution and Transition to Devolved Government Act, 2012 also charge the national government with building 
county government capacity more broadly to enable counties to deliver on all their functions effectively. 
81 Budget seems likely to have an impact but large allocations for Busia, Kisumu and Homa Bay (counties without plans) 
indicate it may not be decisive. It is difficult to assess as data is missing for the three counties with completed plans.  
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highly significant, with all counties receiving such help emphasising its positive impact. The three 
counties with completed plans received assistance: the Kenyan Association of Manufacturers (KAM) 
(funded by the UK Department for International Development (DfID)) assisted Kiambu and Nakuru, 
while the German development agency (GIZ) supported Marsabit. In addition, Kiambu and Marsabit 
also received help from the national government.  These findings align with sources in the literature 
which attribute the failure to complete energy plans to capacity issues along with a lack of resources 
and data at the county level (Johnson et al., 2016). 
Table 5.8: Potential factors contributing to county energy plan completion 
 
County 
energy 
dept.  
Years in 
position 
Years in 
energy 
sector 
Officers 
working 
on plan 
Planning 
budget 
(Ksh) 
Help 
from 
nat. gov 
Help 
from 
other org 
No 
green 
cells1 
Comp-
leted 
Plan  
Baringo Y 2 2 1-5 2M Y N 2 N 
Busia Y 0.66 2 Unsure 6.5M N N 2 N 
Garissa  Y 2 2 1-5 0.5M N N 1 N 
Homa bay Y 3 5 6-10 3.5M N Y 5 N 
Kiambu N 2 25 6-10 No info Y Y 4 Y 
Kisumu  Y 3 10 1-5 6M N N2 5 N 
Kitui Y 4 10+ Unsure None N N 3 N 
Machakos Y 3 3.5 10+ Unsure Y Y 4 N 
Marsabit Y 4 4 6-10 Funded 
by NGO 
Y Y 6 Y 
Nakuru Y  3 11-15 No info N Y 3 Y 
Nyamira N 1 25 1-5 No info N Y 2 N 
Siaya N 1 6 1-5 0.1M Y Y 2 N 
Taita 
Taveta 
Y 0.25 0.25 Unsure None Y N 2 N 
Average  2.2 7.3  3.1M   3.2  
1 Cells shaded green indicate a ‘yes’ answer or a figure above the mean average where questions give a numerical answer. 
2 Kisumu answered ‘no’ but KAM and Carbon Africa stated they provided assistance to the county. 
 
The critical need for external planning support is also evident from the ongoing MoEP/GIZ 
collaboration to develop the County Energy Planning Framework which aims to guide and standardise 
county energy plans by:   
improving the quality and consistency of county energy plans, and their strategic 
content … facilitating a more efficient integration into an integrated national 
energy plan (Jobs in Kenya, 2016). 
Despite what seems a striking and obvious need for this framework, particularly given the ambiguities 
in the legislation, the framework has been slow to develop. The process only initiated in 2015, while 
in 2019 an international NGO representative indicated that it was still not clear whether the 
framework had been mainstreamed across all 47 counties [106]. The development timeframe of the 
framework highlights how the counties have been working without standardised guidance on the 
formations of these plans for most if not all of the period since 2013, exacerbating the regulatory 
uncertainty caused by the impasse over the Energy Bill 2015 and impeding the development of 
decentralised energy governance.  
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A senior representative from Integral Advisory Limited, the consultancy awarded the contract for 
finalising the framework, emphasised these legislative hindrances when addressing a workshop in 
2016: “Counties are ready to move on energy plans but are waiting for guidance from the planning 
framework, and for the Energy Bill to be cleared”. The quote indicates that the lack of framework and 
delayed promulgation of the Energy Bill 2015 are the main reasons why, understandably, most 
counties have not completed energy plans. These issues appear to be an ongoing concern as it is still 
unclear whether a finalised framework is in circulation. Given the expectation that county energy plans 
would form the basis for the planning and implementing of sub-national scale energy initiatives, their 
incompletion is likely to be significantly detrimental for decentralised energy governance.  
County Integrated Development Plans (CIDPs) and energy initiatives 
Despite most counties not completing energy plans during their first terms, each incorporated energy 
into their first term County Integrated Development Plans (CIDPs), a much broader document 
(mandated by the County Governments Act 2012) within which the main strategies and activities are 
outlined for addressing issues across all key sectors. The energy component of the CIDPs seems to 
indicate counties have different understandings of their energy roles. Some counties have 
implemented initiatives specific to their locality, such as Kitui county’s development of a county 
charcoal policy reflecting their position as one of Kenya’s largest charcoal producers. However, a 
number of counties have stated intentions to develop large scale grid-electricity generation projects, 
which do not fall under the county remit. Such proposals suggest either a misunderstanding of the 
county role, or perhaps a desire to pursue politically expedient policies regardless of whether it forms 
part of the county mandate. 
Arguably the most prevalent energy feature of the first term CIPDs was street lighting initiatives. 
Nearly all counties embarked on a street lighting installation drive, with many proclaiming it a flagship 
policy and a means to emphasise county achievements under devolution; a county officer from 
Kiambu commenting in 2017: “since 1963 they [the national government] haven’t done it [street 
lighting], but in three years we’ve been able to” [87]. Counties pointed to improved security and longer 
trading hours for market centres and street vendors as the principal reasons for their focus on street 
lighting. The improved visibility was also argued to increase the chance of there being witnesses to 
transgressions, reducing corruption and improving accountability –one county officer commenting: 
“police officers are more honest in the light” [43].  
The tendency so far for county governments to focus energy sector interventions on street light 
programmes may have political motivations. Such programmes are highly visible and therefore have 
political prestige. Street lighting is also one of the few clearly demarked county specific functions in 
the Constitution, while a representative from GIZ added that counties have focussed on street lighting 
because “it's not that difficult to do” [67]. Although the benefit of longer trading hours has the 
potential to enable greater income generation and increase demand for energy (county energy 
planning function 1d) not all economic opportunities derive from street lighting and energy for 
productive means is also vitally needed outside the market centre context. Thus, street lighting 
programmes only play a part in ‘the provision of services to address broader developmental 
objectives’, the multi-dimensional definition of energy access used by this thesis and acknowledged 
by social science contributions to energy studies (Pachauri, 2011). It therefore seems that populist 
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decision making rather than the interests of overall development has led to street lighting being 
prioritised over other energy initiatives.   
5.7 Conclusion  
Empirical findings 
This chapter has sought to add to current limited understandings of decentralised energy governance 
in the Global South by assessing the subjective interpretations of how Kenyan decentralisation and 
decentralised energy governance have developed since 2013 (the focus of RQ1). The chapter’s main 
argument is that on the ground developments in decentralised energy governance have deviated from 
the MLG2-esque form envisaged by the legislative blueprint for devolved energy due mainly to 
underlying power relations; in particular, the unwillingness of national government to cede effective 
power to devolved units. The chapter argues these developments have been to the detriment of 
equitable energy access and finds five key factors contributing to this situation.  
Firstly, the post-2013 legislative changes have not significantly altered the energy governance 
landscape. The overlapping roles and protracted promulgation of the Energy Bill 2015 failed to 
sufficiently address the ambiguities over devolved energy roles in the pre-2013 legislation, 
disincentivising decentralised energy governance interventions and propagating the prevailing MLG1-
esque regime. Secondly, on the ground institutional developments have reinforced centralised 
control. Despite improving accountability, the structural and operational changes adopted by energy 
parastatals to accommodate devolution clearly represent a form of deconcentration helping to 
maintain national government’s de facto monopoly of grid electricity.  
Thirdly, the chapter notes national government interests have been further consolidated by resources 
continuing to be predominantly focussed on national government led initiatives. Aided by finance 
from TAC1/2 actors, resources have particularly focussed on grid electricity, which has yet to be 
meaningfully devolved due to the ongoing national government monopoly. Off-grid electricity 
initiatives have also been dominated by national government, with cost barriers and delays from 
national government in establishing a regulatory framework for mini-grids disincentivising the 
development of off-grid initiatives by more MLG2-esque networks of other actors. Despite being most 
urgent, clean cooking initiatives have been least prioritised by both levels of government, with the 
county role again hindered by legislative and institutional barriers. This suggests clean cooking access, 
is likely to continue to be unable to keep pace with population growth.  
Fourthly, the chapter finds that while national government dominance has curtailed the scope for 
effective county interventions, capacity shortcomings at the county level have also fundamentally 
impacted the effectiveness of decentralised energy governance. Capacity varies considerably among 
county administrations, but it seems many have not realised the potential for decentralised 
governance initiatives, with counties often lacking the expertise and resources to develop energy 
plans and investor initiatives. In particular, counties seem ideally placed to expediate the key dynamics 
cited by the innovation systems literature for developing distributed energy technologies; namely by 
facilitating, coordinating and potentially subsidising local capacity building and networks of diverse 
local stakeholders to foster urgently needed clean cooking, SHS and community-scale mini-grid 
initiatives (Ockwell & Byrne, 2017). The fact that hitherto these multi-stakeholder decentralised 
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interventions have been limited represents a significant missed opportunity. Thus, the need for county 
capacity issues to be addressed is critical if the multi-stakeholder decentralised governance seemingly 
intended by the legislative framework is to be realised.  
Yet, the fifth contention is that national government has primarily been responsible for the insufficient 
development of county capacity. National government delays over the promulgation of the Energy Bill 
2015 and the County Energy Planning Framework have created sector uncertainty over roles and 
impeded the development of county energy plans, a prerequisite for active county engagement in 
decentralised energy governance. The Energy Bill 2015 also explicitly mandates the national 
government with providing capacity building support to counties, a requirement that has been 
unevenly addressed and, in many cases, critically lacking. This lends credence to the argument that 
energy is considered too important to devolve more fully and more MLG1-esque deconcentration is 
the national government preference for the sector; a reluctance to cede power characteristic of 
broader decentralisation processes in both Global South and North (cf. Rodríguez-Pose & Gill, 2003).  
This continuation of a MLG1 system has had a detrimental impact on addressing Kenyan energy access 
issues. National government interests in grid electricity extension initiatives have been prioritised, 
increasing access to electricity but sub-optimally and inequitably. Specifically, the increased scale of 
uptake publicised by national government figures is overstated as many connections are largely 
inactive due to the electricity being unaffordable for many households. KPLC are thus left burdened 
with the costs of maintaining loss-making connections and running a surplus of generation; costs 
subsequently passed on to consumers which further disincentivises uptake, creating additional surplus 
and costs: a vicious circle. The chapter argues that these failings could have been mitigated had a more 
MLG2 form of governance developed, where decentralised energy governance had greater capacity 
to check the excessive emphasis on grid extension and facilitate, where locally appropriate, more small 
scale off-grid electricity and clean cooking initiatives. 
Conceptual and theoretical implications 
The findings from this chapter have a number of wider conceptual and theoretical implications for 
decentralised energy governance in the Global South. Firstly, the novel application of MLG to 
decentralised energy governance is shows to have clear uses when comprehending the overlapping 
jurisdictions and scales in the energy sector, aligning with findings from MLG’s application to other 
complex sectors (Moss and Newig, 2010). Most notably, the framework is found to be particularly 
effective in terms of deducing and comparing the form of decentralised energy governance intended 
by legislation with that emerging on the ground.  
Partly deduced from this use of MLG, the finding that Kenyan decentralised energy governance has 
deviated from its legislative blueprint due to underlying power dynamics helps highlight how 
decentralisation has distinct relevance to energy and its governance in the Global South. This is 
because grid electricity (particularly transmission and distribution) typically remains one of the few de 
facto monopolies under centralised control in the Global South; the Kenyan experience suggesting 
that central governments will see this control as too financially and politically important to risk being 
reduced by decentralisation reforms. This understanding aligns with the commonly acknowledged 
view in the literature that broader Global South decentralisation processes frequently deviate from 
legislation as central governments seek to limit reforms threatening their hold on power (D’Arcy & 
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Cornell, 2016; Erk, 2014). Yet, this chapter extends this debate by arguing that monopolistic control 
of such a lucrative sector makes central government reluctance to decentralise particularly likely with 
energy – more so than most other sectors – which, by extension, lends support to arguments 
suggesting energy paradigm shifts involving more flexible governance forms (i.e. interventionism and 
fragmentation) may also be resisted (Herington et al., 2017).  
Furthermore, the Kenyan case study shows that the continuation of centralised MLG1 control 
prioritising grid-centric policies has been detrimental to addressing the country’s energy access issues, 
a finding likely to have wider applicability as this combination of energy governance and policy 
approach is widespread in the Global South (Africa Progress Panel, 2015). In particular, grid centric 
approaches seem highly disadvantageous to sub-Saharan Africa where the IEA (2019) notes off-grid 
solutions are the least cost option for 55% of the population attaining electricity access. The side-lining 
of off-grid solutions aligns with increasingly prominent arguments regarding the potential for such 
technologies to disrupt centralised grid monopolies in both Global South and North (cf. Burgen, 2018; 
Farrell, 2019), although the sense that decentralised governance could facilitate this off-grid 
disruption is a point rarely made. The example of KPLC in Kenya also suggests the likelihood of 
erroneous grid-centric policies being pursued is heightened in cases where the energy sector is 
controlled by a part-privatised state monopoly, which, by combining monopoly control with a profit 
motive, merges detrimentally contradictory elements of the statism and liberalism paradigms. 
The Kenyan experience also suggests politically expedient conceptualisations of energy will be key to 
how the pursuit of frequently inappropriate grid solutions is justified. In Kenya, such policies were 
rationalised by the national government defining energy access as physical availability of electricity. 
This erroneous unidimensional conceptualisation has been and may continue to be adopted by other 
Global South centralised governance institutions pursuing grid-centric policies as it side-lines 
multidimensional definitions of energy access (incorporating aspects such as reliability, affordability, 
access to energy services) which the social science literature stresses as vital for addressing the 
inherent geographical variations of energy access that often necessitate off-grid solutions (Pachauri, 
2011). The under-prioritisation of clean cooking in Kenya is also indicative of wider Global South and 
North failings to conceptualise energy beyond electricity, an issue which, if unaddressed, suggests 
urgently needed clean cooking initiatives will continue to be overlooked in the Global South (cf. UNDP, 
2009). 
Centralised control over policy, regulation, resources, and capacity building – a feature of many Global 
South decentralisation contexts (Cabral, 2011) – is indicated by the Kenyan findings to be another key 
tool with which central governments will curtail the development of decentralised governance in 
order to consolidate their hold on power. This supports the argument of Brown et al. (2015) that 
centralised governance in the Global South will seek to retain authority over the management and 
regulation of any movement towards decentralised energy (both in terms of technology and 
governance). To help counter this control, the decentralisation literature (particularly findings from 
the recent Malawian energy decentralisation process) indicates that legislation and regulation 
concerning decentralised energy governance needs to be: a) in place when sub-national authorities 
assume roles; b) a product of collaborative multi-stakeholder engagement to facilitate support and 
understanding; and c) have clear minimum standards for sub-national level roles to avoid excessive 
central government oversight (Buckland et al., 2017; Ribot, 2002).  
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Having explored how decentralised energy governance has developed since 2013, the following 
chapters employ geographical approaches to facilitate a deeper understanding of the power relations  
shaping these developments. Firstly, the scalar dimensions of power relations in Kenya are explored 
in chapter 6 and then the spatial variations of these dynamics across four counties are examined in 
chapter 7.  
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Chapter 6 - Power Relations between Key Stakeholders in Decentralised 
Energy Governance: The Difference between Rhetoric and Reality   
The aim of this chapter is to address research question 2 by analysing the power relations 
underpinning developments in Kenyan decentralised energy governance. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, these developments thus far have seen the emergence of governance more akin to MLG1 
than the MLG2-esque form seemingly intended by the legislative framework: decentralised 
institutions are nominally in place, yet there has been a reluctance to cede energy powers by national 
government which has been detrimental to addressing energy access issues. This chapter seeks to 
better understand this discrepancy by uncovering the agendas and interactions which have shaped 
power relations and the emergent decentralised energy governance. 
In doing so, the chapter explores the concept of scale and how power relations play out at smaller and 
larger levels of analysis than the state (the primary unit of analysis in traditional political approaches 
(Gallaher et al, 2009)), engaging with human geography debates that question the notion of the state 
as simple vertical hierarchy and posit instead that scalar relationships are constructed and thus require 
the state to be viewed relationally (Brenner, 2001; Brown & Purcell; Jessop, 1990). By applying these 
arguments to Global South decentralised energy governance, this chapter extends debates concerning 
the implications of decentralisation for the role of the state – typically the gatekeeper to the energy 
sector in sub-Saharan Africa (Cheeseman, 2015) – and develops new knowledge on how the complex 
political economy of energy issues plays out at multiple scales of analysis. Given the increasing 
recognition by leading social science energy scholars that how energy interventions are effectively 
governed at different scales is crucial to addressing Global South energy access issues yet critically 
understudied (Bagley et al., 2018; Ockwell & Byrne, 2017), the scalar approach of this chapter to 
power relations is an urgent undertaking. 
To achieve these aims, the chapter centres on the county governments – ostensibly the principal site 
of decentralised energy governance – and analyses their power relations with key stakeholders at 
three different scales. First, section 6.1 examines their interactions with transnational actors, revealing 
how engagement is predominantly dictated by the interests of the latter. Section 6.2 then focuses on 
county engagement with the national government, uncovering how the county voice has been largely 
constrained by the limited deconcentration reforms of state institutions. A similar pattern emerges in 
section 6.3 vis-a-vis the county relationship with the community level. Here the participatory politics 
envisaged by the devolution process are found to have remained largely unrealised except over land 
where the community retains a degree of leverage. Alongside this and as appropriate, the chapter also 
explores county interactions with other key stakeholder groups, such as NGOs and the private sector. 
Conclusions are then drawn in section 6.4, establishing the nature and extent of the cross scalar power 
imbalances underpinning the discrepancies between the rhetoric and reality of Kenyan devolution. 
6.1 Transnational actor interactions with decentralised energy governance  
Chapter 5 illustrated how transnational actor energy sector funding has primarily been channelled 
into national government initiatives, seemingly entrenching top-down governance in the energy 
sector and at odds with the intended Kenyan devolution process. This has significant implications for 
decentralised energy governance as the limited transnational actor support for counties has proved 
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highly beneficial, particularly with the development of county energy plans which are the bedrock of 
decentralised energy governance initiatives. This section builds on these findings by analysing the 
engagement between transnational actors and county governments in order to better understand the 
power relations behind this consolidation of MLG1 structures in the energy sector. The section uses 
throughout the three transnational actor categories (TAC1-3) identified in Chapter 4 (see Table 4.4), 
which were defined on the basis of their operational scale. The acronyms used for these categories 
and their meanings are reproduced below for ease of use. 
TAC1 = Multilateral governmental organisations. Examples include the UN, World Bank, and AfDB. 
TAC2 = Bilateral governmental organisations. Examples include DfID, GIZ and USAID. 
TAC3 = International ‘a-governmental’ organisations. Examples include NGOs, charities, research 
institutes, and corporations with an international outreach.  
National government: a conduit for transnational actor engagement  
The period since devolution has seen a lack of direct energy sector engagement with counties by 
transnational actors from all three categories mainly due to national government being the primary 
conduit of transnational actor funding. This is despite significant transnational actor investment in the 
devolution process more broadly, with the World Bank and UNDP funding initiatives to strengthen the 
capacity of national and county institutions to transition to a devolved system of government82. Yet in 
the energy sector, it seems to be mainly TAC3 actors who have circumvented the national government 
to directly interact with counties and decentralised energy governance. 
TAC1 actors appear particularly fixed to interacting with counties via national government, with a 
representative from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) acknowledging 
that “most development partners are scheduling their cash to the national government” [88]. The EU 
county energy planning sensitisation provided a rare case of TAC1 funds being directly delivered to 
counties, although a senior representative of the organisation revealed this was only after initial 
discussions and a scoping study conducted with the national government had been carried out [69]. 
A senior representative of a major World Bank financed mini-grid mapping project conducted via 
national government highlighted the data gathered would be passed to both the MoEP and the 
counties, but that the process was not prescriptive, and it was for the MoEP and counties to make the 
final investment decisions themselves [89]. This suggests a slightly detached approach to county 
engagement unlikely to facilitate MLG2 forms of governance.  
Reasons for this modus operandi were at times vague. A senior UN Environment Programme (UNEP) 
officer insinuated it was simply the status quo: “it [direct engagement with counties] hasn't been really 
considered much at UNEP because everything seems to go through national government” [90]. A 
leading academic on sustainability transitions viewed this funding prioritisation as an issue of scale, 
with individual counties not sufficiently sizeable to warrant funding from TAC1 actors [91]. An ERC 
officer agreed, adding that counties would not be able to access TAC1 finance as their auditing 
 
82 Examples include the UNDP project ‘Support to Devolved Governance in Kenya’ (UNDP, 2014) and the World Bank 
‘Kenya Devolution Support Project’ (World Bank, 2016)  
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processes were not considered sufficiently robust by donors unlike the national government [12]. 
These issues of scale along with the sense of funding via national government being the norm indicates 
the first port of call for TAC1 actors is likely to continue to be the national government. 
The interactions between counties and TAC2 actors have also tended to occur via national 
government. The assistance provided by state run overseas aid agencies such as DfID and GIZ in 
developing county energy plans was secured via bilateral negotiations between the respective 
national governments. A GIZ representative acknowledged that the “the agreements we have [for 
providing county planning support] are with the central government”, with the MoEP and REA the 
lead executing agencies [67]. A similar subsidiary county role was evident in the stakeholder 
interactions concerning the County Energy Planning Framework discussed in Chapter 5. An NGO 
representative contributing to the process reported county participation was largely subordinate to 
that of national government, only occurring after several drafts of the template had been first 
assessed and discussed by national government and other transnational actors [92]. This lack of 
county consultation again defies the recommendation within the literature for multilevel 
collaboration (cf. Brown et al., 2015) and highlights both the imbalance in intergovernmental power 
relations and the challenge counties face securing support from TAC2 actors independently of national 
government. 
However, TAC3 actors seem less constrained by the issues of scale and bilateral relations affecting 
TAC1 and TAC2 actors, with a number of organisations engaging more directly with county 
administrations. Initiatives by research institutes, such as the SONG project highlighted in Chapter 5, 
have often been steered primarily through county channels. International NGOs have also negotiated 
directly with counties in seeking to form collaborations. For instance, the Catholic Agency for Overseas 
Development (CAFOD) capacity building work in Kitui county stemmed from the presence of county-
based strategic partners whom already had an existing relationship with the county government.  
Path dependency skews power relations in TAC/county engagement 
Further indication of uneven power relations can be seen in how transnational actors from all 
categories choose the counties they support. For TAC2 actors, the choice tended to reflect their own 
policy preferences and various economic and geopolitical interests. GIZ worked in Turkana, Marsabit 
and Narok, three ASAL counties with limited grid coverage and significant renewable energy resources 
(RECP, 2015), a context aligning well with GIZ’s preferred model of developing sustainable energy 
supply mainly through off-grid renewable energy and improved cookstoves (GIZ, n.d.).  
In the case of DfID’s county planning support, the choice of county appears to have reflected the 
interests of their in-country partner: the Kenyan Association of Manufacturers (KAM) who supported 
the development of county energy plans in Nairobi, Machakos, Kiambu, Nakuru, Kisumu, Mombasa 
and Uasin Gishu. These seven counties have the largest population centres and industrial bases, 
serving well KAM’s raison d’etre as “the representative organisation for manufacturing value-add 
industries in Kenya” which advocates for “a competitive environment for businesses to operate” 
(KAM, 2018, p.1). However, this apparent path dependency was not always openly acknowledged. A 
senior KAM representative was evasive when asked the criteria behind KAM’s county selection by an 
energy officer from Kitui, a county not working with KAM. A direct response was not forthcoming, only 
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a pledge that five, as yet unspecified, counties would be included in the next phase; a vagueness likely 
to frustrate county efforts to engage with the transnational scale [59].  
In other instances, it seems counties were often chosen by TAC1-3 actors based on long standing 
relationships. This was the case with the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF); a representative stating 
that county engagement had been: 
easy because for WWF already we have certain counties where we have offices 
where we have engaged with them over the years on other issues, we’ve built that 
trust, basically we've partnered over the years [71]. 
This seems to suggest that counties which do not have a history of engagement with the WWF might 
face difficulties to receive assistance. Echoing the opacity of KAM, the WWF representative also 
provided a vague answer as to how certain counties were able to establish relationships with WWF:  
WWF has what we call priority landscapes, so the counties that are within our 
priority landscapes … we deal with them. One of our priority landscapes is the 
coast, so the counties that fall there we’ve worked with them over the years [71]. 
It is perhaps this opaqueness that frustrates counties, as the notion of ‘we’ve always worked with 
them’ is of little use to counties seeking assistance, yet unable to determine the criteria by which to 
help align themselves with transnational actor interests. This suggests it will often be difficult for 
counties to influence TAC actors on where they collaborate.  
Despite these challenges, it seems opportunities for increased county engagement with transnational 
actors may arise when counties adopt a more proactive approach. Most transnational actors operate 
on a partnership model, whereby funding and support is not implemented directly, but channelled 
through a local partner operating on the ground. Hence, if a county administration can take steps to 
establish links with these local partners, it has a greater chance of receiving assistance. This was clearly 
evidenced by Kitui county’s partnership with CAFOD on the international development charity’s 
Energy Delivery Model (EDM) project which focussed on inclusive community energy planning. 
According to a senior CAFOD representative, Kitui was chosen, 
purely in terms of which partners have expressed an interest … the choice of 
counties is determined by where CAFOD has strategic partners doing development 
work that have expressed an interest in the energy advocacy and EDM work, 
Caritas Kitui is the main one and they have good relationships with the county 
government83 [93]. 
The intervention of KAM in supporting the most industrialised counties is also suggestive of this trend. 
Although, as previously discussed, the KAM representative would not be drawn on how the seven 
counties supported were selected, it seems highly likely that county and private sector representatives 
would have actively advocated for this assistance. Similarly, a representative from the African Centre 
for Technology Studies (ACTS), a Kenyan think-tank with access to transnational funding, stated 
invitations for the organisation’s capacity building workshops are prioritised to counties who have 
 
83 Caritas is the umbrella confederation of Catholic development, relief, and social service organisations. 
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actively expressed an interest rather than those whose attendance is understood to be primarily 
motivated by remuneration [94].  
Counties which adopt this ‘proactive’ approach are also often the beneficiaries of multiple streams of 
assistance due to the nature of development sector networking, particularly among TAC3 actors. The 
NGO, Practical Action engaged in capacity building activities to develop county energy plans with 
Migori county following discussions with the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) who had 
conducted participatory planning analysis there. Commenting on their involvement in the CAFOD EDM 
project in Kitui, a representative of the research organisation, the International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED) highlighted their standard model of operations is to work 
through local partners, but with the Kitui EDM project “we’re taking our guidance and lead from 
CAFOD” [95]. This emphasises the snowball effect of multiple transnational actor involvement that 
can occur once a county has begun to successfully engage such institutions. 
Yet, the extent to which a proactive approach can facilitate collaboration with TAC1 and TAC2 actors 
seems more questionable. A representative from GIZ appeared to acknowledge this in her response 
to why only a few counties had managed to overcome the legislative challenges facing the completion 
of county energy plans: 
I think it's only proactive counties that have been able to start putting their policies 
in place or sometimes not necessarily proactive but also counties where 
development partners have had an interest, they’ve also gotten the discussion 
going [67].    
The quote suggests proactiveness or transnational support are key but not that one may lead to the 
latter. Moreover, the quotation reinforces the sense that the lack of legislative guidance for county 
energy plans has created a context where counties are highly dependent on transnational actor 
support, which a proactive approach may or may not facilitate.  
Overall, it seems that transnational actor engagement with decentralised energy governance has 
largely consolidated the MLG1 approach which aligns with national government interests. Direct 
county engagement from TAC1 actors has been lacking due to funding criteria and conventions which 
see support channelled through national government, while support from TAC2 and TAC3 
stakeholders has been uneven as it is often dependent on pre-existing relationships or aligned 
interests. This has significant implications for decentralised energy governance. Without greater, and 
more even engagement from transnational actors, albeit combined with a more proactive approach 
by county administrations, it seems probable that disparities in the quality of decentralised energy 
governance will emerge between counties. In particular, the critical county function of county energy 
planning, which could facilitate a more representative MLG2 system of energy governance, is likely to 
be more slowly, and less effectively realised.  
6.2 National government interactions with decentralised energy governance 
Despite the Constitution’s (2010, p.14) decree that the national and county governments “shall 
conduct their mutual relations on the basis of consultation and cooperation”, this has yet to clearly 
materialise in energy governance. As the previous chapter noted, the reforms adopted by national 
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government parastatals have resembled deconcentration, with resources continuing to be mainly 
focussed on national government priorities, particularly grid electricity where the national 
government retains a de facto monopoly. This section builds on these findings by analysing how these 
limited changes have laid the foundations for the power dynamics between national and county 
governments to be marked by a tendency for the national government to adopt a domineering 
attitude towards the counties in the energy sector, leaving the county voice constrained.  
6.2.1 Interactions over grid electricity   
Counties willing to concede lead role 
Inhibited county engagement was particularly clear over grid electricity, with county officers 
appearing content or resigned to accepting certain grid electricity functions as outside county 
jurisdiction despite legislation stating otherwise.  A case in point was reticulation, stated as a 
concurrent function of national and county government by the Constitution (albeit ambiguously), yet 
an area where county administrations felt the county role was largely redundant: “KPLC is still 
dominating [electricity and] no one is doing [gas] reticulation as no infrastructure network exists” a 
senior Nairobi county energy officer explained [19]. 
The affordability of grid electricity, seen in the literature as the key barrier to access in Kenya, is not 
specifically demarcated a national or county function but was also viewed by county officers as a 
critical issue over which they had little control. A senior Uasin Gishu county water officer argued: 
“Energy costs are very high, especially bills. We need to come up with a solution for this, but this is a 
national level issue and they can handle that” [49]. Although billing is clearly the remit of KPLC, it 
seems counties are failing to consider other potential measures to address cost, such as part-
subsidising electricity costs. This is perhaps most viably achieved by supporting income generating 
activities (a county function) rather than by directly subsidising the cost of grid electricity which is 
likely beyond the means of a county budget and fails to address the issue that many households 
cannot afford electrical appliances or the electricity to power them even when heavily subsidised (Lee 
et al., 2016; Ndii, 2019). 
This view of a grid electricity sector dominated by KPLC was also recognised by representatives of 
national government; an ERC officer acknowledging, “KPLC is not a monopoly because of a lack of 
legislation because the framework is open to all, but investment in distribution is very high so no one 
wants to compete with KPLC” [11]. The quote is revealing as it constitutes tacit confirmation from 
national government of the de facto KPLC monopoly, which suggests national government are fully 
aware that the Constitution’s provisions for county grid electricity initiatives are unlikely to be viable. 
However, a senior representative from the EU commission in Kenya felt a limited grid-electricity role 
would not be of great concern to counties:  
The counties probably don’t mind that the national government and not 
themselves are running this – the county governments are unlikely to feel a sense 
of being undermined by the national government [69]. 
The counties ‘not minding’ the national government’s MLG1-esque control of grid electricity appears 
a rational position, given KPLC’s stranglehold on grid electricity retail and reticulation, county capacity 
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deficits, and the capital expenditure costs of grid electricity being beyond the means of county 
budgets. Thus, understandably, counties have come to view a lead role in grid electricity as an 
unfeasible and unattractive proposition, resulting in the continuation of the MLG1 system of running 
grid electricity that existed pre-devolution. 
Collaborative efforts hindered 
Although county officers tended to discount a lead role in grid electricity initiatives, most felt 
collaborating on certain aspects was both possible and beneficial. However, officers frequently 
complained such endeavours were being hindered by national government operations. A Nakuru 
county energy officer saw this as the case with small scale generation84: 
We can’t handle everything, but generation, we can feed in, but in small scale. 
[However] KPLC are working independently … because they are a monopoly, they 
have all the powers … if KPLC shares their data on energy loads, consumption, we 
can plan for projects [26].  
A senior Uasin Gishu county water officer also agreed there was a limit to the county grid electricity 
role, but felt there was scope for collaboration over reticulation:  
Energy can’t be fully devolved, with the grid it’s not practical to devolve everything, 
not all counties generate electricity. But the linkages [between KPLC and counties] 
should be stronger. … when they are doing new lines, we’d like to be involved [49].  
In theory, these calls for collaboration on small scale generation and reticulation make sense as they 
are areas likely to be facilitated by the better access to local information county governments 
ostensibly have. Although county generation only seems financially and institutionally viable for small 
scale systems which are initially off-grid but with the functionality to be later grid connected as such 
systems are not beholden to KPLC’s monopoly over distribution and retail.  
The viability of collaboration also depends greatly on the varied capacity and institutional strength of 
individual county administrations, as acknowledged by the senior Uasin Gishu county water officer, 
who objectively conceded, “the weakness may be with us because we don’t have an energy 
department” [49]. A KPLC planning manager at the central Nairobi headquarters also felt national 
government institutions were not to blame. The manager highlighted that since devolution his 
department had implemented “regional planning” whereas before “all our planning was just 
centralised”, noting efforts had also been made to “build capacity within the counties to carry out 
energy planning” [6]. Yet, the manager acknowledged uncertainties behind these processes: “we are 
working in a kind of vacuum in terms of guidelines and policy for engaging with counties”, adding that 
senior government officials had advised not to engage directly with counties but via intermediary 
consultants. 
[Senior government officials] were saying we shouldn't try to … help [counties] 
with their planning but … let consultants try to bring us together … who will work 
with counties to prepare their energy plans. Then we should also spread some 
 
84 Small-scale electricity generation is assumed to refer to 10 kW - 10 MW, a commonly used convention (e.g. EU, 2014). 
131 
 
 
guidelines saying that counties cannot do certain activities unless they've taken 
into account the Kenya power master plan , and err, so I think the advice we were 
been [sic] given is that there should be some kind of government circulars directing 
counties on how to act in terms of energy planning … That is advice we were given 
in a meeting; I don't know whether it reflects official policy [6]. 
The quote indicates doubt over whether outsourcing capacity building for county energy planning 
constitutes official policy. Although not necessarily a disadvantageous strategy, the overall uncertain 
tone seems detrimental as it suggests intergovernmental collaborations are likely to be impeded if a 
KPLC manager for regional planning is unsure on county engagement policy. Given the significance of 
capacity building to effective county energy planning noted in Chapter 5, this uncertainty concerning 
the national government capacity building role (which the constitution specifics as a national function) 
is likely to be highly detrimental to decentralised energy governance.  
Thus, it appears the county is being hindered from playing a collaborative role in certain aspects of 
grid electricity, such as supporting the planning of grid extension, facilitating small scale off-grid 
systems with grid-tied functionality, and possibly subsidising the costs of grid electricity for the 
poorest. This partly stems from the institutional and capacity shortcomings of counties 
administrations but equally, if not more, from the unclear county engagement policy of national 
government, seemingly indicative of a reluctance to cede power. 
Evolving county interpretation of energy roles  
Efforts to facilitate national and county government coordination on grid electricity also appear to 
have been hindered by counties having unrealistic expectations of the role they might play in grid 
electricity, particularly in the early stages of devolution. County statements at several capacity building 
workshops expressed a keen interest in large scale grid tied projects, suggesting the legislative 
provisions for devolved energy and the realities of the KPLC monopoly had not been realised.  
The sense that counties had initially been unrealistic over their grid electricity roles was shared by 
national government stakeholders. The KPLC planning manager stressed that initially “most counties 
felt they could go it alone”, not realising they needed national government approvals for grid tied 
initiatives [6]. He added “they are learning the hard way that they have to co-ordinate with us” while 
pointing out that investors often held the same erroneous misconceptions concerning generation 
projects: 
[Investors] just thought that once they work with counties and get approvals from 
counties, then they can put up their solar plant or their mini hydro, or their wind 
plant and it can generate and sell. But then they realised the off-taker of all the 
grid energy is Kenya power, it's not the counties, and the counties have not built 
their distribution network structure, so they realised that even though they've got 
approval from the counties they still have to come and knock on our door [6]. 
The quote provides tacit acknowledgement from a senior KPLC source that stakeholder coordination 
has suffered because counties and investors did not appreciate how the realities of the KPLC monopoly 
would essentially skew the rhetoric of the concurrent energy regulation functions in the Constitution.   
With KPLC as “the off-taker of all the grid energy” and counties not having their own distribution 
132 
 
 
networks there is effectively no scope for counties to bypass national government and operate 
independently in grid electricity and grid-tied off-grid initiatives. The need for counties to ‘knock on 
KPLC’s door’ was only confirmed by the subsequent Energy Bill 2015, which clarifies that all electricity 
regulatory functions are conferred to national government; once more emphasising the damage its 
delayed promulgation has caused to effective stakeholder coordination.  
However, there is a sense that county interpretations of their grid electricity roles have evolved to 
become more realistic, recognising both the legislative and practical limitations of the devolved role. 
This seems largely because county energy institutions have taken time to settle, understandable given 
unlike other sectors there was no forerunner in the pre-devolution districts, while the difference 
between policy rhetoric and reality has been particularly pronounced in the energy sector. At a 2018 
county capacity building workshop, a Kisumu county energy officer indicated counties were not 
interested in competing with national government but merely wanted to be provided with the 
regulatory framework to carry out their roles, requesting frustratedly “can we just have the 
guidelines” [96].  
Interest in major infrastructure initiatives also appears to be dissipating, with signs county officers are 
increasingly focussing their role in grid electricity on lobbying and keeping national government 
institutions accountable, particularly KPLC. A Trans Nzoia county CEC felt improvements to grid 
connectivity within Trans Nzoia were due to the “county putting KPLC under pressure” [52]. A senior 
Uasin Gishu county water officer shared similar sentiments, arguing pressure was now easier to apply:  
Before devolution, energy was handled at parastatal level, but [you] couldn’t really 
push the parastatal agencies … but now there are ‘line ministries’ which you can 
push. Energy wasn’t like the water sector, where before devolution, there were 
local level offices where people could complain [49]. 
The two county officers’ comments appear to be evidence of the bottom up pressure generated when 
MLG2 type systems function effectively; indicating that the proximity of county governments to a 
deconcentrated KPLC has compelled greater accountability, while suggesting lobbying forms one of 
the most important roles of county administrations in grid electricity. The latter quote also indicates 
a lobbying role may be more challenging within energy relative to other sectors as it was not a 
component of the pre-devolution system, reiterating the sense that devolved energy institutions will 
require time to settle.  
National government monopolies prohibit transformational change  
Despite improvements to accountability and service delivery from county lobbying, most stakeholders 
outside national government felt real transformational change to grid electricity governance enabling 
more equitable energy access was only possible via measures to either end or mitigate KPLC’s 
monopoly. Ending the monopoly by creating competition was seen as desirable but challenging, 
leaving most to call for mitigation measures, primarily that KPLC should pay compensation for the 
outages caused by its widely acknowledged poor reliability (see Chapter 5 cf. IEA, 2014). A senior 
Nairobi county energy officer elaborated: 
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Compensation is the only way to make KPLC efficient as it is too late to introduce 
competitors. But KPLC is worried about too much compensation as they are aware 
of how inefficient they are [19]. 
This focus on compensation seems a more realistic initial target for county lobbying, given the 
entrenched centralised governance and elite capture of grid electricity suggests national government 
are unlikely to facilitate the introduction of competition for KPLC (Daily Nation, 2013; Musau, 2018). 
This call for compensation was unanimously rejected by KPLC officers, who consistently reasoned that 
the difficulty of establishing and strengthening an electricity network to cover the highly dispersed 
Kenyan population was of such magnitude for a developing country that outages were inevitable [30, 
47, 51]. Several emphasised the technical challenges, highlighting the frequent need to disconnect 
consumers to allow grid extension work to be conducted, particularly in rural areas lacking alternative 
grid loops. Officers also stressed ‘external’ factors, such as weather, fallen trees and traffic accidents, 
were causes of outages which KPLC could not be held responsible for: a Turkana county KPLC manager 
claiming, “every day there has to be an outage” [30]. Perhaps, most emphasised was the financial 
challenge of compensation. Most KPLC officers felt compensation would leave KPLC unsustainable as 
a business, particularly as a capital injection was already required to refurbish the ageing network [30, 
38, 47], with one Migori based officer claiming compensation would mean “the entire energy sector 
would collapse” [38]. 
However, other stakeholder groups were less sympathetic to KPLC’s arguments, disputing the claimed 
financial challenge. A senior energy analyst highlighted the parastatal was “profitmaking … [and] one 
of the better performing utilities in Africa”, arguing compensation “is the necessary push for them to 
just make sure they update all their system” [60]. A KETRACO officer was particularly forthright, 
arguing “if they’re not obliged to pay, there’s no motivation to improve … it’s completely in bad taste” 
[10]. These calls for compensation seem prudent given the need to incentivise performance from a 
state monopoly, particularly given KPLC’s unwillingness to address reliability appears to stem from the 
parastatal’s profitmaking focus as a manager at a Kenyan energy consultancy explained: 
refurbishing and upgrading the current systems should be of interest to [KPLC] … 
and why it may not be is … that you still have the same number of customers, but 
you invest in upgrading. Extending it however adds numbers onto your books so 
you have a larger customer base, and that will be of great interest to them [61].  
The quote indicates the inherent weakness of KPLC status as a part-privatised state monopoly, where 
the need to satisfy shareholders and fulfil election pledges has resulted in grid extension being 
prioritised over pre-existing reliability issues. Thus, the introduction of compensation via the recently 
enacted Energy Bill 2017 seems critical although it remains to be seen how effectively it will be 
implemented: energy analysts stressing it would be complex without digitised monitoring85 [29, 62]. 
 
 
85) The Energy Bill 2017 (Article 194(1-2)) states “a licensee shall be liable to compensate a consumer [for] power outages 
that exceed a cumulative three hours within a twenty-four hour period, where the licensee has not issued a twenty-four 
hours prior notice”. 
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Transformational change hindered by national government policy  
Transformational change to grid electricity governance has also been hindered by key national 
government policy decisions, which appear to have been made with minimal county consultation. 
Most significant was the shift in REA policy from the mass grid connection of public facilities and 
households via maximising existing transformers to the electrification of primary schools through the 
Digital Literacy Programme (DLP)86. A senior REA officer highlighted that the change in focus was due 
to the DLP being a key component of President Kenyatta’s 2013 election campaign.  
[The initial REA policy] might not have got the same traction as it was not an 
election deliverable … so all the funding went to primary schools, previously it had 
not been so much of a focus, but the new government made it a promise, so it 
became a deliverable [14].  
The quote reveals how the campaign concerns of national government elites have seen REA’s funding 
reallocated to the DLP, a policy which provides less electricity coverage than the previous mass 
connectivity programme. Thus, its prioritisation seems unmerited; the REA officer arguing the 
previous plan was preferable as it “targets the bigger picture” [14]. Compounding this issue was the 
subsequent transfer of responsibility for mass grid connections to KPLC as part of the Last Mile 
Connectivity Project (LMCP). Part-privatised and required to make a profit, KPLC’s connection fees 
have been higher than they would have under REA87, which the senior REA officer stated would have 
involved “no upfront cost or 500ksh (US$5) max”. Thus, the shift in REA policy appears to have 
increased the unaffordability of grid electricity, hindering efforts to address the energy needs of the 
rural poor REA was set up to address. 
The negative impact of this policy shift was argued by the REA officer to have been exacerbated by 
an accompanying deterioration in the parastatal’s engagement with counties: 
It is very possible that a county might not be aware of REA plans. … In the 2014-
2015 and 2015-2016 tax years, the focus of REA was almost entirely on primary 
schools and entirely national run, so hardly any engagement with county 
governments other than on identifying schools. If the old REA CEO plan had been 
kept, counties would be more aware of REA and would have been happy88 [14]. 
Discontent with REA was reflected in the statements of most county officers interviewed. A senior 
Kitui energy officer saw the county relationship with REA as “cordial”; praising a 2014 MOU assisting 
capacity building but criticising the parastatal for not providing invoices which aligned with the 
county’s administrative system [46]. REA’s engagement was more strongly criticised by senior county 
officers in Uasin Gishu and Turkana for a lack of staff on the ground. The REA officer responsible for 
 
86 The DLP pledged every child would have access to a laptop, thus necessitating the electrification of schools and the shift 
in REA priorities (see section 5.3). 
87 Under KPLC, the standard cost of connection is 15,000ksh (US$150), reduced to 1160ksh (US$11.60) under the GPOBA 
scheme for customers in certain low-income areas (see Chapter 5). 
88 Internal parastatal politics may also have facilitated the policy shift. In July 2013, the REA Chief Executive Officer (CEO), 
Zachary Ayieko, a proponent of the initial REA policy, chose not to pursue a second term, while in February 2015 the new 
MoEP Principal Secretary, Eng. Joseph Njoroge, a former CEO of KPLC, reassigned KPLC to the task of maximising existing 
transformers as part of the LMCP. N.B. Principal Secretaries head national government departments.  
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Turkana was stationed over 350km away in Eldoret, a situation the Turkana county energy officer felt 
was exacerbated by the parastatal’s condescending attitude to county engagement: 
Sometimes they have this big brother attitude, ‘we’ve been in this longer than you’ 
[i.e. we know better]. We have never received communication from them, not 
even courtesy acknowledgement of receipt of emails [31]. 
The quote above clearly supports the REA officer’s warning of a lack of county engagement since REA 
shifted policy to the DLP and suggests REA’s focus on the DLP has led to top-down governance being 
the norm, with far less emphasis on addressing county needs. Thus, overall it seems the policy shift 
imposed on REA has had a detrimental effect on equitable energy access and decentralised energy 
governance, leading to less county engagement as national government reverts to a MLG1-esque 
system to fulfil a populist election pledge.  
6.2.2 Interactions over off-grid electricity 
As with grid electricity, county engagement with national government in off-grid electricity has also 
been constrained due to the limited deconcentration reforms adopted by the energy parastatals since 
devolution, with control still residing primarily with national government. This is particularly the case 
with larger off-grid electricity initiatives which are predominantly owned and run by national 
government. In Turkana, a senior county energy officer criticised the county’s two donor funded mini-
grids being run by KPLC89 but felt the county was limited in what they could implement autonomously 
as the county budget “doesn’t allow us to do our own mini-grids” [31]. These budgetary constraints 
suggest large scale off-grid initiatives are likely to remain in national government hands.  
National government control of large scale off-grid systems was essentially confirmed by a senior KPLC 
planning manager, who highlighted their cost meant they would require financing from TAC1 actor 
soft loans, which as section 6.1 noted are almost entirely channelled through national government. 
The manager noted likely roles for the private sector in "constructing mini-grids” and possibly 
“concessionary terms to operate them” but, notably, made no mention of a county role. In addition, 
the manager cautioned that:  
Retail will always be with Kenya Power. They [investors] may wish to retail but I 
don't think the government will approve such a policy because of the tariff issue, 
we'll have customers in some parts of the country paying more per kilowatt hour 
than similar customers in another part of the country, it's like discriminating 
against some Kenyans because they're living in a remote location [6]. 
Although the flat tariff reasoning appears egalitarian, the quote highlights how national government 
control of licensing can be used to preclude competition, thus acting as a deterrent to investors in off-
grid initiatives. The manager conceded KPLC’s monopoly on retail would not be popular with investors 
as “they want to be free to operate on their own commercial terms wherever they have their grids”. 
The national government’s official position on larger scale off-grid systems was confirmed by a senior 
 
89 One was funded by the World Bank, the other by GIZ. 
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consultant for the County Energy Planning Framework, who informed counties at a capacity building 
workshop they should not be considering electricity generation projects over 40MW. 
There are also instances of the constitution’s rhetoric being ignored by national government: counties 
have often been left uninformed of grid electricity expansion plans, whilst off-grid county-based 
reticulation initiatives have been blocked. A case in point was Remba island in Homa Bay county, a 
location not covered by the grid, where national government authorities disconnected an off-grid 
electricity system supplying 10,000 residents, stating the system was operating without the permit 
required under the Energy Act 2006 (ERC, 2018). In a twitter post, prominent government critic and 
economist, David Ndii (2018), rightly blamed the legislative shortcomings noted in Chapter 5, namely 
that the impasse over the Energy Bill 2015 had left the country reliant on outdated legislation:  
County function 8. County planning and development, including (e) electricity and 
gas reticulation and energy regulation. This is because of failure to revise the 
Energy Act to align with Constitution. Microgrids should be regulated by counties. 
It thus appears clear that National Government intends for larger off-grid electricity systems to remain 
centrally controlled in a MLG1 system dominated by KPLC. Large scale off-grid initiatives run by KPLC 
essentially form small ‘islands’ of the national grid. They are structurally ‘off-grid’ in so much as they 
are not connected to the main grid, but from a governance perspective they are ‘grid’, subject to the 
same centralised KPLC control on matters such as tariffs and service. This reclassification of centrally 
controlled off-grid electricity as ‘grid islands’ constitutes a finding of this PhD, shaping how such 
systems are analysed as, essentially, the governance arguments applied earlier to grid-electricity are 
also applicable to ‘grid islands’.     
6.2.3 Small scale off-grid electricity and clean cooking 
Small scale off-grid electricity systems and clean cooking initiatives have been subject to less dominant 
national government control and less contested inter-governmental interactions than seen with grid 
electricity. This appears to reflect the tendency by both levels of government to under prioritise these 
sectors, particularly clean cooking. Although less contested, engagement between national and 
county government over these two energy sub-sectors has been marked by disconnect over how the 
role of each should be interpreted, resulting in the decentralised energy governance of these energy 
sub-sectors being noticeably uneven. 
County officers tended to see initiatives in small scale off-grid electricity and clean cooking as areas 
where they could clearly play a role. A former Nakuru county energy officer felt despite control of the 
energy sector remaining predominantly at national level, counties could play a role in implementing 
small scale off-grid energy initiatives, including solar street lighting, and by raising awareness of green 
economy activities, citing locally generated clean cooking materials such as briquettes from human 
waste as an example [27]. Similarly, a senior Turkana county energy officer emphasised that “energy 
is not yet fully devolved” but pointed out the county has focused on small scale off-grid renewable 
energy systems in public institutions, which the energy department considered a devolved 
responsibility [31].  
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These understandings of the county role in small scale off-grid and clean cooking differ from national 
government interpretations, with KPLC officers inconsistent vis-à-vis the role of county 
administrations. A KPLC Migori officer deemed the national and county roles as “very clear, the roles 
are complimentary” [38], while a KPLC Turkana officer argued “not all energy functions are devolved. 
renewable energy is devolved, so county governments should be able to play a role in renewable 
energy” [30]. Both interpretations of the county role seem flawed: the former appears not to 
acknowledge the uncertainty caused by the pending Energy Bill 2015 with its numerous overlapping 
functions, while the latter is clearly erroneous as although there is legislative provision for a county 
role in renewable energy, neither the Constitution nor the Energy Bill 2015 state renewable energy is 
100% devolved. Inaccurate understandings of the county energy role, particularly in renewable 
energy, were not uncommon and are likely to have caused coordination issues between the two levels 
of government, with each having different expectations of the other’s mandate.   
Non-government stakeholders felt the strained engagement between the two levels of government 
over small scale off-grid electricity, stemmed from national government not wanting to support a 
sector directly threatening its interests. A private sector representative from the solar power sector 
elaborated:  
The government is getting a lot of money from KPLC. Solar will eventually be free 
and the government knows this will lose them business. KPLC have been going for 
a long time, they still want to dominate power. When they see solar, they see 
competition. KPLC … just want revenue, [and so there’s] no solar [58]. 
The reasoning provided in the quote above is supported by findings in the literature which argue 
national government has used policy control to deter solar off-grid investors, such as uncompetitive 
feed in tariffs (see Chapter 3 cf. Phillips & Newell, 2016). This sense that the national government 
might feel threatened by small scale off-grid electricity seems rational. Free from the monopolistic 
control of KPLC, small scale off-grid initiatives appear to be the only aspect of the electricity sector 
where power relations between county and national government are relatively even, and where 
interactions between the two have the potential to be conducted “on the basis of consultation and 
cooperation” as stated by the constitution.  
Further evidence of the national and county disconnect over small scale off-grid electricity and clean 
cooking roles can be seen from their engagement over the ‘Energy Centres’: institutions charged with 
disseminating renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies, including those for small scale 
off-grid electricity and clean cooking. As anticipated in Chapter 5, the fact that the centres are 
demarcated an exclusive county function by the Energy Bill 2015 but the 16 currently in existence are 
national government run has led to tension, seemingly disincentivising engagement90. Although Kitui 
and Marsabit noted regular interactions, most county administrations interviewed reported having 
 
90 A senior MoEP officer stated the 31 counties without Energy Centres should establish their own Energy Centres to run 
parallel to the 16 existing centres which would remain under national government control. However, this seems ill advised 
given the high chance for roles to be conflated, while counties seem unlikely to commit limited resources to an entity not 
firmly established as under their mandate and one which the national government provides for in those counties containing 
the pre-existing centres. 
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little or nothing to do with the Energy Centres, with several officers questioning the capacity of the 
centres [42, 49]. 
A manager for the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (GACC) went further, unflatteringly labelled 
the centres “a lame duck” [66], while a senior REA officer appeared to confirm complaints that 
capacity issues render the Energy Centres ineffective, stating, “the staff level at the Energy Centres 
are too low, they are not so free to engage counties who are at a much higher level” [14]. The REA 
officer argued the centres should be absorbed by REA to provide the parastatal with the regional 
offices they required, enabling REA to “be better able to solicit business from counties, [and] help with 
plans” [14]. This seems prescient in terms of the additional offices addressing county criticisms of a 
lack of REA staff on the ground, yet it remains unclear whether REA’s proposed takeover of the Energy 
Centres will improve interactions with counties as it would still entail a county function being run by 
a national entity. This ongoing disconnect seems a missed opportunity for effective decentralised 
energy governance as the mandates of the counties and the Energy Centres suggest they are ideally 
placed to collaborate on facilitating small scale off-grid electricity and clean cooking initiatives.  
6.3 Community level interactions with decentralised energy governance 
At the legislative core of the Kenyan devolution process is the object of enhancing participatory 
politics, a mandate which falls within the roles of both national and county government. The 
Constitution (Fourth schedule, part 2(14)) outlines the responsibility of the latter as: 
Ensuring and coordinating the participation of communities and locations in 
governance at the local level and assisting communities and locations to develop 
the administrative capacity for the effective exercise of the functions and powers 
and participation in governance at the local level. 
However, as will be demonstrated in this section, the evidence of counties “ensuring and coordinating 
the participation of communities” is limited in the energy sector, which seems a clear missed 
opportunity given Chapter 5 found counties to be ideally placed to facilitate urgently needed 
community-scale off-grid electricity and clean cooking initiatives. Drawing upon data from the focus 
groups discussions (FGDs) conducted in 2017 as part of this PhD, this section reveals this lack of 
engagement has caused tensions in the interactions between communities and decentralised energy 
governance to emerge.  
6.3.1 Community expectations of devolution 
General expectations of devolution 
Uncertain and at times erroneous community expectations of the devolution process seem to have 
contributed to the lack of participatory politics in Kenyan energy governance. While, most members 
of the FGDs were aware of the devolution process, approximately half recall first hearing of devolution 
during the inaugural 2013 county elections, implying they had not been fully aware of the key 
devolution component of the 2010 referendum on the new constitution. This is significant as it is likely 
to influence expectations of devolution. Those hearing in 2010 seem more likely to associate 
devolution with the conceptual notions of participatory politics, that formed part of the referendum 
debate; an association less likely for those hearing in 2013 as election campaigns in Kenya revolve 
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heavily around short term promises of tangible services and infrastructure. This appears evident from 
comments emanating from the community in Echariria: 
I think we never understood the meaning of the subject before, but once it was 
with us, many people heard the president saying that the national government 
would be disbursing resources to our governors at the county level for the 
community to get assistance in the building of roads, schools and to implement 
interests of the majority and not individuals. We … understood that we had 
devolution because we witnessed the construction of roads, provision of water 
and building of schools, all without our contributions. However, to date most of us 
have not really understood what devolution is and thus the opinion that the 
previous centralised governance system was much better, while others are saying 
the opposite. Most of us have not really understood what devolution is [102]. 
The quote reveals members of the community did not fully understand what they were voting for in 
2013, and that their understanding of the concept of devolution is still limited. The phrase “all without 
our contributions” indicates a passive relationship with the county government; the increased 
resources received perceived a result of devolution, but not of community participation. The quote 
also suggests the community’s opinion on the relative merits of devolution compared to “the previous 
centralised governance system” is based on which brings more services, rather than which brings 
greater equity in terms of participation.  
An understanding of devolution centred on improved access to resources, services and infrastructure 
(particularly health, education and jobs), was common in all FGDs, emerging as the main reason why 
all communities reported being mostly optimistic about the newly installed county governments in 
2013. All spoke of their expectation that livelihoods and living standards would improve for 
mwananchi [the ordinary citizen] as the more localised county government would bring services closer 
to the people. In contrast, understanding devolution in terms of community empowerment and 
grassroots participatory politics was far less common, although it was mentioned or alluded to in every 
FGD. This suggests communities may not appreciate that active community participation may be 
required if improved services, the more commonly assumed benefit of devolution, are to be realised. 
It also indicates that raising awareness among communities of the participatory politics component of 
devolution will be required if more active community engagement in politics is to materialise.  
Yet, this initial 2013 optimism concerning devolution had not been maintained in all communities, 
with geographical correlations appearing. The communities in Migori and Turkana were still mostly 
positive, emphasising developments the county government had made in health, education, and local 
roads, although water remained a critical issue. The two Turkana communities were the most 
enthusiastic, stating most of their expectations had been met, a Napetet community member noting 
“It has drastically changed and gotten better” [104]. Much of the credit for this change was attributed 
to the county government now having control over a set budget, contrasting sharply with the pre-
devolution era, where national government had held on to funds, meaning according to a member of 
Napetet community that “Turkana had been left behind” [104]. This sentiment was widely held across 
all stakeholder groups in Turkana, highlighting how perceptions of devolved governance can be 
significantly shaped by their relative performance to pre-devolution governance in a given locality. 
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This positive view was not shared by the communities in Nakuru, who had become largely despondent 
with the county government failing to provide the personnel and infrastructure needed within their 
communities, particularly roads, electricity, and health and education services. In Echariria, several 
reported poverty had worsened since devolution, with the “very corrupt” county government widely 
blamed [102]. Corruption charges centred on the county government’s suspected embezzlement of 
national government allocated funds, something also alleged by the Suna community against Migori 
county government; the relative immaturity of the devolved system and inexperience of county 
governments in managing large budgets seen as contributing factors [100]. In Echariria, a senior 
community member viewed the corruption as exploitation of uninformed citizens, remarking: 
The Constitution guarantees local citizens the right of access to information on 
monies allocated to the county government by the national government … . 
However, due to a lack of awareness among the local citizens on the provisions by 
the constitution, resources set aside by the national government for their benefit 
are more often than not misused by the county officials [102].   
The quote reaffirms the tendency for communities to associate devolution with access to services 
rather than participatory politics, but also suggests this trait has resulted in insufficient bottom-up 
pressure to hold local governance accountable in the manner intended by the constitution.  
Energy related expectations of devolution 
In terms of specific energy expectations being met, similar regional variations appeared, with the two 
Turkana communities again most positive. In Nakwemekwi, 70% of the community were estimated to 
be connected to grid electricity due to the reduced GPOBA programme connection fee; a price cited 
as one that “everyone can afford”, contrasting with prevailing views in the literature (Lee et al, 2016) 
[105]. Credit for the reduced connection fee was attributed to the county government despite GPOBA 
being a national government policy, although county advocacy may have contributed to the GPOBA 
fee being applied to the community. Ongoing energy issues reported by both Turkana communities 
include increasing charcoal and LPG prices, while KPLC grid connected street lights were criticised as 
much more unreliable than the off-grid solar street lights installed by the county government.  
As before, the two Nakuru communities were most critical of county energy endeavours. in Echariria, 
the community complained that grid electricity was only available in the market centre, with county 
politicians and KPLC blamed for the lack of household access: 
The grid connection plans by the government are hardly known to us despite the 
president’s decree to have power distributed across the country. The KPLC officers 
collected our names almost six months ago and promised that our households 
would get connected to the grid in two months’ time, but we have been waiting 
since then. It is difficult for us to understand what their plans are. At times, the 
grid connection process can be disrupted by local politics [102]. 
The quote highlights the perceived unreliability and lack of transparency of KPLC, shared by many 
other stakeholder groups (see section 6.2), which has contributed to the widespread distrust of the 
energy parastatal among communities. In Lemolo community complaints centred on a lack of market 
centre street lights and the fact that grid electricity had become available since devolution but 
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remained inaccessible due to cost [103]. This contrasts with the community perception in 
Nakwemekwi (Turkana) but supports the consensus in the wider literature which cites cost as the key 
barrier to access (see Chapter 5 cf. Lee et al., 2016) [105]. 
The two communities in Migori were less positive about devolution in terms of energy than when 
speaking about the process in general, with the affordability of grid electricity the main grievance. 
Members of Suna community expressed disappointment that the county government had not made 
connecting to grid electricity free as allegedly promised pre-election, now believing this pledge to be 
merely campaign rhetoric [100]. In contrast, a public official within Masaba community argued 
somewhat unreasonably that unaffordability stemmed from grid electricity not being devolved:  
the situation is the same as it were before at the national level, it's only that we 
have these stations at county levels but their workings are the same … . In that 
perspective then we cannot say that electricity was devolved. If it was devolved, it 
meant everybody now should be having electricity in their homesteads, but now 
only few, the able ones, have the ability to pay for connection, it's not cheap, 
therefore we cannot say there has been good results from the Kenya Power team 
in terms of devolution [101].  
The quotation criticises the restructuring of KPLC, often branded by KPLC officials as being devolved, 
but in reality, a form of deconcentration which has left the poor largely uncatered for: the comments 
from Suna and Masaba indicating urgently needed initiatives to subsidise electricity have either been 
insufficient in the case of the national government or lacking altogether in the case of the county. 
However, the public official’s assertion that these issues would be addressed were energy fully 
devolved is highly questionable given the costs and logistical issues of running grid electricity (see 
Chapter 5). What seems more pressing is to have more collaborative and representative MLG2-esque 
governance to tailor policy to local needs; better achieved by more balanced intergovernmental 
power relations which not only attend to national government interests. 
Evidence of the pitfalls of KPLC’s MLG1-esque centralised model were noted by both Migori 
communities; wealthier residents along with most large institutions, such as school, hospitals and 
market places, had been connected to the electricity grid, but the domestic energy situation of the 
less wealthy Masaba and Suna communities were viewed as little changed since devolution, with grid 
electricity cost prohibitive, and cooking still dependent on firewood. In the words of a Masaba 
community member: “it’s only the able [rich] ones that gets electricity, the institutions” [101]. These 
sentiments lend further support to the critique of REA’s change in policy from mass grid connections 
to public institutions (as argued in 6.2.1). The acute unreliability of grid electricity was also particularly 
emphasised by the two communities in Migori, with blackouts reported “almost every day”, leading 
people to opt for solar instead:  
So, what I’ve come to realise, that the electricity also is not reliable, yet it is there 
but not reliable, you’ll find most of the residents have resorted to solar system 
because of unreliability of electricity, especially in Migori county [101].  
The quote highlights the geographical inequity of grid electricity reliability, which varies significantly 
between counties, as corroborated by stakeholder observations (see section 6.2.1) and Kenyan 
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blackout data (Millien, 2017). Ongoing issues of reliability along with lack of affordability again bring 
into question the continued prioritisation of national government grid electricity initiatives, where 
KPLC’s monopoly means the parastatal is less incentivised to improve services. Suna community 
blamed this monopoly for enabling KPLC to operate carte blanche, resulting in corrupt practices and 
poor service91: 
So, the monopoly has given the Kenya power to do what they like, maybe if the 
government would get another company or maybe solar to come up to compete 
with Kenya power, it might allow the common man access, [until then] that one 
[i.e. the common man] still will suffer [100]. 
The above quote reinforces what appears increasingly clear: that the cost, reliability and trust issues 
associated with KPLC grid electricity are incompatible with the purchasing power of many citizens, 
lending credence to sources within the literature that cite the grid electricity centric policy of the 
national government as containing intrinsic inequities (Newell & Phillips, 2016). 
Overall, the findings indicate community satisfaction with energy governance since devolution varies 
considerably, with geographical differences appearing to emerge. The perceived effectiveness of the 
county government in each locality appears to correlate with the relative effectiveness of governance 
in that county prior to devolution. Turkana, arguably the most underserved area in the whole of Kenya 
prior to devolution, appears most positive of devolution. Similarly, the Nakuru communities seem 
least satisfied, perhaps linked to being the closest of the three communities to the centres of power 
in Nairobi and thus an area more likely to have benefited from the more centralised form of resource 
allocation pre-devolution. 
6.3.2 The extent and nature of community interactions with other key energy stakeholders 
Geographical variations were also clear in the engagement communities had with other stakeholders, 
an issue which has affected the extent to which communities’ pre-devolution expectations of 
decentralised energy governance have been met. The data from Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 highlight the 
two communities in Nakuru had most interactions with other stakeholders, followed by those in 
Migori, with the communities in Turkana experiencing least. Across all three counties, community 
interactions with both national and county government over energy issues have been lacking, with 
communities more likely to engage with non-government actors such as NGOs and the private sector 
(Table 6.1). Yet, the extent and nature of these interactions varied considerably by community and 
county as this sub-section now explores. 
 
 
 
 
91 Accusations include inconsistent quantities of energy from pre-paid tokens and the use of middlemen for sales of 
connections and tokens, whose fees increased costs for the consumer. Regarding the issues with pre-paid tokens, a Migori 
KPLC manager argued it was more likely that confusion over KPLC’s complex billing was the cause rather than corruption. 
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Table 6.1 Stakeholder discussions with communities on energy issues 
 
Number of discussions communities have had with key stakeholders 
Stakeholder Many  Some Few None Not sure 
G
o
ve
rn
m
en
t County government   1 (S) 5  
KPLC 1 (E) 1 (S) 1 (L) 4  
REA   1 (L) 5  
Other   1 (S - Energy Centre)  5  
N
o
n
-g
o
v NGOs 2 (E, L)  2 (M, S) 2  
Private companies 2 (S, L) 1 (M) 1 (Np) 2  
Other communities 2 (E, L) 1 (S)  3  
Sample: 6 FGDs with 6 communities across 3 counties: Migori, Nakuru and Turkana. Key: E=Echariria, L=Lemolo B (both 
Nakuru); M=Masaba, S=Suna (both Migori); Nk=Nakwemekwi, Np=Napetet (both Turkana) 
 
Figure 6.1 Quantity of discussions with each stakeholder group by community 
 
Across all counties, the engagement of county administrations with their electorate has been lacking, 
with five of the six communities reporting no discussions with county officers, who were criticised by 
most communities for only appearing during election campaigns. Only Suna community reported an 
interaction with the county level, notifying them of a biogas seminar. Described as “useful” by a 
community attendee [100], this provides an isolated example of the beneficial awareness raising 
activities counties could facilitate92. Although not directly related to energy, Masaba and Echariria 
communities spoke of engaging with the county over the annual county budgetary approval process, 
yet both were dismissive of the process, complaining that the outcomes and implementation of the 
budget were never as expected or discussed, leaving community needs unmet. A Masaba community 
member elaborated:  
You see in that case, they do come with an idea of public participation, but they 
come here for formality, … they come with that paper yes, we go through it in the 
 
92 While not direct interaction, one community mentioned national and county government environmental preservation 
campaigns targeting communities, particularly over the need to reduce the burning of trees for charcoal production. 
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shortest time, any little comment you give out, do not affect anything in that 
paper, so it is a kind of dictatorship [101]. 
The quote suggests low levels of community participation in politics stem not only from a lack of 
awareness among communities, but also from the inclusivity processes adopted by county 
governments and other, higher levels of governance, lacking credibility with communities. This 
supports findings in the literature, which note the lack of county participatory processes in energy 
decision-making in Kenya (Johnson et al., 2016). A Migori county officer added the caveat that “the 
challenge of bottom up planning [is] if people don’t know what’s in it for them” [83], suggesting raising 
community awareness of their roles within the new multilevel energy governance emerging in Kenya 
is a necessity. The irony being that county governments are ideally placed to coordinate various actors 
to facilitate this capacity building role, yet most likely require their own capacities to be built before 
doing so (see Section 5.2). 
Community engagement with national government entities appears similarly sparse; most had never 
heard of the Rural Electrification Authority (REA) nor the national government run Energy Centres 
despite both having mandates specifically catering for the energy needs of rural or poorer 
communities93. Interactions with KPLC, while more frequent, were limited to complaints, billing issues, 
or the energy parastatal trying to sign people up. A public official in Masaba indicated community 
discussions were not a concern to KPLC: 
In fact, there is no discussion in this perspective because the KPLC will give a 
contract to a contractor, and when the contractor comes to the ground, there is 
no consultative meeting done, we'll see them doing their work [101]. 
This lack of community engagement in planning had also negatively impacted a two-year project to 
install small 3kW nano-grids in the two Nakuru communities. Working with a local NGO and 
international research institute, Lemolo B and Echariria had been selected for the project based on 
national government information that the grid was not set to be implemented in the two 
communities. However, two months before the project implementation date, grid infrastructure was 
installed by KPLC, subsequently delaying the off-grid project as well as harming investor and 
community confidence in the potential of future off-grid initiatives. The uncertainty over grid 
expansion plans was compounded by KPLC’s slow customer response times; Echariria and Masaba 
communities emphasising the only way to obtain information was a time-consuming trip to the KPLC 
county office as phone contact was ineffective. An Echariria community member expanded: 
We have never held any discussions with KPLC on our energy needs. In most cases, 
it is the villagers who are always forced to visit their offices for information on their 
grid connection plans 102]. 
The quote highlights the lack of transparency over locations for the expansion of grid electricity 
infrastructure, shedding further light on the reasons for community distrust of KPLC. Critically, 
initiatives to provide communities with electricity from off-grid means are hindered due to 
communities and investors likely being deterred by the opacity of KPLC’s grid rollout intentions. 
 
93An Energy Centre was located near the Migori and Turkana communities. Nakuru county does not have an Energy Centre. 
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Engagement with the private sector was reported in four of the six communities, mainly in terms of 
companies (e.g. M-Kopa, D-Light) seeking to promote and sell household solar products or energy 
saving cookstoves, rather than assess community energy needs. Yet, the associated marketing used 
appears to have had an element of awareness raising even if not for purely altruistic reasons. A public 
official in Suna, noted the companies often highlighted the health and safety benefits of solar 
(particularly in comparison to the local lighting source, paraffin/kerosene), along with the cost 
effectiveness and environmental benefits of energy saving cookstoves [100]. However, private sector 
engagement appears to have been undermined by issues surrounding the reliability and quality of 
solar products. This was strongly emphasised in Suna, with several community member associating 
the purchase of a good quality energy product with “being lucky” and “trial and error”, stating they 
had “no information” to base decisions on which products they buy: 
We call them M-Kopa, I don't know, I think it is the best in Nairobi, we only receive 
their products here, but we don't know the industry, how they work, but the 
products we get here [100]. 
This quote highlights the need for quality standards of energy products to be more rigorous 
monitored, promoted and enforced if the community/private sector relationship is to become more 
mutually beneficial; an issue commonly acknowledged by stakeholders across the Kenyan energy 
sector, and the wider academic literature as a barrier to uptake (Painuly, 2001). 
The presence of NGOs was noted in Migori and Nakuru, with the two communities in Nakuru 
particularly positive over the close working relationship they had developed with a local NGO and its 
overseas partner in establishing small scale solar ‘nano-grids’ as part of the SONG project (see Chapter 
5 cf. Blanchard et al., 2017), reporting that “the NGOs make frequent visits to our village making it 
easier for us to reach them”. NGOs were also viewed positively in Suna, where community members 
highlighted the work of the UN International Fund for Agricultural Development in promoting energy 
saving cookstoves. In contrast, the Turkana communities reported no interactions with any of the 
stakeholder groups, aside from one recollection in Napetet of a private sector organisation (D-light) 
distributing solar panels to primary schools [104]. Both Turkana communities stressed contact with 
other stakeholders is both rare and difficult, occurring only when they actively seek the often 
unavailable person or organisation. This lack of contact was seen as highly challenging, with 
Nakwemekwi community emphasising the lack of repair facilities for energy products [105], while 
those in Napetet pointed out the need to bribe a KPLC officer or be in a senior county government 
position to secure a prompt connection to the grid [104]. 
There was also regional variation in terms of which stakeholder group communities felt could help 
most with their energy needs. Given the NGO led nano-grid project, the two Nakuru communities 
unsurprisingly stated NGOs could help most, commenting they were the only entities to take the time 
to use participatory processes to understand and address their energy needs. The growing relations 
with NGOs were seen as more promising and reliable than other stakeholders, particularly in contrast 
with the county government who according to a member of Echariria community, “shows up when 
they need our votes only to vanish as soon as they are elected into office” [102].  
Conversely, in Turkana, alongside NGOs, the county government was seen as the key entity in 
addressing community energy needs due to the assistance provided for grid connections. NGOs were 
146 
 
 
also viewed as helpful in terms of their provision of humanitarian aid and free energy products, with 
GIZ’s improved cookstoves (see Chapter 5) mentioned in Nakwemkwi community who were 
particularly positive: “these organisations have changed our lifestyles, we are closer to these 
organisations, we can ask for assistance and we get without hesitation” [105]. In Napetet, the 
beneficial impacts of NGOs were associated with these organisations successfully collaborating with 
the county government94. 
The lives of people within the county is improving and there is a good correlation 
between the people and the organisations available, especially when the county 
government come, some organisations have worked hand in hand with the 
Turkana government [104].  
In Migori, most in Suna community felt the question of which stakeholder could help most with their 
needs was moot owing to the KPLC monopoly: “energy here is solely owned by Kenya Power” [100].  
In addition, several community members felt even though some organisations might be able to help, 
they wouldn’t be able to afford their assistance, adding there were no organisations to assist with 
financial issues “it’s you and you alone”. However, a Suna public official saw the county government 
as a potential source of assistance: “if energy is fully devolved and the county takes charge of energy, 
I think there can be a difference”, adding that county efforts to empower citizens would improve 
economic growth and citizen purchasing power, enabling greater numbers to access energy services 
[100]. The official’s views concerning full devolution of energy seem unlikely given the national 
government stranglehold and appear distinct from the rest of the community, partly reflecting that 
public officials are likely to be better informed but also that they are accountable to the county and 
thus more likely to tow the county line. Other community members later agreed with the official, 
indicating the scope for awareness raising and/or agenda setting that senior community members 
have95. 
Overall, adopting a geographical lens reveals the quantity of community engagement appears to 
correlate with the county it is located in. Yet, paradoxically, the quantity of engagement a community 
receives is also the inverse of how well energy governance has been received since devolution: the 
Nakuru communities least positive despite most interactions; the Turkana communities vice-versa. 
This further supports the notion that communities value services received more than participation 
and that the perceived effectiveness of decentralised energy governance is relative to its pre-
devolution performance.  
In addition, it seems calls in the literature for greater participatory politics in the energy sector 
(Johnson et al., 2016) have so far been inadequately addressed by both national and county 
government, with communities far more likely to have energy discussions with organisations 
operating outside of government. Yet, this is to be expected as meaningful direct engagement 
addressing the energy needs of every community within a county where settlement patterns are 
 
94 Some organisations were reported to have reduced support since inception of Turkana county government. There is also 
reluctance in some of the organisations when the county government was introduced, e.g. Oxfam, World Vision have started 
to withdraw some of their support because now the county is in place. 
95 Community level public officials can be divided into two groups: those accountable to the county government (i.e. sub-
county commissioner, ward administrators) and those accountable to the national government (i.e. Chiefs). Both groups 
were present in the Migori FGDs and proved to be dominant, agenda setting participants. 
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dispersed is unrealistic for a county government, indicating that to ascertain community energy needs, 
intermediaries are required, most likely in the form of private sector or NGO/CSO organisations. 
Implicit within this conclusion is an emphasis on the importance of MLG2-esque forms of governance 
if community energy needs are to be understood and addressed, which county governments seem 
ideally placed to facilitate and coordinate. 
6.3.3 Community level interactions with decentralised energy governance over land rights 
Although decentralised energy governance has largely failed to engage communities since devolution, 
the critical issue of land rights provides a notable exception. The Kenyan land tenure system decrees 
community permission is required to use community owned land, which, when combined with the 
deep-rooted, emotive nature of land ownership in Kenya (see Chapter 3 cf. Boone, 2011), has resulted 
in land rights being an issue communities are far more likely to actively defend compared with other 
constitutional entitlements. Most energy parastatal officers interviewed stressed land rights were a 
major, if not the most significant, issue affecting their work. Complaints centred on communities 
protesting (sometimes using violence) for ever increasing sums of compensation to secure their 
permission to use community owned land, a process frequently causing significant project delays. 
The need to engage communities over land rights has particularly affected national government grid 
electricity initiatives, whose infrastructure covers vast tracts of land. Wayleaves were seen as 
particularly challenging, especially for the larger transmission lines, as noted by an engineer from an 
overseas engineering firm contracted to construct the major 428km transmission line between the 
Lake Turkana Wind Power Station and the KETRACO substation at Suswa [64]. The engineer estimated 
the transmission wire between any two pylons could cross approximately 50 separate landowners, all 
requiring compensation96. This issue was exacerbated by inconsistencies over compensation 
payments caused by the failure of the Land Act to set fixed compensation rates for land97. According 
to the engineer, this encouraged land owners to be more obstinate in seeking to negotiate the 
optimum price for their land, leading to lengthy project delays: the project eventually completed two 
years behind schedule with significant cost overruns (Mutai, 2018). 
Most parastatal officers interviewed shared similar experiences to the engineer, but others saw the 
root cause of such issues lying with elites rather than the communities. Commenting on the Lake 
Turkana-Suswa project, a Kenyan CSO representative argued vested elite interests were seeking to 
block power from the Lake Turkana wind project coming online: “those who benefit from thermal 
generation IPPs don’t want the connection” [97]. An officer from KETRACO also alluded to this issue, 
“[the issue of land rights] just needs good legislation, but Parliament, are not very keen to sort this 
out” [10]. Elite insider trading compounded the problem, two senior MoEP officers acknowledging the 
widely held suspicion that speculators were buying or building on land having been informed it was 
designated for an upcoming energy project and thus liable for compensation98 [1, 2]. Transnational 
actor modus operandi was also seen as partly responsible, a senior REA officer revealing wayleaves 
 
96 This differs from the Global North where land tends to be concentrated in the hands of far fewer people. 
97 The engineer also highlighted a geographical dimension, the issue being more difficult to resolve in the central region 
where small scale farming was prevalent, compared with Narok county where the resident Masai owned larger tracts of land 
resulting in the need to engage with fewer landowners [64].   
98 A phenomenon common in other sectors in Kenya, such as with the standard gauge railway project (see Sayagie, 2019). 
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compensation was not paid before TAC1 actors introduced the practice; REA instead engaging with 
communities in open dialogue which according to the officer enabled more effective operations: 
Initially REA would say to people ‘there’s 5million for the project, if you want 
1.5million for wayleaves, we can only do 3.5million worth of electricity’. But people 
were generally very happy when electricity came in, so they weren’t worried about 
funds for wayleaves [14]. 
The quotation indicates contestation over land rights is partly a symptom of transnational actor 
practices out of sync with the Kenyan context and suggests consultative approaches may be the key 
to gaining traction with communities. Critically, the varied underlying causes behind the delayed 
transmission infrastructure highlights how it is too simplistic to place the blame on community 
protests as many parastatal officers seem keen to do. 
Several high-profile electricity generation projects have also been impeded due to community 
protests over land. A KenGen officer argued generation projects were particularly vulnerable because 
“our operations are on the ground and we are dealing with natural resources which are sitting in a 
certain county”, further emphasising the sense of ownership communities have over land and the 
resources contained within [16]. Particularly notorious within the Kenyan energy sector was the 
collapse of a 61MW wind power project at Kinangop (Nyandarua county)99, where investors withdrew 
following ongoing, sometimes violent, community protests, which centred on lack of community 
benefits, health concerns, and inconsistencies with compensation payments (Waruru, 2015). The 
collapse was widely blamed on local opposition politicians seeking political gain prior to the 2017 
election; the Nyandarua County governor, Waithaka Mwangi (of the ruling Jubilee coalition), stating 
at a public rally: “All the problems around this project are a result of incitement by politicians taking 
advantage of people’s ignorance about this project to excite emotions” (cited in Waruru, 2015, p.1). 
This view was shared by a Kenyan NGO officer who felt Kinangop represented “a failure of devolution”.  
However, while the communities’ misplaced fears over the health impacts of wind turbines are 
suggestive of incitement and manipulation, their other complaints have found support from industry 
experts. A renewable energy analyst for an overseas consultancy in sub-Saharan Africa backed the 
community, stating:  
any project that a community felt was of no benefit to it or had no relevance to 
the lives of its people was bound to be met with hostility (cited in Waruru, 2015, 
p.1). 
This seems a fair assessment, especially given engagement with communities over energy has been 
critically lacking (see sub-section 6.3.1). The analyst’s comment also reflects growing recognition 
within the literature of the importance of community buy-in to local scale energy initiatives (Blanchard 
et al., 2017). Although widely seen as a poster child for devolved energy’s failings, this thesis argues 
Kinangop has left a positive legacy as it has helped consolidate the need for consultative MLG2-esque 
governance as a KenGen officer inadvertently acknowledged:   
 
99 See also KenGen’s 400MW wind farm in Meru (Aboo, 2017), and the Olsuswa Energy’s (an IPP) geothermal plant in Turkana 
for other examples of energy generation projects impeded by land rights issues.  
149 
 
 
you have to deal with those two groups because if you [only] deal with the county 
government and you forget about the local community, they will do what they did 
at Kinangop [16]. 
Responses to the issues over land rights are revealing of underlying governance preferences of 
stakeholders. Several parastatal officers appeared to accept that community leverage meant MLG2-
esque consultative governance was the new reality when dealing with land rights, such as a KETRACO 
officer who emphasised counties now had a key sensitisation role to play: 
Counties need to engage communities because when it comes from [county] 
leaders, they believe it … but when it comes from KETRACO, it’s just [national] 
government … [County] leaders need to educate people [9]. 
A KenGen lawyer agreed, emphasising this was in fact a legal obligation: “you cannot deal with the 
local community without representation from the local government” [16], while a GDC officer added 
that trilateral coordination was financially prudent: the county government was better placed to 
negotiate with communities for better rates, which only the national government had “the muscle” 
to subsequently foot [15]. Yet, many stakeholders felt county administrations had failed in this 
sensitisation role, ignoring the long-term development benefits of energy projects, and championing 
instead community compensation in return for electoral votes as seen in Kinangop. Whether this is 
the case in the majority of disputes is unclear; a Migori county KPLC officer viewing community land 
protests as “mostly ignorance, and to a small extent politically motivated” [38].  
For other, predominantly national government, stakeholders the issues over land required reverting 
to a more top-down MLG1 form of governance as seen prior to devolution. Many argued reasonably 
that the absence of set compensation rates for in the Land Act needed to be addressed [1, 2, 10] while 
a representative of an overseas research institute argued strongly that national government should 
conduct land negotiations and not KPLC [80]. The latter point makes sense constitutionally and 
perhaps from a consistency basis, although as noted in the previous paragraph, it seems preferable 
for counties to conduct sensitisation efforts.  
Other points seemed less just. A Migori county KPLC officer felt “government should have rights [over 
land] if it benefits the general public” [38], seemingly ignoring how this has historically entrenched the 
energy interests of the centre and led to the marginalisation of areas outside that sphere (see Chapter 
3). A KETRACO officer blamed the Land Act for not stipulating physical obstruction of projects was 
illegal and that land disputes must be resolved in court. According to the officer, this would ensure 
energy projects could proceed as: 
[the] chance of a court ruling in the claimant’s favour are basically ‘zero’ as a lot of 
process occur prior to building, such as feasibility studies. So, the court case would 
be more about getting more adequate compensation [10].   
The quote suggests the officer’s primary concern is the facilitation of more streamlined MLG1 
governance rather than the legitimacy of the communities’ protests. The reference to ‘a lot of 
processes’ is also questionable given well documented instances of this not occurring (see Chapter 7 
cf. Mullins & Wambayi, 2017), with arguably the most contentious example being the National 
government initiative to construct a 1050MW coal plant in Lamu County.  
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The Lamu plant has been widely derided as unviable given Kenya already has surplus grid supply and 
will be largely relying on costly imported coal despite having vast untapped renewable energy 
resources (Olonyi, 2019). Local grassroots opposition groups have also been highly critical of the lack 
of community engagement and the project’s unsuitability for the local context, citing detrimental 
health, environmental and cultural impacts to produce power destined for Nairobi (Kazungu, 2018; 
Onyach, 2019a). National government top-down governance practices have been blamed for the 
project’s approval, namely acquiescence to corrupt tendering processes and vested overseas interests 
(Onyach, 2019; Ndii, 2017), with Chinese firms set to part finance and operate the plant in what seems 
indicative of the less conditional lending of Chinese financing noted in Chapter 3. However, 
construction has not yet begun (despite an initial 2015 start date) due to ongoing community led 
protest initiatives, spearheaded by ‘Save Lamu’ a coalition of local CSOs, and domestic and 
international NGOs (Kazungu, 2018; Onyach, 2019a). The folly of the Lamu coal project clearly 
demonstrates the need for community land rights engagement not to be bypassed for the sake of 
national government project development expediency.  
Overall, it seems clear the issue of land rights presents one of the few instances where the 
participatory politics envisaged by the devolution process have been realised. Community awareness 
and willingness to protest over land has provided the community with a degree of leverage, creating 
bottom-up pressure which has coerced stakeholders from all scales (transnational, national, county) 
to engage with the community level in a form of consultative and cooperative MLG2-esque politics 
that the Constitution ostensibly prescribes. Although this leverage has been misused at times by 
county governments to further their own agendas, it seems vital as the main bulwark against a 
continuation of the pre-devolution politics which saw large parts of the country critically underserved 
by self-interested national government energy policies. The fact that national government continues 
to promote policies wholly inappropriate to local contexts, such as in Lamu, highlights both the 
dangers of reverting to more MLG1 forms of governance over land rights and the critical need for 
ongoing community participation in decentralised energy governance.  
6.4 Conclusion 
Empirical findings 
Overall, this chapter’s analysis of stakeholder interactions within decentralised energy governance 
reveals engagement has been characterised by significant power imbalances at each of the three 
scales explored, helping to explain why, as Chapter 5 noted, a more MLG1 form of governance has 
emerged despite the ostensibly MLG2 form indicated by the legislative provisions for devolved energy.  
At the transnational scale, TAC1-3 actors have tended to interact indirectly with counties, primarily 
using national government as a conduit for distributing funding and capacity building support. This 
has consolidated top-down MLG1-esque governance, particularly as counties appear to have limited 
scope to lobby for greater transnational actor engagement, whose support is often dependent on 
political economy factors such as pre-existing relationships or aligned interests. Similarly, the county 
voice has been inhibited in its interactions with national government, particularly over grid electricity 
and ‘grid islands’ where the monopolistic control of KPLC has seen counties accept that a lead role is 
unfeasible. Yet, efforts to play a collaborative role in these energy sub-sectors have also been hindered 
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by a lack of support and clear engagement from national government, reducing the effectiveness of 
the checks and balances counties were supposed to bring although counties could still play a more 
active role in lobbying and potentially subsidising costs. This has had a detrimental effect on energy 
governance as policy decisions have often prioritised the interests of national elites rather than local 
needs, as seen with the digital literacy programme.  
KPLC’s monopolies are absent in small scale off-grid electricity and clean cooking, resulting in the two 
sub-sectors being one of the few areas where interactions between national and county government 
are on a broadly even footing. Yet, both levels of government have tended not to prioritise small scale 
off-grid electricity and clean cooking, their engagement characterised by a lack of coordination due 
largely to inconsistent understandings over the roles each should take. This seems a missed 
opportunity as counties with national government support (e.g. from the Energy Centres) seem ideally 
placed to facilitate initiatives in these sub-sectors. 
The domineering approach of national government vis-a-vis the counties has largely been replicated 
by the latter’s engagement with the community level, with participatory politics remaining largely 
unrealised except over land rights where the community retains a degree of leverage. Yet, meaningful 
direct engagement between a county and every community within its jurisdiction seems unrealistic, 
and instead requires locally based intermediaries (e.g. NGO/CSOs) to ascertain community energy 
needs. This implies counties adopt a role of facilitator rather than implementor of energy initiatives, 
which is a key finding of this thesis and the central role this PhD advocates counties play. Counties 
seem ideally placed to gather data from intermediary locally-based stakeholders on the nature, extent 
and likely solutions of local energy issues; information they can subsequently use to direct actors who 
they deem most likely to address these issues in a manner appropriate to the local context. 
Ultimately, the findings from this chapter suggest cross-scalar governance arrangements have worked 
most effectively when one key stakeholder group is not operating at an overwhelming position of 
strength compared to the other(s); a scenario evident in: county interactions with NGOs and the 
private sector; community interactions with stakeholders over land rights; and also (albeit largely 
unfulfilled) county and national government engagement over small scale off-grid electricity and clean 
cooking. These relationships veer most closely towards the consultative power dynamics envisaged in 
MLG2 but are not replicated in the counties’ interactions with other stakeholder groups, where critical 
power imbalances persist.   
Conceptual and theoretical implications 
The findings from Kenya highlight that concepts of scale and power are fundamental to how 
decentralised energy governance processes are shaped, highlighting that decentralised energy 
governance needs to be understood relationally – a view supporting human geography arguments 
concerning both governance (Brenner, 2001; Jessop, 1990) and energy governance more broadly (Van 
Veelen, 2018; Angel, 2017). Notably, the Kenyan experience shows decentralised energy governance 
to be less effective when significant cross-scalar power imbalances are present. This issue is widely 
recognised to affect broader decentralisation processes in the Global South (Cabral, 2011); however, 
the findings from Kenya suggest these imbalances are likely to be more prominent in Global South 
energy decentralisation processes due to the widespread but erroneous conceptualising of energy 
access as grid electricity (Brown et al., 2015). This understanding is often inferred to mean energy 
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concerns scales of governance higher than the sub-national level due to the costs and national reach 
of grid infrastructure, an issue exacerbated by the tendency for energy stakeholder engagement to 
mainly occur between stakeholders operating at similar scales due largely to their budgets and 
auditing processes being more aligned [12, 90, 91].  
Thus, while the grid narrative remains dominant, stakeholder engagement in the Global South is likely 
to remain centred on the national and transnational scale who have the resources to pursue grid-
centric policies – a modus operandi shown to be encouraged by Global South and North central 
governments that seek to prioritise the grid (Baker, 2012; Farrell, 2019). While these power dynamics 
persist, the potential for decentralised energy governance to facilitate urgently needed smaller scale 
off grid electricity, energy efficiency and clean cooking initiatives is likely to be overlooked. To 
counteract these scalar power imbalances and ensuing energy access inequities, the findings from 
Kenya indicate decentralised energy governance roles in the Global South should complement the grid 
where appropriate but primarily focus on developing robust networks of local actors capable of 
providing checks and balances to ‘top-down’ governance.  
However, developing sub-national governance roles is commonly acknowledged to require significant 
capacity building (Conyers, 2007). This chapter extends this understanding by highlighting that 
capacity building of this ilk in a Global South decentralised energy governance context is likely to also 
be subject to pronounced scalar political economy issues. As sub-national capacity building is largely 
dependent on resources from or via the centre, the findings from Kenya indicate central governments 
may use this control to limit capacity support in order to curtail the potential threat decentralised 
governance poses to de facto state monopolies. Capacity building from transnational actors is also 
shown in Kenya to be subject to political economy factors, principally path dependency dynamics. 
These issues are recognised to be prevalent in the development sector in general [71, 93, 95] and thus 
seem likely to be replicated in other Global South energy contexts.  
From a more theorised perspective, the importance of these scalar power dynamics to Global South 
decentralised energy governance processes questions the validity of MLG to adequately understand 
these governance forms. Hooghe and Mark’s (2003) twin concepts of MLG1 and MLG2 provide a useful 
starting point for comprehending the complexity of multilevel institutional and operational 
arrangements, but as critics have argued, do not attest to where power imbalances lie or which actor 
will be casually most important (Blom-hansen, 2005; Bache, 2008). Thus, future studies using MLG to 
investigate Global South decentralised energy governance require either an additional analytical 
framework (cf. Blom-hansen, 2005; Warleigh-Lack, 2008) or empirical data to build on the foundations 
provided by MLG and unearth the critical power dynamics shaping decentralised energy governance. 
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Chapter 7 - Decentralised Energy Governance and its Impact on the Local 
Level: Spatial Variations of Four County Case Studies 
This chapter explores how decentralised energy governance in four counties has been shaped by the 
interactions between key stakeholders since the county governments were instituted in 2013. Building 
on the findings of the previous empirical chapters, the aim is to examine how the power relations (and 
their inequities) found at the broader state level have played out in the energy governance present in 
individual Kenyan counties (the focus of research question 3). In doing so, the chapter takes the 
concepts and debates explored in the earlier empirical chapters and examines how they interact with 
the concepts of space and spatial variation, engaging with human geography debates that argue 
power relations are spatially contingent and that geographical approaches have particular relevance 
to governance in terms of uncovering the interactions and agendas which shape power relations and 
practices of governance on the ground (Griffin, 2012). 
This focus situates the study between the more theoretically and conceptually driven forms of enquiry 
associated with the decentralisation and political science discourses and the more spatially contingent 
empirical approaches espoused by geographers: the latter seen as critical for more accurately verifying 
the former (Griffin, 2012). This intersection of disciplines is understudied. There exist a number of 
important political economy treatments of Global South energy transitions (e.g. Newell & Phillips 
2016; Newell et al., 2014) but very few which engage with spatial debates and as far as the author is 
aware none which assess the implications of space and scale debates for a Global South energy 
decentralisation process. This spatial focus is a critical form of enquiry given the wide disparities in 
capacity and socio-economic development found within Kenyan counties (cf. Chapters 3 & 5) and thus 
is key to better understanding and facilitating the development of more locally appropriate and 
effective forms of decentralised energy governance.  
The chapter focuses on four counties, selected due to their contrasting socio-economic conditions and 
energy governance issues: Migori (rural, opposition stronghold, capacity issues); Nakuru (urban, ruling 
coalition stronghold, significant geothermal resource); Turkana (rural, historically marginalised, 
significant oil resource); and Nairobi (urban, centre of power, unreliable electricity). Each county is 
analysed in turn through Sections 7.2-7.5, replicating the approaches in Chapter 5 and 6 whereby 
developments in decentralised energy governance are first critically appraised before the underlying 
power relations are examined at transnational, national, and local scales. A key energy issue pertinent 
to each county is also explored along with its impact on the community level. Conclusions are then 
drawn in Section 7.6, revealing the extent to which power relations and decentralised energy 
governance vary spatially and whether the MLG1 energy governance emerging at state level has been 
replicated within individual counties.  
7.1 Migori  
Located in the far south west of Kenya, bordering Tanzania and Lake Victoria, Migori has a humid 
climate with fertile soils. The county is predominantly rural, with a dispersed, ethnically diverse 
population of whom 80% work in agriculture, particularly the cash crops of tobacco and sugar (UK AID, 
2017). Politically, the county has been an opposition stronghold, voting overwhelmingly in the 2013 
and (annulled) 2017 election for opposition presidential candidate, Raila Odinga (Table 7.1). 
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Table 7.1 Presidential and governor election results for Migori county in 2013 and 2017 (MCI Maps, 2017). 
7.1.1 Developments in decentralised energy governance 
Migori formed an energy department in 2013, initially placed in the Ministry of Water, Energy, 
Forestry, Environment & Natural Resources, but then transferred to the Ministry of Roads, Transport, 
Public Works and Energy. The motivations for the change seem unclear; a Migori sub-county 
administrator considered the move “just pragmatism” after a minister was removed [42], while an 
officer from the Migori national government run energy centre vaguely assigned it to “a political 
decision at county level” [40]. The lack of clear purpose suggests synergies between the energy sector 
and other departments are unlikely to have been considered, to the probable detriment of inter-
departmental coordination; a trait broadly noted across Kenya in Chapters 5 and 6.  
In terms of county energy policy, the ‘County Integrated Development Plan (CIDP) 2013-2017’ 
provides an overview of the energy issues and proposed plans (Table 7.2). However, it lacks the detail 
of a specific county energy policy, which, along with a CIDP for the second term 2018-2022, have yet 
to be developed. These omissions are likely to impede development in the energy sector given their 
criticality for attracting investment (see Chapter 5 cf. Newell et al., 2014). An SEI/Practical Action 
collaboration with the county into community participation in energy planning appears a positive step 
towards the formation of a county energy policy (Johnson et al., 2016), although SEI representatives 
were uncertain whether the county had begun to implement the report’s recommendations [74, 80]. 
Table 7.2 Migori energy related polices developed since 2013 
Policy and planning documents Published  External collaborators  
CIDP (2013-2017) n.d. (presumed 2013) None 
Community participation in energy planning  2016 SEI & Practical Action 
 
Data from the CIDP reveals access to modern energy services in Migori is amongst the lowest in Kenya, 
with only 2% of households connected to grid electricity and very low uptake of off-grid electricity and 
clean cooking (Table 7.3). The grid electricity supply was also widely viewed as unreliable (although 
improved since 2013), hindering the economic development of the county, such as the ability to 
“establish cold rooms for agricultural produce” as noted by a Migori county engineer [43]. Paraffin 
was used by the vast majority (94%) of households for lighting, with only 0.01% of households using 
solar for lighting, indicating very limited penetration of off-grid electricity. In keeping with the national 
tendency noted in Chapter 5, a street lighting programme focussing on lighting market centres to 
facilitate longer periods of economic activity appears to have been the principal focus of county 
government energy interventions. 
Presidential election results Governor election winner 
2013 2017 (annulled)# 2013 2017 
Kenyatta (Jubilee) 
10% 
Odinga (ODM) 
86.4% 
Kenyatta (Jubilee) 
14.2% 
Odinga (ODM) 
85.3% 
Okoth Obado 
(PDP*) 
Okoth Obado 
(ODM) 
2017 Registered voters: 388,967   *part of opposition CORD coalition  
# The opposition did not participate in the rerun of the 2017 election 
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Table 7.3 Energy access in Migori in 2013 (% of households) (Migori county government, n.d.)100 
7.1.2 Transnational actor interactions with decentralised energy governance  
Transnational actors have been viewed as critical actors by parastatal officers in Migori decentralised 
energy governance due to their assistance in addressing the significant capital expense of grid 
electricity initiatives, particularly the donor financed Last Mile Connectivity Plan (LMCP) and GPOBA 
project (introduced in Chapter 5) [38, 39]. A senior Migori county KPLC officer stressed how these 
initiatives had greatly assisted the funding challenge of expanding the grid electricity network, 
labelling the projects as the “best connectivity solutions that ever came” [38]. As evidence, the officer 
noted connectivity had increased from 8000 to 44,000 people between 2013 and 2017 (50% via 
GPOBA), but dismissed the impact of devolution, stating “GBOBA would have happened regardless of 
devolution, it’s a global initiative” and felt if the synergies between the LMCP and GPOBA were 
exploited, Kenya “will have universal access by 2020”. Similar sentiments were expressed by a KenGen 
officer at the Gogo Falls hydro power station in Migori who felt development was more dependent on 
stakeholder interventions than the devolution process itself [39].  
However, these dismissive views of devolution seem redolent of a top-down governance mindset, 
which appears to ignore that many in Migori will not be well served by grid solutions and that 
devolution ostensibly offers a platform for different stakeholders to voice that reality. Transnational 
actor interventions were further critiqued by a Migori county officer for mostly bypassing the county 
level, as seen generally across Kenya (see Chapter 6) [83]. This he felt had been particularly 
detrimental to off-grid electricity initiatives as transnational actor led global governance policies, such 
as the Paris Agreement, had created a dense regulatory environment too costly for the sub-national 
level to invest in off-grid solutions:  
Our people need energy, but regulations increase the cost of these appliances. 
How can we get costs down if you don’t let mini-grids compete with KPLC? [83] 
Although, this seems an overreaction as the Paris Agreement promotes the off-grid solutions the 
officer is arguing for, the reasoning has more sense when viewed more broadly in terms of how 
transnational financing for such solutions is predominantly channelled via national government, 
enabling, as the officer remarked, the sector to continue to be run to “protect the interests of the 
elites” [83]. Thus, it appears transnational financing rather than the international regulatory, 
environment has helped consolidate national government grid interests at the expense of off-grid 
solutions, an issue particularly damaging to counites with rural, dispersed populations such as Migori, 
where grid solutions are often not viable. 
In keeping with the broader Kenyan trait noted in Chapter 6, TAC3 actors appear to have interacted 
more with local scales of governance through their focus on county government capacity building 
 
100 The CIDP uses data from 2009 and so access rates can be expected to have risen. This emphasises the challenge to county 
planning arising from the lack of available data at the county level noted in Chapter 5 (cf. Johnson et al., 2016). 
Grid Electricity Off-grid electricity Cooking fuel 
2%  0.01% solar for lighting 77.4% firewood, 18.8% charcoal,  
2.8% paraffin, 0.01% biogas 
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initiatives. An SEI representative working on the aforementioned collaboration on community 
participation in energy planning stressed that engaging with the county executive and, more 
importantly, the community level ward administrators had been “crucial” to undertaking the study: 
In terms of mobilising the community, you have to approach them [the ward 
administrators] first to get things done. They are a bridge to the village elders and 
the local community, very influential. [There is a] potential barrier if the ward 
administrator is not keen on a project or doesn’t benefit from it [74].  
This highlights the power vested in senior community level stakeholders, highlighting the necessity of 
transnational organisations engaging such actors in cases, particularly given the potential leverage 
community protests over land rights can have. Yet, the coordination of this process is hindered by the 
competing power structures at community level, with both ward administrators (who respond to the 
county) and chiefs (accountable to national government and often viewed as vestiges of the pre-
devolution system) highly influential in community awareness raising and agenda setting as noted in 
Chapter 6’s discussion of the Migori FGDs.  
Overall, the interaction of transnational actors in Migori appears to reiterate the national picture 
discussed in Chapter 6: the post-2013 flow of resources from transnational actors has remained 
primarily channelled via national government, with county government engagement largely bypassed 
save for TAC3 capacity building engagement. This has largely consolidated MLG1 structures in Migori 
emerging decentralised energy governance, resulting in the continued prioritisation of often locally 
inappropriate national government grid electricity initiatives. 
7.1.3 National government interactions with decentralised energy governance 
Grid electricity 
Representatives from national and Migori county government appeared to agree on how they should 
collaborate over the distribution of grid electricity. A Migori sub-county administrator felt, “Our work 
down here at county level just compliments the parastatals work. Our role is to generate ideas, as we 
know the ground better” [42]. Similar sentiments were expressed by a senior Migori county KPLC 
officer, who stated “the roles are complimentary”, citing the county government partnership to map 
and locate priority LMCP areas as an example [38]. This seems a constructive and realistic relationship, 
aligning with the reticulation roles outlined in the Constitution and Energy Bill 2015.  
However, differing opinions existed concerning county grid electricity generation initiatives. The 
Migori CIDP highlights ambitions to attract investment to develop hydro power from the Gogo 
waterfalls in Migori; a site the sub-county administrator felt should be “county owned, so resources 
can be ploughed into the county” [42]. Noting debates concerning the share of oil revenues in Turkana 
(see Chapter 5 & section 7.4), the officer called for the expansion of Gogo Falls but stressed “how do 
we [Migori] get rewarded for this”. This sense of county ownership was disputed by other 
stakeholders. A KenGen officer at Gogo Falls remarked, “The county government feel Gogo Falls is 
their resource and want to benefit from it, but it’s not the case”, arguing for future collaborations 
rather than transfer of ownership: “long term, we can partner with county government and upgrade 
Gogo Falls” [39]. A county government engineer concurred, stating realistically that the county budget 
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was “not enough for major energy projects” which require financing from national government or 
NGOs [43], while SEI and Practical Action representatives felt grid-tied generation on this scale was a 
national government role, the latter stating a preference for the county to facilitate the private sector 
to develop infrastructure [74, 70].  
These counter arguments seem prudent for while there is a case for Migori county to receive a share 
of the revenue from Gogo Falls, the notion that the asset should be transferred to the county seems 
unconstitutional, impractical and unjust. As noted in Chapter 5, The Energy Bill 2015 states generation 
is a national function while the chapter also indicates that broader sub-national capacity and 
budgetary constraints mean the development of Gogo Falls is almost certainly beyond the means of 
the county101. This suggests that within Migori, county interpretations of their grid electricity roles 
have not evolved to the same extent seen elsewhere in the country, where there has been greater 
recognition that legislative and practical limitations mean a supportive rather than a lead role.  
Off grid electricity 
Migori’s poor roads and dispersed communities have contributed to the county being seen as well 
suited to off-grid electricity initiatives; an SEI representative earmarking the county as an “interesting 
place for small-scale mini-grids” [74]. However, national government representatives were critical of 
county government endeavours in this sector. An officer from the national government Energy Centre 
in Migori, an institution charged with disseminating small-scale renewable energy and clean cooking 
technologies, stated that, aside from street lighting, their interactions with the county government 
had continued to be very limited since devolution: 
At the moment the county doesn’t have any input … If the county had brought 
financial support and experts to the energy centre, then we could work as a team, 
but it’s not happening. I don’t see any tangible activities they are undertaking [40]. 
The officer highlighted there had barely been any contact with the energy department since a street 
lighting initiative one year ago, comparing Migori unfavourably with Homa Bay (a county the Migori 
Energy Centre also covered) who were in contact daily, “Homa bay county have much more interest, 
… they are more active than Migori, they are doing their best”. This seems a significant oversight for 
the county government to not engage with an institution, whose activities seem to readily align with 
county energy roles. The SEI representative confirmed this lack of interaction, but suggested the fault 
may lay more with the Energy Centre:  
In Migori, there is a county energy office and a national government energy centre 
on the same side of the road in different compounds, but they never coordinate 
anything together. The National Energy Centre just follow what their [national 
level] bosses tell them [74]. 
Despite the apparent ease of communications, the quote indicates a top-down power structure, 
absolving the Energy Centre of local accountability and thus likely disincentivising the need to interact 
 
101 In addition, the decentralisation of national grid electricity power stations would appear to unfairly benefit the recipient 
county, as not all counties have such generation assets but have indirectly financed their construction and the adjoining 
distribution network via taxation and electricity bills.  
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with the county government and local communities.  A Migori county representative concurred, 
stating “Energy centres, there is one in Migori, but it’s not doing much, it should be devolved, but it’s 
not as it’s a way of the national government keeping their people in” [83]. The Migori sub-county 
administrator was also damning, noting the “old equipment” and questioning, “is it really effective, 
quite a number of people have gone there to be educated, … because of a lack of resources, it hasn’t 
developed the way it should have” [42]; a point conceded by the Energy Centre officer who stated 
insufficient funding from the national treasury was an issue102 [40]. 
Top-down governance was also seen as hindering the development of the national government run   
South Nyanza Sugar Company (SonySugar) factory as a waste-to-energy producer103. The plant 
currently delivers 4MW of off-grid electricity to the factory facilities via bagasse co-generation, 
although a senior SonySugar electrical engineer stated there was potential for 20MW of which 11MW 
could be exported to the grid [44]. However, KPLC terms were seen as unattractive by the engineer, 
having led to a rival competitor, Mumias, abandoning their grid tied system: 
[The] tariffs are not attractive … There were also lots of penalties imposed by KPLC 
[on Mumias] if there were any breakdowns/stoppages on power generation [44]. 
The imposition of fines seems particularly ironic given KPLC’s firm opposition to paying compensation 
for their own outages [see Chapter 6], and more critically appears to have disincentivised Sony Sugar 
from generating low carbon electricity which Migori urgently needs; the engineer distancing the 
factory from future national government collaborations, preferring to incorporate more solar energy 
“instead of relying on KPLC”. This echoes many of the difficulties Strathmore university faced 
establishing a grid tied system (see Chapter 5 and section 7.5), reiterating the barrier regulatory 
deficiencies pose to sub-national level off-grid electricity initiatives. 
As with Gogo Falls, the sub-county commissioner felt Sony Sugar should be devolved, reasoning “we 
own the surplus and the cane” [42]. The commissioner added any transfer would have the support of 
local sugar farmers allegedly underpaid by Sony Sugar and lacking a say in the national government 
dominated governance of the factory. Yet, it seems the county has not been actively engaging in 
facilitating more representative governance. The Sony Sugar engineer reported little interaction with 
the county government, with co-generation expansion talks occurring only with national government 
parastatals [44]. A manufacturer of cooking briquettes from the waste bagasse at Sony Sugar felt this 
was due to the county not being interested in financing any scaling up of co-generation [45].  
Overall, the lack of engagement by both national and county government institutions in the off-grid 
sector appears significantly detrimental to the county’s development. It also points to the failings of a 
MLG1 governance approach whereby national government grid extension initiatives have been 
prioritised over off-grid initiatives which appear more apt for the Migori geographical context.  
 
 
102 The Migori Energy Centre was visited as part of the fieldwork for this PhD and the equipment demonstrated appeared 
outdated, corroborating the sub-county commissioner’s view. 
103 Sony Sugar is almost entirely state owned, with the national government a 98.8% shareholder (SonySugar, 2018). 
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Clean cooking 
In line with the national picture, clean cooking did not appear to be high on the priorities of either 
national or county government in Migori. An officer at the national Energy Centre stated that clean 
cooking aims were “either biogas or jikos” but was vague on details of specific initiatives [40]; a 
concern given it should be a critical component of the institution’s mandate. The sub-county 
administrator felt biogas initiatives had been undermined by national government political patronage 
and corruption, although conceded the county government had not yet established a regulatory 
framework (part of their mandate under the Energy Bill 2015) [42]. This assertion was shared by a 
representative from an African biogas firm, who cited difficulties working with both levels of 
government in Kenya, but particularly the national government whose overly bureaucratic and corrupt 
processes had slowed development of biogas in Kenya [57]. Interestingly, he compared the enabling 
environment in Kenya as unfavourable compared to Rwanda (where the firm also had operations), 
stating “the Rwandan government is very keen in promoting their farmers; the government in Kenya 
doesn’t really represent ordinary people, just big business”. This is again suggestive of national 
government protecting vested interests in the energy sector, a prevailing trend in Kenya as noted in 
Chapters 5-6.  
Cheaper electricity was seen as the key to clean cooking by the sub-county administrator and senior 
KPLC officer [42, 38] contrasting with the biogas and jikos emphasised by the Energy Centre officer 
and a surprising proposition given the low electricity access rates in Migori and very low use of electric 
cooking across sub-Saharan Africa (Brown et al., 2017). For the sub-county administrator, reduced 
electricity costs would only be possible if competition was provided for KPLC, while the KPLC officer 
felt further investment in geothermal was required. Although geothermal is likely to assist the 
provision of cheaper and more reliable electricity generation, the KPLC officer appears to have 
overlooked the more immediate barriers to grid electricity access: poor reliability and prohibitive cost 
stemming from distribution issues and the KPLC monopoly over retail. This current state of affairs 
suggests that without innovative financing mechanisms, electric cooking via the grid is not likely to be 
an option for most Migori households. Although recent findings in the literature indicate that off-grid 
electric cooking is becoming increasingly affordable in sub-Saharan Africa, with Kenya showing 
particular promise due largely to its “strong track record for innovation in the energy for development 
space” (Batchelor et al., 2018, p.266). 
Yet, despite health and environmental issues suggesting clean cooking should be a priority, county 
government concerns seemed overwhelmingly focussed on street lights. A Migori county 
representative felt this was unfortunate but politically pragmatic: 
Intellectually, you would invest in clean cooking, but people want street lights, so 
they can make more money. … it seems that people want street lights more than 
the thing they should want. However, people have been going without clean 
cooking for a long time, so will ask, why do I need this? [83] 
The county representative added that raising awareness of health implications was key to addressing 
the lack of traction clean cooking had in the county: “when people think of health, in Migori they’re 
thinking of malaria, aids, etc, and not the effects of three stone cooking”. This reiterates calls in the 
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wider literature for a cross sector approach to clean cooking which focuses primarily on 
social/behavioural factors rather than technological dimensions (Brown et al., 2017).  
Community sensitisation thus appears vital in raising awareness of clean cooking’s importance, a role 
the county seems well placed to assist in the facilitator role outlined in Chapter 6, helping coordinate 
local communities and other stakeholders who could deliver sensitisation programmes. Yet, the 
county representative, reflecting the broader political economy issues behind street lighting initiatives 
noted across Kenya in Chapter 5, was pessimistic this would be achieved, stating: “Energy for a county 
is 5th or 6th in the line of priorities, … trying to do a clean cooking programme is a lot of effort to show 
people why they need it, so instead they go for street lighting” [83].  
7.1.4 Key county issue: uncoordinated power structures and their impact on the community level 
A lack of coordination between key energy stakeholders appears to be the key issue undermining 
Migori county energy governance. This issue seems clearly evident within the county government, 
where the energy department was widely seen as under supported. A local research analyst stated 
the county energy director was “basically the only person in the department, he maybe has an admin 
person under him, but he is the only energy specialist“ [98], while the sub-county administrator 
recalled the director had stated in response to being asked how he covered all the wards, “I am one 
county, I cannot work effectively” [42]. 
Representatives of SEI working in Migori confirmed this paucity of staff and also highlighted a lack of 
energy expertise at the senior county executive level [74, 79, 80]. They noted how this had resulted in 
coordination issues between the department and the executive, with the latter appearing to 
continuously undermine the director: 
There’s only [the director] to do all the work. He’s not a career politician, he is 
actually an engineer. Talk [was] that he was feeling demoralised because those 
above him were taking decisions, telling him what was to be done regarding 
energy, and these people weren’t ‘energy’ people, the people above were in 
charge of several sectors [74]. 
The quote reflects warnings from academia that capacity challenges particularly affect the political 
class (Brown et al., 2015) and highlights the issues raised more broadly in Chapter 5 of civil servants 
with sectoral expertise being managed by CECs and COs who often only have expertise in one of the 
departments combined within the ministry they head. This could potentially arise in the coordination 
of county ministries across the country but appears to have particularly manifested in the energy 
governance of Migori.  
The problems of this structure were inadvertently highlighted in a critique of county capacity by a 
Nairobi-based ERC officer: “the main issue with counties is raising awareness. Migori is putting up 
street lights because that’s what they understand. With more awareness, it can open up the roles” 
[11]. However, this prioritisation of street lighting over more pressing energy issues is again reflective 
of the expertise-lacking senior executive overruling the director, who criticised the focus, commenting 
incredulously: “people think street lighting is energy [i.e. it isn’t]” [41]. 
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Other institutions also appeared to eschew coordination with the county energy department. An SEI 
representative reported the national government operators of Gogo Falls Hydro Power plant were 
bypassing the county energy director to engage directly with the community:  
Kenya power [sic KenGen] says itself we just do it [engage communities]; we don't 
have to involve the minister or director of energy. Yet it's the role of the director 
of energy to know the different projects that are happening at the county level so  
… there's still that disconnect [74]. 
While KenGen’s community engagement in Migori is to be lauded, the bypassing of the county energy 
director significantly undermines the governance structure intended by the devolution process, as 
elaborated by the SEI representative, “people haven't really understood why the director of energy is 
at the county level, [it] is so that he can be your first contact person and then he can send the 
information from the communities” [74]. These occurrences of institutions not coordinating activities 
with the energy department seems highly likely to impede the development of urgently needed 
county energy planning; key to facilitating county energy initiatives and investment. 
7.1.5 Migori conclusion 
Overall, decentralised energy governance in Migori has been marked by uncoordinated stakeholder 
engagement which has facilitated the continuation of the national government’s MLG1 approach to 
energy in the county. The lack of capacity at various scales within Migori has further hindered 
coordination, diminishing the scope for the county government to challenge the national government 
dominion and facilitate more locally appropriate solutions to community energy needs: the 
demographic and geographical context suggesting a greater emphasis on small scale off-grid electricity 
and clean cooking is required.  
7.2 Nakuru  
Nakuru lies within the Great Rift Valley and is the fourth largest county in terms of population. The 
population is mainly rural (62%) although the county has several important urban centres (Nakuru 
County Government, 2013). The county capital, Nakuru town, is the centre of the flower industry 
(Kenya’s leading export), while Nakuru’s second and Kenya’s 11th largest town, Naivasha, is a hub for 
geothermal energy and set to become an important industrial centre as a terminus to the Standard 
Gauge Railway (SGR) extension and site of a newly constructed dry port. 
The county’s relative proximity to the centres of power in Nairobi 160 km away has seen Nakuru 
relatively well served by resources, with many governance structures in place owing to Nakuru Town’s 
pre-devolution status as the capital of the former Rift Valley province. Politically, Nakuru has tended 
to vote for the ruling coalition (Table 7.4), although the political landscape has been highly contested, 
which combined with its cosmopolitan demographic mix led to some of the most severe post-2007 
election violence (Anderson & Lochery, 2008). 
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Table 7.4. Presidential and governor election results for Nakuru county in 2013 and 2017 (MCI Maps, 2017). 
7.2.1 Developments in decentralised energy governance  
Since 2013, Nakuru has had an energy department, placed in the Ministry of Environment, Natural 
Resources, Energy, and Water to synergise energy with natural resources and best exploit the county’s 
geothermal resources [26]. The department has developed several energy related policies in 
collaboration with transnational actors and their in-country partners, including a county energy plan 
with KAM (Table 7.5). The development of these policies represents a significant achievement given 
few counties have completed energy plans, which are critical for developing initiatives and attracting 
investment (Newell et al., 2014).   
Table 7.5 Nakuru energy related polices developed since devolution 
Policy Published  External Collaborators 
County Clean Energy Policy (i.e. the County Energy Plan) 2016 KAM, Integral Advisory Ltd 
Renewable Energy Plan n.d. UNIDO, CoG 
First CIDP (2013-2017) 2013 None 
 
These county policy documents indicate access to electricity has improved, rising from 34% in 2009 to 
54% in 2016 (Table 7.6). This has predominantly been achieved via national government grid electricity 
initiatives and is thus subject to the same concerns illustrated in Chapter 5 regarding whether the data 
records usage or merely availability. No data exists in the policy documents concerning overall off-grid 
electricity access rates although it seems likely to be low given the Renewable Energy Policy states the 
exploitation of renewable energy as “minimal” (Nakuru County, n.d., p.iii).  A senior Nakuru county 
energy officer [99] reported the costs of off-grid schemes had limited the county to pilot schemes for 
solar boreholes and waste-to-energy, although two community scale nano-grids were implemented 
as part of the donor led SONG project104. Access to clean cooking also remains low and has not been 
subject to any major national or county initiatives.   
Table 7.6 Energy access in Nakuru (Nakuru County, 2016) 
7.2.2 Transnational actor interactions with decentralised energy governance 
Nakuru county government has interacted with several transnational actors, predominantly on energy 
policy development (Table 7.5). This policy support was viewed by the county as key in helping collect 
energy data and guide clean energy activities; a county environment officer [26] feeling there was now 
 
104 SONG = The Solar Nano Grid Project (see section 1.3) 
Presidential election results Governor election winner 
2013 2017 (annulled) 2013 2017 
Kenyatta (Jubilee) 
80.2% 
Odinga (ODM) 
17.1% 
Kenyatta (Jubilee) 
84.7% 
Odinga (ODM) 
14.8% 
Mbugua 
(Jubilee) 
Kinyanjui 
(Jubilee) 
2017 registered voters: 948,668 
Grid Electricity Off-grid electricity Cooking fuel 
54%  No data 46% firewood, 40% charcoal, 8% paraffin, 5% 
LPG, 0.7% biogas, 0.1% solar  
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potential for “county implementation of projects, with the aid of the guidelines, priority areas and 
directions we now have coming from the two plans”. A senior KAM official concurred, highlighting the 
county government had already begun implementing aspects of the energy plan they collaborated on, 
integrating policies into the broader CIDP while also starting to implement solar powered boreholes. 
Representatives from the WWF and Practical Action also reported collaborations with the county, and 
the extent and success of overall transnational engagement appears to have stemmed from 
networking and a proactive approach on behalf of the county, supporting the analysis of the previous 
chapter which argued these two factors as key to successful transnational actor engagement. 
These interactions with transitional actors appear to have been positively received by the county 
government; a Nakuru county CEC stating publicly at the major 2017 NETFund county renewable 
energy workshop the county’s readiness to work with different transnational actors on renewable 
energy initiatives. A senior Nakuru community-based organisation (CBO) representative agreed 
transnational actor capacity support was critical, but felt it was essentially national government 
driven: 
the other day … the ministry of energy [came] with the consultants from Nairobi 
[i.e. from KAM] and you can already see … there is the national government coming 
to meet the county government and they are actually doing the plan for them [28]. 
This appears concerning for it questions the independence of Nakuru’s energy policies if the national 
government is utilising transnational funding and effectively ‘doing the plan for them’, potentially 
leading to national rather than county government interests being prioritised. This was reinforced by 
the CBO representative’s assertion that “on the ground, the MoEP doesn’t have any presence, it hasn’t 
devolved, so even in terms of contact with the county governments, it's not there” [28]. 
The involvement of Integral Advisory Ltd in delivering the Nakuru energy plan perhaps further 
supports this view, given they were also contracted by the National Government to deliver the 
nationwide ‘County Energy Planning Framework Template’ and thus likely to be aware of national 
government interests105. A CAFOD energy consultant’s analysis of the Nakuru plan listed several 
criticisms which appear to reinforce the notion of national government influence:   
[The plan] relies solely on government data, where available; no independent 
analysis or additional surveys or FGDs and consultations. … Very top line: no 
mention of CIDP projects and energy interventions for them [106].  
The county’s perceived reliance on transnational actor funding for energy initiatives also appears to 
be limiting Nakuru’s scope to operate independently; a Nakuru county environment officer [26] 
revealing: “The energy component of this department [sic ministry] is really underfunded, they’re not 
able to do any projects independently, only through donors and stakeholders”. While funding 
constraints are almost certainly an issue for larger grid electricity initiatives, the attitude appears 
somewhat short-sighted given the array of cost-effective roles a county energy department could 
engage in and appears reminiscent of the broader sense of counties not realising potential 
opportunities noted in Chapters 5-6. Community sensitisation on clean cooking and small-scale 
 
105 At a 2016 workshop it was announced that the template for the GIZ backed County Energy Planning Framework (see 
Chapter 5) was based on the Nakuru energy plan being drafted by KAM and Integral Advisory Ltd. 
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renewable energy seems a particularly critical and feasible role for the county if acting, as this thesis 
contends, as facilitator rather than implementor; the lack of which thus far indicating a facilitating role 
of this ilk is not being sufficiently emphasised by transnational actor capacity building and policy 
initiatives. 
Overall, the positive response of the county to transnational actor engagement and the energy policies 
developed highlights the importance of the latter in assisting the urgently needed county capacity 
building. However, it appears these interactions are being unduly influenced by national government 
and thus may reflect their interests more than the county’s. A greater emphasis on building county 
government capacity to be a facilitator of off-grid electricity and clean cooking initiatives appears 
prudent to help maintain Nakuru’s scope to operate independently of national and transnational actor 
interests. 
7.2.3 National government interactions with decentralised energy governance 
Grid electricity 
Interactions between national government and the Nakuru administration over grid electricity were 
seen as being dominated by the former. Responding to the community criticisms of the county 
government over the lack of improved electricity access A senior representative of a local CBO felt this 
was understandable, given the county role was currently limited: 
As things stand right now, they [the county government] have very little control 
over what would happen or not happen ... whether that is going to be electrified, 
the best they can do is to lobby the government to extend those services in those 
[i.e. their] areas, and if they are within the government plan for that period then 
perhaps all they can do is try and make sure it happen slightly earlier [28].  
The limitations of the county role were also seen by the CBO representative as why the community 
criticisms of the county from the Nakuru FGDs (see Chapter 6) over the lack of improved electricity 
access were misdirected. This analysis aligns with the findings of the previous chapter, which argues 
the de facto monopoly of KPLC and prohibitive costs of grid electricity render a lead county role 
unfeasible, although the community complaints suggest sensitisation of national and county 
government roles needs to be undertaken to help ensure bottom-up pressure is effectively 
channelled.     
County efforts to lobby the national government for “earlier” grid connections (a suggested by the 
CBO representative) appear to have been hindered by funding and capacity constraints. A county 
environment officer criticised the “minimal” funding the county energy department had received, 
stating it was sufficient “only for devising the energy plans, and even then, it wasn’t really enough” 
[26]. This was compounded by the widely cited issue of the national treasury’s unpredictable and 
piecemeal release of county funds, which meant, according to a Nakuru county health officer 
“counties have to budget for what they expect or hope to get” [27] – a particularly testing issue given 
the environment officer’s assertion that the “common challenge is that halfway through the financial 
year, something unexpected comes up which has to be funded” [26]. This appears to reflect the 
reluctance of central government to cede adequate resources for sub-national mandates as widely 
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acknowledged in the sub-Saharan Africa decentralisation literature (Chapter 3 cf. D’Arcy & Cornell, 
2016). However, the environment officer acknowledged the county was also culpable for the lack of 
funding reaching the energy department. The officer noted there was a chain of institutions deferring 
payment as the county treasury also delayed disbursement of funds, while particular criticism was 
reserved for the county planning department:  
The planning docket doesn’t see it [energy] as a priority area … [an energy] plan is 
submitted to the treasury asking for funds, and then the macro planning 
department slashes funds and re-prioritises106 [26]. 
This highlights the challenge posed by internal competition between county ministries and 
departments for a share of the county budget, leading the Nakuru county environment officer to 
conclude energy governance had “not really” improved since devolution, adding “We have the plans 
but can’t implement the projects in this financial year (ends in June) because the amount of funding 
has been minimal and was only for devising the energy plans”. The quote also indicates the importance 
of energy plans in securing resources, and perhaps indicates why energy has often been underfunded 
at county level given many counties do not have completed plans. However, this overlooks the more 
pertinent issue emphasised in Chapter 5 that the absence of an energy plan stems largely from 
insufficient national government support for county capacity building (a constitutional requirement) 
and a lack of policy and framework to guide these plans (i.e. from the prolonged failure to promulgate 
the Energy Bill 2015 and establish the County Energy Planning Framework).  
The senior Nakuru CBO representative agreed that the dearth of resources for energy at the county 
level, which he felt was “near zero if not zero”, stemmed from the national government not 
establishing a planning framework to guide counties: 
currently what we find ourselves in is a situation where the counties can't do that 
much but perhaps by the end of this year, you will have templates [i.e. a planning 
framework] adopted and from next year counties can start sending their county 
energy plans to the ministry and get allocations directly from the national 
government [28]. 
For the CBO representative, developing county energy plans was paramount:  
if you don't have a plan, then you don't have resources allocated, so you can only 
respond very ad hoc-ly, or if you have partners who are generous enough and they 
have come with the resources [28]. 
The quotes emphasise how counties are currently hamstrung by a lack of national energy planning 
guidelines, which partially explains the low prioritisation of resources by Nakuru county to its energy 
department. However, despite the lack of planning framework, Nakuru county appears partially 
culpable for not exploiting opportunities which do exist, as inadvertently alluded to by the county 
environment officer: “Right now, we don’t have someone specific for energy, so we need guidelines, 
structures to help focus efforts” [26]. Given Nakuru appears to have received more support than most 
counties, the comment is concerning as it suggests the political considerations involved in county 
 
106 Docket refers to ‘the portfolio or jurisdiction of an official, especially of government’ (see Chapter 4 cf. Buregeya, 2007). 
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institution building rather than a lack of capacity may be behind the energy staffing deficiency. Thus, 
it seems the county’s energy governance issues are not solely a product of insufficient financing, but 
to an extent self-inflicted by the county administration not prioritising personnel for the energy 
department. 
Off-grid electricity and clean cooking 
Interventions by national and county government in off-grid electricity and clean cooking appear to 
have been lacking. A representative of Solinc (an East African solar panel manufacturer) argued off-
grid renewable energy initiatives were not a priority for the county, citing a Nakuru county renewable 
energy street lights project which he felt was “only for show purposes, it’s not backed up by strong 
policy” [58]. A senior CBO representative felt the lack of county activity was largely due to capacity 
issues: 
If you touch on matters of renewable energy, you will find that most of these 
[county] leaders are not really well conversant on the issues that are affecting the 
people. Now [it] becomes the duty of organisations or CBOs like us, trying to put 
all that into perspective and bring[ing] it to them so they are able to put that into 
consideration in policy making, in implementations of their activities [28]. 
The quote highlights the critical need for local energy needs to be articulated by third parties to the 
county government. This seems reasonable given the capacity constraints at community level and the 
near impossibility of the county government having the resources to assess every community’s needs 
as argued in Chapter 6. Going forward, the CBO representative felt the role of non-government actors 
in decentralised energy governance was to bridge the gap between “being in touch with the needs of 
the community on the ground and being able to articulate the same issues at the next level so that 
they’re taken care of”; objectives the representative felt had “yet to be fully achieved” but could be 
facilitated by devolution: “now you have policy makers very close to where you live” [28]. The CBO 
representative’s argument is highly convincing given the well-documented issues of lobbying in the 
pre-devolution era which necessitated costly and time consuming travel to Nairobi and reflects the 
well-established arguments in favour of decentralisation, namely that local governments can allocate 
resources more efficiently due to having better information about local needs and the way local 
systems operate (Cabral, 2011). 
Evidence of the need for organisations like CBOs to bridge the knowledge gap to county governments 
can be seen through the fact that the initiatives in off-grid electricity and clean cooking in Nakuru have 
primarily been driven by non-governmental organisations. The SONG project involved a collaboration 
between overseas research institutes, a local CBO: Sustainable Community Development Services 
(SCODE), and the village energy committees established by the project to represent the two 
communities. As noted in Chapter 6, the two communities praised the regular on the ground 
engagement of the other stakeholders, particularly with SCODE, which contrasted (albeit 
understandably) with the lack of national and county engagement. The beneficiaries of having an 
established local partner for attracting transnational investment from actors noted in Chapter 6 was 
reiterated by SCODE’s track record of working with leading transnational organisations on clean 
cooking initiatives. SCODE previously collaborated with the Netherlands Development Organisation 
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(SNV) and SEI on their respective community biogas and clean cookstoves programmes, which again 
were largely devoid of government impetus (Johnson et al., 2015).  
This view of the importance of non-government actors also seems to be partly reciprocated by the 
county energy department. In the survey conducted for this PhD, the Nakuru county energy 
department listed three local stakeholders: SCODE, Solinc, and Gogar farm107 as the organisations 
communicated with most on energy issues. This contrasts with the vast majority of the other eleven 
counties surveyed, with ten naming transnational and national government actors as the stakeholders 
most connected with although all 12 counties still considered national government to be the key 
stakeholder at the county level. This engagement with local stakeholders indicates a movement in 
Nakuru county energy governance towards MLG2, suggesting Nakuru may be more responsive to local 
energy needs than the other surveyed counties, who still appear to be engaging primarily with national 
government.  
7.2.4 Key county issue: geothermal energy and its impact on the community level 
Nakuru contains over 90% of Kenya’s current 636MW of geothermal power, which has been at the 
forefront of national government drives to increase the nation’s installed grid electricity capacity and 
reduce dependence on drought affected hydro power (Energy Siren, 2018). Although widely seen from 
a national perspective as successful in achieving these aims, most local stakeholders felt the 
geothermal projects lacked local ownership and direct benefits to the county. The senior CBO 
representative stated, “here in Nakuru, we are saying that we need to get a bit of resources from 
geothermal”, while the Nakuru county health officer highlighted the negative impact on the local 
economy: 
Nakuru generates a lot of electricity. We should benefit but we are not. For 
example, people next to generators aren’t connecting to the grid. Connecting 
people to the grid should be done at county level. Local industries can’t progress 
[28]. 
The lack of local benefits indicated in the quote seems to partly stem from Nakuru having less 
engagement with GDC than other counties with geothermal resources. This is due to the parastatal 
having different operational procedures in the pre-devolution era when most of Nakuru’s geothermal 
facilities were installed as a GDC officer explained: 
For the Menengai project [in Nakuru], devolution came and found us already 
there, so all you had to do now is walk the new government to what we have been 
doing so I think in that instance, I have not seen any challenge. But in terms of 
implementation of projects, from now on, anything that we do, we have to inform 
the county government [15]. 
The quote suggests Nakuru have missed out on the mandatory engagement with GDC required since 
devolution, which stipulates that the parastatal secures a county letter of no objection (Johnson & 
Ogeya, 2018). This appears to have led to the national government dominating the sector in Nakuru 
as the senior CBO representative emphasised: “who's signing the contracts, who's prospecting or 
 
107 Gogar farm is the site of a proposed private sector 10MW solar project in Nakuru (Lakini, 2018) 
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exploring, who's deciding what energy will be generated and used in Nakuru county by everybody –  
[it's] the national government” [28]. The Nakuru voice also seems to have been relatively inhibited 
compared to other counties due to its geothermal resources lying in land classified as forest reserve 
and thus falling under the remit of the national government entity, the Kenya Forestry Service. A GDC 
officer described this as “lucky” for it absolved the parastatal from needing to undertake the same 
level of engagement in Nakuru as seen at other sites in Baringo and Turkana counties 
[In Baringo and Turkana] the land is community owned [and] it's entrusted to 
county government. So, this really calls for close relations between us, the 
implementing entity, and county government [15]. 
The quote suggests Baringo and Turkana counties have been able to use community land rights as 
leverage over GDC in a similar vein to the community protests over transmission lines and power 
station infrastructure discussed in the previous chapter. This appears to have ensured county 
engagement and a governance system more redolent of MLG2, which has not been possible in Nakuru 
due to the GDC sites falling on national government land. This perhaps helps explain why geothermal 
has developed more extensively, yet less equitably, in the county: the more streamlined top-down 
MLG1 governance unencumbered by participatory politics.  
7.2.5 Nakuru conclusion  
Overall, it appears decentralised energy governance in Nakuru has been largely dominated by national 
government interests, with the lack of resources assigned by the county to the county energy 
department a significant contributing factor to this largely uncontested space. However, the county 
appears to be making initial steps to engage with the activities of local non-government stakeholders, 
which may enable a more MLG2-esque governance to emerge. This could have subsequent benefits 
in enabling the county to adopt a more facilitatory role developing off-grid electricity and clean 
cooking initiatives. 
7.3 Turkana 
Turkana lies in the far north west of Kenya and has a hot semi-arid/desert climate with unreliable 
rainfall, leading in recent years to regular droughts (UK AID, 2017). Sparsely populated and remote, 
Turkana is the second largest and poorest of Kenya’s 47 counties (Munda, 2016). 94.3% of the mainly 
pastoralist population live below the poverty line (Mullins & Wambayi, 2017), with human 
development indicators, such as illiteracy (79.25%), among the lowest in the country (Turkana county 
government, 2014).   
The lack of development predates devolution. Both colonial and post-colonial governments 
marginalised Turkana (Mkutu Agade, 2014), with local CSOs pointing correctly to the 1965 ‘Sessional 
Paper Number 10’ as evidence the non-allocation of funds to Turkana and other “lower potential 
areas” was official national government policy (see Chapter 3). Since the enactment of devolution, 
this marginalisation has been formally recognised and Turkana is one of 14 historically ‘underserved’ 
counties receiving a share of the national Equalisation Fund. This historical context has seen Turkana 
mostly vote for the opposition, although there was a sizeable shift to the ruling coalition in 2017 (Table 
7.7), which political analysts have assigned to the Jubilee party being more united and running a more 
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effective campaign emphasising local infrastructure achievements, such as road construction and 
electrification (Cheeseman et al., 2017).108 
Table 7.7 Presidential and governor election results for Turkana county in 2013 and 2017 (MCI Maps, 2017). 
7.3.1 Developments in decentralised energy governance  
There is consensus that the post-2013 devolution landscape has radically increased the pace of 
development in Turkana, leading to the implementation of infrastructure and services not seen before 
2013109. This echoes the sentiment noted more broadly across Kenya but felt more keenly in  Turkana 
and the other historically marginalised ASAL counties. A Nairobi based GIZ representative stressed the 
stark contrast between a visit made in 2012 and subsequent visits to the county following the 
implementation of county governments in 2013:  
Now, when I go back to Marsabit and Turkana, the difference you cannot believe 
it, those two towns [sic counties] have grown and it is growth that if devolution 
hadn't happened, would never have happened, would never have happened [67]. 
Attributing these developments to devolution was echoed by all stakeholders interviewed, with the 
county having its own budget seen as key. Turkana has consistently had the second largest county 
budget allocation after Nairobi, receiving Sh10.3billion for 2019-20 (Mutai, 2019); a benefit extolled 
by a Turkana Chief Officer who stated, “the biggest advantage, the extra money… before devolution, 
the money from the government was probably less than 1billion Ksh (US$10,000,000)” [32].  
Turkana has had a county energy department since 2013, placed initially in the Ministry of Energy, 
Environment and Natural Resources but then moved to the Ministry of Lands, Energy, Housing and 
Urban Area Management in 2017 to exploit synergies between energy and land rights in oil 
exploration [31].  A county energy plan has been developed by the department in in collaboration with 
GIZ (Table 7.8), although it remains unpublished with the county awaiting the promulgation of the 
national Energy Bill 2015 according to a senior Turkana county energy officer [31]. Interviewees also 
reported the county government has implemented several small scale off-grid solar initiatives, 
including street lights, boreholes, and panel installations in remote schools. 
Table 7.8 Turkana energy related polices developed since devolution 
Policy Published External collaborators 
Energy sector plan Completed but unpublished GIZ, EED 
CIDP (2013-2017) 2014 GIZ 
 
108 President Kenyatta was keen to emphasise electrification in the run up to the 2017 election, commissioning a KPLC project 
in July 2017 with the words “From now on there will be no darkness in Turkana” (ESI Africa, 2017). 
109 These include a referral hospital, Early Childhood Development and Education (ECDE) centres, tarmac roads, street 
lighting and electricity in the major urban centres. 
Presidential election results Governor election winner 
2013 2017 (annulled) 2013 2017 
Kenyatta (Jubilee) 
29.9% 
Odinga (ODM) 
67.5% 
Kenyatta (Jubilee) 
44.8% 
Odinga (ODM) 
54.3% 
Nanok  
(ODM) 
Nanok  
(ODM) 
2017 registered voters: 188,617 
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  National government initiatives have seen electricity coverage from diesel powered mini-grids 
increase from two to five urban centres, while 2017 saw Lokichar and Kalemungorok become the first 
urban centres in Turkana connected to the national grid (Ayemba, 2017)110. However, access remains 
low, with only 15% of households using electricity for household lighting (Table 7.9). The quality of 
electricity is also an issue; a GIZ officer based in the capital, Lodwar, reporting the supply was now “a 
bit more stable … but we still very often have 5-6-hour blackouts” [37]. Clean cooking remains under 
addressed by both levels of government; the vast majority of the population remaining reliant on 
firewood and inefficient traditional stone fires (Table 7.9). This is a critical issue given the 
interconnected problems of deforestation and drought in the county (UK AID, 2017).   
Table 7.9 Energy access in Turkana (Turkana county government, 2014) 
7.3.2 Transnational actor interactions with decentralised energy governance  
Transnational actors have played several significant roles in the Turkana energy sector. GIZ and the 
World Bank have funded the implementation of mini-grids in three urban centres via negotiations 
with the national government. Subsequently run by KPLC (and thus equating to the ‘grid island’ 
concept defined in Chapter 6), the governance of these mini-grids has mainly bypassed the county 
government. The current World Bank KOSAP scheme to fund an additional 120 KPLC run mini-grids in 
the 14 underserved counties seems set to consolidate this national government control. As noted in 
Chapter 5, the potential impact on private sector competition is acknowledged, if not wholly accepted, 
by a World Bank report: “some mini grid players in Kenya believe that the program will make KPLC 
more powerful” (ESMAP, 2017, p.76). 
However, in other aspects of the energy sector, transnational actors have worked in partnership with 
the county government. A senior county energy officer praised the collaborations with GIZ on capacity 
building, which directly engaged the county administration (despite emerging from bilateral 
discussions between the German and Kenyan national governments – see Chapter 6) and supported 
the development of the vital county energy plan. The officer highlighted this assistance was crucial as 
“the skills base, technicians, engineers, in Turkana is limited” [31]. This lends further support to the 
comments of the Mandera energy officer in Chapter 5 concerning formerly marginalised counties 
struggling to attract and retain expertise; reinforcing the well documented concern that 
decentralisation facilitates agglomeration economies (Cabral, 2011). 
The senior energy officer also stressed that support from the national government had been lacking: 
“Capacity building, this is where national government can help [i.e. but they don’t], they know the 
plans, we are the same country” [31]. The notion of being ‘the same country’ appears a call for the 
national government to lay aside political based rivalry, pertinent given the high-profile clashes 
 
110 The senior Turkana county energy officer also highlighted that the urban centres of Lodwar, Lokichogio, Lokitaung, Lokori, 
and Lorugum also have access to electricity via KPLC mini grids (or ‘grid islands’ – see Chapter 6) 
Grid electricity/Grid 
islands  
Off-grid 
electricity 
Cooking fuel  Cooking stove 
10% for household 
lighting 
 
5% for household 
lighting 
89% firewood; 9.3% 
charcoal; 1.7% other 
85.9% traditional stone fire; 11% jiko; 
0.9% improved jiko; 1.8% kerosene 
stove; 0.4% gas stove. 
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between the President and county over the sharing of petroleum revenues (see Chapter 5 & sub-
section 7.4.4). The officer’s comment also reiterates the argument made in earlier chapters that 
national government has been mainly responsible for the insufficient development of county capacity 
impeding the development of decentralised energy governance. 
Transnational actors have also supported local, grassroots organisations. A representative of a local 
CSO highlighted significant support from the Catholic transnational development organisation, 
‘Cordaid’ (part of the CARITAS confederation) to fund CSO advocacy work on land rights, environment 
and governance issues concerning Turkana’s oil resource, resulting in the CSO being hired by the MoEP 
to conduct a baseline survey on community perceptions of oil [33]. This significant role seems to reflect 
the highly influential position the church has historically had within Turkana; a GIZ officer stating the 
“Diocese Caritas effectively replaced the local government pre-devolution” [37]. The power of the 
church within the county also appears to represent a check on central government authority, 
challenging national government efforts to implement MLG1-esque governance in Turkana to the 
same extent seen more broadly in Kenya (see Chapters 5-6). 
7.3.3 National government interactions with decentralised energy governance in Turkana 
Grid electricity/grid islands 
Interactions between national and Turkana county government over electricity were strained by 
diverging views over KPLC’s running of the county’s ‘grid islands’. The senior county energy officer felt 
the management was not aligned to the local context, criticising the solar power upgrade of the 
Lodwar mini-grid for not including storage: “it doesn’t make sense”, and the GPOBA connectivity 
initiative for its unaffordability: “this GPOBA scheme, who is going to pay [i.e. be able to pay] the 
monthly charges after they have been connected”, adding that “some people who shouldn’t benefit 
from GPOBA are benefitting” [31]. The comments highlight the challenges inherent in applying a 
national policy without adjusting to local contexts; the relative poverty of Turkana rendering GPOBA 
far less effective than in other counties where the scheme has been seen as an enabler (e.g. by 
stakeholders in Migori and Nairobi – see sections 7.2 and 7.5). It also brings into question the stated 
effectiveness of the cross subsidisation at the heart national government electrification initiatives if 
those who can afford the standard connection fee are paying the reduced GPOBA rate. 
The energy officer saw the unsuitability of these KPLC initiatives as a product of the lack of devolution 
in the energy sector: 
I don’t see why we would have KPLC here, that’s the problem with having to wait 
for decisions to be made 700 miles away, when mini-grids are locally managed, 
decision making is easier … . We are taking a cradle to grave approach, in order not 
to leave people worse off [31]. 
The quote reiterates the sense that KPLC has merely undergone deconcentration, with local operatives 
still bound to centralised, top-down decision making from Nairobi; the implication being that this more 
MLG1 form of governance has failed to consider policy holistically resulting in increased local poverty. 
Given the historic tension between Turkana and the centre, this weak form of decentralisation also 
seems to serve the well-established purpose noted in the literature of elites using deconcentration to 
172 
 
 
consolidate central power by creating posts (particularly in opposition areas) which are filled by 
personnel willing to tow the central government line (Crook, 2003). A senior Turkana county KPLC 
officer seemed to fit this mould, arguing the continuation of top-down governance was positive: “KPLC 
tells the county what it’s going to do, the county then sensitises the community, the relationship is 
working well, no confrontation” [30]. This disparity between the county and KPLC officers’ view of 
their mutual relationship appears to emanate from contrasting energy governance ideals: the KPLC 
officer’s predilection for the de facto MLG1 position and the more MLG2 approach favoured by the 
county energy officer and seemingly intended by the Constitution.  
These distinct governance preferences appear to have resulted in working practices which lack inter-
governmental coordination. The KPLC officer noted the county government was “usually” aware of 
national government grid development plans but added “It’s not a must that you [i.e. KPLC] inform 
the county. If they ask, we give them the information about the extension” [30]. The comment 
contradicts the concurrent status of reticulation operations in the Constitution and Energy Bill 2015 
(see Chapter 3&5), reinforcing the sense that MLG1 thinking dominates the Turkana grid islands space. 
This seems likely to strain relations between the national and county government, undermining the 
KPLC officer’s assertion the relationship was “working well”. 
Small-scale off-grid electricity  
Inter-governmental coordination was also affected by misinterpretations concerning responsibilities 
for small-scale off-grid electricity systems (i.e. not grid islands). The senior county energy officer 
defined the county role as limited to “renewable energy at small scale, for example, standalone 
systems in public institutions, dispensaries, schools” [31]. While not a comprehensive list of the bill’s 
county functions, it is a reasonably realistic overview of the county’s role, supporting the positive 
assessment of county energy department capacity by an ERC officer: “in Turkana, they have someone 
well-versed in the docket, [who] appreciates the role and can lobby” [11].  
This contrasts sharply with the senior Turkana county KPLC officer’s view that “RE is devolved” [30]; a 
clearly flawed understanding as there is no provision in either the Constitution or the Energy Bill 2015 
for 100% devolution of renewable energy. As noted by the senior county energy officer, such a 
proposal would not be feasible given county budgetary constraints: “They say renewable energy is at 
county government, but funds are limited, so if you’re going to do a larger mini-grid project, it could 
exhaust all the county funds” [31]. This uncertainty suggests the well-documented issue of power and 
resources not matching responsibilities in decentralisation reforms is likely to be exacerbated if key 
stakeholders are unaware of where responsibilities have been allocated (cf. Conyers, 2007). 
These different understandings of roles appear to have led to conflicting views on sectoral progress. 
The senior county energy officer emphasised the increase in energy access within Turkana stemmed 
from devolution affording the counties “a mandate to prioritise what they want”, highlighting small 
scale off-grid initiatives such as mini-grid connections, solar lanterns and solar boreholes as evidence. 
Further conflation of energy roles seems evident from the county officer’s assertion that REA’s 
mandate in Turkana was currently being implemented by the county due to the poor performance of 
the parastatal’s contractors:  
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We’ve started [electrifying] public institutions, this is being done by the county, 
not REA. We’ve had a lot of complaints about REA contractors. REA just electrify 
individual classrooms for the laptops programme … not the whole school [31].  
This quotation reiterates the sense emerging more broadly across Kenya that REA since switching 
focus to the Digital Literacy Programme has become more concerned with hitting politically expedient 
national government targets (i.e. number of laptops] than more broadly beneficial institutional 
electrification which could enhance development. In addition, it indicates that progress in addressing 
energy access issues in Turkana since devolution has been primarily county driven.  
Yet, the near opposite view of the county energy department’s performance was expressed by the 
KPLC officer: 
We have not seen much input from the county. They have plans, but I don’t know 
how advanced they are. We have not seen a proactive approach into tapping into 
renewable energy [from the county]. We have really high solar and wind potential 
[30]. 
The veracity of this criticism seems doubtful given the positive appraisal of the county energy 
department by other stakeholders such as the aforementioned ERC officer and the two Turkana FGD 
communities; the latter seeing the county alongside NGOs as the key entities facilitating improved 
energy access (see Chapter 6). The KPLC officer’s comment seems more indicative of a lack of 
collaboration and possibly trust between the two levels of government, with the manager unaware of 
how far developed the county renewable energy plans are. These coordination issues appear to have 
serious implications, with the role of developing small scale off-grid energy (vital in a county with vast 
renewable energy resources and a dispersed population) potentially left unfulfilled if both levels of 
government believe the other is responsible. 
Similar disengagement could be seen over street lighting; the one area the KPLC officer agreed “a 
disconnect” existed, acknowledging that the county felt “the national government was imposing” its 
grid powered scheme on the county whose preference was for “a mix of [off-grid] solar and grid” [30]. 
The presence of grid and solar street lights placed directly next to one another in Lodwar (as shown 
on the cover page) highlights the resulting inefficiencies of this disconnect and is redolent of a non-
consultative top-down approach by the national government, especially given street lighting is an 
exclusive county function under the Energy Bill 2015. Community voices tended to side with the 
county; a Napetet community member complaining the KPLC lights were more unreliable than the 
county solar lights, while another deemed the KPLC lights a political manoeuvre to counter the credit 
the county lights had garnered the governor, a prominent opposition figure [104]. 
Clean cooking 
Reflecting the national picture discussed in Chapter 5, there has been limited engagement by either 
national or county government over clean cooking in Turkana. A senior county energy officer praised 
the county collaboration with GIZ on clean cookstoves on the Endev programme but felt county 
interventions had been limited by the “very lean budget for clean cooking” and legislative constraints, 
with “clean cooking not in the Energy Bill” and “charcoal … under both natural resources and energy” 
[31]. Although this is an accurate reading of the current legislation’s glaring failure to adequately 
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incorporate clean cooking, there still appears scope for critical county interventions despite limited 
funding, such as community sensitisation. A Turkana based GIZ officer suggested deforestation was 
one cooking energy related issue where such initiatives were required [37].  The officer highlighted 
that community awareness was improving but the importance of trees for soil, water and agriculture 
was still not fully appreciated; with the use of local acacia trees for producing Nairobi bound charcoal 
particularly damaging.  
Local CSOs deemed both county and national governments as culpable. A representative from a CSO 
working towards environmental issues criticised the national government’s introduction of the 
ecosystem damaging prosopis plant for charcoal production [34], while a counterpart at a CSO 
focussed on pastoralist issues felt the county government could do more to assist rural communities 
unable to access gas by either “giving everyone a modern jiko [which would] at least be a little better”, 
or promoting kerosene as a firewood alternative: “Kerosene is available from oil and everyone can 
access it” [35]. The latter seems a more prudent proposal as within the development literature 
handouts are widely discredited (Moyo, 2009), while kerosene has found some support (albeit highly 
contested) as a transitional fuel (EED Advisory, 2016), and could potentially become economical in 
Turkana if county oil resources were to be locally distributed. These critiques of government clean 
cooking initiatives in Turkana indicates the county follows the national pattern which has seen the 
energy sub-sector predominantly driven by non-governmental actors.                             
7.3.4 Key county issue: oil and its impact on the community level 
Since the discovery of oil in Turkana in 2012, the sharing of petroleum revenues has been the most 
contentious energy issue in the county and arguably nationwide. As noted in Chapter 5, it was the 
main reason for the prolonged refusal of the president to sign the Energy Bill 2015; the president 
seeking to both reduce and cap the share counties and locally affected communities would receive. 
Although as Chapter 5 reveals, the revised Energy Bill 2017 was eventually passed in March 2019 with 
most of the county demands met, this sub-section reveals the legacy of the deadlock on decentralised 
energy governance is likely to be longer lasting as it has seemingly strengthened a more MLG2-esque 
form of governance in the county. 
Much of the tension which arose from the impasse over revenue sharing from petroleum emanated 
from a sense that the central executive was seeking a continuation of the highly centralised MLG1-
esque governance, which had been responsible for the historical marginalisation of Turkana (and 
other ASAL areas) that had left the county the poorest in Kenya. This sense was heightened by the 
reason for not assenting to the Bill given by the president who argued the proposed 20% share of 
revenues to counties and 10% share to affected communities would be beyond the “absorption 
capacities” of counties unless capped (Kenyatta, 2016). 
This rationale was widely dismissed; many stakeholders in Turkana countering logically that capacity 
could be built or hired. Noting the “168 NGOs” in the county, a CSO representative added dryly, 
“there’s a lot of capacity within NGOs, the UN is here, so there’s no experts” [35]. Most saw the 
capacity argument as a smokescreen for the Energy Bill impasse becoming increasingly politicised 
between the competing interests of the president and the prominent opposition governor of Turkana. 
This seems to have created local distrust over national government intentions; the CSO representative 
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stating the Turkana people viewed the president as “here to take our oil” [35]. This tension has been 
intensified by the lack of community engagement from the national government and Tullow Oil, the 
Anglo-Irish transnational commissioned to extract the oil. Since Tullow Oil began exploration in 2010, 
the issues over engagement have had many dimensions, beyond the scope of this sub-section to cover 
in their entirety. Thus, three key phases of the dispute which have proved crucial in shaping 
developments over the decentralised governance of oil have been selected as focal points for this sub-
section.  
2010-2015: Communities and land rights 
The initial period of Tullow Oil involvement in Turkana (2010-2013) was marked by a distinct lack of 
community engagement. A representative of a CSO focussed on natural resource management argued 
the paucity of interaction with communities was acquiesced to by the national government: 
they [Tullow Oil] were criss-crossing pastoral land, cutting trees, fencing land, all 
this with national government permission, but not local community permission. 
The local community didn’t even know who they were [33]  
The CSO representative pinned this bypassing of community engagement on national government 
exploitation of the Constitution, which decreed resources found below six feet as state owned unless 
a private title deed is held111. This clause hugely disadvantages pastoralist Turkana, where land is 
communally not privately owned, allowing the national government and Tullow Oil carte blanche to 
circumnavigate community engagement. 
A counterweight to this highly top-down form of governance only appeared after community protests, 
mostly focused on demands for jobs and contracts for local companies, forced Tullow Oil to cease 
operations for two weeks in 2013. The stoppage highlighted “the need for clear rules of engagement 
between investors and hosts” (Akumu, 2013, p.1), as acknowledged by Tullow Oil’s Deputy General 
Manager for Operations, Frederic Briens, who conceded Tullow Oil had made mistakes over its 
community engagement which had been the most challenging part of the operation (Mullins & 
Wambayi, 2017, p.23). A more consultative approach appears to have emerged following the protest; 
local CSOs reporting a subsequent three-month period in which a series of meetings between Tullow 
Oil and the communities improved the relationship. This reiterates how community protests over land 
rights have been a key bulwark to national government imposition of MLG1-esque governance in 
Kenya. 
2015 -16 Transnational actors and FIPC 
Community engagement has also benefitted from Tullow Oil needing to comply with Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent (FPIC) of affected communities under the terms of its International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) financing with the Canadian transnational, Africa Oil. Mullins & Wambayi (2017) 
report Tullow Oil’s community engagement was almost universally seen as improved once the FPIC 
process was triggered in 2015. However, communities criticised the county government and CSOs for 
their lack of active involvement in the FPIC process, calling for the county “both to oversee the process 
 
111 The Constitution makes no mention of depth as a qualifying criterion for resource ownership but does stipulate that “all 
minerals and mineral oils are public land … [which] shall vest in and be held by the national government” (Article 62(1-3)). 
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and to help ensure compliance with agreements” (Mullins & Wambayi, 2017, p.38). This inactivity 
indicates transnational actors have exerted greater pressure on Tullow Oil to adhere to global 
compliance norms than the county government elected to represent community interests.  
However, this is perhaps understandable given the senior Turkana county energy officer reported 
county sensitisation over oil was not possible legislatively, and more pertinently because the national 
government was not releasing information concerning Tullow Oil’s operations [31]. The legislative 
argument is debateable as the Constitution mandates counties with “ensuring and coordinating the 
participation of communities and locations in governance at the local level” although the realities of 
the national government withholding information seems to make this point moot.  This seems 
indicative of the broader trend of transnational actor activities being channelled primarily through 
national government (see Chapter 6) and reflects findings in the literature which emphasise how 
uncodified structural factors tend to distort decentralisation from its legislative blueprint (Erk, 2014). 
2016 -2018 CSOs and the Early Oil Pilot Scheme 
Despite the pressure exerted primarily by communities and transnationals, the national government 
has appeared reluctant to cede control of oil. This was evidenced by the lack of transparency 
surrounding the Early Oil Pilot Scheme (EOPS); announced by the national government in 2016, 
ostensibly to determine the cost and logistics of transporting Turkana oil by truck (Otuki, 2018). 
Previously, the intention had been to transport the oil by pipeline in 2022 as part of the Lamu Port-
South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport (LAPSSET) project (Ochieng’, 2015), which was supported by Tullow 
Oil who had reservations over the costs of EOPS. Local CSO representatives saw this national 
government push for the EOPS and its earlier start date as a result of vested interests: a representative 
from a natural resource management focussed CSO explaining “the sitting president wants to be 
champion of the project [i.e. preside over the first oil sales]” [33]. 
Clear evidence of these vested interests can be seen in the national government’s continued non-
disclosure of the EOPS production sharing contract (PSC) (Business Daily, 2018), an industry standard, 
which would determine the share of the resource the government, Tullow Oil, and the community 
receive. A CSO representative emphasised how the national government was “reluctant” to sign the 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative [ETTI], a global standard for accountable governance of oil, 
gas and mineral resources, which CSOs had been advocating for and would push the government to 
disclose the PSC [33]. This secrecy over the PSC has understandably caused significant tension among 
local communities as recognised by a Tullow Oil representative:  
For the community, it’s all about the percentage they get … the community doesn’t 
want oil to be transported before they have agreed their share [i.e. via the PSC], 
they think it’s the start of extraction for real [36].  
The fear seems reasonable, given the previous lack of engagement and the broader context of 
historical marginalisation. A CSO representative also empathised with the community, arguing:  
National government think they’re in charge and it’s their mandate to do whatever 
they want with oil. Decisions are made in Nairobi which the county doesn’t know 
about [33].  
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This supports the senior county energy officer’s earlier assertion that national government was 
withholding information from the county, limiting scope for county engagement. For the CSO 
representative, this meant “CSOs are critical in order to represent the masses” particularly in terms of 
community awareness and negotiating on behalf of communities. Given the illiteracy rate in Turkana, 
the CSO representative stressed this representation was vital “so people are aware of their rights” but 
felt the responsibility also partly fell on “religious organisations and the county energy ministry”, 
which seems redolent of the networked governance of MLG2 [33]. This appears logical given the 
county’s proximity and the strong influence of the church within Turkana. However, it seems the 
county role would perhaps be best conducted by energy department civil servants rather than county 
politicians; Mullins & Wambayi (2017) noting community calls for greater county involvement but 
distrust of elected officials who had “played self-serving roles as intermediaries in the past”. 
Overall, it seems only aspects of a MLG2 system have restricted the national government and Tullow 
Oil from developing the oil resource without engaging affected local communities. In each of the three 
phases, the interactions of non-governmental actors have been instrumental in ensuring community 
engagement. However, this more representative, multi-stakeholder governance has been weakened 
by the apparent national government side-lining of the county government in oil governance. This is 
potentially critical given the EOPS seems to eschew participatory politics; the CSO representative 
warning the “Early Oil Project is very top-down, President to the Ministry to Tullow, completely against 
devolution” [33].   
7.3.5 Turkana conclusion  
Despite national government efforts to impose top-down energy governance in Turkana, most notably 
over the county’s grid islands and petroleum resources, the presence of a range of stakeholders 
operating at various scales with leverage over national government interests has lessened the impact 
of this MLG1-esque approach, coercing engagement. The presence of a capable county energy 
department has also assisted the development of power relations between county and national 
government, which are more evenly balanced than in the other three case study counties.   
7.4 Nairobi  
Nairobi County is the smallest (696.1 Km2) yet most populous county in Kenya, with a population 
estimated to reach 4.9million in 2018 (Nairobi County Government, 2017). The county borders are 
coterminous with the capital city of Nairobi, a national and regional power hub containing most of 
Kenya’s key power structures, notably almost all national government ministries and the regional 
headquarters of a number of major transnational organisations, including the UNEP.  
The presence of these power structures has led to the county contributing most to national GDP, 
although at 13%, this contribution is significantly less than the 60% figure commonly perceived 
(Bundervoet et al., 2015). Yet, despite the lowest poverty rate in Kenya, the wealth generated has not 
been evenly dispersed: 22% of the county population live below the poverty line (KNBS & SID, 2013), 
while over 60% live in informal settlements (or ‘slums’) (Nairobi County Government, 2017).  
Politically, the county’s demographic diversity has led to highly contested elections. The county’s 
informal settlements saw notable post-election violence in 2007 (Anderson & Lochery, 2008), while 
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the 2013 and 2017 elections, although not as charged, also witnessed violence and were tightly run 
(Table 7.10). The latter saw a change of governor, the new incumbent dismissing the entire cabinet of 
his predecessor, raising questions concerning the balance between continuity and political patronage 
(Business Today, 2017). 
Table 7.10. Presidential and governor election results for Nairobi county in 2013 and 2017 (MCI Maps, 2017) 
7.4.1 Developments in decentralised energy governance  
Governance in Nairobi differs significantly from the other 46 counties as many administrative 
structures were in place as the county effectively superseded the pre-devolution Nairobi province. 
This particularly benefitted sectors, such as agriculture and water, where power had been bestowed 
on the former provinces, but less so energy, which was almost entirely centralised before 2013. 
Developments since 2013 have seen Nairobi form an energy department, sited in the county Ministry 
of Water, Energy, Environment, Forestry & Natural Resources (MoWEFNR). The Ministry has received 
relatively little of the county budget, averaging 6.8% over four financial years between 2013-17 
(Nairobi county government, 2017), which divided among five departments, suggests little resource 
for county energy. This allocation is further diminished by recurrent expenses averaging 67%, and 60% 
of the residual 33% ‘development budget’ remaining unused (Nairobi county government, 2017). 
The lack of resources was emphasised by a senior Nairobi county energy officer, who highlighted he 
was the lone officer working on energy within the MoWEFNR, and that the energy department had 
received “no allocation … in any of the last 4 years since the county government was formed … it all 
went to environment” [19], strongly indicating energy has not been a priority for the county. Yet, 
despite these constraints, the energy department has developed a County Energy Policy & Action Plan 
in collaboration with KAM, UNIDO and Practical Action (Table 7.11). Neither the policy nor plan appear 
to be publicly available, possibly denting investment opportunities, although a KAM representative 
stated that aspects of both had been integrated into the publicly accessible second CIDP [59].  
Table 7.11 Nairobi county energy polices developed since 2013 
Policy and planning documents Published  External collaborators 
First CIDP 2013-2017 2014 None 
Second CIDP 2018-2022 (draft) 2017 None 
County Energy Policy & Action Plan Unpublished  KAM, UNIDO Practical Action 
 
The widespread availability of energy services from the pre-devolution era (grid electricity coverage 
was estimated at 90% by the senior county energy officer) has resulted in Nairobi having the highest 
access rates to grid electricity and clean cooking fuels in Kenya (Table 7.12). However, electricity 
outages were still common, with stakeholders reporting the quality of supply had only slightly 
Presidential election results Governor election winner 
2013 2017 (annulled) 2013 2017 
Kenyatta (Jubilee) 
46.75% 
Odinga (ODM) 
49% 
Kenyatta (Jubilee) 
48.4% 
Odinga (ODM) 
51% 
Kidero 
(ODM) 
Sonko 
(Jubilee) 
2017 registered voters: 2,304,386 
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improved since 2013. No data exists concerning off-grid electricity access rates, while the use of clean 
cooking fuels such as LPG is the highest in the country. 
Table 7.12 Energy access in Nairobi (Nairobi county government, 2017) 
7.4.2 Transnational actor interactions with decentralised energy governance  
As the site of (almost) all national government ministries, many major transnational organisation 
headquarters, and the main international airport, transnational actor engagement with other energy 
stakeholders has been centred in Nairobi. Most major transnational run energy conferences are held 
in the capital, which suggests opportunities for Nairobi county to engage transnational actors and 
potentially access funding which time and travel costs may preclude from other counties. The 
triumvirate of KAM, UNIDO, and Practical Action, the transnational actors who supported the county‘s 
energy policy development can perhaps be seen as evidence of Nairobi benefitting from its locality.   
Yet, many transnational run events I attended in Nairobi during my fieldwork period were notable for 
being well represented by all energy stakeholder groups except county governments and the 
community level; a Nakuru environment officer remarking: “this happens a lot” [26]. At a GIZ 
workshop to design the County Energy Planning Framework, a representative of Hivos112 expressed 
concern that county administrations had not been involved in any of the initial meetings [92]. Thus, in 
these cases it seems Nairobi county’s proximity has made little difference to opportunities to engage 
with transnational actors. The highly tangible presence of the Nairobi situated national government 
has also possibly disincentivised the need for transnationals to engage the county, particularly given 
their predilection for using national government as a conduit for resources; a tendency most likely 
encouraged by the county administration’s own lack of prioritisation of energy.  
More common have been transnational actor interactions with the county government over waste-
to-energy initiatives, where energy is seen as the secondary objective. The AfDB financed a municipal 
waste-to-energy scheme in Kibera (Nairobi’s largest informal settlement), while efforts to establish a 
Ksh28billion waste-to-energy recycling plant in Dandora have been ongoing. The county’s failure to 
secure title deeds for the land in Dandora saw the Austrian contractor, Strabag, pull out from the 
initiative in 2016, although the current governor has renewed efforts having made waste disposal a 
major 2017 election campaign pledge.  This pledge reinforces the notion that energy is the secondary 
concern; with the significant county funding and enthusiasm a result of waste’s greater political 
expediency and strengthens the sense that capacity building initiatives may often need to emphasise 
these nexus benefits in localities or sectors (e.g. clean cooking) where energy would otherwise be 
overlooked. 
 
 
112 Hivos (the Humanist Institute for Cooperation with Developing Countries) is a major Dutch NGO with projects covering a 
broad range of development fields. 
Grid Electricity Off-grid electricity Clean cooking access 
68.2% use electricity for lighting (doesn’t say off-grid 
or grid), 28.8% paraffin, 2.9% grass, 1.7% dry cells  
No data 63.2% paraffin, 20.2% LPG,  
10.5% charcoal, 3% firewood 
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7.4.3 National government interactions with decentralised energy governance 
Grid electricity 
National governance interactions over grid electricity in Nairobi seem little altered from the pre-
devolution era. A senior electrical engineer noted “in terms of electrical energy, devolution has not 
changed anything in Nairobi” [20], while a senior county energy officer added “KPLC is still 
dominating” [19]. Yet, county government stakeholders reported positive relations with the national 
government, commending the memorandum of understanding signed with ERC for a subsidised 
county electricity tariff, while collaborations on street lighting and wayleaves provision were also 
praised by county officers.  
This positivity seems to reflect the sense within county government that little county intervention is 
required in grid electricity; the senior Nairobi county energy officer remarking “in Nairobi 
electrification is already done” [19]. Although this is clearly not the case as 30% of the county 
population lack access; the position has some justification as affordability is the key barrier, which the 
county government seems to have little scope to address as most who cannot afford grid electricity 
live in Nairobi’s informal settlements where widespread illegal connections113 or the national 
government run GPOBA programme are likely to undercut any county initiative (Lambe & Senyagwa, 
2015). The electrical engineer viewed GPOBA “a success” for reducing the number of residents risking 
the dangerous practice of tapping into the grid [20], although a senior REA officer felt the primary 
motivation of the KPLC run initiative was to capture revenue lost to these illegal connections in line 
with the sentiments expressed by an EU representative in Chapter 5 [14]. 
Yet, the view that electrification was ‘done’ was not shared by actors outside government; local energy 
consultants argued the distribution network was not keeping pace with the county’s rapid population 
growth, leading to frequent outages [24, 60]. In line with arguments made nationally in Chapter 6, 
consultants argued compensation for outages or bottom-up pressure was required to incentivise KPLC 
to upgrade their systems; the latter a role the county government seems well placed to facilitate 
through lobbying, mobilising grassroots pressure, and potentially via helping coordinate reticulation 
upgrades. However, a Practical Action representative seemed doubtful this ‘pressure’ would transpire:  
for Nairobi, everyone is electrified … . This is where wastage comes in because they 
[the county government] think everything is okay, or we really don't need to put 
much effort in [70].   
Given the capacity constraints in the county energy department and KPLC’s general reticence to invest 
in upgrading lines over developing new lines, the NGO representative’s pessimistic outlook seems 
realistic concerning grid distribution upgrades. 
However, this view seems less valid for another aspect of grid infrastructure: street lighting, where 
the increased county coverage was viewed by many stakeholders as a significant county energy 
intervention, and by some, ‘the only’ intervention. The devolution process was seen as highly 
facilitatory by a county communications officer, who emphasised how it had enabled the county to 
negotiate with national government for the funding required for the lights. A senior county electrical 
 
113 These illegal connections usually charged a flat rate of approximately 500ksh per month (Lambe & Senyagwa, 2015).  
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engineer partly agreed, noting devolution had increased bottom up pressure: “MCAs [Members of the 
County Assembly] are competing with each other. ... the residents in a given ward see other wards 
with street lights and then pressure their MCAs to do the same”, but felt the emphasis on the 
programme’s was mainly due to political interests: “MCAs want things they can see the following day 
so that people will elect them, this also extends to the top leadership” [20]. The senior county energy 
officer concurred, noting how “money was channelled through national government to KPLC for 
lighting up Nairobi” after “[the] President pushed the 24-hour economy idea” [19], reflecting the 
broader Kenyan picture which has seen street lighting initiatives prioritised for their political value. 
Thus, it appears that aside from politically expedient street lighting, the county’s extensive pre-
existing electricity network has reduced the incentive for national and county government 
engagement over grid electricity, leaving MLG1-esque governance the status quo in Nairobi.  
Off-grid electricity 
The widespread coverage of the grid also appears to have diluted national and county government 
interactions over off-grid electricity. A senior county electrical engineer argued there were no “signs 
of support for renewable energy in the county, or awareness of how to enhance it” [20], which he felt 
stemmed from election interests: “the county government is not interested in long term plans, no 
immediate impact”, contrasting sharply with the more quickly delivered and tangible street lighting.  
A senior county energy officer also acknowledged the county had not placed much emphasis on off-
grid renewable energy electricity but argued this was mainly due to national government prioritising 
subsidies for grid electricity connection fees, which the officer felt was justified as it was cheaper than 
the upfront costs of establishing off-grid renewable energy infrastructure [19]. This seems accurate, 
although it does not address the issue of the long-term costs incurred from billing where the literature 
finds off-grid systems may find parity or be cheaper (Roche & Blanchard, 2018). The officer also felt 
county off-grid initiatives had been stymied by regulatory barriers, including outdated national 
legislation, “we’re still being guided by the Energy Act 2006”, low feed-in tariffs, and the need to obtain 
national government approvals for any form of electricity generating projects. This bureaucratic 
challenge was confirmed by an ERC officer, who recognised “there is a need to streamline … for power 
project licencing there are a large number of clearances required” [11], while it also reflects the 
concern raised in Chapter 5 that the legislative failure to provide counties with a regulatory role in off-
grid electricity is likely to hinder county initiatives.  
Although national legislation, bureaucracy, and subsidisation priorities have impeded county interests 
in off-grid generation, there appears scope for initiatives in energy efficiency as the senior county 
energy officer acknowledged when highlighting collaborations with the private sector on energy 
efficiency in buildings. This seems a sensible step with energy efficiency conventionally acknowledged 
in the literature as a ‘low-hanging fruit’ although more recent treatments have begun to question its 
prioritisation over measures with greater long-term benefits (Annunziata et al., 2014). More 
prudently, a Nairobi-based energy consultant stressed the key county role was to lobby and “institute 
policies that push companies in certain directions” [23]. This suggestion of a faciliatory, rather than 
implementing, role for the county is a key recommendation of this thesis and seems particularly apt 
for the current Nairobi context given the lack of resources in the county energy department.  
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Overall, the widespread coverage of the grid appears to have diluted national and county government 
interventions in off-grid electricity. Yet, the county still has a key facilitator role it can play which has 
so far only partially been fulfilled. This is particularly so in terms of lobbying for a more streamlined 
off-grid regulatory environment and incentivising Nairobi’s diverse private sector to engage in off-grid 
electricity.  
Clean cooking 
National Government fuel taxation policies have had a disproportionate effect on cooking energy in 
Nairobi as the capital has a significantly higher proportion of households using gas compared to other 
counties (Table 7.12). Levies have been imposed on kerosene exacerbating the wealth divide as the 
fuel tends to be used by low-income households (Ilako, 2019), while subsidies have been applied to 
LPG (most notably as part of the National government Mwananchi Gas Project – see Chapter 5) which 
is primarily used by wealthier residents. Although the national government justification for these fiscal 
incentives appears well meaning in terms of being a push towards safer, cleaner LPG, a petroleum 
consultancy director argued rationally against “premature tax penalties on kerosene until alternative 
affordable fuels (including LPG) are availed to the lower income households” (Wachira, 2016, p.1).  
This sense of inequity over these tax priorities is supported by findings in the literature; Dalberg (2018, 
p.2) noting the high upfront cost of an LPG cylinder and stove leaves Kerosene “often the only truly 
affordable option for the poorest urban residents” and “the primary fuel for 70- 80% of slum 
households in Nairobi” (Table 7.13). In addition, the ‘Mwananchi Gas Project’ which aimed to ease the 
transition to LPG has stalled due to issues of fraud (cf. Ngugi, 2018). These taxation interventions seem 
indicative of top-down governance as they have mainly bypassed the county government. An energy 
consultant argued the removal of VAT from LPG had “nothing to do with devolution” [25], while a 
senior county energy officer remarked: “Not much has been done on gas and oil, it’s still basically with 
national government” [19].  
Table 7.13 Cooking fuel costs (reproduced and adapted from Dalberg, 2018) 
 Charcoal Kerosene LPG 
Fuel retail price $0.30 - 0.45/kg  $0.75 -0.85/L  $1.75/kg: 6/13kg cylinder refill 
>$3.00/kg: PAYG 
Annual fuel cost for 
average Nairobi household 
$207 - 249  $224  $233 
Stove retail price  $7 Kenya Ceramic Jiko 
$25-35 high efficiency jiko 
$6-20  $40-50: stove & cylinder  
 
Non-governmental organisations tended to emphasise sensitisation as the key role for counties in 
clean cooking. An energy consultant felt there was a clear need to raise consumer awareness of 
alternative cooking fuels and stoves, such as biogas and high efficiency stoves but not grid electricity, 
which was considered “way too expensive” [23]. Whilst the general awareness raising sentiment 
seems prudent, the energy consultant’s misgivings over electric cooking seem misplaced at least as 
far as off-grid electricity is concerned. Recent findings in the literature indicate the off-grid electric 
cooking sector is rapidly evolving in sub-Saharan Africa and likely to be on cost parity with 
conventional fuels in the next five years (Batchelor et al., 2018a). 
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Support for community engagement in Nairobi-based initiatives in clean cooking was also found in the 
literature. Noting charcoal was the main fuel in Kibera for reasons of culture and taste, Lambe & 
Senyagwa (2015, p.25) called for these social drivers to be incorporated into policy initiatives for fuel 
efficient stoves, with community participation stressed as vital “given the level of mistrust and fear of 
the national power utility among Kibera residents”. Adopting this approach seem to align with a more 
MLG2-esque form of governance; whereby the county facilitates engagement between local 
stakeholders, including communities cook stove producers, and awareness raising agencies to develop 
solutions the distrusted national government seems less likely to find. Indeed, a leading electric 
cooking study found uptake of electric cooking was likely to be much quicker by “leveraging Kenya’s 
extensive network of entrepreneurs and established institutions who are already actively rolling out 
energy access solutions” (Batchelor et al., 2018, p.266). This course of action, redolent of MLG2, seems 
applicable not only to Nairobi and Kenya but the wider Global South context as is becoming 
increasingly recognised within academia (Brown et al., 2017). 
Yet, the governance of clean cooking in Nairobi county is complicated by the fact it has a significant 
impact on other counties due to the environmental impact of the capital’s demands for charcoal. A 
county officer representing the counties of the former Coast Province stated publicly “our lands suffer 
from charcoal production, charcoal going to Nairobi”, while similar claims were made in Turkana [37]. 
This indicates the capital’s cooking energy governance cannot be looked at discretely. In an isolated 
case of a county government addressing a national policy void, Kitui county government implemented 
a charcoal ban in 2017, partly to address the environmental degradation caused by Nairobi bound 
charcoal. However, this seems likely to transpose the demand and environmental impact of charcoal 
to other counties, thus potentially having a negligible effect on the nation’s overall environmental 
wellbeing. Thus, while decentralised governance initiatives seem key to promoting clean cooking 
technologies, more centralised governance of charcoal may be required to avoid the impacts of 
production being simply displaced from one county to another; ironic given regulation of charcoal and 
other domestic cooking fuels is one of the few regulatory functions exclusively under the county 
mandate in the Energy Bill 2015. 
7.4.4 Key county issue: grid electricity cost and reliability and its impact on the community level 
The unreliability and cost of grid electricity was widely seen as the most pressing energy issue within 
Nairobi. A county communications officer noted “most manufacturers have stand by generators 
because outages are very frequent” [21], while three energy consultants stressed cost and reliability 
were also the main concerns for domestic customers [23, 24, 25]. The consultants felt KPLC 
performance had slightly improved since 2013 with the development of online customer service 
platforms but did not view the improvement as attributable to the devolution process, which supports 
the findings in Chapter 5 suggesting the county government role has been limited thus far in grid 
electricity. The shortcomings in the capital’s grid supply also have national implications. Backup power 
is supplied by far more expensive diesel generators which are particularly prevalent in the capital. This 
exacerbates the high cost of grid electricity, a burden shared throughout the country. 
Cost and reliability considerations have also deterred the private sector from grid tied renewable 
energy initiatives; a senior county energy officer blaming national government policy: “the problem is 
businesses don’t want to do it because the [feed-in] tariffs are too low, … so the organisations with 
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roof solar just use all the energy themselves” [19]. The experiences of Kenya’s first grid tied solar 
initiative at Strathmore University support this argument; a senior representative of the solar 
installation company explaining that regulatory hurdles had impeded the project, “we were the first 
to get a PPA, we have connected, but we have yet to be paid, [we have been] trying for over two years, 
but the net-metering is not there” [107]. This was an issue the installer felt the university had 
anticipated: “Strathmore was deliberately underpowered to avoid having a surplus, they knew they 
would have issues getting paid, because they were the first” [107]. A Nairobi based energy consultant 
acknowledged the university was using all the electricity generated [76]; it thus seems the primary 
motivation behind the PV array was to reduce dependence on the costly and unreliable KPLC grid 
rather than contribute to it. 
A reluctance to be grid-tied appears to be a growing trend. Sizeable PV arrays installed in two of 
Nairobi’s largest malls, ‘Garden City Mall’ and the ‘Two Rivers Mall’ were also deliberately undersized; 
a manager for the installers explaining, “The company has an IPP [license], which is critical to making 
this work, but it does not have a feed-in tariff, it’s just selling the energy to the shops” [55]. The 
manager attributed the success of the projects to the national government investor friendly policy 
which approved the IPP license. This suggests national government support for non-grid tied or 
‘captive’ systems, despite the manager indicating KPLC had concerns: 
KPLC is worried about companies, especially big factories with heavy regular loads 
going 100% autonomous. It’s easier for them to collect from such big companies 
than loads of little ones. So, with a captive system, we have to show KPLC that they 
save and gain money and emphasise there is less threat [55]. 
KPLC’s concern seems understandable as it seems unclear how the parastatal ‘gains’ from captive 
systems as revenue will have been lost from not supplying 100% of the malls’ electricity needs; a task 
well within their capacity given the admission by a senior KPLC officer that the parastatal is running a 
500MW surplus (cf. Olonyi, 2019). This bypassing of KPLC suggests a lack of investor confidence in the 
national grid, unsurprising given the issues concerning, cost, reliability, and feed-in tariffs. Thus, 
captive systems seem rational from a business perspective, yet likely to detrimentally impact the 
affordability of electricity for the general public as they deprive the grid of anchor clients, critical for 
cross-subsidising the cost of electricity. The non-addition of these viable renewable energy sources to 
the grid also appears to help maintain a role for backup generators, adding weight to the accusations 
of vested elite interests in diesel generated supply (Musau, 2018).  
7.4.5 Nairobi conclusion  
Overall, it seems energy governance has not noticeably altered in Nairobi since the devolution process 
began, remaining highly centralised with only slight improvement in service delivery. The widespread 
availability of grid electricity from the pre-devolution era and the close proximity of the national 
government appears to have resulted in the county administration not prioritising the energy sector, 
creating an extra layer of bureaucracy without clearly discernible results. This has led to a continuation 
of the pre-devolution MLG1 approach, with national government grid electricity interests remaining 
largely unchallenged. Given the far-reaching coverage of the grid in the capital this form of governance 
is arguably more suitable for Nairobi than any other county, yet it has still failed to adequately contend 
with issues of grid electricity affordability and reliability, and access to clean cooking. Issues, a more 
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representative MLG2 system, prompted by a more proactive county administration, might more 
appropriately address. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Empirical findings 
Overall, significant spatial variations are clearly present in the energy governance of the four county 
case studies, featuring many of the imbalances found in inter-scalar power relations at state level. 
Aligning with the state level picture, transnational actor resources have mainly been channelled via 
national government, leading to investment in all four counties for KPLC grid extension or grid island 
initiatives. Although this has increased electricity availability, equity issues persist in each county with 
many unable to afford access. This unaffordability has been compounded by the lack of engagement 
between national and county governments over off-grid electricity alternatives to the KPLC grid 
monopoly, with all four counties complaining of insufficient funding to develop such initiatives 
independently. Clean cooking initiatives have not been prioritised, with the four counties again citing 
funding issues, although the spectre of the highly centralised national government Mwananchi gas 
project has perhaps also disincentivised interventions. However, street lighting initiatives have been 
heavily prioritised in all four counties, indicating political expediency has been a key factor in county 
government decision making.   
Efforts to achieve a less top-down form of governance have been facilitated by transnational actor 
capacity building initiatives in the four counties. In particular, the assistance provided to county energy 
policy development, a key component in facilitating more representative governance and highly 
valued by all four counties. Yet, the level of support each county has received has varied significantly, 
largely due to political economy issues, such as path dependency. Also critical to developing capacity 
have been the varying extents to which each county has prioritised energy. Turkana has allocated 
knowledgeable personnel in key positions, while the Migori, Nairobi and Nakuru energy departments 
have been critically underfunded and understaffed. These contrasting prioritisations have manifested 
in how counties engage other stakeholders; Turkana has been far more active in challenging national 
government, particularly its top-down governance of grid islands and oil extraction. In contrast, the 
other three counties appear impeded by policy, capacity and resource constraints, with Migori 
particularly affected by its lack of inter-stakeholder coordination. 
The development of decentralised energy governance in Turkana therefore seems to least resemble 
the consolidation of MLG1 structures and prioritisation of national government interests which has 
been seen in the other three case study counties and, more broadly, across Kenya (see Chapters 5-6). 
This development has been underpinned by broader political interests. Turkana sees its petroleum 
resource as a key conduit to challenging national government and undoing historical marginalisation, 
and thus having a capable energy department is essential to these aims. However, this objective has 
gained far more traction through the interactions of a broad range of non-governmental stakeholders. 
Local non-governmental organisations such as the church and CSOs have been instrumental in 
sensitising communities, which has helped ensure communities are better informed and also better 
represented at higher levels of governance. This has strengthened the potential leverage of 
community protests, helping to generate significant bottom-up pressure. These various non-
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governmental influences provide a far stronger counterweight to the centre than the county would 
alone, although it is unclear at this juncture whether this MLG2-esque approach was intended and 
actively mobilised by the Turkana county government.  
There are also signs of a movement towards MLG2 in Nakuru, with the county highlighting three local 
non-government stakeholders as the organisations it communicates with most on energy issues. This 
appears indicative of the county beginning to adopt the facilitatory role advocated by this thesis (see 
Chapter 6), where counties act to coordinate networks of stakeholders in addressing community 
energy needs. The county as facilitator is also likely to be beneficial to the development of small scale 
off-grid electricity and clean cooking initiatives, which have been overlooked by the National 
government and been shown in the literature to most effectively develop from broad networks which 
connect and draw on a wide range of actors to help support learning and develop markets (see 
Chapter 5 cf. Byrne et al., 2014). In contrast, decentralised energy governance in Migori and Nairobi 
largely resembles a continuation of the pre-devolution MLG1 approach, primarily for reasons of 
capacity and coordination in the former and a lack of county engagement with the latter. 
Brought together, the four case studies suggest broader implications for Kenyan decentralised energy 
governance. Based on the historical insights on development from chapters 3 and 5 and the findings 
on power relations in chapters 6 and 7, seven key spatially contingent factors are identified as 
underpinning the emergent forms of decentralised energy governance in the four counties. These are 
shown in Table 7.14, which orders the four case studies according to how discernible each factor is 
within each county. The evidence from Kenya suggests the more each factor is manifest, the greater 
the likelihood of decentralised energy governance resembling or moving towards MLG2 in that county.  
Aligning with the empirical findings of this chapter: Table 7.14 show Turkana to be most likely to move 
towards MLG2 followed by Nakuru, Migori and lastly Nairobi.  
Table 7.14 Factors increasing the chance of a move to MLG2 and their discernibility in case study counties   
 Historically 
marginalise
-d 
% of 
people 
lacking 
energy 
access 
County 
access to 
TAC 
support 
County 
energy 
dept. 
capacity  
Bottom-up 
pressure 
from county 
non-gov  
actors  
Bottom-up 
pressure 
from 
community 
level 
Sub-nat 
actors 
coordinated 
 MLG2 
More 
 
 
 Less 
Turkana Migori Turkana Turkana Turkana Turkana Nakuru  Turkana 
Migori Turkana Nakuru Nakuru Nakuru Nakuru  Turkana Nakuru 
Nakuru Nakuru Nairobi Migori  Migori Migori Nairobi Migori 
Nairobi Nairobi Migori Nairobi Nairobi Nairobi Migori Nairobi 
 
Conceptual and theoretical implications 
The main argument emerging from this chapter – that decentralised energy governance and its 
underpinning power dynamics are subject to significant spatial variations – has several wider 
conceptual and theoretical implications. By revealing the marked geographical variations in 
decentralised energy governance, this study compliments and extends important political economy 
analyses which have emphasised the relational but not spatial nature of energy transitions in the 
Global South (Newell & Phillips 2016; Baker & Phillips, 2019).  In particular, capacity building – shown 
by this thesis to be critical to developing effective forms of decentralised energy governance – needs 
to be understood as subject to a number of spatially contingent political economy factors which, if left 
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unchecked, are likely to result in considerable variations of governance quality at the sub-national 
level, exacerbating existing geographical inequities in energy access. These insights also extend 
debates on shifting energy paradigms (cf. Goldthau, 2012) by highlighting that various forms of energy 
paradigm may exist in the same country depending on localised inter-scalar dynamics between the 
state and sub-/supra-national stakeholders. In Nairobi, governance reflects a blurred statist/neoliberal 
paradigm where a profit motivated state dominates control of the energy sector. Yet, the stronger 
decentralised energy governance in Turkana has begun pushing the state towards the “stakeholder of 
public interest” role in the interventionism paradigm, enabling greater scope for the polycentric 
governance approaches espoused by leading energy studies scholars (Sovacool, 2014).  
In addition, the spatially contingent factors outlined in Table 7.14 are likely to have broader relevance 
as they align with increasingly held views about the importance of stakeholder coordination and 
uncodified structural factors in decentralisation processes (Erk, 2014), and the need for capacity 
building, stakeholder engagement, and participatory processes in facilitating transitions to equitable 
energy access (Brown et al., 2015). Given the findings of this thesis indicate a more MLG2 system of 
energy governance is required to facilitate more equitable energy access and counteract the failings 
of centralised energy governance, the theorised causality highlighted in Table 7.14 has important 
implications. Principally, the table could be applied to other Global South contexts to identify specific 
underlying issues which hinder a movement to MLG2, enabling more targeted measures (e.g. capacity 
building interventions) to address these concerns. Without such interventions, it seems probable that 
spatial disparities in the quality of energy governance will emerge while critical sub-national authority 
roles such as energy planning, which could facilitate more representative MLG2-esque governance, 
are likely to be more slowly and less effectively realised. 
Furthermore, recognising decentralised energy governance as spatially contingent has important 
methodological implications. Principally, this understanding supports human geography arguments 
that spatial variations in power dynamics are not easily unearthed by theoretical governance models 
– including the MLG framework used by this thesis – and that geographical empirical approaches are 
therefore needed (alongside theorised approaches where appropriate) if practices of decentralised 
energy governance on the ground are to be better understood and more effectively developed 
(Griffin, 2012). 
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Chapter 8 - Conclusion: the role of decentralised energy governance  
Acknowledging the distinct lack of attention paid to energy governance in the context of 
decentralisation in the Global South, the principal aim of this research has been to investigate the role 
of decentralised governance in addressing energy access issues in Kenya since the institution of 
devolution in 2013. The pressing need for such research has been clearly demonstrated. Chapter 1 
highlighted how lack of access to electricity and clean cooking disproportionately affects the Global 
South and particularly sub-Saharan Africa while emphasising that poor, highly centralised governance 
lies at the heart of the crisis. The urgency of this research was reinforced by the findings of Chapters 
2 and 3 which revealed how the critical lack of engagement between the decentralisation and energy 
studies literatures in a Global South context has undermined decentralised governance as a potential 
means to address energy access issues. 
The literature review conducted for this PhD found only two major studies combining the discourses 
of decentralisation and energy studies: those by the UNDP (2009) and Brown et al. (2015). These 
important works covered multiple countries, providing a broad scope of the extent of decentralised 
energy governance and its potential to address energy access issues. Yet, aside from this PhD, the 
author knows of no other study which has focussed in depth on the quality of energy governance 
emerging from a decentralisation process in a Global South nation; particularly in terms of the 
underlying power relations – and their geographical variations – that have been critical in shaping the 
forms of governance which have emerged. The thesis thus addresses a clear and pressing scholarly 
deficit while also highlighting through its novel application of Hooghe and Mark’s (2003) Multilevel 
governance (MLG) to energy governance that an MLG framework has uses – albeit with key caveats –  
in facilitating understanding of decentralised energy governance processes. 
This urgent research agenda has been addressed through three research questions which focus on the 
experiences, interactions, and agendas of the various stakeholders operating at multiple scales in and 
through decentralised energy governance. Organised into four parts, this final chapter begins by 
identifying the key empirical contributions in relation to the three research questions and then assess 
in section 8.2 the methodological implications of the study for others seeking to do research on 
decentralised energy governance in the Global South. Section 8.3 builds on the empirical findings by 
highlighting how they have shaped this study’s contributions to conceptual and theoretical 
understandings of decentralised energy governance, particularly with regard to Hooghe and Mark’s 
(2003) twin concepts of MLG which form the analytical framework of the study. The implications of 
these empirical, conceptual and theoretical contributions for policy and practice in Kenya and, more 
broadly, the wider Global South are then explored in section 8.4. Lastly, section 8.5 highlights the key 
directions for future research based on the findings and limitations of the thesis. 
8.1 Empirical contributions 
Developments in decentralised energy governance  
This study’s first research question interrogated how the processes of decentralisation and 
decentralised energy governance have unfolded in Kenya. Through a critical analysis of Kenyan energy 
sector legislation and the post-2013 developments in the electricity (grid and off-grid) and clean 
cooking sectors, this thesis concludes that Kenya has seen the emergence of energy governance more 
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akin to the hierarchical nature of MLG1 than the overlapping MLG2-esque form seemingly intended 
by the legislative framework – a development found to be detrimental to addressing energy access 
issues. The unwillingness of national government to cede effective power to devolved units was found 
to present the most significant barrier to a transition towards a more MG2-esque system, with 
evidence from this thesis asserting five key factors underpinning this situation.  
Firstly, decentralised energy governance has been undermined by legislative ambiguities concerning 
national and county government roles and delays in the promulgation of the Energy Bill 2015 – the 
key piece of legislation governing devolved energy roles. Secondly, although decentralised institutions 
are nominally in place, the reforms adopted by national government parastatals have resembled 
deconcentration. Thirdly, the continuation of top-down governance has been aided by resources 
(including from transnational actors) continuing to be focussed on national government priorities, 
particularly grid electricity and, to a lesser extent, grid islands. These energy sub-sectors have not been 
devolved in any meaningful way and national government retains a de facto monopoly while 
decentralised energy governance initiatives in smaller scale off-grid electricity have been 
disincentivised by excessive national government regulatory oversight. Fourthly, the county role has 
been constrained by capacity issues and a failure by many county authorities to prioritise the energy 
sector. In particular, many counties have not established energy departments while interventions 
have tended to focus on politically expedient streetlighting rather than, for example, small-scale off 
grid electricity and clean cooking: energy sub-sectors which counties are well placed to facilitate and 
are more beneficial from a human development perspective.  
Yet, the fifth contention is that national government is primarily responsible for these county 
shortcomings. The Constitution charges national government with providing capacity building support 
to counties, but such assistance has often been lacking (particularly in terms of planning guidance) 
and unevenly distributed among counties due largely to political economy issues. In addition, the 
national government’s monopolistic control of electricity, prolonged failure to promulgate the Energy 
Bill 2015, and delay in establishing a regulatory framework for off-grid electricity have understandably 
disincentivised county energy interventions. This failure to address capacity may be intentional given 
central governments have been found to consistently use capacity arguments to block the transfer of 
powers to sub-national authorities (Ribot, 2002). This resonates with the Kenyan case study, with the 
capacity rationale most notably used by the President when refusing to assent to the share of oil 
revenues awarded counties by the Energy and Petroleum Policy 2015. 
The continuation of a MLG1 system has resulted in the ongoing prioritisation of national government 
interests in grid electricity. Aligning with a growing number of authors (e.g. Lee et al., 2016; Ndii, 2019),  
this thesis asserts that this emphasis has been excessive as grid electricity coverage has increased but 
actual access far less so due to issues of affordability. The erroneous ‘build it and they will come’ 
mentality has not resulted in the increased scale of uptake publicised by national government figures 
as significant numbers of the connections are largely inactive, with households unable to afford 
appliances or the electricity to power them. This leaves the Kenya Power and Lighting Company (KPLC) 
burdened with the costs of maintaining loss-making connections and running a surplus of generation. 
These costs are then passed on to consumers which further disincentivises uptake, creating additional 
surplus and costs: a vicious circle. As a result of this continuation of a MLG1 system, urgently needed 
small scale off-grid electricity and clean cooking initiatives have not been prioritised. This represents 
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a significant missed opportunity as counties seem ideally placed to facilitate such initiatives by 
coordinating networks of diverse local stakeholders.  
Inter-stakeholder power relations  
This study’s second research question centred on how the interactions and agendas of various energy 
stakeholders have helped shape the decentralised energy governance which has emerged in Kenya. 
Here the primary conclusion was that the emergence of a more MLG1 form of governance has been 
shaped by the significant power imbalances present in stakeholder engagement within decentralised 
energy governance. Most notably, the national government has actively sought to exploit power 
differentials in its favour to restrict the development of MLG2-esque governance as it clearly suits 
vested national government interests in grid electricity to persist with a more top-down MLG1 form.  
The thesis cites several key examples as evidence of national government efforts to dominate the 
power relations operating within decentralised energy governance. National government control over 
grid electricity has been consolidated by what seems a deliberate lack of clear engagement with 
counties over the feasible and desirable collaborative roles they could play such as planning, lobbying, 
and potentially subsidising grid electricity. National government control over policy levers has also 
dampened county potential for collaboration. Most notably, REA’s switch from mass connectivity to 
the Digital Literacy Programme (DLP) side-lined counties while delivering a project which prioritised 
the interests of national elites rather than local needs.   
In addition, national government has used its exclusive regulatory control over electricity to curtail 
county and private sector off-grid electricity initiatives – in some cases, disconnecting up and running 
systems (cf. ERC, 2018). This has resulted in most large off-grid electricity initiatives remaining 
centrally controlled by KPLC and subject to the same MLG1-esque governance as grid initiatives. Such 
schemes do not provide a competitor to the grid which might reduce prices; hence the coining of the 
phrase ‘grid islands’ to describe them. Essentially, the national government has consistently obscured 
the clarity of guidelines concerning where the county role ends and the national government role 
begins whilst maintaining national government oversight and bureaucratic checks which limit 
independent decision making at the sub-national level. This is seemingly what the national 
government wants in order to avoid off-grid initiatives challenging national elite interests in grid 
electricity.    
Small-scale off-grid electricity and clean cooking initiatives have been subject to less dominant 
national government control and less contested inter-governmental relations primarily due to being 
underprioritised by both levels of government. This is a significant missed opportunity for county 
governments as their more localised scale means they are ideally placed to facilitate networks of 
diverse actors, which the literature highlights as key to driving development in these energy sub-
sectors (Ockwell & Byrne, 2017). Developments in small-scale off-grid electricity and clean cooking 
were also found to be impeded by: disconnects over the role each level of government should adopt; 
a lack of coordination between stakeholders; and in the case of clean cooking, inadequate recognition 
legislatively or institutionally of the potential role counties could play.  
The imbalances in power dynamics shaping the emergent MLG1-esque governance were also found 
to be propagated by the interactions of other key stakeholders. Transnational actors (TAC1-3) are a 
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case in point, primarily using national government as a conduit for county engagement which has 
consolidated top-down MLG1-esque governance. TAC3 actor engagement with counties has tended 
to be more direct although path dependency often skews power relations, resulting in support being 
unevenly distributed among counties. County engagement with communities has also been limited 
thus impeding the potential for more representative MLG2 governance to emerge. This has perhaps 
been encouraged by the finding that communities value service delivery more than participatory 
politics, suggesting a lack of appreciation between how the two are linked.  
This continuation of MLG1-esque governance spurred by imbalanced power relations has resulted in 
the flawed national government emphasis on grid electricity extension and generation initiatives going 
largely unchecked. Exceptions to this status quo were found to be limited, mostly occurring where 
community awareness and willingness to protest over land rights affected by energy initiatives has 
created leverage and bottom-up pressure. This has resulted in the few isolated instances where 
stakeholders from all scales (transnational, national, county, and community) have been coerced into 
engaging in a form of consultative and cooperative MLG2-esque politics. The thesis thus concludes 
that cross-scalar governance arrangements have worked most effectively when one key stakeholder 
group is not operating at an overwhelming position of strength compared to the other(s). This 
inference draws on findings from other sectors which note the impact of power dynamics on MLG2-
esque forms of governance; for instance, Scott (2017, p.6) highlights how “vested interests and 
unequal power relationships” heavily influenced stakeholder coordination in water-energy-food 
nexus approaches in Kenya and Indonesia.  
Spatial variations   
The third research question of this study focussed on how the process of decentralisation and the 
interactions and agendas of various energy stakeholders have helped shape the development of 
decentralised energy governance at the local level in Kenya. The study concludes that significant 
spatial variations exist in the energy governance of the four county case studies featuring many of the 
inter-scalar power imbalances found at state level. These variations resulted in decentralised energy 
governance in some counties being far more redolent of the intended MLG2 form than in others, with 
the research identifying seven key spatially contingent factors underlying these differences.  
These factors were more manifest and MLG2-esque governance far more marked in Turkana than the 
other three counties. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the near universal coverage of grid electricity and 
proximity to central government institutions has left decentralised energy governance in Nairobi least 
redolent of MLG2. The clear variations among the counties reinforce the relevance of geography to 
theoretical governance models and support findings in the literature which emphasise that spatially 
contingent empirical approaches are needed to uncover the on-the-ground relationships, agendas and 
interactions which shape the power relations underpinning forms of governance (Griffin, 2012). 
Overall conclusion: the role of decentralised energy governance 
Several overarching conclusions can be drawn from the empirical findings. For the most part, 
decentralised energy governance in Kenya has continued to resemble a top-down MLG1-esque form, 
deviating from the more collaborative MLG2 form indicated by the Constitution and detrimental to 
addressing energy access issues. The thesis notes several key features of the Kenyan case shaping this 
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development, with significant cross-scalar power imbalances the most pertinent. Most notably, 
national government exploitation of power differentials in its favour (particularly controls over 
legislation, regulation and resources) has restricted the development of MLG2-esque decentralised 
energy governance. The Kenyan case is also marked by the sub-national level being generally unable 
to provide a sufficient check to top-down governance due to capacity issues, which themselves are 
largely a product of scalar political economy dynamics. In addition, the spatially contingent nature of 
power relations is another key feature of the Kenyan case, with decentralised energy governance 
more akin to MLG2 emerging in counties where coordinated networks of sub-national actors are more 
prominent and able to exert bottom up pressure on centralised governance.   
The thesis argues a shift towards the intended MLG2 form of governance is clearly needed in order to 
facilitate more equitable access to energy in Kenya. Without this realignment, National Government 
has shown its intent to actively pursue a MLG1 governance form which both prioritises centralised 
grid electricity/grid island initiatives that only work for parts of the population and has resulted in non-
sensical decision making tied to vested interests. For every so called ‘failure of decentralisation’ (such 
as Kinangop) there is at least one (if not more) ‘failure of centralisation’ (e.g. The Lamu Coal Power 
Plant, the DLP, and to a certain extent: the Last Mile Connectivity Plan (LMCP). The scale of these 
‘failures of centralisation’ makes them a far more serious issue.   
These vested interests have so far not dissipated, and so robust MLG2-esque networks of local actors 
are needed to provide checks and balances to central government and to advocate and facilitate more 
locally appropriate energy access solutions. Responding to the principal aim of this thesis, the research 
contends that the key role of decentralised energy governance is to develop and maintain such 
networks, with counties deemed ideally placed to facilitate and coordinate their development. This 
conclusion finds support from other sectors where local authorities have played similar roles. Both 
Moloney & Fünfgeld (2015) and Pasquini et al. (2015) emphasise the benefits of local stakeholder 
networks facilitated by sub-national government in addressing climate change adaption, while Stein 
et al. (2011, p.1091) highlight how local government authorities “often cut across sectoral boundaries 
and … facilitate integrated approaches to land and water management”.  
Actors operating at various scales have key roles to play in supporting MLG2-esque networks of local 
energy stakeholders. Transnational actors can provide critical capacity and resource support to these 
networks, with more recent treatments in the energy studies literature suggesting they may also be 
key to financing innovative business models which enable low income households to access energy 
services (Ockwell et al., 2019). NGOs and CSOs can lobby on behalf of communities and engage in 
awareness raising while the private sector role is also likely to be significant, particularly in delivering 
and maintaining locally appropriate energy solutions. Lastly, community participation is arguably the 
most critical component if harnessed effectively as the Kenyan experience has shown their protests 
have generated most bottom-up pressure vis-à-vis the national government.  
Ideally, national government would also see the folly in their excessive emphasis on grid-centric 
policies and overly-centralised governance approaches. Should they do so, they could enhance 
decentralised energy governance by establishing clear sector guidelines, reducing regulatory oversight 
for small-scale off-grid initiatives, and developing a reliable transmission and distribution network that 
can accommodate more flexible and intermittent off-grid technologies. The need for the latter seems 
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inevitable given the introduction of net-metering in the Energy Act 2019 and the fact that a tipping 
point is near, if not already here, concerning the viability of decentralised energy technologies 
(Hankins, 2019). In the same way as transnational actors, national government could provide capacity 
and resource support to develop decentralised MLG2-esque networks and facilitate the coordination 
and development of parallel energy governance schemes – a flexible MLG1 governed grid 
complimented and enhanced by MLG2 facilitated off-grid initiatives. The “cooperative and 
consultative” governance espoused by the Constitution. 
8.2 Methodological contributions 
The research approach adopted by this study has several important methodological implications for 
others seeking to do research on decentralised energy governance in the Global South. Most studies 
within the decentralisation and energy studies literatures have utilised quantitative methods. 
However, my research has shown they are largely irrelevant to understanding the quality of a 
decentralised energy governance as stakeholder interactions and power relations shaped the forms 
of governance which emerged and consequently the responses to addressing energy access issues. 
Thus, a predominantly qualitative methodology is required in order to understand the spatial 
variations of human interactions and power relations which underpin decentralised energy 
governance, aligning with a constructionist ontological position and an interpretivist epistemological 
stance centred on critically appraising various, subjective human constructed ‘truths’. 
Furthermore, quantitative markers concerning the impact of decentralisation on the delivery of 
energy services were often misleading and could be used to serve certain stakeholder agendas. For 
instance, while the number of KPLC offices increased to cover every county, they had little 
autonomous decision making power. Similarly, the national government’s use of extended grid 
coverage to denote improved energy access concealed the fact that this represented availability of 
electricity rather than actual use. This study thus aligns with Batchelor et al (2014) and Brown et al. 
(2015) – among the small number of authors to have engaged in the decentralised energy governance 
field – in emphasising that qualitative approaches (with research methods and questions grounded in 
the aforementioned ontological and epistemological assumptions) are required to assess the critical 
factors underpinning the effectiveness of decentralised energy governance, principally: inter-scalar 
power relations; citizen participatory processes; decision making autonomy; accountability; and 
resource access. 
The second methodological implication is that geographical approaches are critical to understanding 
the spatial variations of the power relations underpinning decentralised energy governance. This 
contrasts with traditional political approaches which have tended to view multi-scalar governance 
arrangements as hierarchical with the state as the main site of political power (Gallaher et al, 2009). 
The findings from Kenya show that significant spatial variations exist in the decentralised energy 
governance found in different counties resulting in some cases where the state has been successfully 
challenged by decentralised governance. The factors underlying these differences are not easily 
discerned from theoretical approaches, including by the use of MLG1 and MLG2 in this study. This 
study thus reinforces arguments within human geography that empirical geographical approaches are 
needed to uncover the spatially contingent on-the-ground relationships, agendas and interactions 
which shape the power relations underpinning forms of governance (Griffin, 2012).   
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The final implication concerns the range of methodological strategies and approaches used by this 
study and detailed in Chapter 4. Although not necessarily containing new insights, it is hoped that as 
a package they will be of use as a researcher’s toolkit for future research into decentralised energy 
governance in the Global South. In particular, the importance of contacts was emphasised, with 
introductions to other stakeholders heavily reliant on prior (mostly face-to-face) engagement with 
these gatekeepers. In-country conferences and workshops were highlighted as an opportune means 
to establish such contacts. Positionality issues were also stressed, with ongoing Global South/North 
partnerships emphasised as a means to avoid extractive research and foster mutually beneficial 
collaborations that enrich research processes. 
8.3 Conceptual and theoretical contributions 
Many of the findings from this research have relevance beyond Kenya and contain a number of wider 
conceptual and theoretical implications for decentralised energy governance in the Global South. 
Initially, the thesis explored how varied understandings of the concepts of decentralisation, 
governance and energy access intersect, a critically overlooked issue in a Global South context 
impeding the development of an evidence base to inform policy on how decentralised energy 
governance might develop effectively (Brown et al., 2015). Drawing together these concepts enabled 
new insights into how they interrelate and whether decentralised energy governance is subject to the 
same recentralisation issues widely acknowledged as affecting Global South decentralisation 
processes more generally (D’Arcy & Cornell, 2016; Erk, 2014). In addition, this approach extended 
knowledge on whether and under what circumstances decentralised energy governance might help 
address Global South energy access issues  – a missing component from ongoing debates over how 
the polycentric governance approaches advocated by leading energy studies scholars might work in 
practice (Goldthau, 2012; Sovacool, 2014). 
Responding to these debates, the findings from Kenya indicate decentralisation has particular and 
distinct relevance to energy and its governance in the Global South. This is because grid electricity 
(particularly transmission and distribution) tends to be one of the few remaining state controlled 
natural monopolies in these country contexts in contrast to other network reliant sectors 
conventionally perceived as natural monopolies (Table 8.1) (Goldthau, 2012). Given the tendency for 
rent seeking within Global South natural monopolies and the lucrativeness of the energy sector 
(Bigsten & Moene, 1996), it seems highly likely that central governments will be reluctant to 
decentralise energy – more so than most other sectors. This paints a rather negative portrayal of 
central government motivations in the energy sector, suggesting self-enrichment and personal power 
appear to be prioritised over improving the provision of affordable energy access; yet the historical 
and ongoing legacy of corrupt centralised energy governance in sub-Saharan Africa impeded by issues 
of political patronage indicates this is not unfounded (cf. Africa Progress Panel, 2015).  
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Table 8.1 Reasons why sectors conventionally perceived as natural monopolies are not in Kenya114 
Sector Reason 
Gas A gas network does not exist in Kenya. The bottled LPG market is deregulated. 
Water Water has been decentralised to service boards. Competition is provided by bottled 
water, direct use from rivers/streams and the informal sector (especially in slum areas). 
Public transport  Train travel is a state monopoly but not widespread. Regional/local bus services are 
deregulated. 
Communications Fixed line telephones have been leapfrogged by my mobile phones dominated by the 
private sector. The mobile network is 40% state owned / 60% private sector owned. 
 
The research also explored the concepts of scale and power, enabling new insights into the urgent but 
understudied area of how power relations and the complex political economy of energy issues play 
out across multiple scales of analysis (Bagley et al., 2018). In doing so, the thesis extends human 
geography debates over whether the state should be viewed relationally (Brenner, 2001; Jessop, 
1990); a discussion applied in a few cases to energy in general (Van Veelen, 2018; Angel, 2017) but, as 
far as the author is aware, never as part of detailed analysis on a decentralised energy governance 
process in a Global South context.  
In response to these debates, the Kenyan experience strongly suggests that concepts of scale and 
power underpin how decentralised energy governance processes are shaped and thus such processes 
in the Global South (and beyond) need to be understood relationally. Notably, Kenyan decentralised 
energy governance was shown to be most effective when significant cross-scalar power imbalances 
were not present, yet this was impeded by political economy issues common to other Global South 
contexts. In particular, the use of erroneous grid-centric conceptualisations of energy access by 
centralised governance to encourage an understanding that energy operates at scales of governance 
higher than the sub-national level (Brown et al., 2015). In addition, and similarly present in many 
Global South decentralisation contexts (Cabral, 2011), centralised control over policy, regulation, 
resources, and, crucially, capacity building were shown in Kenya to be key levers with which central 
governments can consolidate top-down MLG1-esque governance, inter-scalar power imbalances and 
grid-centric approaches.  
While these power dynamics persist, the benefits of decentralised energy governance in facilitating 
more locally appropriate smaller scale off-grid and clean cooking initiatives are likely to be impeded, 
detrimentally impacting Global South energy access issues. However, the Kenyan experience also 
demonstrates how decentralised energy governance can when effectively mobilised, provide checks 
and balances to central government exploitation of natural monopolies. Turkana in particular showed 
how a network of influential non-governmental actors mobilised community awareness to ensure a 
far more participatory community engagement process was adopted by the National government and 
Tullow Oil over the petroleum resource in Turkana. Thus, given the global prevalence of highly 
centralised energy governance regimes, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa but also present in the 
wider Global South and North, the advocacy of MLG2-esque networks of local actors as a bulwark 
 
114 The table highlights why Global North conventions on natural monopolies do not apply to Kenya. These are reasons 
often present in other Global South contexts. The sectors  
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against non-sensical and inappropriate top-down energy governance seems likely to be applicable to 
a broad range of locations.  
These particularities of governance in Turkana are indicative of why the research also explored the 
concepts of space and spatial variation: an approach enabling a better understanding of how and the 
extent to which cross-scalar power relations operating in decentralised energy governance are 
spatially contingent. This mode of enquiry extends existing knowledge through its engagement with 
political economy analyses, particularly resonating with important works by Newell et al. (2014) and 
Newell & Phillips (2016) which highlight how significant vested interests have impeded equitable 
energy access in Kenya. By revealing the marked geographical variations in power relations and 
governance present within Kenya, this research adds an important spatial dimension to these studies 
which compliments and significantly strengthens their findings, emphasising that forms of energy 
governance need to be understood spatially as well as relationally.  
These insights strongly suggest this kind of informed spatial analysis needs to be undertaken in other 
country contexts, supporting arguments that geographical approaches have particular relevance to 
governance in terms of uncovering spatially contingent power relations (Griffin, 2012). This point 
appears particularly pertinent to energy given social science contributions to energy studies highlight 
the sector poses inherent spatial challenges for governance. These issues include complex 
infrastructure and common pool resources spanning multiple scales, and stakeholder tensions 
between existing dominant national scale institutions and emerging more localised market actors 
(Brown et al., 2015; Goldthau, 2014). 
Theoretical contributions to MLG  
Given multilevel governance (MLG) approaches have rarely been used in the energy sector and, as far 
as the author is aware, never as a lens on decentralised energy governance, a key scholarly 
contribution of this PhD is the finding that MLG can be useful as an analytical framework for 
understanding the inherent complexity of decentralised energy governance. This is particularly 
evident when using Hooghe and Mark’s twin concepts of MLG1 and MLG2 as the criteria of the two 
frameworks provides an easily comprehensible means for first deducing and then comparing the form 
of governance intended by a country’s decentralisation legislation with that materialising on-the-
ground. This process also enables comparisons of in-country spatial variations of decentralised energy 
governance to be made more readily. This novel application of MLG therefore serves as an actionable 
approach for identifying whether and where decentralised energy governance reforms have 
developed as intended and, in cases where they have not, features of the intended decentralisation 
reform that are not present. The effectiveness of this methodological approach in analysing the 
Kenyan context suggests it could be replicated successfully in other locations.  
Yet, there were notable limitations to the application of MLG to decentralised energy governance. 
These align with well-established critiques of the concept’s use in other sectors: namely that MLG is 
not predictive; does not identify power differentials or which actor will be casually most important; 
and does not account for meta-governance115 and the effect of collibration116. The three concerns 
 
115 Meta-governance = the governance of governance (see Chapter 2 cf. Jessop, 2016). 
116 Collibration =. the improvement of governance through self-reflection (see Chapter 2 cf. Dunsire, 1996). 
197 
 
 
were found to be factors in this study’s application of MLG to Kenyan decentralised energy 
governance. Hooghe and Mark’s descriptors for MLG1 and MLG2 did not by themselves readily explain 
the reasons behind why a particular form of decentralised energy governance emerged in a particular 
Kenyan county, mainly because power imbalances and capacity building issues (the latter 
corresponding with the notion of meta-governance and collibration) proved to the key factors 
determining the form and effectiveness of the decentralised energy governance which emerged.  
In response to these issues, this study endeavours to mitigate the aforementioned shortcomings of 
MLG by developing a model which facilitates a predictive scope. The model also partly accounts for 
meta-governance and power differentials, helping to address the other major critiques of MLG 
although the thesis acknowledges both issues still require additional theorisation and/or empirical 
evidence to be more accurately identified. The model is depicted in Table 8.2 and enables the 
likelihood of more MLG2-esque decentralised energy governance emerging in a sub-national level 
territory to be predicted.  
Table 8.2 Model predicting the likelihood of a movement towards MLG2-esque decentralised energy 
governance in a sub-national territory  
Key Factors No (more likely 
to lead to MLG1) 
Yes (more likely 
to lead to MLG2) 
1. Clear guidelines to the limits of government roles at different 
scales (i.e. where the sub-national role stops, and the national 
government role begins)  
  
2. The sub-national territory has been historically marginalised by 
the centre 
  
3. A significant percentage of the population of the sub-national 
territory lack access to energy  
  
4. The sub-national government has access to transnational actor 
support (the more independent any access is of national 
government, the more likely a movement towards MLG2) 
  
5. The sub-national government energy department has sufficient 
capacity 
  
6. Non-government actors in the sub-national territory exert 
bottom up pressure  
  
7. The community level exerts bottom-up pressure    
8. Sub-national level actors are coordinated   
 
In the model eight key factors contributing to MLG2 are listed, incorporating the seven spatially 
contingent factors identified in Chapter 7 (see Table 7.14). These spatial factors (2-7) are joined by a 
legislative factor, ‘clear guidelines to the limits of government roles’ – the lack of which significantly 
impeded Kenyan decentralised energy governance (see Chapter 5), supporting views in the literature 
that emphasise such guidelines are key to avoiding excessive government oversight (Ribot, 2002). This 
legislative factor operates on a national scale and is therefore unlikely to differentiate between sub-
national territories but is nevertheless critical in determining whether a more MLG2-esque form is 
likely to emerge. Where these factors exist, a movement towards MLG2 is deemed more likely, while 
in cases where they do not, MLG1 is seen as more likely to emerge. Factors 4 and 5 relate to capacity 
building issues while several concern power differentials (particularly 1, 2, 4, 6, and 7), thus helping to 
address criticisms that applications of MLG do not account for these issues. 
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The use of this model enhances the actionability of MLG in decentralised energy governance 
applications as it provides a means to identify and monitor locations where MLG2-esque governance 
is more or less likely to occur. This is useful given this research finds MLG2-esque forms of 
decentralised energy governance are critical to both counteracting locally inappropriate top-down 
policy making by central government and to building networks of local stakeholders, which are viewed 
by the innovations systems literature as key to developing more locally appropriate small scale off-
grid electricity and clean cooking initiatives (Ockwell & Byrne, 2017). In addition, where factors in a 
locality are found not to be indicative of MLG2, it enables subsequent empirical investigations to be 
more targeted in uncovering potential issues, such as the nature of power differentials and capacity 
constraints. Lastly, while the model has been applied here to decentralised energy governance, it has 
potential to be used (with minor adaptions) to analyses of decentralised governance in other sectors 
or across multiple sectors in the case of nexus approaches. 
However, the model has certain limitations. It does not account for the depth of any capacity deficits 
nor reveal the quality of capacity building support received or the readiness by which it is absorbed. 
These would require empirical data to verify. Several factors also allude to power differentials 
although not with sufficient detail to accurately ascertain the extent of the imbalance and the 
identities of the most causally important actors. The importance of this issue can be seen in the Migori 
case study, where the critical stakeholder coordination issues largely stemmed from members of the 
senior county executive undermining the county energy department. This vital revelation would not 
be deducible from the above model and would most likely require empirical data and/or an additional 
theory to give clarity to these differentials. The use of MLG approaches alongside political economy 
analyses of power relations at different scales (such as those applied by Newell and Phillips (2016) to 
Kenya) would appear to have particular potential to uncover these critical and spatially contingent 
power imbalances. 
8.4 Wider applicability of research: implications for policy and practice 
Implications for policy  
The first clear implication for policy is that decentralisation legislation with clear guidelines 
demarcating where devolved roles begin and end are crucial for effective decentralised energy 
governance. In Kenya, legislative ambiguities have contributed significantly to the emergence of 
MLG1-esque decentralised energy governance which deviates from the ostensibly more MLG2 form 
indicated by the Constitution. Echoing Ribot’s (2002) call that minimum standards are required in 
decentralisation reforms to avoid excessive central government oversight, this thesis argues that clear 
guidelines to the limits of the sub-national role (i.e. where it ends and the national government role 
begins) are required in decentralisation legislation affecting energy to help ensure the sub-national 
level is an independent centre of decision making. 
A further implication for policy is that capacity building is key to developing decentralised energy 
governance institutions, but it needs to be proceeded by the aforementioned clear guidelines and 
transfers of power which will motivate that capacity building. The presence of 19 counties in Kenya 
without energy departments is testament to the disincentivising effect of legislative ambiguity, 
primarily caused by the prolonged failure to promulgate the Energy Bill 2015. Similarly, the ongoing 
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delays in establishing the County Energy Planning Framework have impeded and most likely 
disincentivised the development of county energy plans, the key energy function charged to the 
county level. Critically, capacity building needs to be recognised as heavily contingent on political 
economy factors and measures adopted to avoid scalar and spatial imbalances in how it is delivered. 
The need to increase community engagement in decentralised energy governance is another key 
policy implication. Somewhat contradictorily, the findings of this thesis highlight that communities 
value service delivery more than participatory politics community, yet the protests they engaged in 
were arguably the most effective means to counteract inappropriate central government energy 
policies. This suggests that perhaps the link between participatory politics and improved service 
delivery has not always been effectively made to communities. This is crucial to address as without 
bottom-up pressure and engagement, the likelihood of effective MLG2-esque decentralised energy 
governance materialising is significantly reduced. 
Finally, this thesis has stressed the importance of county governments primarily adopting a role of 
facilitator rather than implementer of energy initiatives. Their more localised scale means county 
governments are ideally placed to develop, coordinate, and maintain networks of stakeholders 
operating within the county to undertake activities which enhance access to energy: particularly 
critical given such networks have been the primary drivers of initiatives to develop small-scale off-grid 
electricity and clean cooking. These are precisely the energy sub-sectors where initiatives are most 
urgently needed in Kenya to cater for the many citizens whose energy needs are not addressed by the 
erroneous emphasis on grid extension policies by national government. Small-scale off-grid electricity 
and clean cooking initiatives are also the sub-sectors in which the national government exerts least 
monopolistic control and where lower costs and fewer regulatory controls mean county governments 
have most freedom to operate. Thus, a clear path to enhance energy access through small-scale off-
grid electricity and clean cooking emerges provided counties facilitate and coordinate the MLG2-
esque network of stakeholder which can most effectively develop these energy sub-sectors.   
Implications for practice 
The findings from this PhD have direct relevance to the practices of leading multinational agencies 
whose main energy policies contain little focus on the role of decentralised governance (e.g. the World 
Bank’s Last Mile Connectivity Project in Kenya and the UN’s global SE4All initiative – see Chapters 2-
3). Given this research finds that MLG2-esque decentralised governance is key to facilitating more 
equitable energy access, it seems imperative that these agencies integrate into their energy practices 
and policies the key lessons drawn from this thesis – namely: a facilitator role for local authorities; 
engagement of the community scale in participatory politics; clear guidelines demarcating where 
devolved roles begin and end; and sufficient capacity building to develop decentralised energy 
governance institutions. 
These insights and advocacy of decentralised energy governance have also been conspicuously absent 
from major international agreements in other sectors where energy has been shown to play a critical 
enabling role (e.g. the SDGs and New Urban Agenda – see Chapter 2). The cross-cutting nature of these 
policies clearly indicates that the findings from this thesis are of significant relevance not only to 
practices concerning energy, but also the broad spectrum of development goals which occupy the 
international development arena. This research could thus have a major impact towards these 
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objectives by contributing a more explicit and comprehensive analysis of the roles of decentralised 
energy governance and how they might be integrated with other sectors. The research could also give 
direction to and learn from institutions such as Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI) and the 
Global Covenant of Mayors which have embraced integrated local and multilevel governance 
approaches to energy access issues, yet not explicitly in the context of decentralisation. 
The findings from this PhD also have direct implications for the raft of ongoing projects being 
undertaken by the Loughborough University members of the Low Carbon Energy Development 
Network. For instance, the PhD has clear relevance to the DFID-funded Transforming Energy Access 
(TEA) programme which has had a major governance and capacity building component, including the 
establishment of a platform for Kenyan county energy governance. The findings from this PhD could 
have a significant impact on the development of this platform by highlighting where and why 
decentralised energy governance arrangements have worked effectively. This in turn could contribute 
to the development of similar platforms in other Global South locations, contributing to a body of 
knowledge on best practice for decentralised governance involvement in the energy sector. This 
process has begun to take effect as ideas from this research have already been drawn upon by CAFOD 
in their capacity-building activities in Kitui county (Kenya) and by the University of Strathclyde in their 
development of a blueprint for the proposed (decentralised) role of District Energy Officer in Malawi.  
This thesis also has relevance to the Loughborough University Solar Nano Grid (SONG) project which 
investigated the viability of community-owned ‘nano-grid systems’ (1-5kW) for small off-grid 
communities in Kenya and Bangladesh. The findings from this thesis suggest that if the success of the 
project is to be replicated on a wider scale, then the involvement of decentralised energy governance 
is likely to be key to facilitating effective upscaling. The lessons uncovered from the Kenyan 
decentralised energy governance experience could provide insight into how these multilevel and 
multi-stakeholder arrangements might be effectively realised and the roles sub-national government 
might play in facilitating such initiatives both in Kenya and beyond.  
8.5 Future research: where do we go from here? 
The research presented in this thesis addresses a critically understudied area and there are a number 
of interesting and valuable directions for future research into decentralised energy governance which 
would build on and enhance the findings of this study and also its predecessor, the Renewable Energy 
and Decentralisation (READ) project (Brown et al., 2015) . 
8.5.1 Additional case studies 
Perhaps, most urgent is the need for additional in-depth case study analyses to establish with greater 
confidence whether the findings from Kenya are more broadly applicable to a wider Global South 
context (as speculated upon in section 8.3).  Outstanding questions concern to what extent is Kenya 
an outlier given its decentralisation process is regarded as having led to “genuine reform” unlike the 
decentralisation processes undertaken by most other countries in the sub-Saharan African region 
(Cheeseman et al., 2016, p.3). Similarly, Dickovick (2014) notes that decentralisation reforms in sub-
Saharan Africa have particular regional characteristics; thus, are the lessons drawn from this study 
also applicable to other Global South regions? 
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Given this study’s finding that decentralised energy governance in Kenya has been undermined by 
ambiguities and delays in the legislation concerning devolved energy roles, case studies of interest 
would be nations where this has not been the case. For instance, in Malawi, decentralised energy roles 
have been defined via a multi-stakeholder consultation process prior to their implementation 
(Buckland et al., 2017). In such cases, do more clearly defined decentralised energy roles lead to more 
effective decentralised energy governance or does the general tendency for uncodified structural 
factors to distort decentralisation reforms from their legislative blueprints also hold true for the 
energy sector (Erk, 2014)?  
Global South states where the availability of energy services is comprehensive but not accessible (i.e. 
for reasons of cost and reliability) also present interesting case studies. These locations raise questions 
such as the role of decentralised energy governance in facilitating access to energy which is at least 
physically available, along with how decentralised governance forms might challenge an entrenched 
energy regime with more locally appropriate solutions. Global South states where rapid increases in 
energy access have been achieved are also of interest (Bhattacharyya (2012) cites China, the 
Philippines, South Africa and Vietnam as examples) as they prompt questions such as, what (if any) 
was the role decentralised energy governance in these swift transitions and how applicable are 
learnings from these contexts to other locations where access rates are currently low? 
8.5.2 Interrogating recent developments  
The energy sector is an incredibly dynamic field and recent developments highlight key areas for future 
research into decentralised energy governance. Clean cooking is belatedly moving to the forefront of 
development agencies’ interactions with energy in the Global South. This is most clearly evidenced in 
the UK by the £38M DfID funded ‘Modern Energy Cooking Services’ project launched in 2019, which 
has a particular focus on the role of electric cooking technologies (Batchelor et al., 2018b). The 
intersection of such initiatives with decentralised energy governance is touched on by this study but 
questions remain. How can large scale TAC2 funded clean cooking programmes work most effectively 
with decentralised energy governance? Does decentralised energy governance have a particular role 
to play in the movement towards electric cooking advocated by MECS? For example, will it conform 
to the ideals of social innovation theory, which in a decentralisation context, this thesis has argued 
means county governments playing a facilitator role developing MLG2 networks of change. These 
themes seem to have clear relevance to Kenya, where electric cooking is seen as particularly promising 
due to the country’s established track record for innovation in the energy for development sector 
(Batchelor et al., 2018, p.266). 
Recent events within Kenya also highlight areas for future enquiry. The Energy Act 2019 – passed in 
March 2019 – is a critical development in Kenyan energy governance and offers scope for longitudinal 
studies that compare decentralised energy governance following the Act with the 2013-2019 period 
(covered by this study) in which counties operated without their devolved roles confirmed. Of 
particular interest are the implications of confirmed devolved energy roles and of the net-metering 
provisions in the Act – will it lead to more counties prioritising energy, establishing energy 
departments, and being encouraged to develop the small-scale off-grid electricity and clean cooking 
initiatives they seem ideally placed to facilitate? Other key questions concern whether the Act will 
lead to counties forming MLG2-esque networks of diverse stakeholders – the central recommendation 
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of this study – or if the confirmation of devolved roles will result in counties adopting a sub-national 
form of MLG1-esque top-down governance. 
8.5.3 Nexus approaches 
The empirical findings of this PhD and the broader literature highlight how sectors other than energy 
have a more established tradition of being incorporated into decentralisation reforms (Brown et al., 
2015). This raises a number of pertinent questions: firstly, why is it that states are seemingly more 
interested in decentralising other sectors and not energy despite the potential benefits highlighted by 
this study? Secondly, could the inertia or reluctance to decentralise energy be mitigated were the 
decentralisation of energy more closely intertwined with other sectors that are more commonly 
decentralised? For instance, the findings from this study indicate clean cooking initiatives have had 
greater traction when incorporated under a multi-sector approach with the health sector at the 
forefront rather than energy. These themes align with increasingly prominent nexus debates focussing 
on the potential synergies and trade-offs energy has with other sectors, indicating an urgent need for 
research into the role of decentralised governance within such nexus approaches (Stevens & 
Gallagher, 2015). Of particular interest are the multilevel governance arrangements which might 
facilitate these approaches in the Global South  
Similar nexus questions concern the New Urban Agenda (NUA) instituted in 2016 by UN Habitat. The 
NUA has decentralisation at its core but only delineates very briefly what decentralised energy 
governance roles might entail and how they might contribute to the NUA’s overall focus on SDG11: 
‘sustainable cities and communities’. Research is thus needed to better understand how the more 
detailed findings from this thesis on decentralised energy governance roles could be integrated into 
the broader multi-sector decentralised governance role required for delivering the vision of 
sustainable cities and communities articulated by the NUA. Lastly, and arguably the most critical nexus 
question concerns how one best facilitates Global North to Global South, South-South, and the oft 
overlooked North-South knowledge exchanges on the role of decentralised energy governance in 
addressing energy access issues. This is vital if research on decentralised energy governance (including 
this PhD) is to be widely disseminated and have a far-ranging impact in locations where it is most 
needed. The ongoing work of the TEA programme suggests platforms (both physical and virtual) are 
likely to be critical in this regard (Chengo, 2018). 
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Appendix 
1. Table of key stakeholder interviews 
 
Code Position Organisation Location  
1 Senior officer Ministry of Energy and Petroleum Nairobi 
2 Senior officer Ministry of Energy and Petroleum Nairobi 
3 Senior officer Ministry of Energy and Petroleum Nairobi 
4 Senior officer Ministry of Devolution and Planning Nairobi 
5 Lawyer Council of Governors Nairobi 
6 Planning manager KPLC  Nairobi 
7 Officer KPLC Nairobi 
8 Officer KPLC Nairobi 
9 Senior officer KETRACO Nairobi 
10 Officer KETRACO Nairobi 
11 Officer ERC Nairobi 
12 Officer ERC Nairobi 
13 Officer REA Nairobi 
14 Senior officer REA Nairobi 
15 Officer GDC Nairobi 
16 Lawyer KENGEN Nairobi 
17 Officer KENGEN Nairobi 
18 Officer Commission on Revenue Allocation Nairobi 
19 Senior energy officer Nairobi county government Nairobi  
20 Electrical engineer Nairobi county government Nairobi  
21 Communications 
officer 
Nairobi county government Nairobi  
22 Officer Nairobi county government Nairobi  
23 Energy consultant Kenyan university Nairobi  
24 Energy consultant Kenyan university Nairobi  
25 Energy consultant Kenyan university Nairobi  
26 Environment officer Nakuru County Government Nakuru 
27 Health officer Nakuru County Government Nakuru 
28 Senior officer Nakuru Community based organisation Nakuru 
29 Energy consultant Nakuru Community based organisation Nakuru 
30 Senior officer KPLC Turkana Turkana 
31 Senior energy officer Turkana county government Turkana 
32 Chief Officer Turkana county government Turkana 
33 Representative Turkana based civil society organisation focussed 
on natural resource management 
Turkana 
34 Representative Turkana based civil society organisation focussed 
on environmental issues 
Turkana 
35 Representative Turkana based civil society organisation focussed 
on pastoralist issues 
Turkana 
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36 Representative Tullow oil Turkana 
37 Officer GIZ Turkana 
38 Senior officer KPLC Migori Migori 
39 Officer KENGEN (Gogo falls) Migori 
40 Officer Migori Energy Centre Migori 
41 Senior energy officer Migori County Government Migori 
42 Sub-county 
administrator 
Migori County Government Migori 
43 Engineer Migori County Government Migori 
44 Electrical engineer SONY Sugar factory Migori 
45 Senior representative Bagasse briquettes manufacturing company Migori 
46 Senior energy officer Kitui county government Naivasha 
47 Senior officer KPLC Uasin Gishu Uasin Gishu 
48 Officer Uasin Gishu Energy Centre Uasin Gishu 
49 Senior water officer Uasin Gishu County Government Uasin Gishu 
50 Sales person M-Kopa Uasin Gishu 
51 Senior officer KPLC Trans Nzoia Trans Nzoia 
52 County Executive 
Committee member 
Trans Nzoia County Government Trans Nzoia 
53 Engineer Trans Nzoia County Government Trans Nzoia 
54 Senior energy officer Machakos County Government Machakos 
55 Energy consultant Kenyan renewable energy technology company Nairobi 
56 Coordinator The Kenya Renewable Energy Association (KEREA)  Nairobi 
57 Energy consultant Biogas technology company Nairobi 
58 Energy consultant Solar Power company Nairobi 
59 Senior consultant Kenyan Association of Manufacturers Naivasha 
60 Energy consultant Kenyan energy consultancy Nairobi 
61 Energy consultant Kenyan energy consultancy Nairobi 
62 Energy consultant Solar power company Nairobi 
63 Energy consultant Kenyan renewable energy technology company Nairobi 
64 Engineer Multinational electrical engineering company Nairobi 
65 Energy consultant Independent energy consultant Nairobi 
66 Senior representative Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves Nairobi 
67 Manager GIZ Nairobi 
68 Manager Multinational Sustainable Development Company  Nairobi 
69 Manager European Union delegation to Kenya Nairobi 
70 Energy consultant Practical Action Nairobi 
71 Programme 
coordinator 
World Wide Fund for Nature Naivasha 
72 Senior officer Clean Cookstoves Association of Kenya Nairobi 
73 Senior representative Kenyan sustainable development NGO Nairobi 
74 Research fellow Stockholm Environment Institute Nairobi 
75 Energy consultant Strathmore University Nairobi 
76 Energy consultant Strathmore University Nairobi 
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77 Senior law academic Strathmore University Nairobi 
78 Law academic Strathmore University Nairobi 
79 Research fellow Stockholm Environment Institute Nairobi 
80 Manager Stockholm Environment Institute Nairobi 
81 Officer Council of Governors Naivasha 
82 Senior energy officer Wajir County Government Naivasha 
83 Officer Migori County Government Naivasha 
84 Officer Siaya County Government Naivasha 
85 Officer Mandera County Government Naivasha 
86 Officer Baringo County Government Naivasha 
87 Officer Kiambu County Government Naivasha 
88 Officer United Nations Industrial Development 
Organisation (UNIDO) 
Naivasha 
89 Senior director National Rural Electric Cooperative Association 
(NRECA) International 
Nairobi 
90 Senior officer United Nations Environment Programme Nairobi 
91 Senior sustainability 
academic 
Danish university Nairobi 
92 Consultant The Humanist Institute for Cooperation with 
Developing Countries (Hivos) 
Nairobi 
93 Manager CAFOD UK 
94 Researcher African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS) Nairobi 
95 Energy consultant International Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED) 
UK 
96 Energy officer Kisumu County Government Kisumu 
97 Analyst Kenyan CSO Nairobi 
98 Research analyst  Freelance Migori 
99 Chief Officer Nakuru County Government Naivasha 
100 Community members Suna community Migori 
101 Community members Masaba community Migori 
102 Community members Echariria community Nakuru 
103 Community members Lemolo B community Nakuru 
104 Community members Napetet community Turkana 
105 Community members Nakwemekwi community Turkana 
106 Energy consultant CAFOD UK 
107 Manager Renewable energy technology company Nairobi 
108 Energy Consultant  Malawian community based organisation Lilongwe 
(Malawi) 
109 Energy consultant Multinational energy technology company Nairobi 
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2. Semi-structured interview guide 
Introductions and general background 
i. Please introduce yourself and tell us a little about your background and your current role in 
energy projects/governance? (and your organization’s role in energy governance?) 
ii. How would you describe what is currently going on with energy decentralisation?  
 
Topic area 1. Experiences of devolution  
1. How has devolution affected your organisation’s work? Were you involved in energy 
governance before devolution? Differences?  
2. What opportunities/challenges have there been for your organisation since devolution?  
3. What would assist your organisation in carrying out its energy roles?  
4. Has devolution developed the way you expected? (explore any differences) 
5. What is your view of the purpose of devolution?   
6. What is the current role of local governance in addressing energy access issues? What do 
you think it should be?  
 
Topic area 2. Policy development  
2a. Factors affecting the development of devolution (quote specific policy aims with questions) 
7. Who defined the aims of devolution/decentralisation?  
8. Where did the ideas for this definition come from? What other definitions were considered?  
9. When did the county become an important part of this legislation? Why 47 counties? 
10. Was anything on the table not included in final policy?  
11. Some people say Kenya over devolved – what do you think?  
12. Before devolution, there were the provincial governments – your view? 
 
2b. How has devolved energy policy unfolded  
13. What effect has the lack of Energy Bill had on your operations? 
14. View on KPLC compensation/revenue sharing aspects of Energy Bill  
15. To what extent is the difference between county & national government energy roles clear?  
16. Do you foresee any issues with devolving energy powers to the county government?  
17. Should KPLC and REA be devolved?  
18. Do you see devolution playing a role in improving energy access (grid/off-grid/cook)? Why?  
 
Topic area 3. Stakeholder interactions  
3a. Stakeholders interactions in the energy sector. 
19. Who do you see as the key stakeholders/people in the energy sector?  
20. What do you see as the roles of these stakeholders in energy governance? 
21. What dealings/relationship do you have with these stakeholders and how have they 
changed since devolution? What are the reasons for these changes?  
22. What about (stakeholder not stated in Q19) – any dealings? If yes, ask Q20-21. 
23. What have other energy stakeholders said about devolution (e.g. affected their work)?  
24. What are their interests in devolution? How have they sought to pursue their interests? 
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25. To what extent, do other stakeholders views align with yours? If there are differences, what 
are they and why? Where there have been differences, what has been the outcome? 
 
3b. Stakeholder interactions in and with county ministries 
26. What have been your experiences/challenges/opportunities working in energy under a joint 
ministry?  
27. If energy wasn’t in a joint ministry, how would energy governance be different?  
28. In Nakuru county, energy is combined with…? Why? Is this different in other counties? why? 
29. To what extent are county governments integrating energy policy with the other sectors? 
30. What could assist integrated working/working in a joint ministry?  
 
3c. Stakeholders interactions in terms of nexus approaches  
31. Do you think energy is linked to other sectors? Which other sectors? (Why?) 
32. What impacts (positive/negative) could energy access have on these sectors? 
33. To what extent is integrating energy with other sectors in the thinking of policy makers and 
in particular county governments?  
34. What have other energy stakeholders (name specific one if necessary) said about how 
energy is linked to other sectors? To what extent do you share those opinions/interests? If 
there are differences, why? Where there are differences, what has been the outcome?  
35. How has devolution affected the way energy is integrated with other sectors? Better/worse? 
36. Regarding land rights issues affecting energy projects – who is best placed to negotiate?  
 
Topic area 4. Overall evaluations of (decentralised) energy governance  
37. Overall, do you feel energy governance has improved since devolution at both national scale 
and local scale? (Why(not)?/Why at one scale and not the other?  
38. Is devolution driving (these/any) changes (or something else – e.g. political will)?  
39. How would the situation be different if devolution hadn’t happened?  
40. What is required to improve energy governance (further) at national and local scale?  
 
Topic area 5. Future visions  
41. Looking to the future, what do you see as your organisation’s role in energy governance? 
42. Briefly describe your aspirations for Kenya’s/county’s future energy governance in next 5-10 
years? What do you think is needed to progress towards these aspirations?  
43. What do you see as the main barriers to change (these aspirations being fulfilled), if any?   
44. To what extent do you think devolution can help enable drivers/address barriers to change? 
45. If I come back in 6/12 months’ time, how do you think the landscape will have changed? 
How would you like it to have changed? 
 
Wrapping up 
i. In terms of energy access, decentralised energy and the role of local governance, what 
data/research would be most useful for you? 
ii. Can you suggest anybody who it would be useful to speak to about these ideas? is there 
anybody else you think I should speak to? 
235 
 
 
3. Questionnaire 
County Government questionnaire: energy governance  
1. Date: _ _ /_ _ /_ _ _ _   (Day/Month/Year)  4. How long have you been in this position?  
2. County administration you represent:  5. How long have you worked in the energy sector?  
3. Position within county government: 
 
County Energy Plan and Investment Needs  
6. Has the county energy plan been completed? (Please circle one answer)     Yes (Y) / No (N)  
6a. If no, what stage is the plan at? 
 
7. How many people work on the county energy plan?  1-5 people   /   6-10 people   /   10 + people   /   Unsure  
8. What is your budget for creating the county energy plan?  
9. Have you received help from the National Government completing the county energy plan?        Y / N 
9a. If yes, what did the help consist of? 
 
9b. If yes, how helpful did you find the assistance from the National Government? 
 
10. Have you received help from any other organisation(s) completing the county energy plan?          Y / N 
10a. If yes, which organisation(s) did you receive help from? 
10b. If yes, what did the help consist of? 
 
 
10c. If yes, how helpful did you find the assistance from each organisation? 
 
 
11. In the energy sector in your county, what three things most require investment? 
1)      
2)   
3) 
This questionnaire forms part of a research project entitled Decentralised Energy Governance in the 
Global South: Political Decentralisation and Energy Access in Kenya post-2010, investigating the role of 
county energy governance since devolution.  It is supported by the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum. 
Findings will be shared via the UNDP supported SE4All technical committee, whose website will provide a 
one-stop shop for energy, helping to match potential investors to energy projects. 
This questionnaire is expected to take 20 minutes to complete 
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County Energy Roles 
12. What are the three most important roles of county and national government regarding energy?  
County roles       National government roles 
1)       1) 
2)       2) 
3)       3) 
13. Is there a role that county government could play that it currently isn’t?  
 
  
14-15. To what extent do you agree/disagree with the following statements (Please circle one answer) 
 Strongly 
disagree Disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Not 
sure 
14. The difference between the energy roles 
of the county and national government is 
clear.  
1 2 3 4 5 0 
15. The energy needs of the county (that the 
county government has identified) are well 
understood by the national government. 
1 2 3 4 5 0 
 
16. What two things impede the county government from carrying out its energy roles?  
1) 
2)  
17. What two things would assist the county government in carrying out its energy roles? 
 1) 
2) 
 
County Ministries 
18. In the county you represent, which ministry is energy contained within? (e.g. Ministry of Energy, 
Natural Resources and Water) 
 
19. What are the reasons for combining energy with the other sectors found in that ministry?  
 
 
20. Do individual officers in this ministry focus on just one sector or several of the sectors?  
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21-22. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements (Please circle one answer) 
 Strongly 
disagree disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Not 
sure 
21. Officers working in the ministry 
containing energy understand energy issues 
well.  
1 2 3 4 5 0 
22. In the ministry containing energy, policy 
for energy is well integrated with the other 
sectors found in that ministry. 
1 2 3 4 5 0 
 
23. What one thing could help integrate energy with other sectors? 
 
 
County Energy Data  
24. Do you have data on the percentage of the county population which uses:   
                a) Grid electricity   Y / N          b) Off-grid electricity   Y / N          c) Clean cooking facilities   Y / N 
25. If Yes to Q23: what percentage of the county population use each source of energy. Please provide the 
source of data and year collected.         
 a) Grid electricity    ____%   Source:   Year:  
 b) Off-grid electricity   ____%    Source:   Year:  
 c) Clean-cooking facilities   ____%   Source:   Year: 
26. If Yes to Q23, do you have data for each energy form at county, constituency or ward level? (circle one) 
      a) Grid electricity:   county   /   constituency   /   ward   /   not sure 
 b) Off-grid electricity:  county   /   constituency   /   ward   /   not sure 
 c) Clean cooking facilities:  county   /   constituency   /   ward   /   not  sure 
27. If No to Q23: What do you estimate is the percentage of the county population who use: 
 a) Grid electricity ____%         b) Off-grid electricity ____%       c) Clean-cooking facilities____% 
28. Have you received help collecting data on the percentage of the county population with access to grid 
electricity, off-grid electricity and clean cooking facilities? (Please circle one answer)              Y / N  
28a. If yes, who have you received help from?  
28b. If yes, what did the help consist of? 
 
 
 
28c. If yes, how helpful did you find the assistance? 
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Devolution 
29. How has devolution changed the way energy is governed in the county you represent? 
 
 
 
 
30 -37. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements (Please circle one answer) 
 Strongly 
disagree disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Not 
sure 
30. Since devolution in 2010, more responsibility 
for energy governance has been transferred from 
national to county government. 
1 2 3 4 5 0 
31. Since devolution in 2010, more resources for 
energy governance have been transferred from 
national to county government. 
1 2 3 4 5 0 
32. Since devolution in 2010, more power over 
energy governance has been transferred from 
national to county government. 
1 2 3 4 5 0 
33. Since devolution in 2010, energy governance 
has not improved at national level. 
1 2 3 4 5 0 
34. Since devolution in 2010, energy governance 
has not improved at local level. 
1 2 3 4 5 0 
35. Devolution has improved access to grid 
electricity in the county you represent  
1 2 3 4 5 0 
36. Devolution has improved access to off-grid 
electricity in the county you represent  
1 2 3 4 5 0 
37. Devolution has improved access to clean 
cooking facilities in the county you represent  
1 2 3 4 5 0 
 
38. Do you foresee any issues with devolving energy powers to the county government? 
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Contact with other stakeholders 
39. At county level, who do you see as the key stakeholders/organisations/people in the energy sector?  
 
 
40. Have communities in this county been consulted about their energy needs?  (Please tick one box)             
[    ] Yes, many consultations  [    ] Yes, some consultations   [    ] Few consultations        
[    ] no consultations           [    ] Not sure                                    
40a. What was discussed?  
 
 
41. How often do you discuss energy issues with the following groups? (Please tick one box for each group) 
 daily weekly monthly quarterly yearly never other 
a. KPLC (national level)         
b. KPLC (county level)        
c. Ministry of Energy and Petroleum        
d. Rural Electrification Authority (REA)        
e. Other government organization         
f. Other County Governments        
g. Community leaders        
h. NGOs        
i. Donors        
j. Academics        
k. Private sector        
l. Other (please state) ……………………...........        
 
 
42. Who are the three people outside the county you communicate with most on energy issues and which 
organisation do they represent?  Which energy issues do you discuss most frequently with them? 
Person Organisation Issues discussed 
   
   
   
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. 
Please return it by email to r.sieff@lboro.ac.uk  
